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# The electoral effect of social context control on voters: The case of Taipei, Taiwan

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The University of Michigan, 1990

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# THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF SOCIAL CONTEXT CONTROL ON VOTERS: THE CASE OF TAIPEI, TAIWAN

by

I-Chou Liu

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
1990

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Gregory B. Markus, Chairman
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For my parents

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# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

Voting is one of the most common activities in which individuals participate in order to reach a collective decision for society. How the individuals make that decision is one of the major subjects of political research. We know some individuals are more independent than others in making voting choices; we also know that some individuals take cues from others sharing their social contexts. There are few studies investigating the possibility of influencing the vote by controlling contexts. This study examines a case of such social context control in Taiwan. The research questions, related literature, and the design for the study are described in the following sections.

## The Research Question

One of the most striking election statistics of Taiwan is the roughly 7:3 distribution of votes favoring Kuomintang ( KMT, also known as the Nationalist Party) candidates over candidates from other parties, in elections of the last two decades. For example, Kuomintang candidates for the Legislative Yuan (branch), the highest legislative body, consistently captured more than 70% of the votes cast in each election during each of the last twenty years except 1986 (see Table 1-1). A similar situation can be found with regard to the Taiwanese provincial assembly elections. Numbers in the bottom half of Table 1 show that in six of nine elections, Kuomintang candidates won about 70% of the popular vote. A number of factors contribute to the consistency of the Kuomintang's performance. These include the dynamics of candidates' personal characteristics, election laws, economic

Table 1-1
Vote for Kuomintang Candidates in Elections (Percent)

| | | | | Legislator Election | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1980 | | 1983 | | 1986 |
| % | | 76.0 | 70.0 | 78.7 | 72.1 | | 70.7 | | 66.4 |
| | | | | Provincial Assemblyman Elections | | | | | |
| Year | 1954 | 1957 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | 1977 | 1981 | 1985 |
| % | 68.8 | 67.8 | 65.4 | 68.0 | 75.5 | 68.9 | 64.1 | 70.3 | 71.5 |

Source: Sheng, Shing-Yuang, 1986, pp.12-13; *China Times* , December 7, 1986, p.2.

conditions of the society, campaign competitiveness, and election day weather. Additionally, there is a party-related variable shaping the 7:3 distribution. Previous investigations of that party factor, however, have found little evidence of its impact. Surveys of Taiwanese voters have indicated that the Kuomintang does not play an important role in influencing voting as compared with other variables such as candidates' issue positions or their personalities (Hu and Yu, 1984; Tsau, Chen and Hsieh, 1983; and a summary of some other previous studies in Chen, 1986).

One must, however, question the methodological validity of these surveys. Two major deficiencies place their credibility in doubt. The first problem is related to the technique of finding the cause behind individual voting decisions. The most often used method is a long list which usually consists of between ten and twenty item of "reasons voted for him/her." Multiple choice is allowed; frequencies are then calculated to compare the relative importance of different factors influencing voters' behavior.

The question is often asked orally, making it difficult for most respondents to comprehend the list and to make distinctions. Worse, instead of identifying the respondents' true attitudes toward the candidates, this method very likely elicits responses reflecting socially desired values. Other surveys have used an open-ended question which

asks the respondents to offer up to three reasons for their voting choice. The responses, again, are coded, counted, and compared. This alternative may educe more "true reasons," but there is no way to guarantee the elimination of the contamination by social desirability of other variables. For instance, government propaganda urges people to vote rationally on the basis of candidates' policy stands. As a consequence, a substantial number of respondents checked or reported "his/her issue positions" as the most important reason they voted for a candidate, even though they knew nothing about the issue positions of that candidate when later asked (Chen and Huang, 1986).

The second methodological problem is related to the measurement of party affiliation. One question frequently asked is "Are you a party member?" If yes, this question is followed by "Which party do you belong to?" Usually more than ninety five out of a hundred party-affiliated voters belong to the Kuomintang. Not surprisingly, Kuomintang members tend to strongly support their party nominees in elections. However, only about 15% of the adult population in Taiwan are Kuomintang members.[1] Even a perfect correlation of their membership and the vote does not explain how the Kuomintang consistently captures 70% of the votes in elections. The problems highlighted here underscore the need for more appropriate measurement of the party variable and a more accurate explanation of the Kuomintang's electoral success.

To solve the measurement problem, I abandoned the "long list" question in a series of opinion surveys and replaced it with a Michigan-type question to measure voters' psychological attachment to a political party.[2] Before Taiwan lifted the ban on new political parties, the Kuomintang was the only party allowed to operate openly. The Tang-wai (non-Kuomintang political activists), however, had been active in the political arena for decades before the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP) was formally established on the 28th of September, 1986.[3] Those decades of unofficial activism have been long enough to develop and maintain stable psychological ties with a portion of the voters. I expected that a

Table 1-2

Party Preference of Taiwanese Voters, 1986 (Percent)

| Party Preference | Oct 4 | Oct 15 | Oct 22 | Oct 28 | Nov 8 | Nov 18 | Nov 30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KMT | 34.2 | 36.0 | 33.6 | 34.3 | 31.6 | 33.7 | 35.0 |
| Independent | 45.4 | 40.1 | 48.1 | 48.2 | 46.5 | 46.5 | 49.4 |
| Tang-wai | 7.3 | 8.4 | 6.5 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 4.5 | 4.2 |
| Don't Know | 10.3 | 13.2 | 9.6 | 6.6 | 8.4 | 13.7 | 8.7 |
| Refused | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 3.3 | 1.6 | 2.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| N of cases | 1228 | 1388 | 1223 | 1090 | 1128 | 1097 | 1226 |

Note: The KMT category includes those who said they are of the Kuomintang and those leaning to the Kuomintang; the Tang-wai category includes those who said they are Tang-wai and those who are leaning to Tang-wai.

Source: Island-wide election surveys by *China Times* in 1986.

Michigan-type question would be able to identify these ties, which I believe to be vital in determining the voting outcome.

When this new measure of party preference was applied to seven waves of island-wide telephone surveys, the results were encouraging. There were stable aggregate party preferences among voters (see Table 1- 2). About a third of the survey respondents were Kuomintang identifiers. Almost half of the respondents chose not to be categorized either as a KMT or Tang-wai. And, not surprisingly, support for the Tang-wai group was not as stable as support for the Kuomintang. The numbers of respondents claiming Tang-wai support dropped in the last two waves which were taken in the two weeks prior to the election. Considering the authoritarian political past of Taiwan, I did expect some respondents to be suspicious of the political survey and reluctant to reveal their true attitudes, especially when political activities in the society intensified.

Although these numbers indicate a stable distribution of party preferences, Kuomintang identifiers still comprise only a third of the sample. Conscious party preference alone does not adequately explain the 70% success rate of the Kuomintang. We need to examine other possibilities.

One possibility is that the majority of voters did not recognize that the Kuomintang actually played an important role in guiding their voting. This could lead to the failure of opinion surveys to tap the actual influence of the Kuomintang. The word "party" or *tang* in Chinese implies tricks, power struggles, and sometimes, deaths. It is not a popular vocabulary word used in polite conversation (Wang, 1931, pp.227-229). The conventional wisdom is that running a campaign under the aegis of "party" may do more harm than good. The Kuomintang thus avoids using the party label to appeal to voters. Also, the Kuomintang enjoys a structural advantage over all other political groups. It is the most powerful political party and did not allow attempts at organizing a new party until 1986. This has fostered an environment where the Kuomintang does not need to appeal to voters in the name of political party. Instead, Taiwanese campaigns stress the local connections between the candidate and an area, candidate personalities, etc.

The third reason why opinion surveys may not accurately uncover the influence of the Kuomintang lies in the nature of the election system in Taiwan. In electing representatives to legislative bodies on all levels, a multimember district with single-entry ballot system is employed. In any district, usually 3 to 5 (sometimes more, depending on the size of the adult population) representatives are elected at large. The election is a competition not only between parties but also among candidates of the same party. To campaign indiscriminately for the Kuomintang nominees as a package would probably be counterproductive; stronger Kuomintang candidates may win more votes than they need at the expense of weaker Kuomintang candidates rather than the opposition. It is understandable that the Kuomintang would rather run a candidate-centered campaign so that it can provide more support for the vulnerable candidates. Therefore, the mechanism of

campaign is one major reason behind the consistent underestimation of actual Kuomintang influence.

In the United States, the effect of campaigns on voting decisions has been a subject of election study for many decades. It has yet to be systematically examined in Taiwan. I believe that a clever plan, known as the Responsibility Zone System (the Zone System hereafter), created by the Kuomintang, actually contributes most of their margin of victory in elections. In the Zone System, each Kuomintang nominee in a district is assigned a zone as his or her bailiwick. In that zone, the Kuomintang mobilizes strong support for the candidate from party members and their families, neighbors, and friends. In each zone, then, it becomes the "responsibility" of all party members to elect that particular party nominee. A Kuomintang nominee is allowed to campaign intensively within his or her own zone and only nominally outside it in the same district. This Zone System has been very effective. For instance, in the city councillor elections in Taipei in 1985, the mean percentage of vote obtained within their zones by Kuomintang candidates was as much as five times higher than that from polling stations outside the assigned zones (Liu, 1986). This zone effect suggests tremendous influence on voters' behavior by the party.

The purpose of this research is to explore the nature and the effect of the operation of the Kuomintang's Zone System in elections. The specific location for this study is Taipei City. Data collected are related to elections for the Legislative Yuan in 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989; the aim is to understand the nature of the party process, mainly of the Kuomintang, and its electoral impact in Taiwan. Questions to be answered in this research are: What are the critical features of the Zone System? Is there manipulation in the operation by the ruling party? If yes, what is it? Is the Zone System effective? What evidence is there? Why are rival hypotheses not plausible? Are certain types of voters particularly subject to influence? What are the implications for the study of voting behavior? And finally, what are the implications for democratic reform in Taiwan? The last question is of special importance to Taiwanese students of political science. As Taiwan has achieved

economic success during the past thirty years, it is now moving toward another goal: political democracy after decades of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang. Fair, just, and open elections are essential to the goal of a healthy democracy. It is a political scientist's responsibility to examine the status of this democratic process.

## Review of Literature

In a multimember district election, the Kuomintang's Zone System, by assigning zones to party nominees, places voters of the same constituency into different candidate-marketing contexts. The purpose is to allocate potential votes so as to effectively maximize the number of seats they can capture. Although there is no indication that the Kuomintang created this campaign approach from any political theory, the underlying assumption apparently is that the context in which people live determines their voting patterns. A successful control over that context can dictate the vote.

### Political Effect of Social Context

In the United States, studies regarding the impact of social context on political behavior began very early. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues hinted at this idea in their study of voters in Erie County, Ohio. They wrote that, "People who live together under similar external conditions are likely to develop similar needs and interests. They tend to see the world through the same colored glasses" (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, pp.148-149). The "colored glasses" concept, then, encourages similar political views for people in the same context.

Miller studied the presidential election of 1952 and found that local political environments (partisan composition of Democrats and Republicans) had important mediating influences upon the relationships between factors influencing partisan choice and

the presidential vote (Miller, 1956). At about the same time, Janowitz and Marvick (1956, p.88) noted the political consequences of this contextual impact; "forces...from the mass media and the party canvasses were hardly so extensive as to constitute manipulation that might threaten the stability of the political system. However, a pattern of more effective and more extensive manipulation is suggested when the impact of campaign is drawn broadly enough to include the concerted primary group pressures."

This concern has never been a major problem in the United States. But the pattern of manipulation Janowitz and Marvick worried about may exist in other societies. I have not found empirical studies of this kind about other systems in the literature.

It was not until the late 1970's that many scholars paid attention to the political impact of social context. Although their findings may differ in detail, they show a common principal theme: individuals are conditioned by the context in which they live. Since the late 1970's, Huckfeldt has completed a series of studies concerning the contextual effect on political attitudes. The influence of the neighborhood is especially emphasized (Huckfeldt, 1979, 1984, 1986). The impact of other contexts, such as ethnic groups (Huckfeldt, 1983), formal organizations (Cox, 1969), and change of context such as migration (Brown, 1984; 1988) are also studied.

While there is evidence showing that social contexts condition the behavior of individuals, there are no indications that a total control, or manipulation, of voting behavior is possible. After all, voting is a complex process in which many contexts are relevant.

## Sources of Contextual Effect

There are various sources of contextual effects. We may find contextual effects in the process of the spread of and the adherence to group norms, in other words, in the process of political socialization; we may find perception-mediated contextual effects, such

as local political campaigns; we also may find effects of contexts due to their intensity and effect on interpersonal communication and associated processes of personal influence.

Socialization Socialization is the process whereby individuals internalize the norms of the context where they live. This process begins early in one's childhood. One learns political values often from one's parents. Studies showed that children's party identifications very often agree with that of their parents (Hyman 1959; Levin, 1961; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Tedin, 1974). Within the context of the family, relative closeness to mother or father was related to agreement in political preference with one or the other (Jennings and Langton, 1969). Also, children learning politics from different contexts show different political orientations. For instance, while strongly positive attitudes toward the presidents of the United States were common among White children (Hess and Torney, 1967; Greenstein 1960), attitudes among Black and Chicano children were not; they had sharply negative attitudes toward the presidents (Sears, 1975, p.102). Similarly, certain Appalachian children have been found to have greater cynicism than a national sample of other senior students (Jaros et al, 1968). Amish children also were found to be different from non-Amish children in attitudes toward participating in politics (Jaros and Kolson, 1974, pp.51-59). Early learning of political values in one's childhood depends very much on the context within which one lives.

As one grows older and moves from context to context, one continues to take cues from others in the new contexts. Students have shown defection from parental attitudes in the direction of peer group norms (Langton, 1967; Jennings and Niemi, 1974, Ch.9). The learned attitudinal differences, either from the family or the school, between White and nonwhite students may change as a consequence of new political and social experience (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, Ch.10). This resocialization appears not only among adolescents but also among adults. For example young adults' partisan identifications are influenced by their evaluation of political issues (Markus, 1979). Although individuals

show a certain degree of consolidation in a variety of sociopolitical attitudes between their mid-20s and the mid-3[illegible] (Jennings and Markus, 1984), changes of context such as migration still have an impact on their existing political attitudes (Brown, 1984; 1988). Political learning from changing contexts is clearly a life long process.

Perceptual Mediation Some contextual effects are the result of perceptual mediation. Political campaigns provide the best examples. The effects are the result of promotion of candidates, policies, or political ideas through the agency of mass media, secondary groups, or interpersonal networks. Among them, mass media has received more attention than the other two. Its effects, according to past studies, are mixed. A traditional assertion about the effect of media was that it had minimal effect because most media remained politically neutral, or because most people pay so little attention to political messages that information essentially does not reach them; also, because people tend to prefer media which support their existing beliefs, the media only tend to reinforce their attitudes (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944, Chaps.9 and 10). This minimal-effect position has been challenged by the agenda-setting scholars (Lau and Erber, 1985; MacKuen, 1984; Erbring, et al., 1979; Miller, et al., 1980) who indicated that the public's concern about sociopolitical issues is highly related to the choice of issues covered by national media. Recently, some other scholars have argued that the media's role is not only influencing what people think about, but also what people think (Iyengar and Kinder, 1982; 1987; Entman, 1989).

The impact of organizational mediation has been little investigated in the United States. Cox (1969) found that individuals belonging to areally intensive organizations showed greater contextual effects that those belonging to areally extensive affiliations. A recent study found that among the three kinds of intermediaries studied, formal organizations are less influential than are media and personal networks (Beck and Richardson, 1989). The lack of studies and the weak link between organizational environment and individual political preference probably reflect the reality that

organizations do not play an important political role in the United States. But this may not apply to other societies. In Mexico, for instance, the success of the Institutional Revolutionary Party's penetrating social groups enables it to exercise strong political influence within those groups (Lawson, 1980, pp.335-342).

The effect of political campaigns does not receive much consideration when political scientists consider contextual effects. Campaigns as a means of imposing socio-political context on voters were found to have an impact on mobilizing voter participation but not necessarily on influencing the votes (Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961; Kramer, 1970).

Interpersonal Interaction Individuals are also influenced by the contexts in which they are involved. Active interaction among individuals may build over time into a relationship of trust, which provides channels for political influence (Cutright and Rossi, 1958). Though those contacts need not be initially political in nature, they can become politically significant during a campaign. Scholars have investigated neighborhood effects of this type (Huckfeldt, 1979; Taylor and Johnston, 1979, Ch.5; Sprague, 1982; Weatherford, 1982; Brown, 1984; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987). In Beck and Richardson's (1989) study of the presidential election of 1988, however, neighborhood is said to be an unimportant source of political messages. They suggest a "contact" conceptualization of context. Beck and Richardson argue that "the context for political discussions is not geographically delimited, as many contextual studies assume, but rather is defined both narrowly by family ties and broadly by opportunities for political interaction in the workplace." (Beck and Richardson, 1989, pp.16-17)

These effects in an election are very difficult to distinguish from one another. Eulau's concept of "primary zone" (Eulau, 1986) provides a good tool to summarize contextual effects. "Primary zone" refers to one's immediate living environment. This includes one's daily contacts in family, work place, and groups. The primary zone is

crucial in providing political information and exerting influence on the individual. The most effective means to influence a voting decision is to penetrate the voter's primary zone. To penetrate it, however, requires intensive labor. Frequent contact with the voters by party workers is a good strategy. Early studies of the success of local party organizations are examples of penetration of this kind (Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961; Crotty, 1971).

Information and Social Context

The effect of context may be interpreted as a result of information processing, as the consequence of reference-group pressures to conform, or as a result of the existence of social networks, etc. (Sprague, 1982). No matter what form of the mechanism appears, it is basically a matter of information supply. The success of the early Chicago Democratic machine in influencing voters could be attributed to its effective control of a communication network (Gosnell, 1937, Ch. 4). To a lesser extent, the two party machines in Detroit were similar (Eldersveld, 1964, Ch. 14). Success in the control of information might facilitate a control of the system or organization (Deutsch, 1963, pp.76-77).

The assertion above is based on the assumption that information, once supplied, has been successfully transmitted to everyone in the system. However, this remains extremely unlikely. Individuals do not consume information in the same manner. Their exposure to and acceptance of information differ from one another both qualitatively and quantitatively. Some receive more information than others; among those who receive information, some tend to accept certain messages more often than others. Individuals highly involved in politics tend to have more information but are less likely to be influenced by the information; the less-involved individuals are more likely to be influenced by information received but they are also less likely to be exposed to information (Converse, 1962; Dreyer, 1971; Zaller, 1987; Geddes and Zaller, 1989). Even when people receive the

same information, their attitudes toward it are necessarily affected by their preexisting attitudes (Zaller, 1987). Therefore, the results may be quite different.

Personal Characteristics and Context

People in the same context do not necessarily act uniformly as the result of conditioning. They possess varied personal characteristics that play equally important roles in their attitude formation and behavior. When considering the contextual effects on political behavior, individual variables also have to be taken into account (Giles and Dantico, 1982). Some of these characteristics are inborn--one's ethnicity, for example. Ethnicity, nonetheless, via socialization, is an important factor in shaping one's attitudes. Some other characteristic are acquired. The education one receives is an example. One's ability nurtured through education is a factor in understanding and interpreting political information. The level of information one has is found to have an impact on the effect of political persuasion (Zaller, 1987). Both given characteristics and acquired characteristics have an impact on voters decision, but neither is completely manipulable.

To summarize the literature, contextual effects on political attitudes may arise from many sources. They may come from the family, neighborhood, work place, and other groups. Successful penetration into these information sources may enable a party or group to influence voter behavior, though not necessarily their votes. This penetration largely depends on the success in controlling the supply of information. Analogous to the control of the nervous system of an organism, success in the control of information facilitates the control of a group of people.

## A Model of Contextual Effect

The Zone System employed by the Kuomintang exemplifies information control. By assigning zones, i.e. information networks, to Kuomintang nominees, the operation of this system combines the context effects of the neighborhood, workplace, and other secondary groups. While the contexts in which individuals operate have political consequences in the United States, those contexts are results of individuals' self-selection. People choose to live in a neighborhood where housing is affordable, where residents share similar social economic backgrounds, etc. In the case of the Zone System, voter context--the zoned information supply--is imposed by the Kuomintang. This system provides a unique type of elite-mass linkage. Mexico, perhaps, exhibits a similar situation (Lawson, 1980, pp.335-342); however, similar studies concerning the Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico do not exist.

The Zone System clearly contributes to the Kuomintang's electoral success through the control of social context. Nevertheless, there is no way that this control can be perfect. There are so many factors influencing voting that total control is impossible. The interaction between the factors involved in this control, however, can be analyzed. Figure 1-1 shows the relationships among factors related to the control of the individual's context. At the center is the individual's attitudes immediately before the election, the main target of the influence of immediate context control. These current attitudes are the predispositions of an individual's behavior, i.e. voting, in this model. At the point of decision-making, or as the authors of the *American Voter* (1960, pp.24-32) stated, the very bottom of "the funnel of causality," attitudes related to political party, candidates, and social and political issues are worth noting. They are major determinants of voting decisions. The social context control in the Kuomintang's Zone System aims to shape the individual's current

Figure 1-1
A Model of Contextual Effects




attitudes. Influence on the shaping of the individual's current attitudes, then, helps to dictate his or her vote.

I attribute the influence on voters largely to the control of immediate context based on two realities. The first is that most people are not interested in politics and do not have much information about current social and political events. They need information supplies from others. Others may seek information by their own effort, but even those interested in politics may need it supplied--by sources in their social contexts.

The arrangement of an official campaign period in Taiwan reduces the opportunities for success of this self-motivated effort. The Election Law constrains campaigns to a limited time period prior to election day. The length of the period varies from one day for village, or *li* leader (a village's counterpart in urban areas, a *li* is similar to a precinct in American cities), three days for county council elections, a week for county magistrate and provincial assembly elections, up to fifteen days for legislator and national assembly elections. Candidates for offices may publicly campaign only during the official period. Before this official period, however, most candidates certainly do campaign in a more unofficial manner such as visiting influential individuals, distributing name cards, hosting

dinner parties for local leaders, etc. The use of larger scale campaign techniques such as public speeches, newspaper advertisement, printed material carrying campaign vocabularies, and door to door canvass are prohibited. Without these stimuli, the public is less likely to receive sufficient information about the campaign. Paradoxically, in a short official campaign, information is too abundant to be fully digested. The public, in order to deal with information-saturation, seeks others to scrutinize and screen campaign messages for them. Those important "others" are very likely the ones living or working with them.

The effect of this control of the immediate context is also mixed with remote context effect. They are remote in terms of either time or space. In other words, historical events and institutional arrangements in a society also exercise impact on immediate context, and then current attitudes. Some of the functioning attitudes are actually the result of previous contexts. For instance, for many individuals party identification is a result of family socialization dating from decades before the election. A large portion of voters' decisions on election day still are directed by this psychological force formed in a prior context.

The impact of previous context indicates that individuals are not *tabulae rasae* when they confront political information. They have predispositions before they come to interact with each factor in their current context. Personal characteristics such as the ability to make political judgements, political knowledge, and political interest are among the related factors. Although these personal characteristics are not completely independent, they are not completely manipulable either.

To summarize the model, this study describes and presents evidence that:

1. The Kuomintang's Zone System is a device to control the individual's immediate social context. This control is effective in influencing the individual's voting behavior.

2. The Zone System's contextual control effect on the vote can only be partial because the individual's previous context and individual characteristics also exert influence.
3. Certain types of individuals are more likely to be influenced by the control of social context than others.

## Methods and Data

There are different types of tasks in this study. To answer the research questions, I need to describe the operations of the Zone System, present evidence of its effectiveness, and examine the plausibility of other models. It is also desirable to present a model of individual behavior showing the influence of this zone system. In this study, three types of data are collected for analysis. They are: participant observation, election reports, and survey data.

### Participant observation

Because most of the operations of the Zone System are not publicized, the best strategy to study the operation is probably to participate in the process, which enables a researcher to obtain first-hand data from the election. In this study, I took part in the campaign of Lin Yu-Shiang, a 3-term (9 year) member of the Legislative Yuan, who was nominated by the Kuomintang to run for reelection. The reason for selecting him is our personal friendship over the past decade. Without the mutual trust from this friendship, the observation would not have been as comprehensive. Before Lin Yu-shiang was elected to the Legislative Yuan, he had been a member of the City Council of the City of Taipei for seven years. During his legislative tenure, he has once been the vice-chairman of the

Kuomintang's Taipei City Committee. His public service history qualifies him as one of the few national figures who are also familiar with local politics in Taipei.

During the period between October 22 and December 2, 1989, I worked as an official campaign assistant in Lin's campaign headquarters. I participated in all but four daily meetings held in the headquarters. Sometimes I was sent out to meetings or dinner parties to represent the candidate. I recorded the major characteristics, participants, and decisions of those activities. The daily schedule of the two-month campaign used in Chapters 3, is supplied by his office. This information enables me to describe the operation of the system in detail.

Lin Yu-shiang fully understood that my purpose in participating in the campaign was to collect data for my research. My role in the campaign, however, was only vaguely explained to the campaign staff. In the first staff meeting I attended, Lin told the campaign assistants that I am a long-time friend and was there to help him and to study the campaign. That was the only occasion he mentioned this. Throughout the whole process, I worked just like other assistants.

Compared with two other participant observations in political activities, this study has been easier to administer. Fenno's (1978) observation of Congressmen covered more cases; Curtis (1971) observed the activity more intensively -- he lived in a candidate's house for more than a year. Curtis had indepth views of the process, Fenno had better variety of political actors.

Election Reports

This research focuses on legislative elections in the City of Taipei. Since legislative elections use the county (or city of the same level) as the unit of constituency, studying a single constituency is appropriate. The City of Taipei was a single constituency before

1989. In 1989 it was divided into two constituencies, the North District and the South District.

Election reports published by the Taipei City Commission of Election Affairs contain the results of all polling stations in the city. Information included is: votes for each candidate, total votes cast, and total number of eligible voters. In order to compare results from different years, the reports from legislative elections of 1980, 1983, and 1986 are included. The data used for the 1989 election are from the computer printout that the City Commission of Election Affairs distributed to candidates after the election, and provide the data for the aggregate analysis of this research (Chapter 4).

Survey Data

Pre-election and post-election surveys were taken by the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University during the 1989 election. The area studied was the South District of the election for the Legislative Yuan in Taipei City. The sample for these surveys was drawn from voter registers which contain the name, gender, age, and address of all eligible voters. Based on the size of the *li* (an administrative unit in local government, similar to a precinct in American cities), 354 *li* in the South District are grouped into four strata. Then, 125 *li* were allocated, proportionally to population in each stratum, to the four groups. Target *li* were randomly selected in each group. In each *li*, 20 names were selected by simple random sampling. Although we selected 2500 respondents, only 720 valid interviews were completed by face-to-face interview before the election. Most failed cases were caused by incorrect household registration and absence of the respondents during the period this study took place (see Appendix A). The post-election interviews were conducted by telephone --which reduced the completed interviews by 33% of the pre-election sample after up to seven calls were made to contact the missing cases plus face-to-face interviews with those without telephones. Of the tests for the representativeness of the

sample, in terms of the distribution of age groups, gender, ethnic groups, and education, only respondents' education shows a significant difference from the population. The sampling procedure and the results of the tests of the representativeness of the sample are included in Appendix A.

I was involved in many polling projects for the *China Times* between 1985 and 1989. Results from those telephone surveys are used as subsidiary evidence here. Samples for those surveys were randomly drawn from telephone directories. The first step was systematically selecting telephone numbers from directories. Then, an adult was selected randomly from a household (represented by a telephone number)[4]. Sample size for those surveys were between 1000 and 1500.

These three methods have built-in advantages and disadvantages. The participant observations enhance the internal validity of the findings but lack external validity. Survey data have the opposite dilemma, being strong in the generalizability of findings but, to some extent, weaker in internal validity. The most apparent strength of using aggregate data in this research is the accuracy of measurement of the dependent variable, the votes the candidates' obtained. Except for trivial random errors such as typos, miscounting of votes (very unlikely because the process is openly watched by the public) etc., I do not see any factor that damages the accuracy of the measurement. It, nonetheless, has a fundamental weakness. The relationship found by using aggregate data usually is greater than the result from using individual-level data (Robinson, 1950). The exact linkage between the zone and individual voter's behavior may not fully illustrated by using statistics from official election reports. Despite these disadvantages, using different data to test the same theory should assure that similar results from the three methods do not result from shared methodological bias (Brewer and Hunter, 1989, p.83).

There is a practical reason I need to use multiple methods. In voting behavior studies in Taiwan, survey respondents' reluctance to answer political questions, such as for

whom they voted, produce a large number of missing cases which increases the difficulty of making valid inferences from the findings. In the survey I used for this research, about half of the post-election respondents were not willing to tell for whom they voted (see Chapter 5). Using other methods to address the survey's shortcomings is desirable.

