Kharis Templeman
中文姓名:祁凱立
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How Successful is the Chinese Regime?

1/6/2018

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My latest review essay, entitled "The China Model: How Successful is the Chinese Regime?" is now out at the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.

More on the themes of that piece below, but first, If you are a China-watcher, you really need to read Edward Wong's terrific new article in the New York Times, "A Chinese Empire Reborn." Wong was a China correspondent for the NYT for a decade, and he cuts through a lot of the crap about the nature of the Chinese regime. China's rise as a global power, he rightly notes, is occurring mostly through its accumulation of economic and military clout, rather than through emulation of its system and values by ordinary people and elites in other countries. That is, China's rise to date has been mostly about increasing its "hard", not "soft", power, and that order shows few signs of changing anytime soon.

There's one assumption in that essay that bothers me a bit, though. It's that the Chinese regime is inevitably going to continue its ascension in the world--that is, though it probably won't attract more admirers or imitators any time soon, China's relative hard power will continue its rapid increase. Here's the end of Wong's essay:

"Chinese citizens and the world would benefit if China turns out to be an empire whose power is based as much on ideas, values and culture as on military and economic might. It was more enlightened under its most glorious dynasties. But for now, the Communist Party embraces hard power and coercion, and this could well be what replaces the fading liberal hegemony of the United States on the global stage.

​It will not lead to a grand vision of world order. Instead, before us looms a void."
What I question is Wong's implicit assumption that China will inevitably continue on an upward trajectory over the next several decades. It's true that the relative power of the United States is declining ("fading" is a bit strong, but we'll leave that aside for now), as it has been since its early post-Cold War peak. It's also true that the "liberal hegemony" of the current global order, and especially the capacity, and willingness, of the United States to maintain it, is under considerable short-term threat right now.

But it is not obvious to me that China is especially well-positioned to benefit from these trends, because it's not self-evident that its current economic expansion will continue much longer, or that Chinese leaders will be able to adapt very effectively to the challenges looming on the horizon. The Chinese economy has grown quickly over the last 35 years, but despite many assertions that China's growth record is unprecedented, it is not--over a similar time interval, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and before them Japan registered equally impressive growth, with a much more equal distribution of gains, to boot. And those earlier "economic miracles" followed a broadly similar pattern--a greater role for market forces, increasing connectivity to the global economy, export-oriented development, high savings rates, broad investment in education and infrastructure, but a continued privileged role for an activist state. 

Here's the kicker: in all of those cases, the economy inevitably slowed down, and at the same time their  "demographic dividends" also ended. The transition to a different growth model has been wrenching, and it's not clear that Japan, or South Korea, or Taiwan or Singapore has hit on the right balance of reforms--in particular, improved corporate governance, strengthened rule of law, and banking reforms--that would improve their long-term economic prospects. (Singapore has probably come the closest so far.) So why should we expect China to? On all these dimensions, China actually looks much worse than its Asian predecessors, and it has the added burden of a hugely unequal distribution of wealth and a political system that suffers from a grievous, long-term legitimacy deficit. (This leaves aside, too, the question of whether its reported GDP figures actually reflect anything close to reality.) It also is facing a dire demographic picture made worse by the One-Child Policy: its workforce-age population is already declining, and its total population is projected to begin falling in less than 20 years. That does not sound like a country destined for global hegemony to me.

For a more detailed discussion, check out my essay at the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.   
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Taiwan Democracy Project Seminar: James Lee

10/13/2017

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On October 17, the Taiwan Democracy Project at Stanford University will host our first event of the fall quarter, a talk by James Lee of Princeton University. The talk is co-sponsored with the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative in the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford. Mr. Lee's talk will draw from his dissertation research, which examines the role of the United States in the emergence of the "developmental state" in Taiwan--the interlocking set of state and regime institutions that oversaw the island's transformative economic growth from the 1960s through the 1980s. 

The title of his talk is "U.S.-China Rivalry and the Origins of Taiwan's Developmental State." The event is free and open to the public; details on the talk and speaker are below.


Abstract
Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the developmental state with producing the first wave of the East Asian economic miracle. Using historical evidence based on original archival research, this talk offers a geopolitical explanation for the origins of the developmental state. In contrast to previous studies that have emphasized colonial legacies or domestic political factors, I argue that the developmental state was the legacy of the rivalry between the United States and Communist China during the Cold War. Responding to the acute tensions in Northeast Asia in the early postwar years, the United States supported emergency economic controls in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to enforce political stability. In response to the belief that the Communist threat would persist over the long term, the U.S. strengthened its clients by laying the foundations of a capitalist, export-oriented economy under bureaucratic guidance. The result of these interventions was a distinctive model of state-directed capitalism that scholars would later characterize as a developmental state.
​

I verify this claim by examining the rivalry between the United States and the Chinese Communists and demonstrating that American threat perceptions caused the U.S. to promote unorthodox economic policies among its clients in Northeast Asia. In particular, I examine U.S. relations with the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, where American efforts to create a bulwark against Communism led to the creation of an elite economic bureaucracy for administering U.S. economic aid. In contrast, the United States decided not to create a developmental state in the Philippines because the Philippine state was not threatened by the Chinese Communists. Instead, the Philippines faced a domestic insurgency that was weaker and comparatively short-lived. As a result, the U.S. pursued a limited goal of maintaining economic stability instead of promoting rapid industrialization. These findings shed new light on the legacy of statism in American foreign economic policy and highlight the importance of geopolitics in international development.