## Notes to Chapter 1

[1] Different numbers of Kuomintang members have been reported. The City Committee of Taipei counted 169,614 in 1988 (*China Times,* September 24, 1988, p.10). During the 1989 primary, the number for Taipei was 237,551, also reported by the City Committee of Taipei; the total membership on the island claimed by the party was 1,925,092 (*United Daily,* July 24, 1989, p.4), about 16% of the adult population in Taiwan. Some people believe that about 20% or even as much as 30% of membership-card holders are not active. A recent report indicated that it might be more. The report said that the Kuomintang was considering new approaches to contact the "nearly a million" (50% of the total) dissociated members (*China Times,* April 26, 1990, p.4). A report indicates that since 1986, the Kuomintang membership has decreased more than half on the largest college campus in Taipei while the DPP has begun to attract college students (*China Times Express*, August 12, 1990, p.2).

[2] The first time I introduced this type of question in a Taiwanese survey was when I was involved in an election poll project for *China Times,* a newspaper in Taipei, in September 1986. We asked: "In this society some people refer themselves as 'Tang-nei' (within the Kuomintang) or 'Tang-wai' (outside the Kuomintang). Do you think you are a 'Tang-nei' or a 'Tang-wai', or neither?" If 'neither' was chosen, a question followed is: "Then, do you think you ar leaning to 'Tang-nei' or leaning to 'Tang-wai', or neither?"

[3] Technically, the Democratic Progress Party was not legal until it registered after the Legislative Yuan passed the Civil Organization Law on January 27, 1989. The Kuomintang also registered as required by the law.

[4] The respondents is selected according to the number of adults in the household and the last two digits of the telephone number. For example, in a household of 3 adults, if the last two digits are between 01 and 33, the oldest of the 3 is selected; if they are between 34 and 67, the middle one is asked to participate; if they are between 68 and 00, the youngest is interviewed.

## CHAPTER 2

## THE SETTING: THE DOMINANCE OF THE KUOMINTANG IN TAIWAN

No political institution exists in a vacuum. Many factors outside the boundary of the Zone System, or the remote contexts I mentioned earlier, exert influence on the process and outcome of the Zone System. Since the Zone System is a campaign device, several election-related environmental factors influence the system significantly more than others. The Zone System is possible because the Kuomintang dominates politics in Taiwan. The purposes of this chapter is to describe the structural and historical backgrounds in which the Zone System operates. How the Kuomintang dominate the government is explained first. Then, the historical developments of partisan and electoral politics are described. This is followed by a brief introduction of the context on which this study focuses -- the legislative election of 1989 in the City of Taipei. Finally, some examples of the dominance, or the practices of context control, by the Kuomintang also are included.

### The Structural Dominance of the Kuomintang

One indicator of the dominance of the Kuomintang is its overwhelming influence on the structures of the political system. The Constitution was written under the influence of the Kuomintang; the Kuomintang controls not only the national government, but also most local governments; the party organization of the Kuomintang is also much bigger than that of the DPP; above all, it also maintains a convenient government-party coordination structure to exert influence.

The Constitution and the Governments

The Constitution of the Republic of China was drafted in early 1946. Writing a constitution had been one of the major efforts the Kuomintang had tried for decades before it was able to reach an agreement with other political parties. As a result of the agreement, the Constitution is an ideological compromise between two groups of politicians: one group were Kuomintang members who insisted on following a political blueprint drawn by Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the republic, who created the Five Power Constitution (see Figure 2-1) which gives the president major power in the government; the other group consisted of politicians who believed that the Western cabinet system was what China needed (Lei, 1957, 13-15). The result is a system between the two: it maintains the shape of Sun Yat-sen's idea of Five Power Constitution, which has a five-branch national government (see below), but as a cabinet system, much of the power rests in the hand of the premier.

Figure 2-1

The Structure of the National Government



The Constitution was enacted in 1947 and has been applied to Taiwan since. However, the substance of the Constitution was altered by two measures taken by the government. The first was the creation of the "Temporary Provisions" which granted the president emergency power without substantial institutional check and balance. The purpose of the Temporary Provisions was to give the president a free hand to cope with the Communist rebellion while the Kuomintang still had the mainland, in the late 1940s. However, later revisions of the Temporary Provisions in fact authorized the president more power than the original constitution designated. It froze the two-term limitation on the presidency, so that Chiang Kai-shek was able to hold the position for five terms until his death; it authorized the president power to create necessary institutions to cope with "vital policies" (Chiang Kai-shek used this power to create the National Security Conference to oversee policy-making); it also authorized the president power to decide when and how many new members need to be elected to parliament to cope with the problem of aging senior members who were elected in 1947 and are still holding offices (see below). In other words, the creation of the Temporary Provisions transformed a cabinet-centered republic into a president-centered autocracy.

The second factor that altered the original plan of government was the imposition of martial law in 1949. The martial law froze basic rights that the Constitution had guaranteed. Although many Kuomintang officials consistently argue that the imposition of martial law in Taiwan did not interrupt the life of most citizens, it was used to impose censorship, to try civilians in military courts, and to ban political activities such as organizing political meetings or associations and establishing a political party.

The national government is headed by a president. The president and the vice-president are elected by the members of the National Assembly, who are elected by popular vote. The National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan are the three branches of parliament. While the National Assembly has the power to elect the president and vice-president of the government, the Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making

body. Representatives to the Legislative Yuan also are elected by popular vote. The major function of the Control Yuan is to oversee government officers and to impeach. Members of the Control Yuan are elected by provincial assemblies and city councils.

One of the most controversial issues related to government structure in Taiwan is that the majority of members of the above three bodies were elected on the Chinese mainland in 1947 and 1948. Since there is no way to hold elections in their constituencies, those "senior members", as they are called, are in fact serving a life-term. In the National Assembly, of the 757 members, 673 (89%) elected in 1947 are still serving (Table 2-1). In the Legislative Yuan, of the 279 members as of May 1990, 152 (54%) are senior members and 127 (46%) are new members. The Control Yuan is the only branch where new members (31) hold a majority, 58% of the 53 seats.

Table 2-1
Numbers of Members in Three Branches of Parliament

| | National Assembly | Legislative Yuan | Control Yuan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Senior Member | 673 (89%) | 152 (54%) | 22 (42%) |
| New Member | 84 (11%) | 127 (46%) | 31 (58%) |

Note: Senior members are those who were elected in 1947 and are still in office; new members are those who were elected regularly in Taiwan; current total is the sum of senior members and new members. Most senior members are in their early 80s. The death rate is high. Also, the government is encouraging them to retire. Therefore, the numbers change quickly.

Source: *China Times*, March 3, 1990, p.4. Compiled by Wu Nan-san.

Given the domination of senior members, legislation was completely under the control of the Kuomintang. The Legislative Yuan was viewed as a rubber stamp of the executive branch. The major reason was that those senior members did not have constituency pressure. As a result, they acted as the party demanded. It was not until the government began to hold elections for new members in 1972 that the Legislative Yuan became a forum for political debates. Most senior members are too old to be actively

involved in political activities. New members thus dominate the operation of the Legislative Yuan. When the Kuomintang needs votes from senior members, however, it still has a comfortable majority in hand.[1]

The Executive Yuan is responsible for initiating, administering, coordinating, and overseeing policies. The premier, or the president of the Executive Yuan, is nominated by the president with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. In the Executive Yuan, the cabinet formed by the premier and ministers of several departments is the decision-making body. Under the Executive Yuan, there are functional departments in charge of internal affairs, public finance, economic affairs, national defense, transportation and communication, education, judicial administration, environmental protection, public health, overseas Chinese affairs, and foreign affairs.

The Judicial Yuan oversees the Supreme Court, high courts, and local courts in addition to the Council of Grand Justices, which has the power to interpret constitutional law. The Examination Yuan administers examinations for the civil service and for professional licences.

Local governments in Taiwan refer to governments at the provincial level and below (Figure 2-2). There are three institutions at the provincial level: the Province of Taiwan, the City of Taipei, and the City of Kaoshiung. Under the provincial government of Taiwan, there are 16 counties and 5 cities (of the county level). A city is divided into several wards which contains about 30 *li* (precincts) each. Within a county there are rural townships, *shiang*, and urban townships, *cheng*. On average, a township has about 20 villages (rural) or *li* (urban).To increase administrative efficiency, a *li* is divided into several *lin*.

Figure 2-2
The Structure of Local Governments in Taiwan




Party structure

No party other than the Kuomintang has yet developed a stable apparatus to handle the daily business of party politics in Taiwan. The DPP is growing, but it is too young to have established a fully integrated structure. Two other parties, the China Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party have been dependent on the subsides of the government. Both parties were established in the 1930s on the Chinese mainland; both moved to Taiwan with the Kuomintang in 1949; both have no close connection with local leaders partly because they have no resources, but mostly because the Kuomintang has blocked their attempts at building this connection. The two minor parties, therefore, exercise very little

influence on Taiwanese politics. Because of this, I shall focus on the structure of and interaction between the two major parties, the Kuomintang and the DPP.

The Kuomintang. The Kuomintang, established by Sun Yat-sen in 1919, moved its headquarters to Taiwan along with the government. Lee Teng-hwi is the current chairman.

The Kuomintang is a pyramidal, highly authoritarian structure (Figure 2-3). On the top is a 180-member Central Committee elected by the Party Congress, which convenes approximately every four to six years. A 31-member Central Standing Committee serves as the executive body between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Candidates for the Central Committee are nominated by the party chairman.

Below the Central Committee, there are provincial committee and provincial-level city committees, county and city party committees, district (township, *shiang* or *cheng*) committees, sub-district party committees, and cells containing 3-15 members each. In order to coordinate party policy and government policy, the Kuomintang forms intermediate organizations of party cadres and Kuomintang members in the government. Details are included later.

The Kuomintang's pyramidal structure was a copy of Leninist party structure (CCKMT, 1956, 11-12). Its structure was reaffirmed at the Party Reconstruction Conference held in 1950 upon the order of Chiang Kai-shek, who wanted to rebuild the party after losing the mainland to the PRC, and has not changed since (CCKMT, 1950; 1952, pp.15-32; Jiang, 1988; *China Times*, May 25, 1988, p.1). The authoritarian nature of the party can be seen in the the operation of party affairs. For example, the Party Charter requires that all party leaderships are decided by voter, but its implementation is far from democratic. Elections of party leaders are always manipulated by party administrators and incumbent leaders. In the election for Central Committee, for instance, the party chairman

Figure 2-3
General Structure of the Kuomintang and Government




used to nominate all candidates. Even in the most recent Party Congress, chairman Lee Teng-hwi still nominated half of the candidates. Multiple entry is allowed--a delegate may pick as many as the total number of seats on the Central Committee. In other words, in order to elect 180 members, the chairman nominated 180 candidates; an additional 180 candidates put their name on the ballot by obtaining five delegate endorsements. In the election, one may choose from 1 to 180 names on the ballot. Because time for the Party Congress is limited, delegates do not necessarily know one another well, and the list of

candidates is quite long, party cadres usually provide a "list for reference" which recommends a group of candidates preferred by incumbent party leaders. In this way, the Central party office was able to manipulate the results of elections (*China Times*, June 12, 1988, p.2; June 22, p.2; June 24, p.2; June 28, p.2; July 15, p.3). In the election in the Thirteenth Party Congress, Chairman Lee Teng-hwi nominated 180 candidates, of whom 147 (82%) were elected (*China Times Weekly*, July 22, 1988, 6-12). Similar practices exist in the Kuomintang's internal elections at the provincial and county levels. No indication of reform has ever been reported.

The DPP. The party structure of the DPP is similar to that of the Kuomintang (see Figure 2-4). On the top, the Party Congress elects a 31-member Central Executive Committee, whose members then vote among themselves to elect 11 standing executive members and a party chairperson. The most obvious difference between the DPP and the Kuomintang is that while the Kuomintang's provincial committee plays an important role in shaping the policy at the provincial level, the DPP does not have a provincial organization. Although there is a DPP caucus in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, it reports directly to the Central Executive Committee.

Under the national party, there are county executive committees elected by county party conventions. According to the DPP's Party Charter, district executive committees should be created under county committees. Since the size of party membership is small,[2] in most counties the county executive committee alone can manage party affairs.

Figure 2-4
The Structure of the DPP




Source: The DPP's Party Charter (Hsieh, 1988)

The DPP's first three years have been filled with disputes between two major factions: the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. The Formosa Faction emphasizes seeking victories in elections, opportunities to govern, a friendly policy toward the People's Republic of China, and less on-street mass protest. The New Tide Faction demands the change of government structure, a full independence (from any connection with China), and continuing the tactic of mass protest to press the Kuomintang for more reform. The disputes have been not only over policy, but also power-sharing (Yang, 1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b; Lin, 1988; Huang et al., 1988; Fan, 1988; Chu, 1989). However, the most serious weakness of the DPP is the small size of its membership. As of August 1990, the number of registered member totaled twenty-one thousand, about one percent of the total Kuomintang membership (*China Times Express*, August 12, 1990, p.2).

The Kuomintang and the Government

The most powerful indication of the Kuomintang's dominance is its influence in policy-making. The linkage between the Kuomintang and the government can demonstrate that influence. On the national level, cells formed by Kuomintang members holding political leadership positions are created in the Executive Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and all important departments in the Central Government. Parallel party caucuses are created in three parliamentary bodies--the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan. All party members of these bodies must join the party caucus in each organ. Then, the Central Policy Coordination Committee is formed to coordinate party policies among government and party organizations (Figure 2-5). Different

Figure 2-5
Party-government Relationship at the National Level



policy views among different branches in the government are brought to the Committee for a unanimous solution. It also is the organization responsible for the party's instruction to members in the government, assuring the smooth implementation of party policy.

On the provincial level, the Kuomintang created a Policy Coordination Group as its intermediary, with an identical structure to the national level. This group is composed of leaders from three sub-groups: the chairman and the chief secretariat of the Provincial Committee represent the party organization; the Governor and the Secretary General (both are appointed offices) of the Provincial Government represent party members from that section; and the Speaker, vice-Speaker, and party whip of the Kuomintang Caucus in the Provincial Assembly represent the legislative branch. All major policies, no matter which sub-group initiates them, are subject to the review of this group. The group's purposes are to implement policies of the national party and to resolve disputes among different branches over policies.

On the county level, another identical structure is built in each county or county-size city. A policy coordination group composed of members from the county (or city) committee, political cell in the county (or city) government, and party cadres in the county (or city) council is the center of policy-making at this level. If a resolution to disputes cannot be reached in the local coordination group, then it is addressed to a superior party organization for instructions.

From the national level down to a very local level, this close link between the party and the official structure assures that the Kuomintang has firm control over policies and personnel in the government.

From the structure of the two major parties in Taiwan, we may say that the Kuomintang is a "mass party" (Durverger, 1963, pp. 62-65), which spreads the burden over the largest possible number of members, and the DPP, a "cadre party", which is a group of influential persons who are willing to compete with the Kuomintang. On the dimension of organization, the Kuomintang is much stronger than the DPP.

## A Historical Perspective of Kuomintang's Domination

History as an input to the current political system is as important as other structural factors discussed above. Special events very often have a profound impact on the political development of a society and political attitudes of the public. Some events in contemporary Taiwanese history are worth noting. Figure 2-6 shows the chronological sequence of events related to partisan politics in Taiwan in the past four decades. I grouped these events into three periods to describe the domination of the Kuomintang in the past.

### The Kuomintang without organized challenge: 1949-1977

The government of the Republic of China has held elections for local offices since it fled mainland China in 1949. The elections before 1977, however, were basically a one-party show; no organized challenge existed during this period.

The lack of organized challenge was a result of three primary factors. The first is the harsh repression by the Kuomintang of indigenous Taiwanese leaders (those living in Taiwan prior to 1949). A large number of Taiwanese local elites were killed, jailed, intimidated, or fled in the early years of the Kuomintang's takeover of Taiwan from the Japanese colonial government. Taiwan had never been a center of attention in Chinese politics when the Ching Emperor gave the island away after China lost the war to Japan in 1895. It still was not an important province after World War II, at least not before 1949. The corrupt government officials and undisciplined army the Chinese government sent to Taiwan angered local residents. The increasing tension between local leaders and the governing Kuomintang erupted in an incident on February 28, 1947 when a female vendor was mistreated by government officials. The incident touched off an island-wide rebellion against the government.[3] The bloody crackdown after that incident resulted in the

Figure 2-6
Time Line: Taiwanese History




disappearance of many activists and intellectuals (Cheng, 1987, 84-93). Some of them fled to Japan and the United States and began to promote the independence of Taiwan. After the Kuomintang solidified its control over the island, harsh measures were continuously taken to oppress dissidents. Organized opposition against the Kuomintang from native political groups in elections thus did not exist.

The second reason was the result of the successful land reform the Kuomintang imposed on Taiwan. On the one hand, the reform paved the way to a more economically equal society. On the other hand, it also created a politically unbalanced society. The existing elites, mostly landowners, were forced to sell their land to the government and were thus cut off from their major source of political power--land and tenants. They lacked the strength and organization to prevent reform or to oppose it meaningfully in the short time it took to implement.

The third reason was the implementation of martial law after 1949. Equipped with martial law, the Kuomintang successfully eliminated all attempts at organizing any opposition political groups. The only nearly successful case happened in 1960 when a popular and highly-respected former Kuomintang leader, Lei Cheng, tried to formally establish the Chinese Democratic Party. The attempt ended when Lei was arrested and jailed on September 4, 1960. He was charged with attempted "treason" and failure to inform the authorities that one of his employees was a "spy of the Communists". After Lei's case, all dissidents were silenced for more than a decade (Lee, 1987, Chaps. 1 & 2).

During the period when there was no strong opposition from outside, there were factions within the Kuomintang. As Key described about factional politics in the Southern States (Key, 1949, 298-310), Taiwanese factions also lack continuity of leadership, electoral support, and faction labels. Most factions disappeared soon after their leaders retired or died (Hu and Lin, 1981).[4]

With the absence of organized opposition, elections during this period were basically competitions among factions within the Kuomintang. More specifically, the result of the election was in most cases determined at the moment the Kuomintang announced its nominations, which were made by a small number of party cadres. The nomination usually guaranteed success in the election--the Kuomintang has been consistently winning 70% of the votes and about 80% of the seats (Sheng, 1987, 12-13).

There were some individuals who successfully challenged the authority of the Kuomintang and won. Their challenges were tolerated probably because they symbolized the existence of a democratic election in Taiwan (Tai, 1970). While highly visible, these cases were too sporadic to impose any threat against the Kuomintang during this period.

The Kuomintang vs the Tang-wai: 1977-1985

The year 1977 was a critical point of the development of party politics in Taiwan. In the local election held in that year, the most popular candidate was Hsu Sin-liang, a former Kuomintang-backed provincial assemblyperson. Hsu adopted unorthodox campaign techniques, such as large campaign posters, college student volunteers, and motivational speeches to beat his Kuomintang opponent. The Tang-wai set a record by winning a quarter of the offices at stake.

The success of Hsu Sin-liang and the other Tang-wai candidates stimulated a new effort to organize an opposition group. Although the election for parliamentary branches in 1978 was aborted due to the uncertain political environment created by the Carter Administration's decision to establish formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC, the campaign continued. A coalition of Tang-wai candidates was formed. Fund raising dinners and political meetings were organized under the sponsorship of the coalition. A new magazine, *Formosa*, was published as their political forum. *Formosa*'s local offices in major cities became more like party organizations than offices for editors and reporters. Many mass demonstrations *Formosa* sponsored lead to a high tension between the Tang-wai and the security forces in the government. The final crackdown came in the Kaoshiung incident on December 10, 1979. A violent demonstration led to the arrest of almost all the leaders of *Formosa*. All of them were sentenced to from 6 years to life in jail.[5] A new group of leaders, however, quickly emerged after the incidents.

The aborted election of 1978 was finally held in 1980, but the Tang-wai were not able to conduct any organizational work. A year later, they revived the collective effort. In the local election of 1981, the Tang-wai activists, acting as a group, endorsed 31 candidates. Twenty-two of them were elected to either local legislatures or magistrates. The positive results of this nomination-like operation encouraged them to form a Central Campaign Assistance Association in the parliamentary elections of 1983 and the local elections of 1985. The experience from these two years laid the foundations of a political party. The real seed of the later Democratic Progress Party (DPP) was the Tang-wai Research Institute for Public Policy established in 1984. Until the establishment of the DPP, the Institute was a quasi-party organization (Lee, 1987, Chaps. 4 and 5). While the DPP is the largest orgainized of the resulting Tang-wai groups, many other minor parties subsequently emerged.

In all the organizational efforts mentioned above, campaign was the common focus. Compared with the well organized campaign apparatus the Kuomintang had, the Tang-wai was at best a loosely affiliated group of candidates working to help one another, and to maintain morale.

## The Kuomintang vs the DPP: Since September, 1986

Despite the government's threats to dissolve the Tang-wai Research Institute for Public Policy, the institute continued to organize activities throughout the island into early 1986. In addition to activities, it also set up branches in all major cities and most counties as *Formosa* magazine had done seven years earlier. With the coming of another election in December of 1986, the Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Association became active again. Behind the scene, the leaders were preparing for the establishment of a new party. On September 28, in the national meeting of the Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Association, leaders from the Research Institute proposed official formation of a new party. Despite the

unexpectedness of the proposal, participants quickly passed it. The tasks of the Assistance Association and the Research Institute were taken over by the new party. Elections in Taiwan had entered a new age.

The creation of the DPP quickly brought an uncertainty and tension to the political atmosphere in Taiwan. A week later, however, in an interview with American publisher Katharine Graham, President Chiang Ching-kuo expressed his willingness to accept the DPP providing it obeyed the Constitution, supported the national policy of anti-Communism, and rejected the Taiwan Independence Movement. The DPP responded positively. Although it was technically not legal until the new Civil Organization Law, which was enacted six months later, the DPP immediately began to act as a normal party.

## The Election of 1989 in the City of Taipei

A number of offices including legislators, members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, members of the city councils of Taipei and Kaoshiung, magistrates of 16 counties, and mayors of 5 cities were subjected to re-election in 1989. The mayor of the City of Taipei is appointed by the premier. Therefore, in Taipei two categories of election were held in 1989: elections of representatives to the Legislative Yuan and to the City Council.

The 1989 election was important in two aspects. It was the first election since the government lifted martial law in 1987; it also was the first election since the formal establishment of the DPP in 1986. The lifting of martial law removed some restrictions on campaign activities. For instance, demonstration was prohibited by martial law. With the absence of martial law, demonstrations occurring during an election year would likely draw the attention and involvement of the candidates. The abolition of martial law has created a more liberal environment for campaigning.

The DPP was formally established on September 28, 1986, two months before the election. Despite its cooperative campaign in 1986, the DPP was not well organized. Its party organization was primitive. During the three years between 1986 and 1989, the DPP managed to build branches in every county of the island. Though still primitive in organization, the local branches provide supporting bases in election. For the first time, it also presented an organized challenge to the ruling Kuomintang.

## The First Kuomintang Primary

For the first time in its history, the Kuomintang decided to hold a primary for the 1989 election. Although the final decisions usually are made by an ad hoc committee in the Central Committee and need to be approved by the Central Standing Committee, the Kuomintang announced that it would honor the results of the primary if the district turnout was higher than 50%. In areas with turnout lower than 50%, the result would serve as a major consideration in the nomination. Since there is no law regulating primaries, it remains an internal affair of every party. Membership, a membership card and a small amount of monthly dues are only indications of active membership required to run and to vote.

The Kuomintang primary began in June. Party members who wanted to enter the race registered between June 9 and June 15. Votes were cast on July 24. The campaign for support both from party members and leaders began earlier than the official date. Campaign activities were similar to an election only smaller in scale.

The primary is supposed to be a process in which party members select candidates for the party. The party organizations of the Kuomintang actually tried, in many cases successfully, to manipulate the result. In order to select some strong (based on the organization's evaluation) candidates, the party selected a group of favorites in various elections. Though some party leaders deny it, others gave conflicting information (*China*

*Times*, July 9, p.13; July 10, p.2; July 21, p.2; July 23, p.2). The exposure of the existence of party favorites provoked dissatisfaction and criticism (*United Daily*, July 30. p.4; *China Times*, July 8, p.2; *China Times*, August 3, p.2). Some angry contenders threatened to break away from the party after they learned that the party organization had a favorite in the place they were running. Although the nomination is subject to final approval by the Central Standing Committee, recommendations submitted by lower party committees actually determined the boundary of choices. In Taipei, the list of recommendations disclosed on August 11 was accepted in full by the Kuomintang's Central Standing Committee (Table 2-2).

Table 2-2
Summary of the Result of Kuomintang Primaries in Taipei

| District | Candidate | Vote obtained | Nominated? |
|---|---|---|---|
| North District | Chao Shaw-kang | 31,782 | Yes |
| | Chao Chen-peng | 18,211 | Yes |
| | Tien Wen-chung | 11,915 | No* |
| | Ting So-chung | 11,827 | No |
| | Chou Chuan | 10,074 | Yes |
| | Mar Ay-jean | 7,940 | No |
| | Lin Hsien-tung | 7,582 | Yes |
| | Lee Chung-shiang | 5,172 | Yes |
| | Wang Lin-lin | 4,420 | No |
| | Chen Sui-liang | 3,262 | No |
| South District | Yu Mu-ming | 35,863 | Yes |
| | Hong Tong-kwei | 26,143 | Yes |
| | Lin Yu-shiang | 23,168 | Yes |
| | Huang Su-wei | 15,849 | Yes |
| | Wang Ying-jei | 7,430 | No |
| | Chu Sin-min | 6,350 | No |
| | Chang Chih-min | 12,979** | Yes** |

* Tien competed for the candidacy of legislator, was nominated for city councilman. He declined the nomination.
** Chang ran in the city councilman primary, was nominated for legislator.

The use of multiple entry ballots also complicated the primary. In the legislative primary, Kuomintang members are allowed to pick as many as five names on the ballot

since the party planned to nominate five in each district. The military community instructed those soldiers and veterans they could influence that they should pick only one candidate, the one supported by the military. Vigorous canvassing led to a higher turnout of the military community (average 55%, more than 70% in some party units) than other party

Table 2-3
Summary of the Result of Kuomintang's Nomination, 1989

| Category of Election | number of offices in election | number of nominees (a) | number of FR nominees[1] (b) | primary factor (b/a)x100% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legislator | 101 | 71 | 61 | 86% |
| County Magistrate | 21 | 20 | 19 | 95% |
| Provincial Assembly | 77 | 53 | 47 | 89% |
| Taipei City Council | 51 | 44 | 37 | 84% |
| Kaoshiung City Council | 43 | 34 | 26 | 76% |
| Total | 293 | 222 | 190 | 86% |

Note: 1. FR nominees are front runners whose ranks were high enough to be nominated.
Source: Compiled by Chang Gin-wei. *China Times*, August 17, 1989, p.3.

units (average 42%). The problem was that the result of the primary did not reflect the actual candidate strength. It was difficult for the Kuomintang to explain why front runners like Tien Wen-chung were not nominated.

Despite all these controversies, the Kuomintang mostly honored the result of the primary. Overall 86% of the nominees are from the front runners of the primary. Table 2-3 shows that of the 293 positions open to election, the Kuomintang nominated 222 candidates (76% of the total). Among the 222 Kuomintang candidates, 190 (or 86%) were

front runners in the primary. In other words, according to their performance in the primary, they were entitled to be nominated.

The Primary of the DPP

The primary of the DPP is seen by some as an empty formality. The DPP has such small membership that in some places there were not enough people to make up a ballot. Though the DPP captured at least a quarter of the popular vote in 1986, it has had no success in bringing membership into the structure. The total number of members registered island-wide in the primary was no more than 20,000. The party, however, decided to hold the primary because, the leaders declared, they wanted the party members to choose candidates for all elections. The secretary general of the party, Chang Jun-hon, expressed the party's determination to honor the democratic process (*China Times*, July 24, 1989, p.3).

In Taipei, the DPP decided to nominate 6 candidates, three in each of two constituencies, the North District and the South District. Since there were only three--Yeh Chu-lan, Lin Cheng-jei, and Chang Teh-ming -- registered in the South District, no vote was needed. In the North District, four politicians registered to compete for the three open seats. Harmony within the group, under this circumstance, has top priority in Chinese politics. In order to achieve the image of unity and harmony, at least on the surface, politicians would make every effort to avoid confrontation. Therefore, most decisions of this sort are made under the table. The four contestants tried but failed to reach an agreement for one to withdraw. They then let the primary decide. Chen Sui-ben, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Lin Wen-long won in the primary while Huang Tien-fu was defeated. An interesting aspect of the DPP primary was that party members from all over the city voted to decide the nominees in the North District. The embarrassingly small size of the North District membership was the main reason.

The relatively small membership size limits the political significance of the DPP's primary, although its primary received major media coverage that helped them in developing a positive public image. Its small size definitely distorted the representativeness of electoral strength. For instance, in Yunlin, a southern county, 458 DPP members (33% of the total registered members in that county) participated in the primary. Chu Kao-cheng, an incumbent legislator, got 103 votes. The other, Huang Erh-shuan won with 305 votes (*China Times*, August 7, p.2). Although not nominated, Chu managed to obtain ten thousand signatures endorsing his candidacy, which is not required by the law or the party, just to show his electoral popularity. He won the election, 128,420 votes to Huang's 6,980 (*United Daily*, December 3, p.12).

Pre-Campaign Activities

On September 20, the Central Commission of Election Affairs of the Executive Yuan made its official proclamation of the election of 1989. Prospective candidates registered between October 23 and October 30. Though the final list of candidates was not approved until November 10, no applicant was denied by the Commission.

Technically all campaign activities before the official campaign date (fifteen days before the election) were illegal. However, no candidate waited to begin campaigning until the coming of that date. The Election Law has articles regulating pre-campaign activity. Advertisements, speeches, or any other activities "explicitly and publicly" promoting any candidate are prohibited. The line between legal and illegal is obscure, and prosecutions are rare or unknown.

Campaign Activities

There are four types of legal campaign activities in Taiwan; speech making, propagandizing by using car speakers, advertisement, and canvassing are all permitted during the official campaign period.

Speech making enables a candidate to communicate his or her policy positions to the electorate. Candidate-sponsored meetings, where only the candidate and his/her campaign assistants are allowed to speak, are held in the first half of the official campaign period. Government-sponsored meetings where all candidates in a constituency are presented are held in the second half.

In the past, Tang-wai candidates usually attracted big audiences to their meetings. In 1989, the attendance dropped sharply. Most people believed that the lifting of martial law, thus the loosening of censorship, reduced the motivation to attend. The public no longer expected to hear "untold" stories in the speeches; they had already read them in the newly-freed newspapers.

Car speakers are heavily used. The candidate's name and sequential number on the ballot are repeatedly announced through the loudspeaker attached to the car. The purpose is to increase name-recognition. Despite the fact that parades are prohibited by law, most candidates organized parades during the final days of the campaign.

Many advertising materials are allowed to circulate. Name cards, handbills, and pamphlets may be distributed to households. Posters are allowed only on bulletin boards in designated areas. Newspaper advertisement is permitted only during this period. However, as indicated before, the difference between some pre-campaign advertisements and the campaign advertisements was slight. The use of television is prohibited by law. The Kuomintang, however, was able to gain advantage by manipulating news programs (see below). Canvassing, or more accurately personal contact, is widely used in the campaign.

This is the backbone of the Kuomintang's Zone System and is described in detail in Chapter 3.

In addition to the legal or the quasi-legal activities described above, there were illegal campaigns: that is, vote-buying. Bribing voters is a common practice in elections at all levels. Except in special cases where competition is great, and thus prices high, the money involved in bribing a voter is small, usually from 200 to 500 Taiwan dollars (equivalent to 8 to 20 US dollars). For most people in Taiwan, this is a trivial amount. Therefore, the reason for accepting money or souvenirs like radios, watches, calculators, imported wine, and gift coupons from candidates (*China Times* July 3 p.2; July 25, p.3; September 15, p.4; *United Daily*, July 23, p.13), in many cases, is that it is a social custom. Bringing a small gift when you visit someone represents your goodwill. However, some of these "small gifts" are not small at all. Election law prohibits any of these gift offers, in any amount.

Taiwanese generally believe that many candidates buy votes. In responding to a survey question "Do you think that buying votes is common in Taiwanese elections?", in island-wide telephone polls (both by *China Times*), 69% in 1986 and 68% in 1989 said "yes". No candidate involved in rumors of vote-buying in either years was charged, nor did the rumors appear to damage the candidacy.

Candidates bribed not only voters, but also other contenders. Rich candidates tried to buy other potential opponents out by paying millions in cash. In 1989, two notorious cases occurred, where candidates offered to pay 2.5 million dollars (US$100,000) to another candidate if he withdrew from the campaign (*China Times,* June 28, 1989, p.2; July 10, 1989, p.3; September 6, 1989, p.2). An investigation failed to find sufficient evidence to prosecute. In almost all elections rumors of this kind arise. However, evidence of bribery is hard to find unless the parties involved voluntarily confess.

Table 2-4
Results of the Elections in 1989

| Category of Election | Number of Seats | Win by the KMT | Win by the DPP | Win by Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legislator | 101 | 72 (71%) | 21 (21%) | 8 (8%) |
| Taiwan Provincial Assembly | 77 | 54 (70%) | 15 (19%) | 8 (10%) |
| Taipei City Council | 51 | 36 (71%) | 14 (27%) | 1 (2%) |
| Kaoshiung City Council | 43 | 29 (67%) | 8 (19%) | 6 (14%) |
| County Magistrate and Mayor | 21 | 14 (67%) | 6 (29%) | 1 (5%) |

The Result of the Election

The election of 1989 was held on Saturday, December 2. Voting proceeded smoothly and, apparently, fairly. Turnout was high--75.4% of eligible adults voted, a record in ten years (*Independence Evening Post*, December 3, 1989, p.1).

Vote-counting began right after voting was closed. Therefore, the results of most elections were known before midnight. Table 2-4 includes the result of all elections held in 1989. In general, the outcome of this election has been interpreted as a setback for the Kuomintang, although the Kuomintang still has a comfortable majority in all legislative bodies. It won seventy-two (71%) legislative seats of the 101 contested,[6] fourteen (67%) of the twenty-one county magistrates and mayors, fifty-four (70%) of the seventy-seven seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, thirty-six (71%) of the fifty-one seats in the Taipei City Council, and twenty-nine (67%) of forty-three seats in the Kaoshiung City Council. The major change was that the Kuomintang won fewer popular votes than in any election held before. In the one-on-one elections for twenty-one magistrates, Kuomintang

candidates won 53% of the vote cast; in the legislator elections, Kuomintang candidates won 63% of the votes; both are the lowest in Taiwanese election history in each category.

## Examples of the Kuomintang's Dominance in Elections

There is no way the Kuomintang can completely control all political sources in the society. Even so, some degree of control is desirable. There is a need to foster a warm attitude toward Kuomintang candidates. Control of this kind is not so much an active assistance to particular candidates, as it is a passive prevention of a negative effect that may reduce the Zone System's power. Since the Kuomintang dominates Taiwanese politics, it is not difficult for the party to exercise control in areas such as legislation, the bureaucracy, television, and (to a lesser extent) newspapers.

### Control of Legislation

Electoral laws have been found to be universally in favor of strong elective parties and against weak ones (Rae, 1971, pp.69-86, 134-138). In Taiwan, election law can be easily rewritten by the Legislative Yuan, which remains dominated by the Kuomintang. Revisions usually are based on the Kuomintang's desire to run an easier, more successful campaign. The arrangement of speech making is an example.

Historically, the election campaign was the most important method the Tang-wai had for making their political positions known to the public. Before the lifting of martial law, the rights of free speech and free assembly were abridged. The Tang-wai did not have comparable opportunities to the Kuomintang to publicize their political agenda except during the campaign period when controls were loosened. Public speech meetings were thus a way to deliver political information, to attract large groups of voters otherwise uncontactable by the Tang-wai, and to maintain morale in their campaigns. Speech

meetings sponsored by Tang-wai candidates usually attracted thousands of listeners, far more than those sponsored by any Kuomintang candidate (who typically drew several hundred or less).

Tang-wai candidates carefully used this freedom in the campaign. They managed to bring voter morale to a peak on the last day of the campaign through a series of emotional speeches. Compared with the Tang-wai candidates, the Kuomintang candidates' campaigns during the last days were relatively quiet. In order to quash the opposition's momentum, the Kuomintang decided that the official campaign period should be divided into two periods. Candidate sponsored speech-meetings must be made only in the first half. The second half must be reserved completely for commission-sponsored speech meetings. Since candidates of both groups could only speak at the officially-sponsored meetings, the Kuomintang use that tactic to hold the campaign momentum of Tang-wai candidates down when the election approaches. Despite strong protest from the DPP legislators (*Bulletin of the Legislative Yuan*, 1980, No. 34-36), the Kuomintang refused to make any concession during the two revisions in 1983 and in 1989. Instead, the Kuomintang imposed more technical restrictions on campaign activity aimed at hindering the DPP's electoral efforts.

Table 2-5 shows four more examples. They show that as the Tang-wai found a new tactic, the Kuomintang found a way to cope with it. Having no strong organization, campaign posters were one convenient way the Tang-wai could publicize their political agenda. Therefore, the Kuomintang set limitations on where they can put those posters. The Kuomintang's control over media has been loosened since the lifting of martial law, but the DPP still has no access to television propaganda. Co-sponsoring speech meetings could be used to save campaign resources and to increase propaganda power for the DPP--but was banned. Audio and video tapes were found to be an effective technique to

Table 2-5
Some Changes in Election Laws

| Subject of Regulation | Prior to 1980 | Election Law of 1980 | Election Law of 1983 | Election Law of 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Campaign Posters | may be put anywhere | may be put anywhere | may be put only in designated areas | may be put only in designated areas |
| Use of Media | prohibited | prohibited | prohibited | no TV commercials allowed |
| Co-sponsoring Speech Meetings | no regulation | no regulation | prohibited | political party may sponsor meetings for party nominees |
| Use of Audio and Video Tape | no regulation | no regulation | audio tape is prohibited | both are prohibited |

Source: *Bulletin of the Legislative Yuan*, vol. 69 (1980) no.34-36; vol. 72 (1983) no.48-51; vol. 78 (1989), no.7.

communicate the DPP's political information to voters, so the Kuomintang forbade any use of either.

Control Over the Bureaucracy

Although the Kuomintang has branches in every district and cells are ubiquitous, the party organization alone cannot carry the burden of canvassing the entire constituency in an election. Control of the bureaucracy from the top down to the grass-roots level gives the Kuomintang a big advantage over other political groups.

The most important resource of the Kuomintang is that it dominates the executive branches of the government. This dominance enables the Kuomintang to influence public opinion via timely announcement of policies. Political control of the economy like this is found in the United States (Tufte, 1978, ch.2). An example in Taiwan was related to stock market. On November 28, the Taipei stock index dropped 548 points, stopping at a daily decline-limit set by law. The Kuomintang wasted no time. Its director of the Culture Department (rather than a government official) announced that the government will reduce the stock exchange tax from 1.5% to 0.6%. The stock market reacted with a sharp increase of 590 points the next day--all stocks reached increase-limits (*China Times Express*, November 28 & 29, 1989, both on p.1). Political intervention by the Kuomintang was the major reason for this dramatic performance during the election period.

Some other acts taken by the government were believed to influence public opinion before the election. In the same week as the election of 1989, the Ministry of Defense announced its plan to compensate veterans retroactively for their service, a policy demanded by old veterans who followed the government to Taiwan but were discharged with a small amount of cash compensation and a certificate entitling them to receive a piece of land after the government "recovers the Mainland". The Ministry of Education announced that it would extend maternal leave for all female teachers of public schools from six weeks to up to one year; it also announced a loosening of the restrictions on starting private schools. The Ministry of Finance announced that it would increase the standard tax deduction for individuals; and allow married couples to file tax-returns separately so they may save significant amounts of money. All these announcements were accompanied by a denial of election motivation (*China Times Express*, November 30, 1989, p.3). Most of these promises were kept after the election.

During the campaign period, the Kuomintang also sent many government officials to campaign for Kuomintang candidates. The DPP strongly protested this move as a Kuomintang attempt to manipulate elections (*China Times*, September 5, 1989, p.2). I

believe that the Kuomintang officials did not substantially help their comrades because most of them did not have close local connections, which is important in Taiwanese elections. The most obvious benefit for Kuomintang candidates is that they received media coverage when an official visited their campaign headquarters. But it also took valuable time to receive these officials, time in which they could have contacted more local leaders.

Media control

Before 1989, the election law did not allow the use of newspaper advertisements and television commercials in the campaign. The Division of Cultural Affairs of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang closely monitors news programming in all mass media. This control of mass media allows the Kuomintang to supply voters with standards for political evaluation (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, ch. 7). Or, in Riker's words (1986), mass media can be used to manipulate dimensions of the campaign. In an election, the opposition's major concern has two dimensions. One is that the Kuomintang may try to block the oppositions access to news media. The second, even worse, is that the Kuomintang may use the media to distort the Tang-wai's image in the public by spreading negative messages about the opposition.

The Election Law of 1989 permitted newspaper advertisement but only during the official campaign period. TV commercials, however, are still prohibited in campaigns. Except for the Kuomintang, no political groups have open access to television news programs, which has been found to have an impact on individual's attitudes (Iyengar and Kinder, 1982). The Kuomintang has effective control of TV news programming, which tends to be filled with information supplied by Kuomintang candidates. Other candidates do get occasional coverage. The stories about non-Kuomintang candidates are very often biased; most of them are negative messages. A newspaper, the *Capital Morning Post*, carried daily analyses of television news program during the campaign period. Table 2-6

Table 2-6
Television Coverage of Campaign in Taiwan, 1989

| Party affiliation | Positive message | Neutral message | Negative message | Total Length (seconds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kuomintang | 76.3% | 23.5% | 0.1% | 5085 |
| DPP | 1.3 | 37.9 | 60.8 | 2849 |
| Others | 7.3 | 88.7 | 4.0 | 506 |

Source: Original data was compiled by *Capital Morning Post* and appeared on the newspaper between November 15 and December 2, 1989.

provides a summary of TV news coverage in the 15 days prior to the election of 1989. Since the publisher of *Capital Morning Post* is a well known DPP leader, employees of the *Post*, to some degree, I believe, are more likely to be supporters of the DPP. The original coding might be biased by the compilers' political attitude. Therefore, I recoded each piece based on the original descriptions of the news. As shown in the table, reports about Kuomintang candidates were heavily positive (76.3% of the time), with hardly any negative reports about the Kuomintang and its nominees (0.1%). On the other hand, DPP candidates received heavily negative treatment (60.8% of the time) with almost nothing positive (1.3%).

One of the most notable examples of media manipulation appeared in the T.V. news on the day before election day. The news supplied by the Kuomintang showed Yu Ching, a DPP leader running for Magistrate of Taipei County, interviewed by a reporter from the American Public Broadcasting System. Yu was quoted as saying that he supported the idea of Taiwanese Independence--a highly controversial issue debated between some DPP candidates and Kuomintang candidates in the campaign. All television channels repeated the same interview in all their news programs that day and also on election day. This tactic may have scared some middle-class supporters for Yu Ching because they were afraid Yu Ching was being "too radical".

The control over newspapers has been loosened lately, especially after the lifting of martial law. Control, however, still exists. The Yu Ching story was the headline on the front page and half of the third page of the *United Daily News* on election day. Because of this, a group of angry DPP supporters gathered at the headquarters of the daily on election day evening. They threatened to burn the building if Yu Ching lost. He won by a margin of less than 1%.

## Summary

I have described the environment in which the Kuomintang's Zone System operates. The major features of the environment are:

1. Structurally, the Kuomintang dominates Taiwan in terms of its powerful party organizations and the government-party links it has built to influence the government's decisions.

2. The Kuomintang did not face a strong opposition in elections in the past four decades: non-Kuomintang candidates won only a small number of offices.

3. In the legislative election of 1989 in Taipei, the Kuomintang still won a comfortable majority of the open seats.

4. The Kuomintang uses its control of legislation, bureaucracy, and mass media to create a warm environment for its nominees.

## Notes to Chapter 2

[1] Most decisions in the Legislative Yuan are made unanimously through negotiation between the two major parties. A vote is rarely needed. Not surprisingly, when a vote is requited, the Kuomintang always wins.

[2] The DPP's membership is tiny (21,000 as of August 1990) and grows slowly, however (*China Times Express*, August 10, p.2; *China Times*, August 24, p.14).

[3] This incident had a fundamental impact on the relationship between mainlanders and Taiwanese. Due to the chaotic situation at that time plus the prohibition of any research on the event, an objective account of the event has never been possible. For example, there has never been agreement on how many people, mainlanders and Taiwanese, were killed at that time. The most often cited literature is a first-hand record, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) by George H. Kerr who was an American vice-consul at Taipei. Readers would find that he is publicly partisan. He was sympathetic to native Taiwanese.

[4] The only exception is the Black Faction led by Yu Deng-fa in Kaoshiung County In the past forty years, the Yu family has dominated the faction. Yu Deng-fa once was elected to head the County (magistrate, 1964-1968). After him, many of his families ran and succeeded. They are Yu Chen Yueh-ying (daughter-in-law, provincial assemblyman, 1964-1980; legislator, 1980-1986; magistrate, since 1986), Huang Yo-zen (son-in-law, magistrate, 1977-1981), Huang Yu Show-luan (daughter, provincial assemblywoman, 1981-1985), Yu Cheng-hsien (grand son, legislator, since 1986), and Yu Ling-ya (grand daughter, provincial assemblywoman, since 1985).

[5] All of them were released before they completed their terms.

[6] Different statistics appeared in different newspapers because they used different criteria of classification. Some candidates are Kuomintang members but were not nominated by the party. Some newspapers counted seats won by candidates of this kind as won by the Kuomintang. Some counted them as "others".

# CHAPTER 3

# THE OPERATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY ZONE SYSTEM

In the past, Taiwanese political scientists often argued that the Kuomintang was good at organizational tactics in elections and the Tang-wai was good at propaganda. It is easy to understand why the Tang-wai focused on propaganda, because they did not really have a party organization. But how the Kuomintang excels at organizational tactics remains unanswered. My analysis in this chapter will attempt to produce one answer.

One hears and sees the term "responsibility zone" most often when an election approaches. It is heavily associated with the Kuomintang's campaign operations. Since Taiwanese elections for representatives are at-large elections, candidates from the same party have to compete against one another.[1] The use of the Zone System transforms the multiple-candidate district into several single-candidate zones, where the Kuomintang works to promote its zone nominee (zoned candidate). The purpose of this chapter is to describe the details of the system. The procedures of my participant observation of the campaign of candidate Liu Yu-shiang in 1989 are described first. They are followed by paragraphs describing how the zones are assigned, the structure of the Zone System, and the major activities in the zone.

## Method

There has been only one prior study of this zone campaign device. My analysis of the result of the election of the Taipei City Council in 1985 showed that the effect of the Zone System was discernible. On average, votes for a Kuomintang candidate in zone are as

much as five times the votes they obtain outside the zone (Liu, 1986). The connection between the party's operation and voter behavior has yet to be investigated. Evidence of this connection is very difficult to identify in a survey. The major reason is that the Kuomintang does not publicize its activities in the Zone System. As a result, the public is not generally aware of its existence.

Since survey research won't give a complete picture of the Zone System, the complementary approach is to participate in its operation. Before I joined Lin Yu-shiang's campaign staff, I had several conversations with him. From these conversations I developed the framework of observation used during the 1989 election. I formally began to take part in the campaign on October 22. My observation lasted roughly five and one-half weeks, until the evening of election day. After the election, I had separate talks with the candidate and all his major campaign staff to clarify some questions I found during the process.

In the weeks I worked at the campaign headquarters, I participated in all but four daily staff meetings. In the first two weeks, my job was to provide advice and to be Lin's representative to campaign meetings or social obligations. In the second half, during the official campaign period, my main role was to coordinate candidate-sponsored speech meetings. I worked with fifteen campaign assistants, consulted with them about the foci of their speeches and the candidate's, and, arranged the schedule for each meeting. Through all these participations, my foci of observation were the following:

1) The actors: who participated, directly and indirectly, in the campaign.

2) The structure: what are the inter-relationships among actors.

3) Activities: what are the major events and sequences of events in the campaign.

Except for some documents, I made notes right after I observed the above. Sometimes I was able to write them down concurrently; other times, I relied on my memory. No tape recorder was used. This observation is by no means comprehensive. Other Kuomintang candidates have different styles. Findings from the observation of a

single case may not be generalizable to other cases. Due to the time-constraints of such a short campaign and my lack of personal connections with other candidates, it was impossible for me to observe all campaigns in Taipei. In my analysis, I will pay more attention to events and facts that I believe are common to different candidates, although unique situations in Lin Yu-shiang's campaign are also described.

In the first meeting I attended (on October 22) Lin also said that I was "late by a month". However, after I checked his appointment records for that month, I found that activities he conducted in that month were similar to those of the first three weeks I observed. There is a possibility that some events I missed did not reappear, but since I raised questions about almost everything and I did not see any hesitations, I do not think the impact of my absence on the findings is significant. The only question I did not ask in the study is the financing of the campaign, since it is irrelevant to the goals of this study.

## Assigning Zones to Candidates

Zone assignments are made by the Kuomintang's City Committee. In the process, incumbent nominees are consulted about their preferences. For instance, in a conversation in early April Lin Yu-shiang told me that he would pick Mucha and Ginmei, two districts he had not received in previous elections. The report after the first assigning meeting did not include these two districts in his zone (*China Times*, August 25, 1989, p.14). The final zone assigned to him did.

In the following I describe the criteria for assigning zones, types of zones, and the result of the assignment in the legislative election in Taipei, 1989.

Criteria for Assigning Zones

In the allocation of zones, four criteria are taken into consideration. The first involves the population in each district. The number of voters in various zones is designed to be roughly equivalent, although some of them will have more voters because Kuomintang candidates have not performed well in the past. In strongholds of the Kuomintang, the number of voters in a zone will be smaller.

The second criterion is candidate-related -- the personal connections of the candidates with local leaders. A better connection would definitely make for an easier campaign. Campaign efficiency is best served by allocating zones to candidates with strong ties to the zone.

The third criterion is the demographic composition of districts under consideration. Based on their knowledge of voters' behavior in the past, party cadres in the City Committee match districts and candidates. For instance, they would not assign a Mainlander candidate to districts heavily populated by native Taiwanese. Although there are conflicting opinions, party cadres believe that native Taiwanese are more likely to vote for native Taiwanese candidates, and mainlanders for mainlander candidates (*China Times*, August 25, p.14; August 27, p.14).

Incumbency is the fourth criterion considered. An incumbent usually is assigned to the same zones as in prior campaigns (*China Times*, August 25, p.14; September, 9, p.14). This is a reasonable standard because an incumbent usually has good connections with local leaders, or at least they have had better opportunities to create some.

Types of Zones

There are two types of zones: geographical zones and functional zones. Some functional zones are assigned at the time geographical zones are assigned; others are spare zones, to be used as "reserves" to support struggling candidates.

Geographical Zones. Since the *li* is the unit of assignment in geographical zones, they are called "responsibility *li*". Each candidate is allocated about 50 to 90 *li* so that the potential votes for all Kuomintang candidates in the election are roughly equal. Using *li* as the unit of assignment in the legislative elections is new. Before the 1989 election, zones for legislative candidates were composed of wards.[2] Assigning zones using administrative ward as the basic unit is easier to administer. But because the main organization in the zone system is the CCHP-Conference which is *li*-based, splitting a ward has no major impact on the effect of the zone. In 1989, the *li* was first used as the unit of assignment for legislative zones. As a consequence, some wards were divided into several groups of *li* that went into different zones. A candidate's zone, therefore, may contain several groups of *li* from different administrative wards.

Functional Zones. Functional zones are organizationally defined. Party units in all important organizations and groups--such as the Veteran's Association, the Railway Worker's Union, the Postal Worker's Association, units among police, and units among educators, etc, are the units of assignment in the functional zone. Individuals belong to these party units are excluded from the geographical zones.

*Huang-Fu-Hsing* is the largest party division of this kind. *Huang-Fu-Hsing* is the internal Kuomintang code name for the many party units composed of veterans. It maintains close contact with the military apparatus and is the major component of the military community. The emergence of the military community as a political force goes

back to the early 1950's. After the Nationalist government retreated from mainland China to Taiwan, the Kuomintang troops and their families resided in villages that were physically isolated from the rest of the society. In the City of Taipei, 119 *li* contain such villages. The isolation of these villages gave them a unique solidarity. The Kuomintang has been able to successfully control votes in those villages. The military community, the servicemen[3] and their families, vote in blocs to support the candidate assigned by the party, no matter who he or she may be. As the society has become more urbanized and modernized, those villages have been replaced by public housing projects. Today, a large portion of the members of the former community have been integrated into the rest of society. The community's solidarity in elections is, therefore, weakening. However, their community loyalty is still strong. Most voters of the military community still vote as the party instructs, and the Kuomintang still can count on the bloc vote they cast.

A less reliable but still powerful functional zone is the Intellectual Youth Party Division, code-named *Kong-Chih-Ching*, which manages party affairs with regard to university students, faculty, and staff. Compared with other party members, this highly educated group receives favorable treatment from the Kuomintang. In addition to a Department of Youth Works in the Central Committee, the Kuomintang also created three Intellectual Youth Party Divisions in northern, central, and southern Taiwan to take care of party affairs on college campuses. This investment brings the Kuomintang a high degree of support among intellectuals. In elections, they are a strong part of the Kuomintang's political base.

Spare Zones. Spare zones are a special subset of the functional zones. They refer to some special party units that are designated to balance the electoral performance of Kuomintang candidates. The influence the Kuomintang has in some secondary groups enables it to mobilize quick support, even on election day itself. Unlike other networks, these groups are not geographically-bonded, but rather contact-centered. The Bank Worker's Union,

Railway Worker's Union, Postal Worker's Union, and similar organizations, are designated as supplementary units. Some of these are allocated at the beginning of the campaign, but most of these spare zones are assigned to struggling candidates only four days before the election. As I mentioned earlier, scientific evaluation is absent. Consequently, the allocation of spare zones is made upon request on a first-come-first-serve basis.

In the candidates' eyes not all zones are equal; there are good spare zones where the proportion of sure votes is high, and bad spare zones which are less predictable. For example, the party division formed by Kuomintang members among police is assigned to candidates as close as the evening before the election day. Their votes for party candidates are believed to be the most reliable. Yet, there are also unreliable spare zones where party members do not necessarily vote as the party instructs. For example, the Railway Worker's Union in Taipei was assigned to Lin Yu-shiang's zone in 1989. Since a substantial portion of the workers are Hakka, a minority ethnic group who tend to vote for Hakkan candidates, their willingness to vote for Lin Yu-shiang was doubted. Since they do not live in only one *li*, there is no way to check if they voted for Lin or not.

Table 3-1
The Result of Zone Assignments, Legislative Yuan Election, 1989.
South District, Taipei.

| Candidate | # of *li* received |
|---|---|
| Chang Chih-ming | 88 |
| Hong Tong-kwei | 91 |
| Huang Su-wei | 89 |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 86 |
| Yu Mu-ming | 60[1] |

Note: 1. Yu Mu-ming represented the military community, the number indicates the *li* where the community located. There are overlaps with other candidates' zones.
Source: Newsletter (dated November 15, 1989) distributed to every household by the Taipei City Committee of the Kuomintang.

Based on the above criteria, zones for the election I observed were allocated to each candidate early in September. The result is shown in Table 3-1.

Along with these zone assignments, the Kuomintang also tried to team the candidate for legislator with the candidate for city council in the same constituency. The idea was that each could enhance their electoral strength by assisting the other (*China Times*, September 1, 1989, p.14; September 10, p.14). From what I observed during the campaign, this effort failed. Mutual assistance among candidates was very limited. An immediate benefit for candidates was that they could share the cost of co-sponsored activities, and thus save some money. But no formal rules were set for the co-operation, and most teammates fell out at various points during the campaign due to disputes over how to share those financial costs.

## Structure of the Zone System

During an election, the overall Kuomintang campaign in the City of Taipei is directed by its city committee. Most of the campaign activities, however, are coordinated by district committees. Major decisions such as which candidate gets which zone, what adjustments need to be made during the campaign process, what strategies are to be implemented, etc., are made by the City Committee of the Kuomintang. The responsibility of carrying out these decisions falls upon the shoulders of the sixteen district committees.

The district committees are housed in the community service stations, the Kuomintang's offices; one in each of the 16 wards. A director appointed by the city committee and about ten committee members form the district committee. There are about 20 full-time party employees on average in a community service station. These stations keep close contact with voters in the wards. An effective director usually knows all the *li* (precinct) leaders, most of the *lin* (neighborhood) leaders, and some government

employees in the ward, in addition to all party cadres. He (currently there is no female director on this level in the Kuomintang) is expected to be a heavy-weight drinker, since he needs to participate in major meetings and special events such as weddings and funerals in the district. These close contacts enable him to take a key role in the social network in the district. During an election, the district committee is the group in charge of the coordination of the campaign activities of party nominees. Figure 3-1 illustrates the relationship between major players in the Zone System. The City Committee, consulting with party nominees, makes decisions and then delivers them to district committees. The party nominees, through close coordination with the district committee, campaign in the zone via the *Chih-Chiang-Hui-Pao,* or the CCHP-Conferences (see below), held within every *li* in his or her zone.