Bio
James Lee is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. He specializes in International Relations with a focus on U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and relations across the Taiwan Strait. James also serves as the Senior Editor for Taiwan Security Research, an academic website that aggregates news and commentary on the economic and political dimensions of Taiwan's security.
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Taiwan-Related Events at APSA 2017

8/8/2017

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 The Conference Group on Taiwan Studies is a special Related Group of the American Political Science Association. For this year's annual APSA conference in San Francisco, CGOTS is hosting two panels, a business meeting, and a reception. All are open to registered conference participants. Details can be found here and below.

Thursday, August 31

 4:00-5:30pm, Westin St. Francis, Georgian Room
CGOTS Panel I. Legitimacy Issues in Taiwanese Politics
 
1. "Personality Traits and Individual Attitude toward the Independence/Unification Issue in Taiwan,"
Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University (Author)
Ching-hsing Wang, University of Houston (Author) 
 
2. “The Rise of Cause Lawyers and the Rule of Law in Taiwan”
Chin-shou Wang,  National Cheng Kung University (Author) 
Yu-Hsien Sung, University of South Carolina (Author) 
 
3. “Framing Effects of Pro-Gay and Pro-Family Activism in Taiwan”
Shih-chan Dai, University of Massachusetts-Amherst (Author) 
Chung-li Wu, Academia Sinica (Author) 
 
4. “Generation and Identity in Taiwan: Change and Continuity”
T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University (Author) 
Su-Feng Cheng, National Chengchi University (Author) 
 
Chair:
Yao-yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas
Discussants:
Chien-kai Chen, Rhodes College
Aram Hur, New York University
 
 

Friday, September 1

4:00-5:30pm, Parc 55, Hearst Room
CGOTS Panel II. Parties and Elections in Taiwan
 
1. “Accounting for Legislative Candidate's Donation and Spending”
Chia-hung Tsai, National Chengchi University (Author) 
Nathan F. Batto, Academia Sinica (Author) 
Su-Feng Cheng, National Chengchi University (Author) 
Ching-hsin Yu, National Chengchi University (Author) 
 
2. “Electoral Institutions, State Subsidy Rules, and the Party System in Taiwan”
Yen-Pin Su, National Chengchi University (Author) 
 
3. “The Emergence of New Parties: A Case Study of the New Power Party in Taiwan”
Chi Huang, National Chengchi University (Author) 
Kah-yew Lim, National Chengchi University (Non-Presenting Co-Author) 
Lu-huei Chen, National Chengchi University (Author) 
Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University (Taipei) (Author) 
 
4. “The Issue Structure of Voter Choice in Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential Election”
Caleb M. Clark, Auburn University (Author) 
Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas (Non-Presenting Co-Author)
Alexander C. Tan, University of Canterbury (Author)
 
Chair: 
Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas
Discussants:
Lu-Cheng Dennis Weng, SUNY, Cortland
Austin Horng-En Wang, Duke University
 
 
6:30-7:30pm, Hilton Union Square, Golden Gate 1
Conference Group on Taiwan Studies Business Meeting
Open to all CGOTS members
 
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7:30-9:00pm, Hilton Union Square, Golden Gate 3
Conference Group on Taiwan Studies Reception
Open to CGOTS members and guests; food and drink provided
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APSA 2017 Mini-Conference: Electoral Malpractice in East and Southeast Asia

8/7/2017

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PictureThe Westin St. Francis San Francisco, with Union Square in the foreground.
The 2017 American Political Science Association annual conference will be held in San Francisco, CA, from August 31-September 3, 2017. One of the new formats that APSA introduced last year is a "mini-conference"--that is, a day-long set of panels that share a related theme and set of questions, considered in a more flexible format than the standard, rigid APSA section panels. 

This year I have had the privilege, with Netina Tan of McMaster University, to organize a mini-conference on electoral malpractice in East and Southeast Asia. The event will run all day Saturday, September 2, and is open to all registered APSA conference attendees. The full schedule of panels is below. 