As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the duties of a district office, apart from election and party management activities, are to organize community activities such as Chinese cooking

Figure 3-1
Relationship Between Actors in Campaign



classes, legal services, marriage counseling, etc. During election periods, the service stations are converted into campaign tactical units. In any district, the service station alone certainly cannot accomplish the job of campaigning for several party nominees (often elections for more than one office are held at a time) in the district. For example, on average it takes the efforts of more than 20 assistants for a week to complete door-to-door canvassing in a zone. The district committee does not have sufficient manpower to assume this burden in the campaign. Candidates need to organize substantial numbers of volunteers or hire campaign staff of their own.

Some of the manpower added to this canvassing cadre is from local party units, or the CCHP-Conferences, the key organizations in the Responsibility Zone System. A CCHP-Conference is an informal meeting composed of local government officials and local Kuomintang cadres (see Figure 3-2). A conference typically consists of about 30 to 50 total participants. On the official side, there are the *li* leader, the *li* administrator, and all Kuomintang-member *lin* leaders (numbers average from 20 to 30, with a few *li* having up to 60 *lin*) in the *li*. On the party side, there is the standing member of the sub-district committee, four other regular committee members, the Secretary of the committee, all cell leaders, and some other activists in the *li*. In a few cases the *li* leader also holds the standing committee membership of the sub-district committee; in most cases the *lin* leaders also are the cell leaders. In *lin* where the leaders are not party members, there are *lin* correspondents. These correspondents also participate in the CCHP-Conference. Since these conferences are not a part of the formal election system, the Kuomintang may handle it in a more informal manner. In order to include potential non-party supporters in the conference, the Kuomintang avoids using any party label for the conference. Instead, it uses "*Chih-Chiang*" Conference. "*Chih-Chiang*", or "Self-Strengthening", is a popular title for public events in Taiwan.

Figure 3-2
The Structure of CCHP-Conferences




In Chapter 2, I described the Kuomintang party organizations, where the party awards important government officers parallel party positions. By doing so, the decision makers in the government at any given level are basicaliy the same group as within

the party. At the lowest local level, the Kuomintang takes a quite different structure. The CCHP-Conference is a uniting of public officers and party cadres in a *li*. Through this unity, important decisions made during the election by upper levels will be channeled to the all-important local leaders. By doing so, the Kuomintang successfully penetrates local interpersonal networks. Before 1990, there was only one *li* leader affiliated with the DPP in Taipei. Until the DPP gains major offices in the *li* elections, the CCHP-Conference, I believe, will remain a powerful weapon for the Kuomintang in party conflict.

Campaign Office of Candidate

The organizational aspect of the candidates' campaigns also need to be addressed. Most candidates in Taiwan have similar campaign organizations to Lin's: a campaign manager and a group of relatives and friends serving as campaign assistants working at a temporary office or, in rural areas, the candidate's house. Lin Yu-shiang has an office in downtown Taipei. Two full-time secretaries help him to deal with casework such as job recommendations, disputes with government agencies, public construction needs, and wedding invitations. In the early stage of the campaign, the office also was his campaign headquarters. An official campaign headquarters, entitled "Service Center of Lin Yu-shiang", was set up on October 15.

All staff in Lin Yu-shiang's campaign headquarters are his friends or relatives. There was only a little effort to organize the staff. In the weeks I worked at the headquarters, I did not see any chart showing the organization of the campaign. The chart existed only in the mind of the candidate. However, there were unofficial divisions of labor among the staff (see Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3
The Structure of Lin Yu-shiang's Campaign Headquarters




Like other candidates, Lin Yu-shiang is at the center of the campaign. However, while most other candidates depend heavily on their campaign mangers. Lin is more than simply a candidate. He is the de facto campaign manager. Although there is a campaign manager, Mr. Hsu, he does not play a major role in the process; for example, he attended no more than half of the daily meetings held in the headquarters in my six weeks of observation. The candidate's role in managing the campaign also can be seen in the meeting process. Lin presided at almost all meetings. When he chaired the meeting, it usually lasted for more than two hours, while when a substitute sat in, the meeting ended in thirty minutes. In either case, discussion was rare. The candidate made all the decisions. Lin Yu-shiang's wife and his father also played important roles. They were not officially part of the staff, but their contribution cannot be overlooked. They substituted for the candidate at important meetings or parties.

Zone-correspondents probably are the most important staff in the campaign. Essentially, they serve as agents of the candidate to each wards. They are responsible for contacting the district committee office (the community service station) every day, and for working closely with party employees in the service stations and cadres in each *li*. They participate in meetings and dinner parties at all CCHP-Conferences. Out-of-zone-correspondents campaign secretly because they work in other candidates' zones. They personally contact friends, relatives, and co-workers in the ward.

Group and organization correspondents also work independently. They contact the candidate's acquaintances in groups like the Lions Club, the Junior Chamber Commerce, the Rotary Club, and organizations such as banks, the power company, and schools. Although party officers in the City Committee had some doubts about the effect of contacting these secondary groups, Lin Yu-shiang believed that these groups made substantial contributions to his success in previous elections.

A media correspondent's duty is to provide information about Lin Yu-shiang's campaign to reporters from newspapers, television stations, and a campaign news center located in the Kuomintang's city headquarters.

Campaign assistants are a group of lawyers, accountants, and university professors. They are officially registered with the government and only they are allowed to deliver campaign speeches on behalf of the candidate. Except for this speech-making, however, most of these campaign assistants were not actively involved in the campaign.

Telephone campaigns became popular in Taiwan only in recent years. Lin Yu-shiang's telephone campaign concentrated on groups. His secretary collected directories of many civil groups. Several campaign workers made calls to individuals emphasizing the close relationship between Lin Yu-shiang and the group they belonged to, and pleaded for voter support.

As I mentioned, all candidates need the assistance of the district committees and the CCHP-Conterences to do canvassing. The candidates, however, still need to hire a group

of part-time campaigners to canvass the constituency. In the last two days of the campaign, Lin Yu-shiang hired 100 college students to canvass for him. All these canvassings were supervised by a secretary.

The art design staff person was to design all campaign literature including name cards, posters, handbills, and newspaper advertisements. The artist worked independent conferred only with the candidate.

Although Lin Yu-shiang's campaign headquarters was only loosely organized, the working atmosphere was good throughout the campaign.

Rule of Zone Activity

There is only one important rule in the zone system: One should not campaign intensively beyond one's domain. Except for existing natural relationships such as relatives and/or close friends, a candidate is not supposed to pursue new connections outside his or her zone. This rule, however, is very difficult to enforce. This is an internal rule of the party, thus no legal sanctions can be taken against a violation. Also, it is hard to make distinctions between old and new connections. All Kuomintang candidates in fact pursue old and new support in their colleagues' zones. Ultimately, each Kuomintang candidate is competing against every other at least to some degree. This is an inevitable outcome of a multimember-district, single-entry ballot election.

Zone campaign activities are supervised by the City Committee. Any punishment for violation of the agreement among candidates is very difficult, since punishing candidates during the campaign would hurt not only the candidates involved but also the party as a whole. Therefore, the Zone System relies on the self-restraint of all party candidates.

## Evaluation of Zone Performance

Mid-campaign evaluation helps the Kuomintang to make adequate adjustments to the zone assignments. Surveys are occasionally used to investigate nominees' progress. But the result are often not reliable because a large group of respondents do not reveal the candidates for whom they intend to vote. The City Committee chairman's preference also is a factor. If the chairman has confidence in surveys, surveys are used. Otherwise, the Kuomintang relies solely on the CCHP-Conferences to estimate potential votes for party nominees. *Li* and *lin* leaders report their estimates to the district committee, then the district committees report estimates to the City Committee. The City Committee then balances estimates from all conferences. Other than this, I did not see any indication that scientific techniques are used to evaluate the electoral strength of candidates.

## Activities in the Zone

The idea of the Zone System is to utilize the existing social network to spread political information. This process of information supply consists of many different activities.

### Three Phases of the Zone Activity

A number of activities held in the campaign are related to the zone system. CCHP-Conference Meetings, dinner parties, free trips for local leaders, door-to-door canvassing, and parades are typical ingredients. The purposes of these activities may be divided into three: introduction, interaction, and mobilization.

Introduction. In the first stage, the candidate is introduced to local leaders in a meeting, the CCHP-Conference, held in a public place such as a school, community service center, or a party member's house. The candidate and several assistants attend the meeting. After the candidate has been introduced (by the standing member of the sub-district committee, or the *li* leader, or in joint-meetings of conferences, by a party cadre from the district committee), the candidate delivers a speech. The content of the speech always begins with the candidate's connections with local leaders, followed by a thanks for support in the past, a promise of favors if elected, and a request for support in the election. Assistants to the candidate distribute name card, handbills, and other printed materials to the audience.

Interaction. The second phase includes many different activities. The purpose is to maximize the candidate's exposure to the public. The most popular format is a dinner party organized by a secretary of the district committee and a *li* leader. In some cases, this stage and the first are combined to save the candidate's time. If they are separated, the participants might not be the same group; friends, neighbors, and relatives of participants from the first meeting would be invited to the later dinner. During the dinner, the host introduces the candidate; the candidate makes a short speech reminding all of his or her local connections; thanks the group, promises future support, and pleads for support in turn. Then the candidate will go to every table to say a word or two to the participants. The candidate usually is invited to appear at about three to five dinner parties every night. If the candidate cannot make it, the candidate's spouse, or one of the parents, or brothers, sisters, and one or two of the campaign assistants represent the candidate. The candidate's staff is always there to distribute campaign material to participants. Occasionally, the host asks one staff person to speak for the candidate. One other duty for the staff is to pay for the dinner party. A large chunk of the candidate's campaign expenditures go to dinners of this kind.

*Chih-Chang-Ho-Dong* (CCHD-Activity, or literally, self-strengthening activity), or political junkets, are another kind of popular activities in the second stage. These activities

are sponsored and partially financed by the City Government to reward the *li* leaders and *lin* leaders for their efforts throughout the year. A CCHD-Activity usually is a one or two-day trip to a resort. The activity may take place any time during the year. In an election season, it happens most often in the two months before election day. This timing is favored by both the Kuomintang and the participants. The Kuomintang needs opportunities to sell their candidates to the local leaders, while participants expect that some candidates will appear right before their buses starts -- with good wishes, drinks, and some gifts for the participants. These activities are not free to participants, but they pay only nominal fees.

The purpose of these activities is to increase the exposure of the candidate to a selected public. In addition to activities arranged by the district committees, all candidates seek to participate in as many activities as possible. Ordinary dinner parties during the election season are very often interrupted by unexpected guests--candidates, and decks of campaign materials.

The candidate also need to attend most "red" and "white" events (which refer to weddings and funerals respectively due to the color of invitation cards). Funerals are especially crucial. A candidate may simply send a gift to a wedding and not attend, but he or she cannot miss a funeral. According to Lin Yu-shiang, many of his supporters volunteer to campaign for him simply because he attended one of their grandparents' funerals. The "face" Lin gave them makes them strong supporters.

A typical day's activities for Lin Yu-shiang during this period may be best illustrated by his schedule on Friday, November 24, a week before the election day (Figure 3-4). His early morning activity began with a visit to a group leaving for a trip. Lin agreed to wish them a happy trip--with some soft drinks he brought for them. Then he attended a meeting with some teachers at a school. Right after breakfast, he attended three funerals held at the same funeral house. Since the party assigned divisions in banks in Taipei to his zone, he spent much of the morning visiting the offices of three banks. After lunch, he participated in a mass meeting held for Kuomintang candidates before attending his fourth

funeral of the day. Then, he visited a market to shake hands with store owners, retailers, and their customers. Before dinner time, he spent about two hours in his campaign office answering several telephone calls, talking to secretaries about some changes in schedule, and thinking about the content of the speech he planned to deliver in his own speech meeting.

Dinner time is especially difficult for any candidate. Lin was invited to participate in eleven dinner parties. He could attend only half of them. However, at least one aide represented him at each dinner party. He skipped all of the weddings. Before eight in the evening, he spoke for fifteen minutes at a Kuomintang-sponsored speech meeting.

Figure 3-4
Lin Yu-shiang's Schedule: Friday, November 24, 1989.



After the meeting, he joined campaign assistants in his own speech meeting which had already been underway for about an hour in a market.

His speech lasted for another hour. As in other speeches, he began this speech emphasizing his connections with local people, appreciating the support they provided in the past, and pleading for continued support. After the speech, he went to another candidate's office to express his good wishes before he returned to the campaign office for the day's staff meeting.

In the staff meeting, he asked everyone about the work they had done that day. Then, a schedule for the next day was announced. After a snack break, he spent about an

Table 3-2
Frequencies of Lin Yu-shiang's Interaction Activities,
October 5 - November 30, 1989

| Dates | dinners | meetings | weddings | funerals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 5-8 | 14 | 32 | 2 | 5 |
| Oct 9-15 | 14 | 41 | 13 | 11 |
| Oct 16-22 | 20 | 41 | 2 | 13 |
| Oct 23-29 | 19 | 59 | 15 | 5 |
| Oct 30-Nov 5 | 32 | 65 | 6 | 11 |
| Nov 6-12 | 35 | 61 | 13 | 20 |
| Nov 13-19 | 58 | 71 | 18* | 24 |
| Nov 20-26 | 46 | 74 | 14 | 19 |
| Nov 27-30 | 12 | 34 | 4 | 9 |

* All 18 weddings took place on the same day. Distribution of frequencies is not even because there are days better than others for a wedding, according to the Chinese zodiac calender.

hour or so talking to individual zone and non-zone correspondents to get a full understanding of the situation in each area. By the time he was ready to go home, it was almost 12:30 a.m.

Efforts to attend all of these activities lead to an extremely tight schedule for the candidate. Table 3-2 shows the frequencies of four categories of activities Lin Yu-shiang

attended in the 8 weeks before the election day. Most activities he were intended to increase his exposure to and contact with voters before the election day.

Mobilization. The third phase, taking place in the last week of the campaign, is to mobilize voters in the zone. The above two phases also are to mobilize support for the candidate. In this stage, the activities are more intensive than the first two phases. Door-to-door canvassing and a zone-wide parade are conducted during this stage.

Door-to-door canvasses are usually organized by the candidate's staff with coordination by the district committee. When canvassing in a *li*, the *li* leader, some *lin* leaders, and sub-district committee members accompany the candidate and his/her staff. With the presence of these local leaders, the contacts are typically warmly perceived. The candidates would like to have as many of these contacts as possible, but time is limited. In some areas, therefore, the canvasses are carried out without the candidate. However, if possible, one of the candidate's family members will represent him/her.

To cap these mobilizing activities, a parade (which is prohibited by the Election Law) was organized on the last day of the campaign. This parade was carried out only in the candidate's zone. Two or three days before the parade, the plan was suggested by the District Committees in the zone. The District Committee also made arrangements such as asking *li* leaders and *lin* leaders to set fireworks (supplied by the candidate) along the route of the parade, hanging a banner of blessing for the candidate, and presenting themselves during the parade. The purpose of this parade is to create high morale, though I did not see much enthusiasm in the public's response.

## Issueless Zone Campaign

Issue positions of candidates and of voters have been found to be associated--at least with a portion of the electorate (Campbell et al 1960, Ch.8; Nie et al, 1976, Chs.6-8).

Therefore, taking positions on current issues is a strategy for a political party and its candidates to attract votes (Downs, 1957). In the Kuomintang's zone campaign, issue positions of candidates do not play an important role. This does not mean that no candidate raised issues in the campaign. DPP (and Tang-wai) candidates do raise issues in all elections. There are two factors leading to the lack of issue-focus in the Kuomintang's zone system. First, most voters do not pay much attention to issues. As a consequence, there is no incentive for the candidate to bring up issues in the campaign. Second, the political reform issues Tang-wai candidates have raised in the past, such as the imposition of martial law, the government's subsidies for activities of the Kuomintang, the tenured parliament, etc. are not what the Kuomintang wanted their candidates to discuss during the election. Most Kuomintang candidates accordingly kept silent on these issues. Occasionally, some candidates took positions directly violating the Kuomintang's policy. Those candidates were punished after the election. Lin Yu-shiang's campaign in 1989 was an example. A position he took during the campaign was to dissolve the National Assembly, the Taiwanese version of the Electoral College, and let voters directly elect the president. This was a powerful political appeal during the campaign. I believe that this issue position helped him in the election (see Chapter 5). However, this position was a direct assault on the party's policy, which is still determined by a small group of senior politicians. Lin Yu-shiang was purged--a suspension of rights in the party for 18 months--after the election. This purge may have enhanced his popularity with the voters. When the Kuomintang's decision of the purge was announced in the Legislative Yuan where Lin was attending a meeting, he won applause from the audience (*China Times*, December 28, 1989, p.2-3). The purge was canceled after 6 months (*China Times*, June 22, 1990, p.2).

Mechanism of the Zone System

Manpower involved in a zone campaign, especially the CCHP-Conferences, is huge. In the legislative election, a zone of 80 *li* needs the participation of the 80 *li* leaders and 80 standing sub-district committee members. Some of them are the candidate's acquaintances, some are not. Most who work at all work actively and enthusiastically for the candidate. Local leaders in the United States have been found to have both personal and impersonal motivations (Eldersveld, 1982, pp. 177-182). In Taiwan personal relationships between the candidate and local leaders explain some of the enthusiasm, as do close connections between the Kuomintang's community service stations and local leaders. There are, however, more ingredients in the system. Material compensation, party loyalty, and good diplomacy by the candidate all can motivate a group of leaders to work hard for party nominees.

Personal Connection. The candidate's local connections provide him/her good access to voters; after seven years as city councilman and nine years as legislator, Lin Yu-shiang knows a large group of local activists including party cadres, *li* leaders, *lin* leaders, school presidents, police station directors, and small store owners. They occasionally need service from the legislator. The casework Lin's office did for them won him certain support city-wide. However, a greater credit must be given to hard-working party employees at the community service stations. They are the ones who maintain frequent contacts with local leaders and voters. They provide the bridge connecting the candidate and local leaders. A couple of Lin's zone correspondents indicated that local party workers do make a big difference. Judging from the outcome of the votes, they were correct. For instance, due to the relatively larger size of constituency for legislators than for city councillors, legislative candidates can do only "extensive cultivation", which means that campaign efforts focus on the level of contacting *li* leaders. They must rely on *li* leaders to contact voters for them. In

a small ward, however, party workers at the district committee were able to conduct an "intensive cultivation" for Lin Yu-shiang; they contact *lin* leaders at least twice during the last week. Lin Yu-shiang's performance in these endeavor was much better than Kuomintang candidates assigned to the same area in previous elections.

Local leaders have many connections with different politicians. One's *li, lin*, or organization might be assigned to a candidate while one has a better relationship with another. In situations like this, friendship prevails since personal relationships are given first priority (Jacobs, 1979). For example, a school president presided at a meeting was supposed to campaign for a particular candidate as the party instructed. He did so but subtly revised it. One of the president's friends was running in the same election but was assigned another zone. This president, in the meeting, urged the participants, "If you have a natural relationship, you may vote with it; if not, then vote the party nominee." The "natural relationship" referred to the relationship between families, relatives, schoolmates, and home town acquaintances. He was obviously helping his old college friend. After his speech, however, another school president stood up from his seat and made another speech emphasizing his knowledge of the candidate assigned to that zone. He said that the party's chosen candidate is outstanding, and thus, all party members should support the party's decision. That candidate happened to be his own close friend. In both cases, the speakers used a personal relationship to support their arguments.

Financial and Material Compensation. Personal relationships alone do not provide sufficient motivation to work for the candidates. Financial and other material rewards to these local leaders are important and expected. Some of them demand money even before the candidate offers. From the candidate's view, providing some financial compensation for the labor they contribute is reasonable. To my knowledge, the rates in the past election were as follows:

--*Li* leaders received NT$10,000-20,000 (US$400-800) and some gifts such as a casette recorder, calculator, tea pot set, etc.

--Sub-district committee chairs received NT$10,000 (US$400).

--Sub-district committee secretariats received NT$5,000 (US$200).

--*Li* administrators received NT$5,000 (US$200).

--*Lin* leaders received NT$2,000 (US$80) from the City Committee.

In order to encourage hard-working leaders, a district committee initiated a competition among *li* leaders in the district. The criteria for evaluation were turnout and percentage of votes obtained by zone candidate. Leaders of the top five *li* were awarded between 10,000 and 20,000 dollars (US$400-800). Cash was provided by the candidates running for different offices.

In addition to money offered to local leaders, some candidates use money to buy votes. As I indicated earlier, the amount is small--between 200 and 500 dollars (US$8-20).[4] A reasonable explanation for these small sums is that they were used to show the goodwill of the candidate. This is a common feature of Asian societies.[5] Jacob (1980, pp.147-148) indicates that the major function of vote-buying in Taiwan is to remind voters to vote. However, voters occasionally demand money. A DPP candidate told me they also spent money for that purpose because local leaders demanded it--saying that they did not care about the amount of cash, they cared about losing face if they got no money to distribute to their neighbors. The major effect of vote-buying in Taiwan, I believe, is to reinforce existing attitudes, not to convert a voter.

There is an "ethic" of vote-buying in Taiwan, as Jacobs (1980, p.148) and Crissman (1981, p.111) indicated. Many voters accept a candidate's money only when they intend to vote for the candidate. In a rural county, a candidate lost in the local election of early 1990 after spending several million dollars in the campaign. When the news of his bankruptcy circulated in the community, voters voluntarily returned him 2 million dollars

he spent to buy their votes (*China Times*, January 24, 1990, p.16). This event, however, could be interpreted in another way. The money the candidate gave to local leaders probably was not distributed to voters. That was why the candidate lost. Those leaders, not the voters, returned the money.

One important aspect of vote-buying is the inter-personal network of *li* and *lin* leaders; without them the money would have no place to go; or if it goes, it does not get the vote. For instance, Lin Yu-shiang's performance in some *li* of his zone was not as good as he had expected. During the campaign process, vote-buying by another candidate was reported by Lin's friends in those areas. Some *lin* leaders were saying that it was better to live in the other's zone than to live in Lin Yu-shiang's zone. In a meeting I attended, two candidates for city council also complained about the rumor. They thought that the candidate involved was "disturbing the market"--they demanded that acts such as vote-buying should be conducted later. I learned after the election that the other candidate was able to buy votes in that area because he had help from a former city councilman who built his political base there and still is actively involved in local politics. Lin did not have good relationship with him, and thus opened the door to the other candidate.

A Matter of Face. In spite of the above, it is unfair to say that all local leaders are materially oriented. Some of them receive gifts of limited value, yet remain enthusiastic. Either a framed picture taken with the candidate or a letter appointing them as an "honorary member of the campaign committee" will make them very devoted -- though no such committee exists. Others received only courtesy from the candidates. The only benefit they get is "face", a reputation of being associated with famous people in the society.

Party Loyalty. Some part-time campaigners campaigned for candidates simply because they hold leadership positions in the party. They did not accept money, they did not know the candidate, they also did not work for "face"; all they received was a "thank you and happy

new year" card plus a phone call from the candidate. For instance, a small group of university professors, who accompanied Mrs. Lin and me to visit a village where our faculty colleagues live, campaigned for Lin Yu-shiang simply because the party units on campus asked them to do so. The fact that Lin Yu-shiang is an alumnus did help. But if it were another candidate, those professors would have done the same.

I did not have an opportunity to observe operations within military community. I believe that party loyalty is a major factor that contributes to the Kuomintang's electoral success among them.

## Summary

The purpose of this participant observation in a Kuomintang candidate's campaign is to investigate the operation of the Zone System, which functions like a party machine in American cities. As Gosnell described, the Democratic machine in Chicago provided community services (e.g., assistance in funerals and weddings) when no elections were being held, canvassed houses and, sometimes, bribed voters to win votes (Gosnell, 1937, pp.69-90). Curtis (1971, pp.67,117,239) describes similar activities in Japanese elections. The similarity of the operations indicates that in elections the electoral strength, to some degree, is built on non-political contacts with voters. The Zone System is an example. The followings are the major findings:

1. The zone system is a campaign structure using interpersonal networks to mobilize supporters of the Kuomintang for particular candidates in particular areas.

2. The major actors in the Zone System are local leaders including *li* leaders, *lin* leaders, *li* administrators, sub-district committee members, party secretaries, cell leaders, and *lin* correspondents. They have influence because they keep close contacts with individuals in their neighborhoods.

3. There are two types of zones. Structural *li* are geographically defined; functional zones are organizationally defined.

4. The major activities in the zone campaign are aimed at maximizing the exposure of the candidates to voters. Informal meetings are used most frequently. Other activities such as speech-making, telephone campaigning, and canvassing are all used in Taiwan.

5. The party allocates zones, social networks formed by local leaders, to candidates so they can concentrate their campaign activities within the networks.

6. Candidates provide most other resources needed to win an election. Some local leaders work hard because they are loyal to the party. Others, however, are materially oriented. The candidates are responsible for most of the financial cost to motivate these local leaders.

## Notes to Chapter 3

[1] Japanese elections also use a multimember district system. In Japan, however, I do not see a zone system initiated by any party. The bailiwicks of politicians are rather a result of their own political campaigns than the designation of the party (Curtis 1971, 49-50).

[2] There were two cases where candidates shared a ward. Chi Cheng and Chao Shaw-kang shared Ward 7 (Chungsan); Lin Yu-shiang and Chi Cheng shared Ward 10 (Daan).

[3] After the reconstruction of the Kuomintang in 1950, it established secret units in the military. Government officials consistently deny the existence of Kuomintang organizations in the armed forces. The existence of these party units are well known to the public. The code names the Kuomintang used for party division in the military were *Wang-Shu-Kai* and *Sun-Chung-Hsing*. Currently, it is *Ho-Ding-Chern*.

[4] Sometimes the amount is bigger because the competition is high. Some candidates tried to negotiate among themselves to achieve a "reasonable market price". A case involved two Kuomintang candidates for the city council. One tried to convinced the other that $500 (US$20) was high enough. The other candidate refused to cooperate; the amount they spent on each vote was $1000 (US$40). Crissman (1981, p.110) also has a similar observation.

[5] A similar practice is found in Japanese elections (Curtis, 1971, pp.117, 236-241).

# CHAPTER 4

## THE ZONE EFFECT ON VOTING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION RESULTS

In a previous study, I have shown that Kuomintang candidates for one city council election in Taipei won significantly more votes from within their responsibility zones than from outside it (Liu, 1986). I concluded that the Zone System is effective in the city council elections. There is no similar research investigating the effect of the Zone System on legislative elections. Although the previous study suggests that the Zone System is effective, the analysis of results from a single election is not sufficient to test other plausible theories. For example, the strong performance of a candidate in a particular area could be a result of the fact that the candidate is a local favorite. With or without the help of the Zone System, he would draw strong support from local residents. Unless there is evidence excluding this possibility, we cannot be sure that a candidate's strong performance is due to the impact of the Zone System.

In this chapter, my purpose is to provide evidence of the electoral effect of the Zone System in the legislative elections. Hypotheses and possible rival hypotheses are developed and examined. Data and methods of analysis are described. Following these descriptions are analyses of the results from four legislative elections in 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989 in the City of Taipei. The results show that the Zone System is effective, but that the impact of other factors such as localism, a special sociopolitical connection between candidates and voters, cannot be ignored.

## Hypotheses and Rival Hypotheses

For the Responsibility Zone System to have an impact on a zoned candidate's performance, two conditions must exist. First, since the Zone System divides a multi-member constituency into several single-candidate zones, votes for zoned candidates must concentrate in a small, though not necessarily contiguous, area: the particular candidate's assigned zone. Second, other factors that may lead to the concentration of votes for a candidate must be examined and ruled out. Based on these necessary conditions, I develop the following hypotheses.

### Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Distribution of votes for the zoned candidates tend to be more concentrated (i.e. within the zone) than that of candidates without zone assignment. The degree of unevenness of vote distribution among *li* is greater among zoned candidates than candidates without a zone.

The aim of the Kuomintang's Zone System is to mobilize support for each nominee in a particular area. If the Zone System is effective, votes for zoned candidates should be concentrated in a small area rather than evenly distributed throughout the district. On the other hand, those who have no zone assignment tend to have more evenly distributed votes throughout the constituency. In other words, the degree of concentration is greater for the zoned candidates, smaller for others.

Hypothesis 2. Zoned candidates perform significantly better in the zone than outside it.

Concentration alone is not enough to prove that the zone system causes the difference of the vote distribution between candidates with and without zones. The concentration of votes for zoned candidates must occur within each candidate's zone. A candidate's performance should be better in his or her zone than outside it.

Hypothesis 3. Functional zones perform similar functions to geographical zones, with similar reliability.

The term "concentration" in this study implies that the zone is geographically defined and that we may find zoned candidates performing particularly better in some geographic areas than others. However, not all zones are geographically defined. Some zones are formed by Kuomintang units in organizations; they are functional zones (see Chapter 3). The military community is the most powerful and most reliable zone of this kind. The Kuomintang enjoys a considerable degree of freedom in assigning different candidates to this functional zone. Although difficult to estimate with primarily geographically-based measures, the effect of this special zone also needs to be tested.

Rival Hypotheses

There is a possibility that the concentration of votes for zoned candidates within the zone is caused by other factors. Due to special economic, social, and political connections, some politicians enjoy strong support from particular areas. This localism may lead to the concentration of votes. These possible influences need to be examined..

Rival Hypothesis 1. If a candidates has special local connections, s/he tends to draw consistently strong support from that particular area over multiple elections.

If a candidate is locally popular, and if s/he runs in several elections for the same office, votes for her/him in a particular area should be consistently high. However, we may discount the influence of localism by showing the Kuomintang's freedom of assigning zones to candidates. If voting patterns for a highly-popular candidate still change dramatically with a change in zone assignment--especially a strong negative change--then the zone impact can be said to be a more powerful force than localism.

Rival Hypothesis 2. Popularity of candidates tends to increase the dispersion of votes for the candidates.

A candidate's general popularity certainly can help the candidate in an election. If one is popular among voters in a particular area, one's popularity should lead to a concentration of votes and better performance in that area. However, it is not likely that a popular politician will be popular only among a small group of voters. In a small country such as Taiwan, it is easier for politicians to develop nationwide popularity. Therefore, votes for popular candidates tend to distribute evenly throughout the constituency. The candidates, however, may still benefit from a zone assignment. If so, the concentration of the votes for them is more likely produced by the zone than by their popularity.

## Data

Data used in the analysis of this chapter are election results published by the government. The election records for Taipei contain the results from each of about 1000 polling stations in the city. Because of the differences in size of *li*, some large *li* are divided into several polling stations, so that each station has about 1500 voters. No polling station serves more than one *li*, no matter how small a population is in the *li*. This arrangement allows me to merge polling stations belonging to the same *li* for the purpose of analysis. It

is also logical to use *li* as the unit of analysis because the major structure in the Zone System, the CCHP-Conference (see Chapter 3), operates within *li*. Using *li* as the unit of analysis is also more preferable to using polling stations because the latter change between elections, thus making comparison impossible.

Election records used in this study include those of the legislative elections of 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Kuomintang did not face any serious organized challenge in elections before 1977. Also the number of seats open to election were small, which made the elections less meaningful. It was not until 1980 that Taiwan had more competitive legislative elections. I believe that the inclusion of these four elections in this analysis is both necessary and appropriate.

Not all candidates in these four legislative elections are included in the analysis. Since achieving candidacy is easy in Taiwan, there are usually more than 15 candidates competing for between five to eight seats. The legislative election in Taipei in 1980 had 33 candidates seeking seven seats. In 1983, there were 25 candidates competing for eight seats. The number of candidates in 1986 was 16 for eight seats. In 1989, 21 candidates ran in the North District and 17 competed in the South District; both for six open seats. Although many candidates contended, the major players were those who were nominated by the Kuomintang and those who were backed by the DPP. There were eleven major players in both 1980 and 1983, ten in 1986, and nine and eight, in the North and South Districts, respectively, in 1989. Independent candidates do not have a good chance of attracting voters, nor of winning the election. Those few who performed exceptionally well are included in the analysis. Total votes for those excluded from analysis in this study comprise no more than 5% of the vote in each election. The impact of this omission is minute.

## Measurements and Analyses

In this section, the measurements of the variables used in this study are described below. Since data used in this chapter are election results from all *li* in each election, there is no sampling problem involved. There is also no need to consider measurement error. No serious error is expected.

Concentration of Votes. Concentration of votes means that a high percentage of the vote for each zoned candidate appears in a small area. In other areas, the zoned candidates obtained smaller percentages of votes cast. The equation for computing the percentage of vote is

$$P_{ij} = (V_{ij}/V_j) \times 100\% \quad (1)$$

where $P_{ij}$ is the percentage of the vote for candidate *i* in ward *j*; $V_{ij}$ is votes for candidate *i* in ward *j* ; and $V_j$ is the total number of votes for all major candidates in ward *j* .

Whether the degree of concentration is high or low, in term of the size of $P_{ij}$, depends on the number of major candidates. Given no differentiation between candidates, the best guess of the share of votes by any given candidate should be about average, which is

$$(100\%)/N$$

where N is the number of major candidates in the election. For example, if there are ten candidates, each candidate would be expected to receive 10% of the votes. Given the large number of candidates, differences between them, and multiple offices, the variations of vote percentage for candidates are high; receiving ten percent of the total votes will usually win the election. For the four elections we are interested in, the number of major contenders runs between 11 and 8. Therefore, an "all things equal" expectation for each candidate is to win 9% to 12.5% of the total vote in any area. Since in most cases the ward is the unit of zone assignment, it is reasonable to examine the candidate's vote

concentration among wards. In wards where a candidate wins less than 9% of the vote, the performance in that ward can be considered poor; if s/he wins more than 12.5%, the performance is good. Concentration of votes means that the vote for the candidates is much higher than 12.5% in a small number of districts while significantly smaller than 9% in other areas. The major function of the Zone System is to mobilize support for zoned candidates in particular area. Therefore, votes for each zoned candidates should concentrate in a small area. Again, the reader should note that this small area, due to the nature of zone assignment, need not be geographically contiguous.

Spread of Vote Distribution. The measurement of the concentration of votes is also one way to measure the unevenness of vote distribution. Higher concentration means greater degree of unevenness. In the above I used the ward as the unit of analysis. There are only 16 wards in Taipei. Under the jurisdiction of these wards, there are 630 *li* (It was 780 in 1980) in the city. Using *li* as the unit of analysis should reveal more information about the vote distribution. First, I calculate the percentage of vote for each candidate in each *li* ($L_{ik}$). The computation equation is

$$L_{ik} = (V_{ik}/V_k) \times 100\% \qquad (2)$$

where $L_{ik}$ is the percentage of vote for candidate *i* in *li k*; $V_{ik}$ is votes for candidate *i* in *li k*; $V_k$ is the total vote for all major candidates in *li k*.

As indicated in the previous section, the best guess of a candidate's performance in a *li*, in terms of percentage, is between 9% and 12.5%. Because of the smaller unit, the variance of the distribution at the *li* level should be greater than at the ward level. For example, in 1983, a candidate (Jen Yo-sin) won 87% of the votes in a *li* where a nursing home is located. Five of the other ten candidates received less than one percent of the total vote in that *li*. Such an extreme distribution becomes much more unlikely at the ward level.

To examine the spread of votes among *li*, I simply compute the standard deviation of the percentage of vote for each candidate across all *li* ($L_{SD}$) (Wonnacott and

Wonnacott,1977, p.24). The higher the standard deviation the greater the variance. The standard deviation of the distribution of votes for zoned candidates should be greater than those of candidates without zones, if my hypotheses hold.

Performance of Zoned Candidates. To compare the candidates' performance in and outside the zone, the first step is to compute the mean of the percentage of votes for candidates in all *li*. The computation equation is

$$L_{Mean} = (\text{Sum of } L_{ik} \text{ in an area})/n \qquad (3)$$

where $L_{Mean}$ is the mean percentage of the vote for candidates in all *li* in an area (may be a ward, a zone, or the whole constituency); n is the number of *li* in the area.

By using equation (3), Both $L_{Mean}$ in and outside a zone may be calculated. Then, a t-test can be conducted to compare the difference of the two means. A significant difference supports the effect of the Zone System on the candidate's performance.

The Effect of a Functional Zone. I indicated in Chapter 2 that the military community provides consistently strong support for Kuomintang candidates. Usually, the community has its own legislative candidate. However, the candidate is decided by the party leaders, not by the rank and file. Despite this, most of the community members vote for the candidate as the party instructs. These candidates, for the elections studies, are Lee Chih-peng in 1980 and 1983, Chen Hong-chuan in 1986, and Chao Zen-peng (North District) and Yu Mu-ming (South District) in 1989. If military support for these candidates is consistent, then we should find that their votes are highly associated. The Pearson correlations between military candidate of one year should be highly correlated with military candidates of other years. These correlations indicate that they have the same supporting base.

Discounting the Impact of Localism. The effect of localism may be discounted if the Kuomintang enjoy great freedom in making zone assignments. If we find the following, the impact of the Zone System, rather than localism, can be asserted to be the primary factor causing the concentration of votes and better performance within the zone.

1) The removal of a ward from a particular candidate's zone is followed by a sharp decrease of votes for him/her in that ward.
2) The addition of a ward to a particular candidate's zone is followed by a significant increase of votes for the candidate in that ward.
3) The reassignment of a ward (which was previously removed from a particular candidate's zone and caused a decrease in votes,) back to that particular zone brings a significant return of votes for the candidate in that ward.

Since the tests for the above hypotheses need candidates who ran in different election situations, the number of cases for this purpose is not large. Four cases, three from the Kuomintang, one from the DPP, can best be used for the test. Lin Yu-shiang ran in all four elections related to this study, while Hong Wen-tung and Chi Cheng ran in 1980, 1983, and 1986 for seats representing Taipei. A fourth case is the DPP's Kang Nin-shiang who did not have a zone in any election. In order to make a contrast, votes for Kang in three elections (in 1980, 1983, and 1986) are analyzed. All of their votes in different years can be compared to see if the patterns of change discussed above exist.

Performance of Popular Candidates. There is no accepted measure for a candidate's general popularity based on election results. However, in the 1980s, two candidates for legislative elections in Taipei were considered widely popular. They are Chi Cheng, the only Taiwanese female athlete to ever win a medal in the Olympic Games, and Chao Shaw-kang, once a college professor and host for a TV news program. Chi's popularity came from her active involvement in campaigns for popular support for sports in the 1970s.

Chao's popularity was largely the result of his frequent appearances in the mass media. In a survey in 1986, he was rated the top among all legislative candidates in all evaluation categories such as "the most outspoken," "the most enthusiastic," "provides the best service," "has the best knowledge" etc. (Lui, Chen, and Liu, 1987)

Votes for each of them were examined to see the relationship between their popularity and the Zone System. A popular politician should draw more even support from all areas of the city, if his or her popularity is the dominant factor in her/his electoral success.

## Results

### Votes for Major Candidates

Table 4-1 through 4-4 show the vote percentages for major candidates in the four legislative elections in the 1980s in Taipei. Wards assigned to Kuomintang candidates' zones are underlined. Except for a few cases in 1989, the percentages for zoned candidates are clearly higher in those wards, lower in others. The concentration of votes for zoned candidates becomes evident.

While some concentration of votes is apparent for non-zoned candidates as well, they attain neither the degree of concentration nor the relative peaks of support of the zoned candidates. In 1980 and in 1986 (Table 4-1 and 4-3), Kang's votes in Wards 12 and 14 were as good as or better than those of the zone candidates. Huang (T.F.) in Ward 8 (Table 4-1 and 4-2), and Hsieh in the same ward (Table 4-3) were similar. These wards were either their former city council constituencies or the wards where they lived -- they had good local connections.

The results in 1989 (Table 4-4) are different from previous elections. The differences between zone candidates and candidates without a zone are not evident. The

reason was that the unit of zone assignment was *li*, instead of ward, in 1989. There were five cases where zone candidates were assigned the whole ward. Votes Hong Tung-kwei in Ward 11, Lin Yu-shiang in Ward 8 and Ward 16, and Huang Su-wei in Wards 9 and 12 still are significantly more than other wards. The tendency of concentration of votes for zone candidates still exists in these wards.

The concentration of votes for zoned candidates can be seen not only by comparing their performance ward by ward for each candidate, but also by comparing different

Table 4-1
Percentage[1] of Vote for Candidates in Wards,
Legislative Election of 1980, Taipei.

| | Candidate with Zone[2] | | | | | | Candidates Without Zone | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ward | Huang L.F. | Chou | Lui | Lin | Chi | Lee[3] | Kang | Yeh | Wang | Hong | Huang T.F. |
| 1 | 29.9 | .8 | 3.4 | 1.3 | 14.0 | 5.1 | 11.2 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 11.2 |
| 2 | 24.0 | .9 | 5.5 | 1.2 | 13.4 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 2.3 | 12.6 | 10.9 |
| 3 | 43.0 | 1.0 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 11.1 | 3.0 | 14.3 | 5.2 | 2.5 | 7.6 | 1.9 |
| 4 | 2.0 | 28.0 | 7.4 | 2.0 | 16.3 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 2.4 | 7.3 |
| 5 | 2.0 | 24.3 | 3.9 | 1.2 | 10.7 | 25.5 | 7.1 | 4.3 | 7.3 | 2.8 | 5.6 |
| 6 | 1.4 | 21.1 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 11.0 | 15.9 | 5.5 | 4.9 | 18.9 | 5.9 | 5.0 |
| 7 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 15.1 | 2.0 | 16.4 | 12.8 | 11.3 | 5.4 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 12.1 |
| 8 | 7.8 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 16.3 | 13.3 | 1.8 | 15.3 | 6.3 | 2.6 | 8.4 | 18.6 |
| 9 | 13.7 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 12.9 | 14.0 | 2.8 | 16.8 | 7.6 | 2.5 | 6.1 | 14.5 |
| 10 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 6.2 | 25.5 | 19.0 | 9.8 | 8.0 | 5.2 | 1.1 | 4.0 | 6.5 |
| 11 | 3.3 | .9 | 5.6 | 23.4 | 18.6 | 10.5 | 10.6 | 5.8 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 8.9 |
| 12 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 26.5 | 13.7 | 2.7 | 24.3 | 5.0 | 1.4 | 5.2 | 7.9 |
| 13 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 5.9 | 2.2 | 35.0 | 14.8 | 10.9 | 4.8 | .8 | 6.0 | 5.3 |
| 14 | 4.4 | .8 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 28.6 | 3.8 | 27.1 | 4.5 | 1.2 | 8.8 | 6.1 |
| 15 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 7.0 | 2.9 | 37.1 | 15.0 | 9.7 | 4.2 | 1.6 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
| 16 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 8.6 | 1.8 | 42.1 | 12.9 | 8.0 | 4.8 | 1.1 | 7.0 | 4.0 |

Note: 1. Entries are percentages. The computation formulas is: $(V_{ij} / V_j) \times 100\%$, where $V_{ij}$ is votes for candidate *i* in Ward *j*. $V_j$ is the total votes in Ward *j*. Row totals do not add up to 100% because votes for minor candidates, whose votes are less than 3% in all districts, are not included in the table.
2. Underlined are zones for each candidate.
3. The military community is spread among wards; therefore, the zone is not as clear as the geographically defined zones.

candidates in each ward. The vote percentages for the zoned candidates, with few exceptions, are consistently the highest. Some less evident cases appeared in wards where candidates share a zone. In 1986 (Table 4-3), Lin and Chi shared Ward 10, Chao and Chi shared Ward 4, and Chao and Jen shared Ward 7. If we add the percentage for candidates who shared the zone, the results are about the same. That is, the hypothetical "aggregate zone candidate" is the top performer in the ward. This provides an indication of the zone's power in influencing the results of elections.

Table 4-2
Percentage[1] of Vote for Candidates in Wards,
Legislative Election of 1983, Taipei.

| | Candidate with Zone[2] | | | | | | Candidates Without Zone | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ward | Hong | Jen | Lin | Tsai | Kao | Lee[3] | Chi | Jiang | Huang | Lui | Kang |
| 1 | 31.8 | 7.6 | 4.7 | 8.6 | 3.3 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 9.6 | 6.3 | 4.0 |
| 2 | 31.9 | 7.9 | 4.3 | 11.0 | 3.0 | 9.8 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 5.9 | 3.0 |
| 3 | 27.3 | 5.9 | 4.8 | 11.4 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 5.3 | 6.3 | 17.9 | 5.8 | 4.1 |
| 4 | 5.1 | 38.7 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 2.8 | 7.8 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 4.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 |
| 5 | 6.4 | 8.3 | 26.9 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 17.0 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 2.6 |
| 6 | 7.3 | 9.1 | 30.8 | 7.5 | 4.5 | 12.9 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 2.8 |
| 10 | 3.9 | 13.5 | 30.9 | 6.9 | 2.9 | 9.8 | 9.5 | 6.3 | 3.5 | 6.3 | 3.1 |
| 11 | 4.8 | 10.1 | 33.7 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 7.8 | 8.7 | 7.2 | 5.0 | 5.9 | 3.9 |
| 7 | 6.7 | 9.9 | 7.4 | 21.0 | 3.1 | 9.9 | 8.4 | 10.3 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 3.9 |
| 8 | 9.6 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 25.5 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 5.6 | 10.5 | 17.1 | 5.9 | 5.2 |
| 9 | 9.8 | 6.5 | 7.2 | 27.4 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 6.1 | 10.4 | 11.6 | 8.0 | 4.3 |
| 12 | 7.6 | 5.9 | 8.9 | 30.9 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 9.9 |
| 13 | 6.5 | 11.3 | 7.4 | 5.9 | 21.3 | 14.1 | 9.9 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 7.0 | 5.3 |
| 14 | 9.0 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 24.8 | 4.1 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 14.3 |
| 15 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 7.2 | 4.5 | 23.9 | 14.2 | 10.2 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 8.4 | 3.5 |
| 16 | 7.5 | 10.2 | 5.8 | 3.1 | 33.6 | 11.9 | 9.3 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 7.2 | 3.6 |

Note: 1. Entries are percentages. The computation formulas is: $(V_{ij} / V_j) \times 100\%$, where $V_{ij}$ is votes for candidate *i* in Ward *j*. $V_j$ is the total votes in Ward *j*. Row totals do not add up to 100% because votes for minor candidates, whose votes are less than 3% in all districts, are not included in the table.
2. Underlined are zones for each candidate.
3. The military community is spread among wards; therefore, the zone is not as clear as the geographically defined zones.

Table 4-3

Percentage[1] of Vote for Candidates in Wards,

Legislative Election of 1986, Taipei.

| | Candidates With Zone[2] | | | | | | | Cand. Without Zone | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ward | Hong | Lin | Jen | Huang | Chi | Chao | Chen[3] | Kang | Hsieh | Wu |
| 1 | 24.0 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 6.4 | 12.9 | 7.4 | 17.6 | 9.9 | 9.3 |
| 2 | 30.3 | 3.8 | 5.8 | 3.4 | 6.2 | 11.7 | 7.8 | 15.1 | 8.1 | 7.9 |
| 8 | 25.2 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 9.2 | 1.0 | 13.8 | 22.9 | 11.1 |
| 3 | 11.8 | 18.7 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 10.0 | 3.3 | 19.0 | 13.6 | 11.3 |
| 5 | 5.0 | 23.3 | 5.0 | 2.7 | 6.1 | 19.7 | 11.4 | 10.2 | 6.5 | 10.1 |
| 6 | 6.0 | 22.7 | 4.5 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 24.1 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 5.0 | 13.2 |
| 10 | 2.9 | 15.3 | 8.7 | 5.4 | 16.7 | 13.6 | 10.8 | 13.9 | 6.0 | 6.7 |
| 4 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 20.9 | 3.3 | 6.8 | 21.4 | 9.7 | 11.1 | 6.2 | 11.9 |
| 11 | 3.2 | 5.9 | 28.2 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 11.7 | 4.6 | 17.0 | 7.2 | 7.8 |
| 9 | 6.3 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 24.3 | 4.6 | 10.3 | 1.4 | 15.6 | 17.4 | 11.4 |
| 12 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 35.3 | 4.0 | 8.4 | 1.3 | 24.3 | 6.6 | 8.3 |
| 13 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 6.6 | 29.3 | 8.3 | 13.9 | 7.4 | 15.6 | 5.0 | 5.7 |
| 14 | 5.1 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 24.9 | 5.4 | 10.9 | 2.7 | 32.4 | 4.5 | 6.4 |
| 15 | 3.8 | 4.9 | 6.6 | 27.1 | 9.3 | 14.7 | 11.2 | 12.3 | 4.8 | 5.4 |
| 7 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 14.3 | 17.8 | 7.9 | 14.9 | 14.3 | 9.8 |
| 16 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 31.9 | 13.7 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 5.1 | 5.6 |

Note: 1. Entries are percentages. The computation formulas is: $(V_{ij} / V_j) \times 100\%$, where $V_{ij}$ is votes for candidate *i* in Ward *j*. $V_j$ is the total votes in Ward *j*. Row totals are 100%.

2. Underlined are zones for each candidate.

3. The military community is spread among wards; therefore, the zone is not as clear as the geographically defined zones.

Table 4-4

Percentage[1] of Vote for Candidates in Wards,

Legislative Election of 1989, Taipei.

North District

| Ward | Candidate With Zone | | | | | Candidates Without Zone | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Lee | Lin H.T. | Chou | Chao S.K. | Chao[2] Z.P. | Ting | Chen | Hsieh | Lin W.L. |
| 1 | 11.3 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 21.4 | 7.7 | 6.1 | 12.9 | 25.6 | 6.4 |
| 2 | 10.2 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 26.6 | 9.2 | 6.2 | 11.2 | 20.2 | 9.7 |
| 3 | 2.9 | 13.7 | 4.0 | 20.3 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 16.0 | 31.8 | 3.9 |
| 4 | 2.3 | 5.9 | 11.8 | 29.3 | 8.2 | 6.4 | 17.4 | 17.4 | 1.4 |
| 5 | 1.8 | 9.1 | 12.9 | 25.5 | 10.5 | 6.2 | 14.7 | 16.4 | 2.8 |
| 6 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 12.7 | 34.1 | 8.9 | 4.0 | 15.9 | 16.0 | 2.5 |

South District

| Ward | Candidates With Zone | | | | | Candidates Without Zone | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hong | Lin Y.S. | Chang C.M. | Huang | Yu[2] | Chang T.M. | Yeh | Lin C.J. |
| 7 | 16.9 | 10.7 | 13.6 | 4.3 | 16.1 | 6.8 | 19.1 | 12.6 |
| 10 | 18.4 | 12.4 | 7.2 | 8.6 | 24.4 | 6.9 | 8.7 | 13.4 |
| 11 | 27.3 | 11.7 | 6.6 | 4.9 | 15.3 | 9.3 | 12.2 | 12.7 |
| 8 | 8.9 | 28.4 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 6.9 | 6.6 | 23.4 | 15.1 |
| 13 | 8.9 | 14.5 | 20.8 | 4.9 | 25.8 | 6.7 | 9.8 | 8.6 |
| 15 | 9.7 | 16.1 | 23.4 | 4.7 | 23.0 | 4.7 | 9.0 | 9.6 |
| 16 | 10.6 | 24.8 | 13.9 | 3.6 | 26.8 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.4 |
| 9 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 5.1 | 23.7 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 20.4 | 14.9 |
| 12 | 6.9 | 9.0 | 5.8 | 33.1 | 7.4 | 6.2 | 14.6 | 17.1 |
| 14 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 15.4 | 17.6 | 12.7 | 6.3 | 18.0 | 13.7 |

Note: 1. Entries are percentages. The computation formulas is: $(V_{ij} / V_j) \times 100\%$, where $V_{ij}$ is votes for candidate *i* in Ward *j*. $V_j$ is the total votes in Ward *j*. Row totals are 100%.

2. Underlined are zones for each candidate. Both Chao Zen-peng (Chao, Z.P.) and Yu Mu-min (Yu) had were functional zones and were spread throughout the whole constituencies.

Spread of Vote Distribution

The concentration of votes for zoned candidate means that the unevenness of votes for them should be relatively higher. Tables 4-5 through 4-8 contain the standard deviations of distributions of votes for zoned candidates and candidates without zones in the elections of 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989. In general, the results support the hypothesis that zoned candidates have greater degrees of vote distribution. In 1980 (Table 4-5), of the six Kuomintang candidates who were assigned zones, only one (Lui, $L_{SD}$=6.46) had a standard deviation smaller than that of the leading candidate without zones (Kang, $L_{SD}$=7.99).

The results of the election of 1983 (Table 4-6) indicate a clearer association between the tendency of vote variance and zone assignment. All candidates with zone assignment have high standard deviations (all more than 8.00). All candidates without zones showed smaller standard deviations (all less than 5.00).

Table 4-7 indicates a similar tendency in the election of 1986. Six of the seven Kuomintang candidates with zone assignment have greater standard deviations than other candidates. Only one non-KMT candidate, Kang Nin-shiang of the DPP, has a standard deviation ($L_{SD}$=7.08) greater than one of the Kuomintang's candidates (Chao Shaw-kang, $L_{SD}$=5.73). Two other DPP candidates, Hsieh Chang-ting and Wu Su-jean, have smaller standard deviations ($L_{SD}$=4.83 and 3.96 respectively).

In the election of 1989 (Table 4-8), two anomalous cases emerge. Hsieh Chang-ting ($L_{SD}$=8.27) and Lin Wen-long ($L_{SD}$=6.69) have greater degrees of vote distribution. Both were incumbent members of the City Council, and thus drew stronger support from their city council constituencies. The rest have trends similar to the other three elections. Zoned candidates have a greater unevenness of vote distribution, though the differences are not as clear as before since the unit for zone assignment was the *li*, not the ward, in 1989. The change in the unit of assignment make it difficult to compare candidates' vote in 1989

with votes in other years. Therefore, we need to examine votes in smaller units, at the *li* level. The t-tests (Tables 4-9 & ff.) provide appropriate analyses.

Table 4-5
Comparison of Standard Deviations of Vote Distributions for Candidates, Legislative Election of 1980, Taipei.

| Candidates With Zone | | Candidates Without Zone | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Huang Lian-fu | 11.96 | 7.99 | Kang Nin-shiang |
| Lee Chih-peng | 10.58 | 5.23 | Wang Kun-ho |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 10.56 | 4.53 | Hong Wen-tung |
| Chi Cheng | 9.96 | 2.46 | Yeh Chen-chau |
| Lui Yu-chi | 6.46 | | |

Note: N=780. Candidates are arranged according to the size of standard deviation.

Table 4-6
Comparison of Standard Deviations of Vote Distributions for Candidates, Legislative Election of 1983, Taipei.

| Candidates With Zone | | Candidates Without Zone | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jen Yo-sin | 12.16 | 4.68 | Huang Tien-fu |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 11.72 | 3.60 | Kang Nin-shiang |
| Hong Wen-tung | 11.30 | 3.54 | Jiang Peng-chien |
| Kao Chung-sin | 10.58 | 2.49 | Chi Cheng |
| Lee Chih-peng | 9.44 | 1.95 | Lui Yu-chi |
| Tsai Chen-chou | 8.33 | | |

Note: N=630. N is smaller than in 1980 due to a reorganization of *li* in 1981. Candidates are arranged according to the size of standard deviation.

Table 4-7

Comparison of Standard Deviations of Vote Distributions for Candidates, Legislative Election of 1986, Taipei.

| Candidates With Zone | | Candidates Without Zone | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Huang Su-wei | 10.87 | 7.08 | Kang Nin-shiang |
| Hong Wen-tung | 10.11 | 4.83 | Hsieh Chang-ting |
| Chen Hong-chuan | 9.85 | 3.96 | Wu Su-jean |
| Jen Yo-sin | 8.14 | | |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 7.56 | | |
| Chi Cheng | 7.38 | | |
| Chao Shaw-kang | 5.73 | | |

Note: N=630. Candidates are arranged according to the size of standard deviation.

Table 4-8

Comparison of Standard Deviations of Vote Distributions for Candidates, Legislative Election of 1989, Taipei.

| | Candidates With Zone | | Candidates Without Zone | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North District | Chao Zen-peng | 8.80 | 8.27 | Hsieh Chang-ting |
| | Chao Shaw-kang | 6.85 | 6.69 | Lin Wen-long |
| | Lee Chung-shiang | 6.63 | 5.16 | Chen Sui-ben |
| | Chou Chuan | 6.51 | 2.28 | Ting So-chung |
| | Lin Hsien-tong | 5.34 | | |
| South District | Yu Mu-ming | 10.57 | 6.14 | Yeh Chu-lan |
| | Chang Chih-min | 8.40 | 4.07 | Lin Cheng-jei |
| | Huang Su-wei | 8.20 | 3.18 | Chang Teh-ming |
| | Hong Tung-kwei | 7.72 | | |
| | Lin Yu-shiang | 6.07 | | |

Note: N=276 in the North District, 354 in the South District. Candidates are arranged according to the size of standard deviation.

Better Performance in Zone

While the comparison of vote distribution indicate the concentration of votes for zone candidates, we need one more piece of evidence to show that zone candidates did perform better in those small areas. Table 4-9 through 4-12 are the results of t-tests of zoned Kuomintang candidates in the four elections. The results of all four elections show a clear effect for the zone. On average, candidates win about 15 to 25% more of the total vote in their zone than outside the zone. Military candidates showed a less evident trend because their functional zones are mixed with others. All t-tests between means in the zone and means outside the zone are statistically highly significant ($p < .001$), while none of the non-zoned candidates demonstrate significant differences.