Venue: Westin San Francisco, California Room West
Date: Saturday, September 2, 8:00am-5:30pm
​

8:00am-9:30am          Panel 1: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Issues
  1. Welcome (Netina Tan, McMaster University and Kharis Templeman, Stanford University)
  2. Keynote: “Electoral Integrity and Democratic Practices in Asia” (Larry Diamond, Stanford University)
  3. “Methodological Challenges in the study of Electoral Malpractice” (Carolien Van Ham, University of New South Wales)
Chair: Allen Hicken (University of Michigan)
Discussant: Allen Hicken (University of Michigan) 

9:30am-11:00am      Panel 2: Types of Electoral Malpractice
  1. “Drivers of Pre-Electoral Manipulations in the 2013 Cambodian Election” (Max Groemping, University of Sydney)
  2. “Pre-Electoral Malpractice in Single-Party Dominant Malaysia” (Kai Ostwald, University of British Columbia)
  3. “Electoral Malpractice in Myanmar: A Comparison of the 2010 and 2015 Elections” (Marco Bünte, Monash University, Malaysia)
  4. “The Use and Abuse of Electoral Rules to Manipulate Election Outcomes in Thailand” (Joel Selway, Brigham Young University)
Chair: Larry Diamond (Stanford University)
Discussant: Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University)

11:00-11:15pm           Break 

11:15pm-12:45pm      Panel 3: Effects of Electoral Malpractice  
  1. “Gerrymandering and Malapportionment in Singapore” (Netina Tan, McMaster University)
  2. “Voting for the Incumbent in Single Party Regimes: Fear or Conviction?” (Guillem Riambau, Yale-NUS and Kai Ostwald, University of British Columbia)
  3. “Voting in the Dark: How Vietnamese Voters Negotiate Low Information Elections” (Paul Schuler, University of Arizona)
  4. “Silent Manipulation: Effects of Polling Place Distance on Voting Behavior in Hong Kong’s Electoral Autocracy” (Stan Hok-Wui Wong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University)
Chair: Kenneth McElwain (University of Tokyo)
Discussant: Meredith Weiss (University at Albany, Suny)

12:45pm-2:00pm    Lunch Break

2:00pm-3:30pm          Panel 4: Sources of Electoral Integrity   
  1. “Sources of Electoral Integrity: Reforming the Central Election Commission in Taiwan” (Kharis Templeman, Stanford University)
  2. “Violations of Electoral Integrity in the Myanmar 2015 Election” (Elin Bjarnegard, Uppsala University)
  3. “Free and/or Fair? How Japanese Courts Rule on Election Campaign Regulations” (Kenneth Mori McElwain, Tokyo University)
  4. “Restricting free speech in the name of fairness: Campaign regulation in South Korea” (You Jong-Sung, Australian National University)
Chair:  Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University)
​
Discussant: Allen Hicken (University of Michigan)  

3:30-3:45pm              Break 

3:45-5:00pm               Panel 5: Challenges of Electoral Reforms 
  1. “Challenges of Electoral Reforms and Engineering in Mongolia” (Michael Seeberg, University of Southern Denmark)
  2. “The Menu of Manipulation: Reform and Malpractice in Contemporary Indonesian Elections” (Sarah Shair Rosenfield, Arizona State University)
  3. “The Decline of the Effectiveness of Vote-Buying as Electoral Mobilization Strategy in Taiwan” (Wang Chin-Shou, National Cheng Kung University)
  4. “Using Election Forensics to Detect Fraud and Strategic Behavior in the Philippines” (Allen Hicken, University of Michigan)
Chair: Guillem Riambau (Yale-NUS)
​
Discussant: Carolien Van Ham (University of New South Wales)

5:00pm-5:30pm          Panel 6: Roundtable  Discussion 
  1. Comparative Regional Implications, Publications and Steps Forward (Netina Tan, McMaster University and Kharis Templeman, Stanford University)
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Varieties of Democracy Post-Doctoral Fellowships

12/1/2016

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The Varieties of Democracy project has posted a call for applications for up to two new post-doctoral fellows to join their team at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. This is a terrific opportunity to be part of the next wave of quantitative research on comparative democracy and democratization. Gothenburg is also a fantastic city to spend time in. I've reposted the full call for applications below.


V-Dem is seeking to replenish our research agenda and are therefore looking for scholars who have completed their degree no more than four years before the application deadline; present exciting new ideas; and that have a strong record of accomplishments in or more of the following areas:
  • Comparative democratization (e.g., sequencing of democratization, democracy and development, democracy and governance/corruption, elections and democratization, or other areas);
  • Regional expertise;
  • Research methods (e.g., aggregation, Bayesian IRT-modeling, experiments, expert coding in data collection, causal inference in time series analysis, sequencing algorithms and methods, or related methods);
  • Previous experience from larger-scale research- and other projects are meritorious, as well as competencies in data management.

The Postdoctoral Research Fellow is expected to conduct research primarily in collaboration with the Principal Investigator of V-Dem, Staffan I. Lindberg, with a focus on one or several of the main questions of the research program. Excellence in English (orally and written) is expected, competence in Arabic, French, Spanish and/or Portuguese is a merit. The call is open to candidates who (at the time of assuming the position) have a PhD in political science or related field.

More information is available here.
Applications are submitted online here. 
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2016 Legislative Election Redux: Were "Third Force" Candidates Different from the DPP?

9/16/2016

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NPP candidates ran close to Tsai Ing-wen in the district races. Other non-DPP candidates, not so much.

​One of the more interesting developments in Taiwan's 2016 general election was the rise of so-called  "Third Force" parties--completely new entrants into the political system, rather than break-aways from the KMT or the DPP.  While some of the media commentary got a bit carried away about the significance of these new parties, the founding of one, the New Power Party (NPP), did pose a serious threat to the DPP's chances of winning a majority in the legislature. As an offshoot of the Sunflower Movement, the NPP positioned its message in a way calculated to appeal to pan-green voters, and it recruited high-profile candidates to run in district races, not just the party list. These district candidates had the potential to split the pan-green vote in what everyone expected would be a very anti-KMT year, and in a worst-case scenario for their side, help the KMT hold on to their legislative majority. 

In the end, a pan-green split didn't happen. A key reason is that the DPP headed off the threat early: the party formed a kind of pre-electoral coalition by yielding 11 districts to the NPP and other non-DPP candidates in exchange for their support not to run against DPP candidates elsewhere. And the districts that the DPP yielded were, with one exception, far past the critical 57th seat needed to deliver a legislative majority. It turned out to be a good deal for the DPP, which won 68 seats overall. It also, more surprisingly, turned out well for the NPP, which won all three district seats and five overall and became the third largest party in the LY. 
The NPP Surprise
My own expectation going into the election was that the NPP candidates would perform worse, on average, than a generic DPP challenger. (In fact, if you read that linked post closely, I was even more specific: 2-4 points worse, on average.) The rationale was pretty simple: Freddy Lim, Hung Tzu-yung, and Huang Kuo-chang were already household names, but their close association with the Sunflower Movement, and the acerbic rhetoric of Huang, especially, suggested they would be fairly polarizing as candidates. And in the traditionally blue-leaning districts of Taipei 5 (Lim) and New Taipei 12 (Huang), I thought they would turn off more voters than they attracted with that approach. 

So what actually happened? In the graph above, I've plotted the vote share of each DPP and DPP-endorsed district candidate against Tsai Ing-wen's share of the presidential vote in the same district. DPP incumbents are represented by solid dots; challengers (i.e. non-incumbents) by hollow ones; NPP candidates by hollow squares, and other non-DPP candidates by hollow triangles. (A hearty thank you to Frozen Garlic for doing the yeoman's work of sorting the presidential race vote totals by LY district and making these data publicly available.)

Thoughts on this below the break. 

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APSA 2016 Annual Conference in Philadelphia: Taiwan Panels

8/28/2016

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​The 2016 American Political Science Association Annual Conference will be this week, from Thursday, September 1 through Sunday, September 4, in Philadelphia, PA. There's over a dozen panels planned with Taiwan-related content. For those interested, I've listed below all the presentations I could find in the conference program. 

Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) Official Panels

​First and foremost, the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies has two special panels this year, one on domestic politics and one on foreign relations. We strongly encourage anyone with even a passing interest in Taiwan studies to attend at least one panel (and bring your friends!)--our ability to retain a special conference group on Taiwan is contingent on good turnout at these organized events, and we take attendance to help make our case to APSA. The panels are:
​
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2:00-3:30pm 
Marriott Rm 414
CGOTS PANEL 1: Preferences, Identity, and Taiwan's 2016 Election

This panel discusses and examines how democratic consolidation and the changing domestic political preferences, identity, and social cleavages have shaped Taiwan's 2016 election.

Chair: Da-chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University
  • "Coattail and Reverse Coattail Effects: The Case of Taiwan's 2016 Election," Chi Huang and Kaw-yew Lim, National Cheng Chi University
  • "Legislative Co-sponsorship Networks in Taiwan," Jinhyeok Jang, University of Louisville
  • "Political Cleavage in Taiwan: Is There a Shift?," T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University, and Su-feng Cheng, National Cheng Chi University
  • "The Legal Complex in Taiwan's Democratization," Chin-shou Wang, National Cheng Kung University
  • "The Psychological Cognition and Vote Choices in Taiwan," Chung-li Wu and Hsiao-chien Tsui, Academia Sinica.
Discussants: Dennis Weng, SUNY Cortland; Kharis Templeman, Stanford University

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 10:00-11:30am 
Marriott Rm 414
CGOTS PANEL 2: Cross-Strait Relations and Economic Integration

This panel discusses and examines cross-strait ties in the wake of Taiwan's 2016 elections and the implications for Taiwan's economic integration policy.

Chair: Shelley Rigger, Davidson College
  • "China's Foreign Policy Transformation: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," Nien-chung Chang Liao, Academia Sinica
  • "Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan's 2016 Elections," John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, University of South Carolina
  • "Prospect of the TPP under the Scope of Taiwan's Party Realignment," Rou-lan Chen, National Sun Yat-sen University
  • "Reconciliation without Convergence?: Theorizing Taiwan-China Relations," Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Ithaca College
  • "When Frictions Do Not Cause Rift: Explaining Ambiguity in Alliance Management," Ping-kuei Chen, University of Maryland
Discussants: Dennis Hickey, Missouri State University; Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas

CGOTS will also hold its reception Saturday evening from 6:30-8pm in Marriott Rm 411, and its business meeting right after, from 8-9pm, in Marriott Rm 410. 