Table 4-9
T-test of Difference of Performance in/out Responsibility Zone,
1980, Taipei.

| Candidate | Mean Percentage of Vote In the Zone | Mean Percentage of Vote Outside the Zone | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chi Cheng | 33.60 (169) | 14.40 (611) | 36.47*** |
| Huang Lian-fu | 31.73 (141) | 3.96 (639) | 55.82*** |
| Chou Wen-yon | 27.93 (133) | 1.32 (647) | 55.32*** |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 21.79 (248) | 1.85 (532) | 51.68*** |
| Lee Chih-peng | 19.50 (117) | 6.15 (663) | 14.09*** |
| Lui Yu-chi | 15.97 (89) | 4.54 (691) | 18.99*** |

Note: Entries are mean percentages of votes obtained in *li* . Number of cases in the parentheses.
*** $p < .001$.

Table 4-10
T-test of Difference of Performance in/out Responsibility Zone,
1983, Taipei.

| Candidate | Mean Percentage of Vote In the Zone | Mean Percentage of Vote Outside the Zone | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Wen-tung | 33.02<br>(101) | 7.57<br>(529) | 36.88*** |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 32.19<br>(140) | 6.10<br>(490) | 61.43*** |
| Jen Yo-sin | 30.30<br>(132) | 9.25<br>(498) | 24.91*** |
| Kao Chung-sin | 25.66<br>(143) | 3.58<br>(487) | 45.29*** |
| Tsai Chen-chou | 24.24<br>(114) | 7.19<br>(516) | 32.14*** |
| Lee Chih-peng | 19.06<br>(119) | 6.49<br>(511) | 15.32*** |

Note: Entries are mean percentages of votes obtained in *li* . Number of cases in the parentheses.
*** $p < .001$.

Table 4-11
T-test of Difference of performance in/out Responsibility Zone,
1986, Taipei.

| Candidate | Mean Percentage of Vote In the Zone | Mean Percentage of Vote Outside the Zone | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Wen-tung | 28.50 (113) | 4.90 (517) | 50.71*** |
| Huang Su-wei | 27.78 (151) | 4.06 (479) | 64.82*** |
| Chao Shaw-kang | 26.33 (47) | 13.76 (583) | 17.70*** |
| Chi Cheng | 24.54 (94) | 6.91 (536) | 40.60*** |
| Jen Yo-sin | 24.11 (105) | 5.66 (525) | 39.64*** |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 21.95 (112) | 4.99 (518) | 42.06*** |
| Chen Hong-chuan | 19.31 (119) | 4.75 (511) | 17.79*** |

Note: Entries are mean percentages of votes obtained in *li* . Number of cases in the parentheses.
*** $p < .001$.

Table 4-12
T-test of Difference of performance in/out Responsibility Zone,
1989, Taipei.

| Candidate | Mean Percentage of Vote In the Zone | Mean Percentage of Vote Outside the Zone | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| North District | | | |
| Chao Shaw-kang | 35.51 (48) | 23.53 (228) | 14.72*** |
| Chao Zen-peng | 17.35 (59) | 5.65 (217) | 10.81*** |
| Chou Chuan | 16.94 (70) | 5.34 (206) | 20.46*** |
| Lin Hsien-tong | 12.68 (91) | 3.03 (185) | 26.83*** |
| Lee Chung-shiang | 15.87 (68) | 2.56 (208) | 28.65*** |
| South District | | | |
| Yu Mu-ming | 31.23 (60) | 15.72 (294) | 12.41*** |
| Hong Tung-kwei | 24.60 (90) | 10.18 (264) | 26.29*** |
| Chang Chih-min | 23.28 (87) | 9.84 (267) | 17.87*** |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 22.06 (87) | 10.51 (267) | 26.87*** |
| Huang Su-wei | 15.61 (92) | 6.74 (262) | 10.13*** |

Note: Entries are mean percentages of votes obtained in *li* . Number of cases in the parentheses.
*** $p < .001$.

The Kuomintang's Support by the Military Community

The effects of functional zones are more difficult to assess than those of geographical zones, as organization members are unevenly distributed among *li*. Therefore, a t-test will underestimate the effects of functional zones. The main functional zone in this study is the military community. Results from the previous section already show that military candidates, like other zoned candidates, perform significantly better in the *li* where the military community are located. In addition to the test for military candidates' performance, we also need to test the consistency of support by the military community. A correlation analysis of vote distribution by *li* is used to determine patterns of voting behavior suggestive of a functional zone. Higher correlations between two different (military) candidates in two different elections suggest that the power and cohesiveness of the military zone is high.

There was a restructuring of *li* after 1980. Some large *li* were divided into more than two new *li*; some small *li* were merged. As a result, it is not possible to compare votes of different years because the unit of calculation is changed. Analyses for the other three elections, however, are still possible. The results show that Pearson correlation coefficients among the three military-community-backed candidates' votes, *li* by *li*, are moderate or high. The correlation between Chen (of 1986) and Chao-Yu (Chao Zhen-penng of the North District, Yu Mu-min of the South District in 1989) is the highest ($r = .72$) which indicates that there is high similarity between the military community's support in the two elections. The other two correlations are smaller, the Pearson r is .45 between Lee (of 1983) and Chao-Yu (of 1989), and .53 between Lee (of 1983) and Chen (of 1986). Why these two coefficients are smaller needs further investigation. A possible explanation is that the military villages were under reconstruction during the mid-1980s. The moderate correlation coefficients, however, are not just by chance. They indicate that there is a certain degree of consistency of military support for zoned candidates.

Discounting the Impact of localism

To demonstrate a consistent impact of localism, we need repeat observations in different elections. To discount its impact, we also need cases where candidates ran in different situations. Three Kuomintang candidates, Hong Wen-tung, Chi Cheng, and Lin Yu-shiang, ran in at least three elections in the 1980s. The percentages of votes for each of them (see Table 4-1 through 4-3) are rearranged in Table 4-13 through 4-15. The differences between two consecutive years are computed. The results show that changes in votes for these candidates are associated with the changes in zone assignment. Sharp differences tend to appear when changes in assignment are made. All double digit differences appear in situations where zone assignments were changed.

When three wards were allocated to Hong Wen-tung (Table 4-13) in 1983, all three wards showed increases of around 20% of the ward votes. A change in 1986 resulted in about a 15% increase in the new zone ward (Ward 8) and a 15% loss in the ward that was dropped from his zone (Ward 11). When Chi Cheng was not given a zone in 1983 (Table 4-14), the vote percentages in her former zone all dropped more than 20%. One of the former zone wards (Ward 16) was reassigned to her in 1986 -- causing a 22.6% increase. The other two moderate increases (Wards 7 and 10) were new zone wards she shared with other candidates. Lin Yu-shiang's case is similar (Table 4-15). The addition of a ward to his zone resulted in a big increase in votes from that ward; a removal caused a sharp drop. I will discuss his case in detail later. Three other candidates, Jen Yo-sin, Chao Shaw-kang, and Huang Su-wei ran twice. Their performances are provided in Appendix C as supporting evidence; the patterns are the same.

The DPP's Kang Nin-shiang had a different pattern of changes in vote percentage (see Table 4-16). Sharp drops and dramatic increases in votes happened across all wards, including those where he was considered a local favorite. In Ward 12 and Word 14, he consistently performs the best among all wards. We may say this is an example of

localism. But this localism could not protect him from a dramatic loss in the elections. The sharp drop of votes for him in 1983 strongly suggests the unreliability of localism as a political base.

Table 4-13
Changes of Percentages of Vote in Wards,
Hong Wen-tung, 1980-1986.

| Ward | 1980 | Diff. 1983 - 1980 | 1983 | Diff. 1986 - 1983 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 6.8 | +24.0 | 31.8 | -7.8 | 24.0 |
| 2 | 12.6 | +19.3 | 31.9 | -1.6 | 30.3 |
| 3 | 7.6 | +19.7 | 27.3 | -15.5 | 11.8 |
| 4 | 2.4 | +2.7 | 5.1 | -.6 | 4.5 |
| 5 | 2.8 | +3.6 | 6.4 | -1.4 | 5.0 |
| 6 | 5.9 | +1.4 | 7.3 | -1.3 | 6.0 |
| 7 | 6.3 | +.4 | 6.7 | -2.1 | 4.6 |
| 8 | 8.4 | +1.2 | 9.6 | +15.6 | 25.2 |
| 9 | 6.1 | +3.7 | 9.8 | -3.5 | 6.3 |
| 10 | 4.0 | -.1 | 3.9 | -1.0 | 2.9 |
| 11 | 2.9 | +1.9 | 4.8 | -1.6 | 3.2 |
| 12 | 5.2 | +2.4 | 7.6 | -3.4 | 4.2 |
| 13 | 6.0 | +.5 | 6.5 | -2.8 | 3.7 |
| 14 | 8.8 | +.2 | 9.0 | -3.9 | 5.1 |
| 15 | 4.5 | +1.0 | 5.5 | -1.7 | 3.8 |
| 16 | 7.0 | +.5 | 7.5 | -2.0 | 5.5 |

Note: Underlined numbers are those of the candidate's zones. Hong had no zone in 1980 since he was not a Kuomintang member at that time.

Table 4-14
Changes of Percentages of Vote in Wards,
Chi Cheng, 1980-1986.

| Ward | 1980 | Diff. 1983 - 1980 | 1983 | Diff. 1986 - 1983 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 14.0 | -7.5 | 6.5 | -.1 | 6.4 |
| 2 | 13.4 | -6.8 | 6.6 | -.4 | 6.2 |
| 3 | 11.1 | -5.8 | 5.3 | -.4 | 4.9 |
| 4 | 16.3 | -9.0 | 7.3 | -.5 | 6.8 |
| 5 | 10.7 | -4.8 | 5.9 | +.2 | 6.1 |
| 6 | 11.0 | -5.7 | 5.3 | -.5 | 4.8 |
| 7 | 16.4 | -8.0 | 8.4 | +5.9 | 14.3 |
| 8 | 13.3 | -7.7 | 5.6 | -.7 | 4.9 |
| 9 | 14.0 | -7.9 | 6.1 | -1.5 | 4.6 |
| 10 | 19.0 | -9.5 | 9.5 | +7.2 | 16.7 |
| 11 | 18.6 | -9.9 | 8.7 | -1.3 | 7.4 |
| 12 | 13.7 | -7.7 | 6.0 | -2.0 | 4.0 |
| 13 | 35.0 | -25.1 | 9.9 | -1.6 | 8.3 |
| 14 | 28.6 | -21.9 | 6.7 | -1.3 | 5.4 |
| 15 | 37.1 | -26.9 | 10.2 | -.9 | 9.3 |
| 16 | 42.1 | -32.8 | 9.3 | +22.6 | 31.9 |

Note: Underlined numbers are those of the candidate's zones.

Table 4-15

Changes of Percentages of Vote in Wards,

Lin Yu-shiang, 1980-1989.

| Ward | 1980 | Diff. 1983 - 1980 | 1983 | Diff. 1986 - 1983 | 1986 | Diff. 1989 - 1986 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1.3 | +3.4 | 4.7 | -.6 | 4.1 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 2 | 1.2 | +3.1 | 4.3 | -.5 | 3.8 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 3 | 1.3 | +3.5 | 4.8 | +13.9 | 18.7 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 4 | 2.0 | +4.3 | 6.3 | -2.0 | 4.3 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 5 | 1.2 | +25.7 | 26.9 | -3.6 | 23.3 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 6 | 1.0 | +29.8 | 30.8 | -8.1 | 22.7 | -- | n.a.[2] |
| 7 | 2.0 | +5.4 | 7.4 | -2.2 | 5.2 | +5.5 | 10.7 |
| 8 | 16.3 | -10.5 | 5.8 | -1.8 | 4.0 | +24.4 | 28.4 |
| 9 | 12.9 | -5.7 | 7.2 | -2.8 | 4.4 | +5.9 | 10.3 |
| 10 | 25.5 | +5.4 | 30.9 | -15.6 | 15.3 | -2.9 | 12.4 |
| 11 | 23.4 | +10.3 | 33.7 | -27.8 | 5.9 | +5.8 | 11.7 |
| 12 | 26.5 | -17.6 | 8.9 | -4.7 | 4.2 | +4.8 | 9.0 |
| 13 | 2.2 | +5.2 | 7.4 | -2.9 | 4.5 | +10.0 | 14.5 |
| 14 | 2.8 | +4.0 | 6.8 | -3.1 | 3.7 | +4.8 | 8.5 |
| 15 | 2.9 | +4.3 | 7.2 | -2.3 | 4.9 | +11.2 | 16.1 |
| 16 | 1.8 | +4.0 | 5.8 | +.6 | 6.4 | +18.4 | 24.8 |

Note: 1. Underlined numbers are those of the candidate's zones.

2. n.a.=not applicable, they were redistricted as into North District. The rest are in the South District.

Table 4-16
Changes of Percentages of Vote in Wards,
Kang Nin-shiang, 1980-1986.

| Ward | 1980 | Diff. 1983 - 1980 | 1983 | Diff. 1986 - 1983 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 11.2 | -7.2 | 4.0 | +13.6 | 17.6 |
| 2 | 8.3 | -5.3 | 3.0 | +12.1 | 15.1 |
| 3 | 14.3 | -10.2 | 4.1 | +14.9 | 19.0 |
| 4 | 8.1 | -5.5 | 2.6 | +8.5 | 11.1 |
| 5 | 7.1 | -4.5 | 2.6 | +7.6 | 10.2 |
| 6 | 5.5 | -2.7 | 2.8 | +5.8 | 8.6 |
| 7 | 11.3 | -7.4 | 3.9 | +11.0 | 14.9 |
| 8 | 15.3 | -10.1 | 5.2 | +8.6 | 13.8 |
| 9 | 16.8 | -12.5 | 4.3 | +11.3 | 15.6 |
| 10 | 8.0 | -4.9 | 3.1 | +10.8 | 13.9 |
| 11 | 10.6 | -9.7 | 3.9 | +13.1 | 17.0 |
| 12 | 24.3 | -14.4 | 9.9 | +14.4 | 24.3 |
| 13 | 10.9 | -5.6 | 5.3 | +10.3 | 15.6 |
| 14 | 27.1 | -12.8 | 14.3 | +18.1 | 32.4 |
| 15 | 9.7 | -6.2 | 3.5 | +8.8 | 12.3 |
| 16 | 8.0 | -4.4 | 3.6 | +7.3 | 10.9 |

## Discussion

My concerns in this chapter are the effects of the Zone System and of other factors on elections. Analyses above generally support that the Zone System has an impact on the results of elections. Other factors such as localism and candidate popularity also have an impact but not as powerful as the Zone System.

### The Zone Effect

Hypothesis 1. The distribution of votes for the zoned candidates tends to be more concentrated than that of candidates without zone assignment. The degree of variance in vote distribution is greater among zoned candidates than for candidates without zones.

Hypothesis 2. Zoned candidates perform significantly better in the zone than outside it.

In general, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are supported by the data. Not only are votes for zoned candidates concentrated, they are concentrated in the zones. Although the degree of concentration is less dramatic in 1989 (Table 4-4) than in prior elections, a higher percentage of votes for zoned candidates still tend to appear in their zones. It is less dramatic because, in 1989, the unit of zone assignment was the *li*, not the ward. In some cases, more than two candidates shared the same ward. Therefore the degree of concentration, measured ward by ward, is not as obvious.

The strongest evidence for the zone effect is that all zoned candidates performed significantly better in the zone than outside it. On average, they tend to obtain a 15% to 25% higher percentage of their votes from *li* in their zone than from the others (see Table 4-9 through 4-12). An equally strong piece of evidence is that almost all zoned candidates had

a better performance than all other candidates in their respective zones (see Table 4-1,through 4-4).

Hypothesis 3. Functional zones perform similar functions to geographical zones, with similar reliability.

The effect of the support of the military community is also evident. The moderate to high correlation coefficients among military candidates, in fact, underestimates the true stability of support. That is because the military community is not a geographically contiguous area. The villages in which servicemen and their families live are mixed with other households in each *li*. No separate data is available to examine the election results for the military community alone. In addition, not all members of the community live in those villages. Some relocate, yet remain loyal to the community. The correlation among the performances of military candidates, I believe, does not reflect the full power and stability of the community support. The defeat of Chen Hong-chuan in 1986, the first of the military-backed candidates, was generally interpreted as a withering of support in the military community for the Kuomintang. That appears to be untrue. The defeat apparently was a result of mis-estimation of votes. It was reported that the reassignment of some areas in Chen's zone to others, on election day, caused Chen's loss. I checked with a resident in a military village, who confirmed such activity. However, this report cannot be independently verified with the available data.

The effect of the zone is clear. However, zone assignment does not guarantee a victory. Some candidates performed well in their zones yet still lost the election. Compared with the fact that usually about a third (two out of six in 1989, one in three in 1986, and in 1983, four of the five) DPP candidates lost in each election, the Kuomintang's Zone System is quite successful. All zoned candidates in 1980 and 1983 won the election. In 1986 one (out of seven) lost. Only three zoned candidates out of twelve did not win in

1989. However, a candidate clearly cannot rely solely on the assistance of the party's zone assignment, as the three zone-supported losers in 1989 can attest. After all, there are many other factors such as popularity and constituency service that influence the outcome of elections.

## The Effects of Other Factors

While the effect of the Zone System seems clear from the above, rival hypotheses still need to be examined. Primary among the rival explanations for the patterns of vote distribution described are localism and the personal popularity of a candidate.

Localism. Localism may confound the effect of the Zone System. But, the freedom the Kuomintang enjoys in assigning zones showed that even if there is localism, the effect of zone assignment is paramount. Localism usually functions in a geographically contiguous area. The wards assigned to zones were not contiguous (see map in Appendix B). When the party has such freedom to reassign zones, it provides an indication of the power of the Zone System.

In most cases, localism does not matter. Lin Yu-shiang's example (Table 4-15) shows the clearest proof of the hypothesis: adding a ward to a zone caused a sharp increase in his votes in that ward; removing the same ward from his zone resulted in a dramatic loss of votes; reassigning the ward back to Lin's zone significantly increased the vote percentage again. His overall share of the vote increased in 1983. Only three wards showed decreases (Ward 8, 9, and 12; -10.5%, -5.7%, and -17.6% respectively). These decreases are associated with the removal of the three wards from his zone. At the same time, his two biggest increases (Wards 5 and 6, +25.7% and +29.8%) are from the two new wards in his zone. The situation in 1986 was identical. Big differences appear only where zone assignments were changed; an increase in Ward 3 (+13.9%); losses in Ward 10 (-15.6%)

and Ward 11 (-27.8%). The size of the change in Ward 10 is smaller because Lin retained half of the district in his zone. The strongest supporting evidence can be found in the example of Ward 10, which Lin considers his political base since he has lived there for more than twenty years. With the assistance from the Zone System, Lin's performance was outstanding in the ward in the elections of 1980 and 1983. When he needed to share the ward with other candidates in 1986 and 1989, the percentages of vote for him decreased significantly. If one's political base can be so vulnerable to changes in zone assignment, localism apparently does not play an important role in one's campaign.

Compared with zoned candidates, the changes in percentage of votes for DPP candidates occurred more evenly city-wide, not just in particular areas. Kang Nin-shiang is a good example (Table 4-16). He lost in 1983; his vote percentages decreased from the previous election in every ward. When he won again in 1986 all wards showed an increase of votes for him. Among the sixteen wards, Ward 12 (Longsan) and Ward 14 (Swanyuan) consistently led all wards in terms of support for him. They are his political base. We may say that localism exists in his case. However, the fact that he could show such major losses in both wards in 1983 is a compelling argument for the comparative strength of a zone system.

Popularity of Candidate. Chi Cheng and Chao Shaw-kang were considered popular among the public in Taiwan. Chi Cheng ran for the first time in 1980, and won high percentages of votes in every ward (see Table 4-14). However, she also benefited from the zone assistance. The percentages are significantly higher in wards in the zone (28.6% to 42.1%, compared with less than 20% in other wards). When she was not assigned a zone in 1983, overall decreases (column 2 of Table 4-14) are seen. The largest losses appear in wards in her former zone. But it also seems that she became less popular among voters. The mostly small changes between 1983 and 1986 suggests that she remained less popular than she

was in 1980. In this context, the increase in votes within her zone appears even more dramatic.

Chao Shaw-kang ran twice, in 1986 and 1989. He won handsomely in both years, receiving the largest total vote both times. It is fair to say that he was popular in 1986, and remained popular in 1989. Nonetheless, the zone clearly aided his performance (see Table 4-11, 4-12).

It seems almost redundant to say that popularity helps politicians. Certainly this is as true in Taiwan as anywhere. Nonetheless, at least in Taiwan, popularity serves most effectively as an adjunct to the Zone System rather than a stand-alone gateway to political office.

## Summary

In this chapter, I used the results for major candidates in four elections to examine the evidence for the effectiveness of the Zone System. The following are the major findings.

1. The Zone System is clearly effective in achieving its goal; to mobilize electoral support in particular areas for the zoned candidate. Votes for Kuomintang candidates with zones consistently concentrate in areas assigned to them. Their performances in the zone are significantly better than their performances outside.

2. Functional zones, specifically the military community, generate similarly reliable support for Kuomintang candidates.

3. Localism may lead to the concentration of votes for a candidate in a particular area. However, through the years, the Kuomintang has been able to assign candidates to zones quite freely, without regard for such affiliations. Different zones assigned to the same candidate over time perform equally well, as do the same zones assigned to different candidates.

4. Given the large number of Kuomintang-supported candidates, the Zone System alone is not a guarantee of success. Within the framework of the Zone System, there is still room, and need, for political factors such as popularity and local connections. However, these tend to operate within the framework. Alone, or even in unison, they are not strong enough to overpower the Zone System.

# CHAPTER 5

# THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT CONTROL ON VOTING: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA

The analysis of election results in the previous chapter indicates that the Zone System is effective in influencing voting decisions of Taiwanese voters. By using aggregate voting records for analysis, I may commit the ecological fallacy error because the unit of analysis is the *li*, instead of the individuals. In this chapter, my purpose is to present evidence from a survey to support the same claim as Chapter 4 -- that context control in the Zone System is effective. Two logistic models synthesizing contextual and attitudinal factors are estimated. One model distinguishes Kuomintang voters and voters for other parties. The other demonstrates the tendency of Kuomintang voters to vote for zone candidates. The characteristics of the data are explained, followed by the results of the analysis and a discussion. In general, the analysis yields results supporting the theory that the Kuomintang was successful in influencing voting by controlling contexts of voters.

## Supporters of the Kuomintang and of the Zone System

The Kuomintang has enjoyed a comfortable majority in Taiwanese elections for forty years. In order to achieve this record, it must have consistent support by particular groups of voters. Previous studies have found that mainlanders, better educated people and older voters tend to be stronger identifiers with the Kuomintang (Chang, 1987; Lui, Chen, and Liu, 1987). They also tend to vote for the Kuomintang more than others (Chen, 1986). These studies, however, used only demographic variables to identify the political base of

the Kuomintang. To differentiate supporters of a political party, demographic variables are not the only or even necessarily the best predictors. Some attitudinal factors might be useful in distinguishing supporters of one party from others.

In Chapter 1, I summarized a contextual model to describe voters' behavior in Taiwan. Factors regarding remote contexts, immediate contexts, and personal characteristics of the individual are believed to influence current attitudes, which shape the individual's vote. Combining these factors together, one should be able to identify those who voted for Kuomintang candidates; and, among Kuomintang supporters, those who voted for the zoned candidates. The purpose of this section is to provide a rationale behind these factors and the two models.

Three groups of voters

Based on the vote the respondents reported and the *li* where they lived, I classified voters into three groups. Those who voted for candidates of the DPP or other parties form the first group. Since most of these voted for DPP candidates, I call them "DPP voters." Those who voted for a Kuomintang candidate but not their particular zone candidate are the second group; they are labeled "independent KMT voters." Those who voted for the candidate zoned to their *li* are classified as the third group, the "zone-influenced voters." The second and the third group also can be combined as "Kuomintang voters."

Two types of mis-classification may occur, due to the difference between geographically defined responsibility *li* and organizationally defined functional zones (see Chapter 3). In the first type, Kuomintang members who belong to a party unit such as the Railway Worker's Union, who were asked to support a particular candidate, and did so,

Table 5-1
Three Groups of Voter in Taipei

| Group | Description | n | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. | DPP voter | 42 | 18.8 |
| II. | Independent KMT voter | 105 | 46.9 |
| III. | Zone-influenced voter | 77 | 34.4 |
| Total | | 224 | 100.1 |

might be classified into Group II because that candidate happens not to be the one assigned to their *li*. Although they actually voted as the party instructed, they are mis-classified. In the other type, voters might be classified to Group III because they voted for the candidate zoned to their *li* but actually they were asked to support a functional zone candidate. While the first type under-counts the number of zone voters, the second type inflates it. In this study, no question asked can be used to check the magnitude of this mis-classification. The total number of Kuomintang member belonging to the functional zones was around 480,000,[118] about 4% of adult population. This percentage gives us a possible upper limit of the mis-classification. However, this percentage should be higher in Taipei because members in the functional zones tend to be employees of public sectors which concentrate in urban areas. The possible magnitude of mis-classification in this analysis, therefore, is probably a bit higher than 5%.

The Kuomintang Voters

Since the publication of *The American Voter*, party identification, issue positions, and candidate evaluations of individuals have been used as major predictors of their votes. Although this is an idea developed in the American political context, the idea should be able

to transferable to other societies, though the parameters of the model may be different. In this research, in addition to these "traditional" variables, two variables related to mass media, which is part of the Kuomintang's context control in elections, are also included in the model. Variables in the model are explained below:

Party preference. Party identification is the psychological tie binding one to a political party (Campbell, 1960, pp.121-122). This affect is found to be a stable force shaping the individual's vote (Campbell, et al., 1954; 1960, Ch. 6). Although party identification among the American electorate has shown a decline since mid-1960s (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Wattenberg, 1981), the way it influences voters remained very stable (Converse and Markus, 1979) and still is the most powerful predictor of votes (Abramson, et al., 1990, pp.203-212).

Recent political developments in Taiwan, especially the emergence of new parties, should cause a gradual growth of mass affect toward the major political parties. In other words, a "party among the electorate" is taking shape in Taiwan. As surveys for *China Times* between 1986 and 1989 documented, a stable distribution of bipartisan attitudes has taken shape among the public (see Table 1-2 in Chapter 1; *China Times Express*, November 21, 1989, p.2). Since this two party system is still in a very primitive stage, I would like to call the affect the voters hold toward the two major parties as "party preference." After all, the partisan contexts of Taiwanese society is quite different from the United of States where the concept of "party identification" was developed.

The questions used to measure party preference are similar to those of the NES/CPS questionnaire which measures American voter's party identification. The first question asked if the respondents would consider themselves "of the Kuomintang" or "of the DPP". If yes, then, is their support for the party "strong" or "so so"? If the respondents identified with neither of the two major parties, a question followed to ask if they were "leaning to the Kuomintang" or "leaning to the DPP" or neither. Based on these questions,

respondents are placed into seven groups on one dimension. The low end is comprised of strong DPP supporter; the high end reflects strong Kuomintang support; and the middle point represents independent voters.

Party preference questions were asked both in pre-election and post-election interviews. It is possible that the respondents believed they were identified with the Kuomintang simply because they voted for a Kuomintang candidate. The results of the pre-election survey are used in the analysis to control for this possible impact on the measurement.[119]

Issue positions. Although issues are thought to be fundamental dimensions in considering an individual's vote decision, average Americans are found to have only moderate information about issues and have poor knowledge about specific policies (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 171-175). However, the public is found able to perceive the difference between major parties and between candidates if such a difference exists (Page and Jones, 1979).

During the legislative election of 1989, candidates in Taipei raised two major issues in their speeches and campaign materials. One is the issue of the Taiwanese Independence Movement. The other concerns the presidential election. On the question, "If Taiwan declares full independence, ending any possibility of unification with mainland China, will the PRC use force to attack Taiwan?" the Kuomintang's position is "yes". Most DPP candidates said that the Kuomintang was intimidating the general public. On the issue involving the presidential election, the DPP's long-time stand is that the Presidency should be decided by popular vote, not by the National Assembly. The Kuomintang favors the status quo. The two major parties' divided positions should be perceived by the public.

The question about the presidential election is clearer in its meaning. Questions about the Taiwanese Independence Movement could not be defined clearly. Not only is the concept of "independence" vague, the mere mention of "independence" triggers some degree of political sensitivity. The question used in the analysis is more specific than asking

voters attitudes toward "independence" in general, and the resulting variance is larger than that for the other questions, which usually end up with more than ninety percent of the respondent against the idea of independence.