Other Panels with Taiwan-Related Presentations

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1
8:00-9:30am 
Marriott Franklin 2

Deterrence and Coercion
  • "Nuclear Deterrence Theory in Asia: Ideational Beliefs and Nuclear Strategy," James Turner Simpson, Boston University

2:00-3:30pm
PCC 108-B

Complexity, Process and Disruption: Political Theory under Pressure
  • "Secularism beyond Christian Political Theology: Thinking from Taiwan and China," Leigh K. Jenco, London School of Economics
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2
8:00-9:30am 
Marriott Franklin 5

Beijing, Taipei, Tokyo: East Asian Security Relations
  • "Why Underbalancing?: Nation Building and Taiwan's Rapprochement toward China," Dean Chen, Ramapo College
  • "Difficult but Necessary: Changing the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship," Eric Gomez, Cato Institute

PCC 109-AB
The Role of Elections in Regime Transitions
  • "Don't Call It a Comeback: Autocratic Successor Parties and Democratization," Michael K. Miller, George Washington University

10:00-11:30am
PCC 103-A
Exchange Rate Politics
  • "Exchange Rate Policy and Policy Diffusion: The Case of South Korea and Taiwan," Hyunsook Moon-Chen, UC Santa Barbara

PCC 113-B
​Courts as Catalysts of Policy Change: Comparative Perspectives ​
  • ​"Who Judges?: Introducing Jury Systems in Industrialized Democracies," Rieko Kage, University of Tokyo

12:00-1:30pm
PCC 203-A
Employing Migrants: Multiple Perspectives
  • "Comparing Migrant Care Worker Policies in Taiwan and South Korea," Yi-chun Chien, University of Toronto

Marriott, Franklin 2
Sources of Regime Durability and Transformation in China
  • "Strength without Confidence in Authoritarian China," Dan Slater, University of Chicago, and Joseph Wong, University of Toronto

2:00-3:30 
Marriott Salon C
Vote Choices, Ideology, and Political Parties
  • "Heterogeneous Anchoring of Extreme Candidate on Voter’s Perception of Mainstream," Austin Horng-en Wang, Duke University

4:00-5:30pm 
Marriott Rm 303
Cooperation and Conflict within Legislatures
  • "Parliamentary Brawls and Reelection in Taiwan," Nathan Batto, Academia Sinica

PCC 103-B
Public Support for Trade Policy
  • "What Do Voters Learn from Foreign News?: Experimental Evidence on PTA Diffusion," Megumi Naoi and Jason Kuo, UC San Diego
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3
8:00-9:30am 
Marriott Rm 414

Competing Interests and Paradigms in East Asian Political Economy
  • "The Changing Role of Taiwanese Investors in the PRC and Southeast Asia," Shelley Rigger, Davidson College
  • "Will International Law Change Taiwan's East China Sea Policy after 2016?" Chi-ting Tsai, National Taiwan University

Loews, Commonwealth A1
Migration and the Migration Crisis Today: Policies, Experiences, Impact
  • "Migrant Workers vs. Brides: The Care Crisis in Southern Europe and East Asia," Tiziana Caponio, University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto, and Margarita Estevez-Abe, Syracuse University

Marriott, Franklin 8
Transformations in Asian Security: Multiple Challenges for the 21st Century
  • "Inadvertent Escalation in East Asia: Strategic Implications of Joint Access and Maneuver," William J. Norris, Texas A&M University

10:00-11:30am 
Marriott Rm 412
Contextualizing Race Narratives in Asian American Political Activism
  • "Politics & Preferences of New Americans: Chinese Americans on Affirmative Action," Jeanette Y. Harvey, CSU Los Angeles, and Pei-te Lien, UC Santa Barbara

12:00-1:30pm
Marriott Rm 414

Conceptualizing Difference
  • "Transformations of Taiwanese People's State Identity," Frank Liu, National Sun Yat-sen University

PCC 201-C
Corruption and Corruption Control in the Asia-Pacific Region
  • "Collective Action Problems for Principals, Agents, and Clients in Corruption," Jong-sung You, Australia National University

Marriott, Franklin 3
Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes
  • "The Frequency and Success of Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide," James Loxton, University of Sydney

2:00-3:30pm 
PCC 111-B

​The Political Logic(s) of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Asia
  • "Disappointed by Design?: Media Bias in Anti-Corruption Reporting in Taiwan," Christian Goebel, University of Vienna

4:00-5:30pm
​Marriot Rm 412

​Conflict and Cooperation: State and Society in Contemporary China
  • "Close Encounters of the First Time: Tourist Peace in the Cross-Strait Relations," Hsin-hsin Pan, and Yu-tzung Chang, National Taiwan University, and Wen-chin Wu, Academia Sinica

Marriott, Franklin 5
China and Its Neighbors: Regional Diplomacy and China's Foreign Policy Choices
  • "Private Diplomacy, Tacit Understandings, and Lessons from China's Rapprochement," Dalton Lin, Georgia Institute of Technology
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Post-Election Analysis: Some Thoughts on the Swing in 2016

3/9/2016

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PictureCampaign poster of Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate, Chen Chien-jen, in Datong District in Taipei, January 2016.
​I've been going through some of the 2016 Taiwan elections data for another project, and I came across something that I haven't seen noted elsewhere. In the presidential vote, Tsai Ing-wen actually improved her vote shares more in the north than elsewhere in Taiwan.

Nationally, she won 45.63% of the total vote in 2012, and 56.12% in 2016, for a net aggregate swing of 10.49%. But this increase wasn't uniform across Taiwan. Her worst performance relative to 2012 was in Penghu, where her vote share increased from 45.65% to 50.81%, for a net swing of only 5.16%. Her best was in Taipei, where she increased her vote share from 39.54% to 51.96%, for a net swing of 12.41%, which gave her an absolute majority of the vote. Again, that was in Taipei, which was supposed to be the bluest stronghold of them all, and the most resistant to the appeal of the DPP ticket! (Or at least that's what this idiot thought.) 

Moreover, Taipei wasn't an outlier. From Keelung all the way through Miaoli, Tsai's vote share increased more in every single northern jurisdiction than it did nationally, as the table below shows. By contrast, the swing toward Tsai was lowest in the south and east/island jurisdictions. And central Taiwan, where I thought the swing would be largest, was actually slightly behind the national average. (Perhaps that's one of the reasons several endangered KMT incumbent legislators in Taichung and Nantou held on to win re-election. More on that in another post.)

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2016_post-election_swing_analysis.public.xlsx
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This result is surprising in part because it's the opposite of what happened in 2012, when the national swing toward Tsai was 4.24%. In that election, Tsai's gain was lowest in Taipei at 2.58%, and highest in Pingtung at 4.88%. In other words, in 2016 Tsai improved the most in precisely the places where she improved the least in 2012. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Taipei itself: a DPP majority there was hard to imagine as recently as two years ago.
PictureTaiwan 2016 presidential election results by township: not a blue north anymore.
​The North Is No Longer Blue
​Tsai's wins in the north are also surprising because the conventional wisdom has long held that Taiwan has a strong regional divide, with a deep blue north, deep green south, and swing districts in the middle. This is obviously a simplification, but it's so widely accepted among the political commentariat in Taiwan that there's even a wikipedia entry in Chinese for the phrase, "blue north, green south" (beilan, nanlü 北藍南綠).

The accepted explanation for these regional political differences is that they reflect socioeconomic and sub-ethnic ones: there are more waishengren in the north and east, aborigines in the east and central highlands, and a concentration of Hakka voters in Miaoli and Hsinchu Counties who have tended to support pan-blue candidates, while the Hoklo benshengren heartland of Tainan has been the DPP's strongest area.

​But some research has found region to be a significant independent predictor of vote choice even accounting for partisanship, national identity, age, occupation, attitudes toward cross-Strait relations, and so forth. Why would this be? Part is probably a "local hero" effect--national candidates do better than average in their hometowns because of their long-standing personal connections there that trump partisan affinities. Part is certainly a factional story: when local factions switch sides they can bring a big chunk of votes with them all the way up to the presidential level. But while these effects certainly have existed in local and legislative elections for a long time, it's not obvious that they consistently matter in presidential ones.
​ 
Does Political Geography Still Matter in Taiwan?
The way that Tsai won in 2016 leads me to think we should reconsider how, or even whether, geography has an independent effect in presidential elections. It's not self-evident that presidential vote choice in 2016 had anything to do with where voters lived, once we take into account all the usual demographic variables. There was no pan-blue firewall north of the Choshui River, and the DPP's win was clearly not built on turning out more core supporters in pan-green strongholds in the south. Instead, the swing data suggest a shift in the same groups of voters toward Tsai and away from the KMT all over the island. (Voting for the legislature is a different matter--I'll tackle that in a separate post.)

Granted, the swing toward Tsai was not as uniform as in 2012, when it ranged between only 2.58 and 4.88%. But still, in every single locality Tsai won at least 5% more in 2016 than she did four years ago. That suggests, for at least the last two elections, voters who switched their votes to Tsai did so because of factors not correlated with where they lived.

The best illustration of the irrelevance of geography to vote choice is what happened in New Taipei, where Eric Chu was, and still is, the mayor. He was re-elected there in 2014, holding on during a green wave that flipped most of the other local executives to the DPP. If a candidate's local connections matter at all, then Chu probably should have been able to deliver a hometown bump. Yet a little over a year later he won only 1/3 of the vote in New Taipei, winning 250,000 votes less than he did in the mayor's race, a lower share than the 37.5% he got in Taipei City proper and only 2 points above his island-wide total. And as the figures above show, Tsai Ing-wen improved more in New Taipei than she did nationally--not the result we'd expect if Chu was enjoying some kind of home-court advantage.     