In addition to party preference and issue positions, candidate evaluation is important in determining the individual's vote. In a context of one-on-one elections such as presidential elections, the two candidates are the foci of attention. The voters' evaluations of the candidates, therefore, are essential to the understanding of the vote. However, in a multi-candidate election, the measurement of candidate evaluation becomes complicated. Since there are eight major candidates (among seventeen) in the election this study investigates, including questions about all these candidates would increase the length of the interview unacceptably. No question in the survey can be adequately used in this study to address issues of candidate evaluation.

Media influence. In an overview of past and current researches on mass media, Graber stated that the role the media play in American elections is now generally accepted to be important and at times decisive (Graber, 1986). The Kuomintang has tried hard to control both broadcast and print media (Tien, 1989, pp.204-205; see also Chapter 3). This control, however, does not grant any particular candidate an advantage in the Zone System. The function of media control, as determined by the Kuomintang, is to create a warm environment for all Kuomintang candidates, not for a specific one. It should have an impact on the voter's choice between Kuomintang candidates and non-Kuomintang candidates, although it would not be able to discriminate among Kuomintang candidates to assist particular candidates in particular areas. I include two variables to verify that media control did make a difference. The two media variables are measured by asking the respondents two questions. The first one asked the respondents how often they read reports about the election in newspapers; the second about their exposure to television news.

Ethnicity. Group membership cannot be ignored in the understanding of an individual's behavior (Campbell et al., 1960, pp.295-298). There are two major ethnic blocs in Taiwan, mainlander and native Taiwanese. The former (about 15% of the population) refers to the group who came to Taiwan around 1949 and to their children who were born in Taiwan. The latter (about 85% of the population) is the group whose ancestors came from mainland China earlier, by up to three hundred years. The two groups share the same cultural values. Both mainlander and Taiwanese are socialized in the same educational system and thus bear similar, though not identical, political attitudes (Wilson, 1968; Appleton, 1970). But some attitudinal and behavioral differences between adults of the two groups are evident. After controlling for education level, more mainlanders than Taiwanese identify with the Kuomintang (Lui, Chen, and Liu, 1987). Tang-wai and DPP candidates are mostly supported by Taiwanese (Chen, 1986).

While the content of political lessons in the schools (all teaching materials are standardized at least before college) is the same for both groups, the differences of attitudes toward the Kuomintang between the two ethnic groups reflect influences from various sources. Family is probably the major influence. In other words, while Taiwanese and mainlanders share the same context (schools) at some times of their life, they have different contexts (e.g., family) at other times. Ethnic differences are likely the result of these contextual differences.

The above factors are used to predict if the voters vote for the Kuomintang or not. Therefore, a logistic function is an appropriate form to demonstrate the relationship between these factors and the dichotomous dependent variable. The function can be shown as:

$$L_{KMT\text{-}Vote} = 1 / (1 + e^{-XB})$$

where $XB$ = a + $b_1$Ethnicity + $b_2$Party preference + $b_3$Independent issue
+ $b_4$President election+ $b_5$TV-news exposure + $b_6$Newpaper readership

The Zone-influenced Voters

Among those who voted for the Kuomintang, there is a group of voters who voted for candidates assigned to their zone. They are the zone-influenced voters. I believe that a contextual variable, the voter's connection with local leaders, is one of the forces influencing the voter's decision to support Kuomintang candidate in the zone. Other variables including personal characteristics such as political interest, political discussion, and political knowledge are also relevant. In addition, the existing partisan attitude is also important. Except for party preference, which is the same variable as in the first model, other factors are explained below:

Local leader connection. The Zone System is a device to discriminate the kind of information sent to voters. Information is channeled to voters through the network formed by *li* and *lin* leaders. Voters are in fact put into different information contexts. An individual's connection with local leaders should be a good measure of the strength of this context.

The direct contact between the individual and local leaders increases the chance of being influenced by the Zone System. Respondents were asked three questions to investigate if they knew the *li* leader, if they knew him/her personally, or if they were contacted by the leader for supporting a particular candidate. The same three questions were asked about the *lin* leader. The frequency of "yes" answers to these six questions is the measure of local leader connection. The scores range from zero to six. Then, these scores are recoded into four groups to form a Gutman scale (0 = know neither of the two leaders;

1 = know one, know both, or personally know one of the two leaders; 2 = at least personally know one or have contact with one of the leaders; 3 = contacted by at least one of the leaders). The higher the score, the more likely it is that the individual will be influenced by the zone operation.

Political knowledge. While education improves one's ability to receive and interpret political messages, it is possible that some highly educated individuals are naive about politics. Political information is recommended as a more persistent measure (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, p.39; Zaller, 1987). It is the actual information rather than the potential that has an impact on the level of political activity. The level of political information one obtains is positively related to the degree of independence in political judgement. High levels of political information, thus, tend to reduce the probability of being influenced by zones.

Political knowledge is measured by asking the respondent six questions related to political institutions and political figures. The sum of correct answers to these six questions is the score for political knowledge.

Interest in campaign. High interest leads to a high possibility of exposure to the Zone System's information. However, high interest in politics is found to be associated with better knowledge. And, individuals with better knowledge tend to be more independent and less likely to be influenced by the political information (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1987). However, the relationship is found to be a non-linear one. To obtain a more appropriate function form, a transformation of this variable is needed (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, p.97).

Discussion with Others. Discussion is a process by which political information in the zone may be diffused to residents in the zone. The more channels through which a respondent receives campaign information from others, the more likely it is that s/he will tend to be

influenced by the zone. Results for other studies indicate the contrary. The more actively the individual is involved in political activity, such as discussion about politics, the more independent the individual becomes (Converse, 1962). Discussion does not reduce the probability of being influenced by zone information. The fact is that those who have more political information are more likely to discuss politics with others (Pearson r = .40). This elite group of voters is among the most independent and thus is less likely to be influenced by the Zone System. Respondents were asked three questions: if they had discussed the campaign with any family members, with friends, or with neighbors. I count the "yeses" for a score. Zero represents no discussion, three indicates an active exchange of information with all three groups.

When these factors are used to predict if the voters vote for zone candidates or not, a logistic function is more appropriate than other analysis to demonstrate the relationship between these factors and the dependent variable. The function can be shown as:

$$L_{\text{Zone-Vote}} = 1 / (1 + e^{-XB})$$

where $XB = a + b_1\text{Party preference} + b_2\text{Connection} + b_3\text{Interest} + b_4\text{Interest*Interest} + b_5\text{Discussion} + b_6\text{Discussion*Discussion} + b_7\text{Political knowledge}$

## Data and Analyses

Data used in this analysis are from the pre-election and post-election surveys conducted by the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University during the 1989 election. The sample for these surveys was drawn from voter registers that contain the name, gender, age, and address of all eligible voters. The 354 *li* (similar to a precinct in American cities) in the South District were grouped into four strata according to the population in each *li*. Then, 125 *li* were allocated, proportionally to stratum population, to the four groups. Target *li* were randomly selected in each group. In each *li*, 20 names were

randomly selected. Although 2500 names were sampled from the voter register, only 720 valid responses were completed, via face-to-face interviews. About a third of the failed cases were caused by incorrect household registration; another thirty percent were a result of the respondents' working or studying in other cities; about a sixth of the households the interviewers visited had no one home; only eight percent of them refused to be interviewed at all (see Appendix A).

The post-election interviews were conducted by telephone, with face-to-face interviews conducted with those without telephones. The attrition was high--a third of the pre-election sample was incomplete after up to seven calls were made in a two-week period[120]. The size of the post-election sample was 482 respondents. Tests of the representativeness of the sample, in terms of the distribution of age groups, gender, ethnic groups, and education, indicate that only respondents' educational level shows a significant difference from the population. The sampling procedure and the results of the test of the representativeness of the sample are included in Appendix A.

Of the 482 respondents in the post-election telephone survey, 443 (92%) respondents reported that they voted, but only 224 (46%) revealed their vote. A high refusal rate on this question is common in Taiwanese surveys and is expected.[121] Those who did not report their vote are not randomly distributed. A test of the difference of means between the non-missing group and missing group showed that three of the independent variables (political knowledge, party preference, and ethnicity) are significantly different. However, the differences are small in magnitude (see Appendix D). No correction for these differences is made.

Two sets of separate analyses are conducted in this chapter. In the first set, the bivariate relationships between the independent variables and KMT-vote are tested by using crosstabs and chi-square tests. Then a logistic model using party preference, issue positions, media exposure, and ethnicity to predict the individuals' vote is estimated. In the

second set, the same procedures are applied to a set of different independent variables to estimate the probability of voting for zone candidates.

## Results

In general, the results of the analyses support my theory that the Kuomintang's control over social contexts are effective in influencing some voters' decision. The bivariate relationship between independent variables and the vote are all in the right direction. Estimated coefficients for the contextual variables are significant, though not necessarily showing a linear correlation.

### Support for the Kuomintang

The frequencies of the distribution for all independent variables in the analysis are included in Appendix E. To examine the relationship between the independent variables and the vote for the Kuomintang, I begin the analysis with bivariate contingency tables. Table 5-2 summarizes the tables into one.

As can be seen in Table 5-2, the relationship between party preference and vote, as well as the two issue positions and vote, are apparently linear. The strength of partisan attitude deeply affect the individual's voting decision. Individuals identify with the Kuomintang and those holding similar positions to the Kuomintang are more likely to vote for Kuomintang candidates. The relationship between ethnicity and KMT-vote also is clear. Most mainlanders vote for the Kuomintang while the DPP wins votes mainly from native Taiwanese.

The impact of mass media is evident. The relationship, however, is not linear. The least and the most exposed groups are less likely to vote for the Kuomintang than those

with medium exposure. In the logistic analysis of KMT vote, therefore, a transformation of these two media variable is performed to generate a more appropriate functional form.

Table 5-2

Bivariate Relationships Between Individual's Attitudes and KMT-vote

| Variable | Category | Vote for KMT candidate (%) | Vote for DPP candidate (%) | Total | n |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnicity | Taiwanese | 73.8 | 26.2 | 100.0 | 141 |
| | Mainlander | 95.1 | 4.9 | 100.0 | 82 |
| Party preference | DPP | 20.0 | 80.0 | 100.0 | 20 |
| | Independent | 71.2 | 28.8 | 100.0 | 59 |
| | KMT-leaned | 95.9 | 4.1 | 100.0 | 49 |
| | Weak KMT | 90.0 | 10.0 | 100.0 | 30 |
| | Strong KMT | 100.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 41 |
| Independence issue | Pro-DPP | 69.0 | 31.0 | 100.0 | 71 |
| | Depends | 78.2 | 21.8 | 100.0 | 55 |
| | Pro-KMT | 92.5 | 7.5 | 100.0 | 93 |
| Presidential election | Pro-DPP | 67.7 | 32.3 | 100.0 | 99 |
| | Depends | 88.2 | 11.8 | 100.0 | 51 |
| | Pro-KMT | 94.6 | 5.4 | 100.0 | 74 |
| Newspaper readership | 1 (low) | 76.0 | 24.0 | 100.0 | 25 |
| | 2 | 92.5 | 7.5 | 100.0 | 40 |
| | 3 | 84.6 | 15.4 | 100.0 | 104 |
| | 4 (high) | 69.1 | 30.9 | 100.0 | 55 |
| TV news exposure | 1 (low) | 33.3 | 66.7 | 100.0 | 6 |
| | 2 | 73.8 | 26.2 | 100.0 | 42 |
| | 3 | 89.2 | 10.8 | 100.0 | 111 |
| | 4 (high) | 76.2 | 23.8 | 100.0 | 63 |
| All | | 81.3 | 18.8 | 100.0 | 224 |

Table 5-3 summarizes the result of the logistic analysis of the vote for the Kuomintang. Partisan attitudes have a significant impact on one's voting choice. The more strongly one identifies with the Kuomintang, the more likely it is that one will vote for the Kuomintang. Traditional issue positions also are significant. On the surface, only one coefficient of the two issues achieves a significance level of 0.05. Since the relation between vote and these two are almost identical , the influence of one is absorbed by the other.

Table 5-3
Coefficients: Logistic Analysis of KMT Vote

| Variable | | Coefficient | Standard Error | t |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept: | Taiwanese | -1.864 | 1.917 | -.972 |
| | Mainlander | -1.551 | 1.977 | -.784 |
| Party preference | | .554 | .126 | 4.398*** |
| Independence issue | | .153 | .161 | .949 |
| Presidential election | | .381 | .159 | 2.385* |
| Newspaper readership | | -.202 | .800 | -.252 |
| Newspaper-square | | .012 | .145 | .086 |
| TV news exposure | | 3.539 | 1.248 | 2.834** |
| TV news-square | | -.626 | .215 | -2.903** |

Goodness of fit Chi-square = 172.066, d.f. = 182, p = .690.

Although the correlation between these two issues is not high (r = .29), each has significant influence on partisan vote. The coefficient of the logit model using the independence issue alone to predict Kuomintang vote is .404 (s.e. = .109, d.f. = 222, p < .001). If we use the presidential election issue alone to predict Kuomintang vote, the coefficient is .554 (s e. = .132, d.f. = 217, p < .001). Voters' positions on both issues have a significant impact on vote.

The Kuomintang's control over mass media can be seen clearly from the significant coefficient of TV news exposure. The probability of voting for the Kuomintang increases with the increase of TV news exposure. But the effect decrease among the most exposed group. Newspaper readership does not have a significant impact on partisan vote.

Supports for the Zone System

For those who voted for Kuomintang candidates, the effects of social context control also are examined first by looking into the bivariate relationship between independent variables and the zone vote. And, then, since the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, another logistic analysis is carried out to estimate the joint influence of these independent variables on the probability the individuals will vote for the zone candidate.

Listed in Table 5-4 are the results of bivariate crosstabs. The relationships between the individual's local leader connection, party preference, interest in campaign, discussion with others, and political knowledge and the zone vote are all in the expected direction. None of the Chi-square tests of bivariate distribution achieves a significance level of 0.05, though all show a slight tendency supporting my theory that the individual's context, existing partisan attitude, and personal characteristics all have impact on the effect of context control.

Table 5-4

Bivariate Relationship Between Voters' Backgrounds, Attitudes and Zone Vote

| Variable | Category | Vote for zone candidate (%) | Vote for other KMT candidates (%) | Total | n |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Party preference | DPP[1] | 25.0 | 75.0 | 100.0 | 4 |
| | Independent | 35.7 | 64.3 | 100.0 | 42 |
| | KMT-leaned | 36.2 | 63.8 | 100.0 | 47 |
| | Weak KMT | 40.7 | 59.3 | 100.0 | 27 |
| | Strong KMT | 56.1 | 43.9 | 100.0 | 41 |
| Local leader connection | 0 (low) | 35.9 | 64.1 | 100.0 | 64 |
| | 1 | 45.3 | 54.7 | 100.0 | 53 |
| | 2 | 42.3 | 57.7 | 100.0 | 52 |
| | 3 (high) | 61.5 | 38.5 | 100.0 | 13 |
| Discussion with others | 0 (low) | 54.8 | 45.2 | 100.0 | 42 |
| | 1 | 40.0 | 60.0 | 100.0 | 35 |
| | 2 | 34.1 | 65.9 | 100.0 | 82 |
| | 3 (high) | 52.2 | 47.8 | 100.0 | 23 |
| Interest in campaign | 1 (low) | 18.2 | 81.8 | 100.0 | 11 |
| | 2 | 42.1 | 57.9 | 100.0 | 38 |
| | 3 | 45.7 | 54.3 | 100.0 | 92 |
| | 4 (high) | 40.0 | 60.0 | 100.0 | 40 |
| Political knowledge | 0 (low) | 47.6 | 52.4 | 100.0 | 21 |
| | 1 | 71.4 | 28.6 | 100.0 | 14 |
| | 2 | 55.6 | 44.4 | 100.0 | 36 |
| | 3 | 32.6 | 67.4 | 100.0 | 43 |
| | 4 | 29.0 | 71.0 | 100.0 | 31 |
| | 5 | 37.5 | 62.5 | 100.0 | 24 |
| | 6 (high) | 38.5 | 61.5 | 100.0 | 13 |
| All | | 42.3 | 57.7 | 100.0 | 182 |

Note: 1. Since the number of DPP identifiers in this analysis is small, they are combined into one group. The original scale was 1 through 7. Scales in this analysis are 3 through 7 ( 3=DPP, 4=Independent, 5=KMT-leaned, and so on).

To estimate the joint effect of these variables on zone vote, I put them in one model. Table 5-5 is the result of a logistic analysis.

Table 5-5
Coefficients of Logistic Analysis of Zone Vote

| Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 5.137 | 1.080 | 4.754*** |
| Party preference | -.091 | .114 | -.805 |
| Local leader connection | -1.405 | .480 | -2.923** |
| Party x Connection | .280 | .088 | 3.149** |
| Interest in campaign | .598 | .598 | 1.000 |
| Interest-square | -.105 | .108 | -.975 |
| Discussion with others | -.486 | .282 | -1.720 |
| Discussion-square | .131 | .097 | 1.349 |
| Political knowledge | -.137 | .058 | -2.345* |

Goodness of fit Chi-square = 163.796, d.f. = 152, p = .243

In the second model, I expected the voters' local leader connection to show a positive impact on their zone-vote. The closer the connection, the more likely they will vote for the zone candidates. The bivariate analysis in fact shows a slight linear relationship between leader connection and zone vote. The relationship, however, is not statistically significant. It is reasonable to think that the strength of the individual's party identification has an influence on the relationship between local leader connection and zone vote. The significant coefficient of the interaction term shows that it does have an impact on zone vote, but the influence depends on the individual's party attachment. A voter's interest in campaign does not have an impact on the probability of voting for zone candidate.

Except for those who do no discussion at all, an increase in discussion increases the probability of voting for zone candidate, but the coefficient is not statistically significant at 0.05 level ( though it is close; $p<.10$).

As expected, the influence of political knowledge is negative. Among those who voted for the Kuomintang, the better their political knowledge, the more likely they were to be independent of the party. The less knowledge they have, the more likely they are to vote as the party instructs.

Overall the goodness of fit of this model is low (Chi-square = 163.796, d.f=152, p=.243). Absence of some important elements in the model is the reason. For example, the influence among family members on one another is not considered in the model. The family, however, is one of the most influential contexts in which one learns and takes cues about politics.

## Discussion

Previous studies on Taiwanese voters were not successful in interpreting how the Kuomintang organized campaign tactics and the links between those tactics and voter's behavior. In Chapter 3, I described how the Zone System is operated to influence voting in campaigns through the assistance of social networks of local leaders. I have already shown the evidence (in Chapter 4) that, with other possibilities accounted for, the Zone System is effective. The above analysis attempts to identify the behavioral, contextual, and personal characteristics of those who are more likely to be influenced by the Zone System.

### Salience of Partisan Attitudes

Political parties play a vital role in influencing Taiwanese voter's behavior. The clear distinction between Kuomintang voters and DPP voters is an indication that the

operation of the Zone System is a process of selective mobilization of like-minded individuals. During the process, local leaders who participate are mostly local Kuomintang cadres. They are familiar with the political inclinations of a large number of their neighbors. As a consequence, they should be able to avoid campaigning to voters who are DPP-inclined. However, this behavioral tendency seems not to be taken into consideration by the Kuomintang. About two months before the election, party units of the Kuomintang distribute a form to party members, to estimate the number of family members the party member can contact for the campaign. One of the instructions is that the member should not count other party members in the family. The purpose is to avoid over-estimation. By distributing this form to party members only, the process is a selective one. By asking numbers only, the party does not count the likely predispositions of voters. The Zone System attempts to mobilize as many voters as possible through the network of its members. The result, however, is influenced by a principle dictating the behaviors of many individuals; that is, association with like-minded people. Local leaders in the Zone System tend to mobilize those Kuomintang-inclined voters.

Relevance of Issue Position

Lack of issue positions is a characteristic of zone candidates' campaigns. Most candidates do not discuss issues; at least, there is no emphasis on policy proposals in the operation of the Zone System. However, there is a position difference between Kuomintang candidates and DPP candidates. The two parties' stands on the two major campaign issues were far apart during the 1989 election. The difference between candidates of the two parties seems to have been perceived by the public. Their attitudes on these two campaign issues had an impact on the individual's partisan choice in the election.

This result is different from a previous study which concluded that issue position rarely plays a role in influencing Taiwanese voters (Chen and Huang, 1986). I have no

reason to conclude that Taiwanese voters now pay more attention to issues in the campaign than before. The two issues in this analysis probably are exceptional. They have existed in the Taiwanese political arena for more than two decades. The length of their existence and the intensity of the discussion when they are raised probably make them unusually popular. If we used different issues, most respondents , I believe, would have limited knowledge.

The Effective TV News Control

The impact of the Kuomintang's control over television news programs is evident. Except for the most frequent watchers, the increase of exposure to TV news leads to an increased probability of voting for Kuomintang candidates. The negative message about the DPP the Kuomintang managed to communicate to voters (see Chapter 2) did create a favorable environment for the Kuomintang. This explains why the Kuomintang allows new daily newspapers published by DPP members, and loosens its control over editorial policy even in the party's official newspapers, yet does not allow any new TV channel to be open to the public. All the DPP's attempts at establishing their own TV stations have been blocked by the government.

Those who watch television news the most voted less for the Kuomintang than did those who watched less. This phenomenon may be interpreted as the result of a protest among the best informed voters against the Kuomintang's strict control over TV news program. The Kuomintang, however, succeeded in controlling electronic media.

The Effective Social Network Control

The Kuomintang's campaign effort heavily relies on the operation of the Zone System. In the operation, the mobilization of the social networks formed by *li* and *lin* leaders is the backbone. Therefore, the individuals' connection with these leaders should

show an impact on their choices among candidates. It does, but the strength of its influence is not as high as I expected. A possible reason is the existence of the interaction between party preference and connection, as discussed above. Table 5-6 summarizes the total effect of party preference and local leader connection, including their interaction, on zone-vote.

Table 5-6
Total Effect of Party Preference, Local Leader Connection, and Their Interaction On Zone-Vote

| Local Leader Connection | Party Preference | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | DPP | Independent | KMT-leaned | Weak-KMT | Strong-KMT |
| 0 | -.273 | -.364 | -.455 | -.546 | -.637 |
| 1 | -.838 | -.649 | -.460 | -.271 | -.082 |
| 2 | -1.403 | -.934 | -.465 | .004 | .473 |
| 3 | -1.968 | -1.219 | -.470 | .279 | 1.028 |

Note: 1. Entries are the sum of the effects of party preference, connection, and the interaction term.

We may see from the table that the individual's connections help the zone candidates when there is warmer attachment toward the Kuomintang. Among those who identified with the DPP, the independents, and KMT-leaned voters, connections with leaders function against the zone candidates. The total effect in the first three columns decreases as the connection increases. Leader connections of the voters in these three groups actually reduce the probability of voting for zone candidates. Among the weak and strong Kuomintang identifiers, the impact of connection is evident. The increase of connection leads to the increased probability for the voting zone candidate. The control of local-leader-networks works best in mobilizing party identifiers. This is a piece of evidence supporting that the Zone System is a process acting to reinforce existing favorable inclination toward the Kuomintang.

In addition to the impact of interaction between party preference and local leader connection, a methodological phenomenon may have had an impact on the not-so-strong influence of local leader connection. The canvassing was conducted during the day when most of the respondents are working or studying away from their houses. They probably did not know that the *li* or *lin* leaders visited for the zoned candidate. It is also possible that they were indirectly influenced by their family members who have better connections with *li* and *lin* leaders. In this research, I do not have any question measuring the interaction among the respondents' family members. This, however, could be a source of influence not detected in the survey.

The Enduring Impact of Ethnic Ties

As indicated by previous research, ethnicity is a party cleavage line in Taiwan (Chang, 1987; Liu, 1987). Mainlanders are overwhelmingly affiliated with the Kuomintang. While the DPP has begun to expand its membership, few of them are mainlanders. The party-ethnicity association is evident.

Intuitively it is not clear why ethnicity has an impact on behavior. The reason should not be a physiological one but rather contextual. The Kuomintang is a party built on the Chinese mainland. When it was defeated by the Chinese Communists in 1949, most (or at least a majority) of its followers who fled to Taiwan must have had a close and warm relationship with the party. This long time historical connection leads to what we see today; most mainlanders in Taiwan identify with the Kuomintang. The DPP, on the contrary, was built in Taiwan. It also was built in opposition to the Kuomintang. The DPP, therefore, is less likely to be embraced by mainlanders. The resulting behavior difference is largely determined by the individual's party attachment, rather than their ethnicity. In fact, among the Kuomintang voters, there is no systematic difference between the two groups in terms of their support for zone candidates. Forty percent of the mainlander group voted for zone

candidates. In the Taiwanese group, the percentage is forty-four. The proportion of independent Kuomintang voters is about the same within each group.

## The Impact of Personal Characteristics

Even if all individuals are exposed to the same contexts, their ability and subjective perception of the stimuli from the contexts tends to be varied. In other words, personal characteristics also have an impact on the electoral effect of the Kuomintang's attempt of controlling social contexts. Above all, individuals' political knowledge plays an important role. The more political information one has, the more one tends to be independent of the Kuomintang's zone influence. This behavioral tendency fits our expectations for individuals in a democracy. However, only a minority of the public can be said to have a high level of political knowledge. In this study, only a fifth of the respondents scored five or six (on a scale of zero through six) in the political knowledge test. The distribution of political knowledge among the public provides the Kuomintang a favorable environment for exercising context control.

## Summary

The analysis of individual-level data in this chapter yields some evidences supporting the effect of context control, among other factors, on voting:

1. Traditional variables, including party preference and issue positions, are found to have a significant impact on voters choice between the two parties, the Kuomintang and the DPP, in Taiwanese elections.

2. The Kuomintang's strict control over television news programs did provide it an advantage in influencing voters' choice. There is a tendency that the increase of exposure to television news leads to higher probability of voting for the Kuomintang. The relationship,

however, is curvilinear. The least exposed and the most exposed voters are less likely than the moderately exposed individuals to vote for the Kuomintang.

3. There is a difference between the two major ethnic groups in Taiwan. Mainlanders are more likely to vote for the Kuomintang; the DPP candidates are mainly supported by Taiwanese.

4. Among those who voted for the Kuomintang, their connection with local leaders have an impact on the probability of supporting zone candidates. Party preference, however, has a mediating effect on the relationship. The stronger the identification to the Kuomintang the more influence the local connection has on votes for zone candidate. For those who do not identify with the Kuomintang, the connection has negative impact on their tendency to support the Zone System, though they also generally voted for Kuomintang candidates.

5. Lower political knowledge leads to higher probability of voting for zone candidates. Those who have higher political knowledge scores tend to be more independent in choosing among Kuomintang candidates.

6. Increase of frequency of discussion with others has a slight tendency to increase the probability of voting for the zone candidates. The relationship, however, is not linear.

## Notes to Chapter 5

[118] Estimated by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang in November, 1989.

[119]. The correlation coefficient between pre- and post-election party preference is 0.61, which indicates only moderate stability of this measurement. Given the short history of the two-party system in Taiwan, this is not unexpected.

[120] Most interviews were conducted on Saturday afternoon, 10 a.m. - 10 p.m. Sunday, and 2 - 10 p.m. Monday. Our experience is that working on weekends yields the best results. Saturday evening was skipped because the result is usually the poorest. The attrition rate in a similar study in 1986 was about the same; 28% of the pre-election sample could not be reached after the election.

[121] The interviewers are required to read a statement at the beginning to assure the respondents that they have the right to skip any question they do not want to answer. I noticed that most other surveys did not include this statement in the questionnaire. However, the rates of refusal on the vote question in other surveys are as high (usually higher than 50%) as this study. In the *China Times* telephone surveys before the election, on average only 30% of the respondents told the interviewers who they intended to vote for.

# CHAPTER 6

# CONCLUSION

It is commonly accepted that both personal characteristics and the social context in which one lives have an impact on one's behavior. While one's personal characteristics mostly do not change (e.g., gender, ethnicity) or change very slowly (e.g., interest in politics, involvement in campaigns), one's social context can be altered voluntarily or imposed by external forces. It follows that the imposition of a social context would have a consequent impact on an individual's behavior. The campaign context a political party imposes on voters would therefore have a significant impact on the results of elections. Analyses in previous chapters examined the operations and the effect of the Kuomintang's Zone System, a campaign structure aimed at controlling the social contexts of voters. In this concluding chapter, I synthesize the major findings to examine the nature of the Zone System as a tool of social context control. Then, the implications of these findings are discussed in the current context of political reform in Taiwan. Finally, directions for further research are suggested.

## The Zone System as a Tool of Social Context Control: A Party-Mass Linkage

The Zone System is intended to influence voters' behavior through the control over social contexts, especially neighborhoods and work places. This study investigates the campaign process, election results, and behavior of voters in the City of Taipei. The findings indicate that in the voters' choices for candidates in elections, their partisan attitudes -- party identification and standing on party related issues -- are important factors.