PictureRegional voting patterns in South Korea: Jeolla in the southwest, Gyeongnam in the southeast.
​Now THIS is What a Party Stronghold Looks Like
Finally, consider the comparative angle. There's a country not far away that demonstrates exceptionally strong regional effects on voting behavior: South Korea. In the last presidential election there (in 2012), the opposition candidate Moon Jae-in won at least 85% of the vote in the three provinces that make up the southwest region of Jeolla, while the incumbent party candidate Park Geun-hye won over 80% in two provinces in the southeast region of Gyeongsang. That is a stark regional divide that has been present since the beginning of the democratic era in Korea. By this standard, Taiwan doesn't look very divided by geography at all. 

Does Where You Live Affect Who You Support for President?
In fact, it's worth considering whether the "blue north, green south" trope has outlived its usefulness as a guide to voting behavior in Taiwan. The Taiwanese media often writes election narratives that emphasize geography as the key to understanding voting patterns in presidential elections, with frequent discussion of "battleground regions" and "swing districts." And political scientists, too, routinely use the language of electoral geography to talk about presidential campaigns. (I'm guilty of this too. For other instances, see here, here, and for a kick, this wikileaks cable from AIT.)

But if you think about this a bit, it's an odd way to characterize voting for a single national office. Taiwan doesn't have an electoral college, so an extra vote for Tsai in Penghu is worth the same as one in Taipei, or Taichung, or Hualien, or anywhere else in Taiwan. When we talk about "swing regions" we are implicitly underemphasizing factors that don't vary much by location and playing up ones that do, like factional ties. And I'm starting to think those other, non-geographic factors are where the real story is at, particularly differences between age cohorts. Something to keep in mind as we pour over the post-election survey data. 

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Five Things to Watch for on Election Night in Taiwan

1/11/2016

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Picture
If 2016 looks like this, the KMT's LY majority is in big trouble.
​Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are headed for a historic victory in Saturday’s elections, and the battle has already begun to define the narrative about what that means. One fairly common refrain is that this likely outcome will presage a fundamental realignment of the party system around issues beyond the blue-green divide over cross-Strait relations.
 
I’m skeptical that we are about to see this kind of realigning election, despite the attention given to the campaigns of the so-called “Third Force” parties. I’m also skeptical that this result will be the death knell for the KMT as a political party capable of winning elections. The KMT's coming defeat clearly reflects deep unhappiness with Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT’s rule over the last eight years, intensified by a spectacularly ill-timed economic downturn over the last few months (at least if you are a KMT member!) But an unpopular leader, toxic party brand, and disillusioned supporters are not fatal to major party survival, as the DPP showed after its 2008 electoral thrashing. So while a KMT recovery is not assured, and will at a minimum require some major leadership shakeups, we shouldn't expect the party simply to fade away, and for all those pan-blue supporters (still at least 30 percent of the electorate) to suddenly become fans of the DPP or one of the new parties.

Of course, I could be totally wrong--I'm just some guy on the internet, after all. But either way, we'll know a lot more soon: elections have a nice way of splashing everybody with a cold dose of reality. The results of the election this Saturday will give us the most concrete evidence we'll have to evaluate these competing narratives. So, in the interest of intellectual honesty, let me lay out my own expectations about what will happen, and what it means. Beyond who wins and loses, here's what I'll be watching most closely to see where Taiwanese politics is headed.

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Why the KMT Is Going to Lose: It's the Economy

12/30/2015

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Picture
Bad time to be an incumbent.
Some of the sharper commentary on the upcoming election has noted how livelihood issues, such as a growing wealth gap, soaring housing prices, and stubbornly high youth unemployment rate, are a big part of the reason public opinion has swung so dramatically against the KMT over the last two years, rather than cross-Strait relations. If I can hammer one thing home to outside observers about this election, it's that domestic issues, rather than cross-Strait relations, are what will decide this coming election. The outcome is not really a referendum on Taiwan's relationship with China, or an indication of a sudden surge in Taiwanese nationalism, but instead reflects deep concerns with "bread and butter" issues.  

So what do I mean by bread and butter issues? Well, the commentary linked above is focused mostly on the concerns about income and wealth distribution that have been salient for a while and have gotten a lot of press in recent years. But in addition, there's something much more recent and fundamental working against the KMT right now: the economy is just not doing very well. Here's a sample of the (English-language) economic news reports coming out of Taiwan over the last few months: 

Taiwan is in a recession, and it's China's fault -- Forbes (December 1)
Weaker growth exposes downsides of China ties -- The Economist (November 14)
Industrial production falls 15% -- Taipei Times (November 20)
Unpaid leave hits 3-year high -- Taipei Times (November 17)
Taiwan nears recession, exports to China slump -- (October 31)
Taiwan exports in decline -- Voice of America (October 16)
GDP growth forecast cut to below 1% -- FocusTaiwan (October 15)
Tax revenue falls by 14.3% over previous year -- Taipei Times (October 13)
Rising pessimism about economy  -- China Post (October 12)
TISR poll: 81% believe economy in bad shape -- via Solidarity.tw (September 14)
TAIEX suffers worst-ever one-day drop -- Taipei Times (August 25)

What all that reporting is trying to say can be summed up succinctly by the chart at the top of this page: Taiwan's economy is now rather suddenly headed into a recession, if it's not already in one. And that makes this a terrible moment to be running as an incumbent party. 
PictureSay it, Bill
Economic Voting in Democracies. The theory of economic voting behind this claim is that economic conditions powerfully shape electoral outcomes in democracies everywhere. As Michael Lewis-Beck puts it in a great review article, "good times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out."

I should note that the evidence for this effect and its size varies a lot across countries, and the sometimes puzzling variation in the size of economic effects remains an open area of inquiry in political science. 

For instance, when the government is supported by a coalition of several parties, it's harder for voters to figure out which members deserve the blame for bad performance. The lack of a credible alternative to the incumbent--an opposition party or candidate who appears likely to do better--also leads to a weaker effect. (The opposition to the LDP in Japan has long struggled with a credibility problem, for instance.) And sometimes it's clear to voters that governments don't have much influence at all over bad economic outcomes because of global factors beyond their control, so they are less likely to punish incumbents at the ballot box.

In addition, voters turn out to have really short memories (i.e. they're "myopic," in the jargon of the discipline): the performance of the economy over the last six months matters a great deal more than the performance over a government's whole term in office. This is probably why the Conservatives in Britain, for instance, recently won re-election after presiding over an austerity-induced downturn during much of their first term.

Nevertheless, the basic claim, that economic downturns motivate voters to vote out incumbent governments when they can, is quite robust. In the United States, in fact, the state of the economy in the few months before a presidential election appears to be the single most important factor in who wins, more than the candidates themselves, their parties' policy platforms, or their campaigns.  

Picture
(Image Credit: The Economist)
Economic Voting in Taiwan? So what about in Taiwan? Given the current political environment, we should expect the state of the economy to have a major impact on the upcoming election. Taiwan right now has:
  • A long tradition of "stewardship" of the economy by the central government, dating back to the early martial law era, so the incumbent party at the national level is assumed to have significant responsibility for economic performance;
  • The presidency and legislature have been controlled by the same party for the last 7 years, so they can't escape blame;
  • The economic slowdown appears linked to a slowdown in the PRC's economy--linkage which was deliberately and explicitly promoted by the incumbent government;
  • The incumbent government has consistently made economic issues central to its policy platform;
  • The incumbent government has made prominent, highly specific economic pledges--for instance, President Ma's 6-3-3 promise.
  • The existence of a credible alternative to the incumbent--the DPP has previously held national office and is not a complete unknown or too looney to be taken seriously (and the bar for that is pretty low these days.)   
In short, this is close to a worst-case scenario for an incumbent party: standing for re-election during an unexpected economic downturn that appears to be linked directly to your own policies. Voters will kill you for that just about anywhere. Which brings me to the trends in election polls...
Picture
That's a large gap. (Source: TISR, 2015.12.14)
Bad Economy = Bad Polls. At about the same point that the economy started to sour over the last six months, Taiwan's presidential election turned from a competitive race into a rout. As the Taiwan Indicators Survey Research survey reproduced above shows, at the beginning of June, one could at least imagine a combined pan-blue effort that would give Tsai Ing-wen a real race: support for Hung Hsiu-chu and James Soong together was at 44.8%, above Tsai's 37.1%. But then what happened? Support for both cratered.

Part of that was Hung's own shortcomings as a candidate, but once she was replaced by Eric Chu, the KMT should have seen a real bounce. It hasn't. Chu is now down around 20% in the polls. That's likely to go up somewhat as pan-blue voters come back to the fold, and there are other polls showing him getting up to 30%. But even if pan-blue voters coordinated on a single candidate, the combined Chu-Soong support is nowhere near enough to make this a race anymore. It's all but over now. 

Some of this decline in the polls is undoubtedly self-inflicted--the fiasco with Hung and the presence of James Soong in a spoiler's role yet again could probably have been avoided. But even if Eric Chu had accepted the nomination back in March, and Soong hadn't joined the race, I still don't think this would be much of a contest right now. The reason is those economic figures: Chu is the standard-bearer for a party that in voters' eyes is squarely to blame for this economic downturn, and they're going to have a chance in less than three weeks to weigh in.

​Tsai Ing-wen is not Ma Ying-jeou or the KMT, and in these circumstances that looks like all she needs to win a comfortable victory. Cross-Strait policy, debate performances, campaign promises, VP selections--none of it is going to matter. In this election, it really is about the economy.
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    About Me

    I am a political scientist with research interests in democratization, elections and election management, parties and party system development, one-party dominance, and the links between domestic politics and external security issues. My regional expertise is in East Asia, with special focus on Taiwan.

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