The Kuomintang thus has a significant influence on voter choice. This influence may be partly attributed to the control of social context -- the one-sided TV news programming and the mobilization efforts of interpersonal networks in the Zone System. These two control operations perform two functions: to create a context favorable to Kuomintang candidates generally and to supply voters "zoned" information. This control is effective in terms of generating support for Kuomintang candidates in general and in their particular zones. The electoral support it generates, on average, ranges between 25% and 30% of the votes in the zone. Clearly, the control in the Zone System is not totally effective. Because an election is a complex process involving many variables, it is also true that the effect of context control by any authority can only be partial. There is no evidence indicating that the Kuomintang attempts to control all social contexts. Even it did, a total control would not be possible. The control can only be partial--both over the context and the voter.

Partial Control Over Context

As a dominant political party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang can control many aspects of political resources, such as media exposure, not attainable by other political groups. However, the social contexts the Kuomintang can control are in fact limited. One works, eats, entertains, and sleeps, among other things. These activities do not take place in the same location. They are performed in different environments, thus imposing various contexts on the individual. Consequently, there is no guarantee of a consistent political message in all these contexts. While the effects of different contexts interact, each context also has its unique impact on the individual. On the time dimension, the effects of previous contexts persist. One's direct or indirect memory of previous contexts, for example, the history of the society, continues to affect one in a way that competes for influence against the current context. The effects of control of current and immediate contexts are somewhat constrained by the effects of previous and remote contexts.

The effectiveness of the Zone System's context control relies on the effectiveness of the agents carrying out the control. The characteristics and behavior of these agents and the quality of the work they accomplish determine the degree of success. In the Zone System local leaders have different motivations. Some of them work for the candidate due to their loyalty to the party, some campaign because of a personal friendship, still others are motivated primarily by financial and material compensation. Because of different motivations, levels of enthusiasm toward the campaign also tend to be different. There is no guarantee of a group of uniformly hard-working local leaders. As a result, a complete transmission of "zoned information", and thus fully-effective influence on voters, is unlikely.

Individuals are known to have a behavioral tendency to communicate with people like themselves. This implies that the mobilization for support by local leaders is a selective process. Local leaders are able to mobilize support from those with whom they maintain non-political day-to-day contacts. These contacts with a portion of the voters provide a linkage between the party and the voters. However, the selectivity of this process again reduces the scope, and thus the potential impact, of the Zone System.

Independence / Dependence of Voters

When the Kuomintang try to mobilize potential Kuomintang supporters to vote for particular candidates, the assumption is that some voters, for whatever reasons, can be "directed." In other words, "dependence" rather than "independence" is one of the major characteristics of these voters.

Classic theories of democracy require full knowledge and active participation from all citizens; everyone should be an independent decision-maker. Empirical evidence disagrees. The public are generally ill-informed about politics and few actively participate. Most people's opinions are constrained by self-interest, group membership, party

affiliation, and mass media. Individuals are not perfectly politically independent. They are inevitably influenced by some other individuals, groups, or institutions.

Although the public are not completely independent, they are not completely manipulable either. Not all individuals are equally vulnerable to influence. Some are more capable than others of analyzing and making choices based on information they receive. In general, better-informed individuals and politically active individuals are less likely to be influenced. This finding applies to voters both in Taiwan and in the United States (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1987).

Most individuals do not enter the world of politics completely ignorant. Some individuals may have strong attitudes inconsistent with the information the influencer wants to communicate. These individuals are more resistant to influence.There are others wearing Lazarsveld's "colored glasses" to examine the campaign message political parties intend to convey. They have preexisting attitudes which function to reinforce or to bias new information they receive. Still, there remain the poorly informed, who are easier to influence if the message reaches them, if they do not have a prior opinion on the issue, and if they do not have any other context competing for influence.

Control Over Candidates

The impact of the Zone System on candidates for offices is as powerful as its impact on individual voters. The Kuomintang's electoral success in the past indicates that, with the party's assistance, the zoned candidates will win most of the time; without it, most candidates are defeated.

Individual politicians may win support by personal charisma or localism, among other ways. In either case, the support may not be sufficient to win an election. Even a popular candidate can lose if the party's assistance is not provided. The contribution localism can make is relatively small in size and usually is not strong enough to win an

election. The party's organizational coordination in the campaign is vital even if a candidate has popularity or local support.

The party can control candidates better than it can control the electorate largely because political parties have more political resources than any individual politician can acquire -- resources politicians covet. This is more apparent in an authoritarian political system where one party dominates politics. In the case of Taiwan, before the Kuomintang began to face an organized challenge from the DPP, the party's nomination was tantamount to a victory in the election. Instead of interacting with voters, winning the party's nomination (through political infighting, as there was no primary election process) was the focus of candidates' efforts. The dependence of the candidates upon the party is evident. Even now, with the first formal organized challenges to the Kuomintang from the DPP, the Zone System remains the central political fact of the Taiwanese election process. It is even possible that the challenge may strengthen the Zone System, as the Kuomintang attempts a defensive response. Only time will tell.

## Interdependence of Actors in the Zone System

From the above, we may conclude that the Zone System is part of an interdependent party-candidate-mass linkage. It is an interdependent structure because none of the actors are completely independent from the influence of others, nor are they totally dependent. It is only part of the linkage because it functions only during elections, while other non-electoral activities dominate when no elections are being held.

The party, candidates, local leaders (who sometimes are also candidates), and voters form an interdependent structure (Figure 6-1). The party recruits and supports nominees at all levels in exchange for the support of party policies; the political patronage to local leaders assures those leaders' loyalty to the party; the formulation of policy wins the

support and identification of the voters. All these foster a base where the Zone System can operate.

Figure 6-1
The Interdependence Between Party, Candidates, Local Leaders, and Voters




The Zone System in fact, functions to activate the interdependent relations among the candidates, local leaders, and voters. The candidates provide friendship, material compensation, and good "face" to motivate a group of local leaders to campaign. The local leaders are able to do so because they maintain frequent non-political contacts with voters. These contacts are transformed into political support in elections. In addition to the assistance from local leaders, the candidate's own contacts with voters (e.g., casework) also can win votes. It is the Zone System which activates the candidate-local leader-voter triangle. Without this organizational structure, the support for party nominees would probably be less, and less dependable.

Through this linkage, a large portion of the electorate are directly or indirectly involved in the competition between the major parties. The Kuomintang has been able to retain the advantage because of its long time non-political contacts with the electorate through the network of local leaders. However, other parties are developing, and it is questionable if the advantage, or at least the magnitude of the advantage, can be retained indefinitely.

## The Zone System vs Political Reform

The major political reforms that have occurred in Taiwan since 1986 were the lifting of martial law and the legalization of the establishment of new political parties (Tien 1987; Chou and Andrew, 1987). The impact of these reforms on Taiwanese politics should be profound, though it may not appear dramatic as yet. The presence of an opposition party creates a new party system in which the Kuomintang need to confront real competitors; the elimination of martial law accelerates the democratization of Taiwanese politics. Both have significant implications for the Zone System.

### The Zone System in a New Party System

The emergence of new political parties, mainly the DPP, in the political arena has not brought an end to the dominance of the Kuomintang. Neither has it had an immediate impact on the Zone System. The Zone System operates as usual, at least as recently as 1989. However, with the presence of new parties, the Kuomintang's dominance should gradually fade away. Even so, its reliance on the Zone System as an effective campaign structure should remain.

The presence of a new party has offered the public an alternative. With the DPP's formal organization setting up island-wide, the number of DPP members winning offices increasing, and the contacts between the DPP and the electorate expanding, these collective efforts will attract more identifiers from new voters in the future. After two or three generations, we may see a mature and stable party system (in the electorate) through the transmission of the political attitudes of the current electorate to their offsprings (Converse, 1969).

Even in such a new party system, the Zone System still will be vital to the Kuomintang's electoral fortune. It will remain as an effective structure to control party

adherents; it also will remain an effective system to mobilize support in elections. What the Zone System has done is to translate non-political interactions into political support. The KMT's needs under this new situation remain the same. The major difference we may expect is that the Kuomintang will increasingly become a competitor, instead of a dominator, in the new system. Therefore, the need for it to rely on a well-run Zone System is increasing.

Given that the Zone System has worked for the Kuomintang, it should also work well for other political parties. The DPP, in the long run, also can build its own zone system. As it is developing, the DPP will increase its non-political contacts with voters. The social networks of local leaders can be built in a similar way. The mobilization for electoral support should also be equally effective in the future.

## The Zone System and Democratization

Democratization in Taiwan has many dimensions. One of them is an increase in responsiveness by political parties. The Zone System can achieve this goal for the Kuomintang through its influence on candidates.

After Taiwan lifted martial law, the Zone System faced new, competing social forces, especially the "liberalized" newspapers (though it still strictly controls television news) and emerging voluntary groups. This change provides the candidates, of the Kuomintang as well as the DPP, more channels in which to transmit their messages to voters. In other words, the Zone System has more competitors in providing information to voters. In order to make up for the potential disadvantage of this change, the Kuomintang has needed to be more responsive to the needs of voters. Early signs of this trend include the adoption of a (non-binding) primary in the election of 1989.

The Zone System, through its powerful influence on candidates, helps the party to increase its responsiveness. In years when the Kuomintang is the dominant force in

elections, candidates need to pay more attention to the party and less to the electorate. When the party cannot provide total control of the context, or when the candidates need to compete among themselves, they turn to voters. They need to work more with the electorate; to be more responsive. As time passes, Kuomintang candidates may get involved in more of the activities at the local level. In the long run, this may in fact enhance the power of the Zone System.

## Suggestions for Future Research

A common feature of the studies of contextual effects is that personal interactions with the context are assumed. However, there are few investigations of such interactions. To improve the measurement of the context variable in surveys, we need further observations of the agents carrying out contextual influence. To understand the personal interaction within the context, we need to use a more appropriate unit of study and technique of data collecting.

### More Complete Measurement of Context

One major deficiency of question design in this study is related to the measurement of local leader connections. Since *li* and *lin* leaders are the major agents carrying out the party's intent, measurements of voters' acquaintance with them are necessary, but not sufficient. For the message to reach voters, *li* and *lin* leader must work hard to ensure the voters receive the message. Therefore, measures of the quality of the work, the attitudes, and the characteristics of these leaders are needed. Also needed is measurement of voter perceptions of the work done by local leaders--not only the work during elections, but also their daily contacts. Although my concerns for this project focus on society in Taiwan, I

believe this principle applies to other similar studies. The connection between a context and the individual needs to be more fully measured.

Using an Appropriate Unit of Study

Insufficient measurement of the connection between context and individual is often the result of the unit of study used. Survey researchers use the individual as the unit of study. Measurements of interactions between the individual and the context are often unilateral perceptions of the respondents. More observations of the varieties of interaction, such as interaction with other family members, is preferable. The canvassing in the Zone System contacts households, not necessarily the respondents of the survey. However, the interaction within the family is likely to spread the message to other family members. Under such circumstances, using the family, one's most immediate context, as the unit of study is more appropriate. This consideration makes more sense when we consider the fact that the idea of "one man one vote" is foreign to Chinese who emphasize the value of maintaining harmony, within the family. The investigation of the family will provide a better chance to look at the behaviors of those who are not contacted by local leaders, those who have less interest in the campaign, and those who have less knowledge.

In Taiwan, as in other societies where political sensitivity creates bias (e.g., missing data) on surveys, there is also a practical reason to use the family as the unit of research. With smaller numbers, it is possible to build mutual trust between researchers and the respondent families. This is not possible in a brief interview during a survey. The need for this more personal relationship in conducting better quality research is as critical as it is in mobilizing votes!

# APPENDICES

# APPENDIX A

# SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLE

There are 354 *li* in the South District in Taipei. They were grouped into four strata according to population in the *li*. In total, 2500 sample respondents were allocated to each stratum. The number of sample respondents divided by 20 equals the number of sample *li* in each stratum. The sample *li* in each stratum were randomly selected. In each *li*, 20 respondents are selected using systematic sampling. The sampling plan is described in Table A-1.

Of the 2500 names drawn from voter registers, the interview failed to find 1780. The causes are listed in Table A-2. The representativeness of the included cases, in terms of distributions of age groups, gender, ethnicity, and educational level, were tested. Only education level shows a difference. The reason may be that many residents in Taipei did not update their educational level records in the household registration, from which the educational level of the population is calculated.

Table A-1
Sampling Plan

| Stratum (Population in *li*) | % of Total Population in Stratum | Sample Allocated | Actual[1] Sample |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2500 + | 31.54% | 789 | 780 (20 x 39) |
| 2000-2500 | 26.56% | 664 | 660 (20 x 33) |
| 1500-2000 | 25.83% | 646 | 660 (20 x 33) |
| 1500 - | 16.07% | 402 | 400 (20 x 20) |

Note: 1. The actual sample is determined by multiplying a predetermined number of respondents in a *li* (20) by number of *li* in each stratum. For example, in the first row, where 789 respondents are allocated, in fact 780 names are sampled. The 780 respondents are drawn from 39 *li*, 20 each.

Table A-2
Causes of Failed Cases

| Cause | Number of Cases | % |
|---|---|---|
| Refused | 145 | 8.1 |
| Not available during the period when interviews were conducted | 416 | 23.4 |
| On military duty, studying or working in other places or abroad | 130 | 7.3 |
| No one home | 265 | 14.9 |
| No such person; no such address | 384 | 21.6 |
| Moved | 201 | 11.3 |
| Cheating by interviewers | 73 | 4.1 |
| Not interviewed[1] | 131 | 7.4 |
| Others | 35 | 2.0 |
| Total | 1780 | 100.0 |

Note: 1. Some interviewers returned the questionnaires blank.

Table A-3
Chi-Square Test of Difference Between Sample and Population
Age Distributions

| | Sample | | Population | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Observed n | % | Expected n | % |
| 20~29 | 192 | 26.7 | 203.5 | 28.3 |
| 30~39 | 207 | 28.6 | 209.8 | 29.1 |
| 40~49 | 111 | 15.4 | 114.2 | 15.9 |
| 50~59 | 93 | 12.9 | 84.8 | 11.8 |
| 60 and older | 117 | 16.3 | 107.6 | 14.9 |
| Total | 720 | 100.0 | 719.9 | 100.1 |

df = 4, Chi-square = 2.39, $p > .05$.

Table A-4

Chi-square Test of Difference Between Sample and Population Gender Distributions

| | Sample | | Population | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Observed n | % | Expected n | % |
| Male | 340 | 47.22 | 363.8 | 50.53 |
| Female | 380 | 52.78 | 356.2 | 49.47 |
| Total | 720 | 100.00 | 720.0 | 100.00 |

df = 1, Chi-square = 3.15, $p > .05$.

Table A-5

Chi-Square Test of Difference Between Sample and Population, Ethnicity Distributions

| | Sample | | Population | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnicity | Observed n | % | Expected n | % |
| Native Taiwanese | 509 | 71.2 | 495.1 | 69.2 |
| Mainlander | 206 | 28.8 | 220.0 | 30.8 |

df = 1, Chi-square = 1.28, $p > .05$.

Table A-6

Chi-Square Test of Difference Between Sample and Population, Education Distributions

| | Sample | | Population | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education | Observed n | % | Expected n | % |
| Primary school and less | 173 | 24.4 | 245.0 | 34.6 |
| Middle school | 263 | 37.2 | 311.5 | 44.0 |
| College and more | 272 | 38.4 | 151.7 | 21.4 |

df = 2, Chi-square = 124.19, $p < .05$.

# APPENDIX B

## MAP OF THE CITY OF TAIPEI AND ZONE ASSIGNMENT IN FOUR ELECTIONS




| # | Ward |
|---|---|
| 1 | Sulin |
| 2 | Peitow |
| 3 | Datong |
| 4 | Songsan |
| 5 | Neihu |
| 6 | Nankang |
| 7 | Chungsan |
| 8 | Chienchern |
| 9 | Yenpin |
| 10 | Daan |
| 11 | Chernchung |
| 12 | Longsan |
| 13 | Kuting |
| 14 | Swanyuan |
| 15 | Ginmei |
| 16 | Mucha |

Zone Assignments in the Legislative Elections in Taipei

| 1980 | | 1983 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Candidate | Wards in Zone | Candidate | Wards in Zone |
| Huang Lian-fu | 1,2,3,9. | Hong Wen-tung | 1,2,3. |
| Chou Wen-yon | 4,5,6. | Jen Yo-sin | 4. |
| Lui Yu-chi | 7. | Lin Yu-shiang | 5,6,10,11. |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 8,9,10,11,12. | Tsai Chen-chou | 7,8,9,12. |
| Chi Cheng | 13,14,15,16. | Kao Chung-sin | 13,14,15,16. |
| Lee Chih-peng | Military community | Lee Chih-peng | Military community |

1986

| Candidate | Wards in Zone |
|---|---|
| Hong Wen-tung | 1,2,8. |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 3,5,6,10. |
| Jen Yo-sin | 4,11. |
| Huang Su-wei | 9,12,13,14,15. |
| Chi Cheng | 7,10,16. |
| Chao Shaw-kang | 4,7. |
| Chen Hong-chuan | Military community |

1989[1]

| Candidate | Wards in Zone |
|---|---|
| Lee Chung-shiang | 1,2. |
| Lin Hsien-tong | 1,3,4,5. |
| Chou Chuan | 4,5,6. |
| Chao Shaw-kang | 2,4,6. |
| Chao Zen-peng | Military community |
| Hong Tung-kwei | 7,10,11. |
| Lin Yu-shiang | 8,10,13,15,16. |
| Chang Chih-min | 7,13,14,15. |
| Huang Su-wei | 9,12,14. |
| Yu Mu-ming | Military community |

1. The first five are in the North District; the rest are in the South District.

# APPENDIX C

## THREE SUPPORTING CASES DISCOUNTING LOCALISM

There are three Kuomintang candidates who ran twice in elections between 1983 and 1989. The changes of the vote percentage for them are associated with changes in zone assignment. In the case of Jen Yo-sin (Table C-1), removal of half of Ward 4 reduced his share of the vote in that ward by 17.8%; the addition of Ward 11 to his zone increased the percentage of the vote for him in that ward by 18.1%. Huang Su-wei's case is similar (Table C-2). The changes in Chao Shaw-kang's vote, however, are not consistent with the hypothesis. His unusual popularity probably is the reason for the overall increase of votes in all wards.

Table C-1
Changes of Percentages of Vote in Wards,
Jen Yo-sin, 1983-1986.

| Ward | 1983 | Diff. 1986 - 1983 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 7.6 | -2.4 | 5.2 |
| 2 | 7.9 | -2.1 | 5.8 |
| 3 | 5.9 | -2.0 | 3.9 |
| 4 | 38.7 | -17.8 | 20.9 |
| 5 | 8.3 | -3.3 | 5.0 |
| 6 | 9.1 | -4.6 | 4.5 |
| 7 | 9.9 | -3.8 | 6.1 |
| 8 | 6.2 | -2.4 | 3.8 |
| 9 | 6.5 | -2.2 | 4.3 |
| 10 | 13.5 | -4.8 | 8.7 |
| 11 | 10.1 | +18.1 | 28.2 |
| 12 | 5.9 | -2.5 | 3.4 |
| 13 | 11.3 | -4.7 | 6.6 |
| 14 | 6.1 | -2.0 | 4.1 |
| 15 | 12.1 | -5.5 | 6.6 |
| 16 | 10.2 | -5.1 | 5.1 |

Note: Underlined numbers are those of the zone.

Table C-2

Changes of Percentages of Vote in Districts,

Chao Shaw-kang and Huang Su-wei, 1986-1989.

| Ward | Chao Shaw-kang | | | Huang Su-wei | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1986 | Diff. 1989 - 1986 | 1989 | 1986 | Diff. 1989 - 1986 | 1989 |
| 1 | 12.9 | +8.5 | 21.4 | 3.3 | -- | n.a. |
| 2 | 11.7 | +14.9 | 26.6 | 3.4 | -- | n.a. |
| 3 | 10.0 | +10.3 | 20.3 | 3.5 | -- | n.a. |
| 4 | 21.4 | +7.9 | 29.3 | 3.3 | -- | n.a. |
| 5 | 19.7 | +5.8 | 25.5 | 2.7 | -- | n.a. |
| 6 | 24.1 | +10.0 | 34.1 | 2.1 | -- | n.a. |
| 7 | 17.8 | -- | n.a. | 5.0 | -.7 | 4.3 |
| 8 | 9.2 | -- | n.a. | 4.2 | +1.5 | 5.7 |
| 9 | 10.3 | -- | n.a. | 24.3 | -.6 | 23.7 |
| 10 | 13.6 | -- | n.a. | 5.4 | +3.2 | 8.6 |
| 11 | 11.7 | -- | n.a. | 7.0 | -2.1 | 4.9 |
| 12 | 8.4 | -- | n.a. | 35.3 | -2.2 | 33.1 |
| 13 | 13.9 | -- | n.a. | 29.3 | -24.4 | 4.9 |
| 14 | 10.9 | -- | n.a. | 24.9 | -7.3 | 17.6 |
| 15 | 14.7 | -- | n.a. | 27.1 | -22.4 | 4.7 |
| 16 | 15.7 | -- | n.a. | 5.7 | -2.1 | 3.6 |

Note: 1. Underlined numbers are wards in the zone.

2. n.a.= not applicable, they were redistricted as the North District and the South District.

# APPENDIX D

## TESTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MISSING AND SAMPLE GROUPS

In order to check the representativeness of the sample, chi-square tests and t-tests are conducted. As can be seen in Table D-1 and Table D-2, five variables show significant differences between the missing group and sample group. Except for the difference caused by ethnicity, other differences are small.

Table D-1

Chi-square Test of Ethnic Background and Missing Data

| Ethnic Group | Vote Revealed | Vote Not Revealed | Total | n |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mainlander | 62.9% | 37.1% | 100.0% | 132 |
| Taiwanese | 46.5% | 53.5% | 100.0% | 303 |

df = 1,Chi-square = 9.19, $p < .01$.

Table D-2

T-test of the Differences of Means Between Missing and Sample Group

| Independent Variable | Mean of the Group Reveled Votes | Mean of the Missing Group | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age (years) | 41.1 (225) | 42.1 (210) | -.65 |
| Education (years) | 11.6 (223) | 10.6 (210) | 2.27* |
| Political knowledge (low 0 -- 6 high) | 3.05 (225) | 2.65 (211) | 2.38* |
| Interest in campaign (low 1 -- 4 high) | 2.92 (224) | 2.88 (211) | .36 |
| Newspaper readership (low 1--4 high) | 2.84 (224) | 2.77 (209) | .89 |
| TV news exposure (low 1--4 high) | 3.04 (223) | 2.97 (209) | .87 |
| Discussion (low 0--3 high) | 1.53 (225) | 1.36 (211) | 1.67 |
| Local leader connection (low 0--6 high) | 1.95 (225) | 2.22 (211) | -1.54 |
| Party identification (DPP 1--5 strong KMT) | 3.06 (200) | 2.77 (177) | 2.27* |
| Independence issue (unlikely 1--3 likely) | 2.10 (219) | 2.10 (204) | -.03 |
| Presidential election (Pro 1--3 Con) | 1.89 (225) | 1.74 (204) | 1.87 |

* $p < .05$, N in parentheses.

# APPENDIX E

## QUESTIONS AND FREQUENCIES OF SELECTED VARIABLES

Interest in Campaign

There is an election underway; do you pay very much attention to the campaign? Or some attention, or not much attention, or not at all?

| | |
|---|---|
| very much | 23% |
| some attention | 35 |
| not much | 32 |
| not at all | 9 |
| Total (n=720) | 99 |

Newspaper Usage

Some people read election news in detail, some don't have time to read any. How about you? Do you read a lot, or read some, or read a little, or not at all?

| | |
|---|---|
| a lot | 19% |
| some | 47 |
| a little | 20 |
| not at all | 13 |
| Total (N=720) | 99 |

TV News Exposure

Do you pay very much attention to election news on TV? or some attention? or not much attention? or pay no attention at all?

| | |
|---|---|
| very much | 27% |
| some | 43 |
| not much | 23 |
| not at all | 7 |
| Total (N=720) | 100 |

Discussion with Others

1. Did you talk about the election with your family members or your relatives?

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 59% |
| No | 41 |
| Total (N=720) | 100 |

2. Did you talk about the election with your friends or co-workers?

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 60% |
| No | 40 |
| Total (N=720) | 100 |

3. Did you talk about the election with your neighbors?

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 22% |
| No | 78 |
| Total (N=720) | 100 |

Local Leader Connection

1. Do you know your *li* leader?
   a. Do you know him personally?
   b. Did s/he ask you to vote for any particular candidate?

| | |
|---|---|
| Know who | 47% |
| Know him/her personally | 37% |
| Contacted for vote | 10% |
| (N=482) | |

2. Do you know your lin leader?
   a. Do you know him personally?
   b. Did s/he ask you to vote for any particular candidate?

| | |
|---|---|
| Know who | 52% |
| Know him/her personally | 46% |
| Contacted for vote | 8% |
| (N=482) | |

| Score | % |
|---|---|
| 0 | 36 |
| 1 | 6 |
| 2 | 21 |
| 3 | 8 |
| 4 | 22 |
| 5 | 6 |
| 6 | 2 |
| Total (N=482) | 101 |

Political knowledge

1. For how long a term do we elect legislators?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 34% |
| Incorrect | 49 |
| DK | 18 |
| Total (N=720) | 101 |

2. Of which country is Gorbachev the leader?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 76% |
| Incorrect | 3 |
| DK | 22 |
| Total (N=720) | 101 |

3. Who is the prime minister of Communist China?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 29% |
| Incorrect | 32 |
| DK | 39 |
| Total (N=720) | 100 |

4. Who is the minister who resigned recently?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 66% |
| Incorrect | 6 |
| DK | 27 |
| Total (N=720) | 99 |

5. Who is the chairman of the DPP?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 57% |
| Incorrect | 5 |
| DK | 38 |
| Total (N=720) | 101 |

6. Who are eligible to elect the members of the Control Yuan?

| | |
|---|---|
| Correct | 20% |
| Incorrect | 30 |
| DK | 49 |
| Total | 99 |

| Political knowledge score | % |
|---|---|
| 0 | 15% |
| 1 | 11 |
| 2 | 16 |
| 3 | 20 |
| 4 | 20 |
| 5 | 13 |
| 6 | 6 |
| Total (N=720) | 101 |

Party Identification

In recent years, some people refer to themselves as belonging to the Kuomintang or the DPP; would you say you identified with the Kuomintang or the DPP, or others, or none of them?

(If the R is an identifier)

a. Would you say you strongly support the party, or just so so?

(If the R said "none" or "Don't know")

b. Then would you say you are leaning to the Kuomintang or the DPP? or Neither?

| Party id. | SD DPP | WD DPP | DL leaned | IND pendent | KL leaned | WK KMT | SK KMT | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n | 6 | 6 | 36 | 286 | 137 | 84 | 105 | 660 |
| % | 1 | 1 | 5 | 43 | 21 | 13 | 16 | 100 |

Party Image

1. Which party has better candidates? The Kuomintang or the DPP?

| | |
|---|---|
| KMT | 34% |
| About the Same | 46 |
| DPP | 6 |
| DK + Refused | 15 |
| Total (N=482) | 101 |

2. Which party offers better policy proposals? The Kuomintang or the DPP?

| | |
|---|---|
| KMT | 34% |
| About the same | 26 |
| DPP | 7 |
| DK+ Refused | 33 |
| Total (N=482) | 100 |

3. Which party can represent our local interests better?

| | |
|---|---|
| KMT | 46% |
| About the same | 17 |
| DPP | 6 |
| DK+ Refused | 30 |
| Total (N=482) | 99 |

4. Which party is more able to take care of the peoples' welfare?

| | |
|---|---|
| KMT | 52% |
| About the same | 18 |
| DPP | 6 |
| DK+ Refused | 24 |
| Total (N=482) | 100 |

5. Which party has better leadership?

| | |
|---|---|
| KMT | 57% |
| About the same | 14 |
| DPP | 5 |
| DK+ Refused | 24 |
| Total (N=482) | 100 |

| Image Score | % |
|---|---|
| 0 | .5 |
| 1 | .5 |
| 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 |
| 5 | 24 |
| 6 | 12 |
| 7 | 10 |
| 8 | 14 |
| 9 | 15 |
| 10 | 16 |
| Total (N=482) | 101 |

Issues

1.Independence

During the campaign, some people have said that if we change the national title, national flag, and national anthem, and declare the full independence of Taiwan, then Communist China will attack Taiwan. Do you agree with this opinion?

| | |
|---|---|
| Agree | 37% |
| Depends, no opinion | 30 |
| Disagree | 29 |
| Refused | 3 |
| Total (N=720) | 99 |

2. Presidential Election

Some people say that the President should be directly elected by voters. Do you agree or disagree?

| | |
|---|---|
| Agree | 48% |
| Depends, no opinion | 24 |
| Disagree | 26 |
| Refused | 3 |
| Total (N=720) | 101 |

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