Monitoring the Cross-Strait Balance

Taiwan’s Defense And Security

ANNUAL TAIWAN DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY PROJECT WORKSHOP REPORT
SEPTEMBER 2019
MONITORING THE CROSS-STRAIT BALANCE
TAIWAN’S DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Annual Taiwan Democracy and Security Project Workshop Report
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The 2019 Taiwan Democracy and Security Project workshop was made possible in part by the generous support of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco.
WORKSHOP PURPOSE

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, which laid the legal foundation for the development of U.S.-Taiwan relations to the present day. To commemorate this anniversary, the theme of the 2019 workshop of the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project was the state of U.S.-Taiwan ties in the face of a rapidly evolving security situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

For this year’s workshop, we brought together policy experts across a wide array of security domains to take a hard look at Taiwan’s challenging security environment, and to debate strategies for Taiwan to best deter security threats over the long run. Participants considered the changing and multifaceted challenges posed by the growing “sharp power” of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan’s defense and security strategy in light of its current and future resource constraints, and the prospects for cooperation between Taiwan and the United States to prevent further erosion of Taiwan’s security and to maximize its ability to deter both conventional and unconventional threats.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Highlights</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for the United States</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for Taiwan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PANEL SUMMARIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. PRC Sharp Power and Taiwan’s Security</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PRC’s Exercise of Sharp Power in Taiwan</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An End to the “Diplomatic Truce”</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including Taiwan in a Broader Coalition against Chinese Sharp Power</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending Taiwan against Sharp Power</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PRC Hard Power and Taiwan’s Defense Posture</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Military and Operational Concepts</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan’s Military Investments</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the United States</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Political Economy of Defense and Security</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining Defense Spending</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in an Indigenous Defense Industry</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining the Willingness to Fight</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The China Factor</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The All-Volunteer Force</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Paradigm</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Prestige</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan in Comparative Perspective</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Force</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Asymmetric Defense</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence Options</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing Unconventional Threats</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Arms Sales</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Risks and Opportunities</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORKSHOP MATERIALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop Agenda</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop Participants</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which has served as the legal foundation for U.S.-Taiwan relations since the United States broke off official diplomatic ties in 1979. The TRA has helped to safeguard Taiwan’s security and prosperity and lay the groundwork for its transition to democracy. Yet today, as the power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) grows, the security challenges confronting Taiwan domestically and in the broader Indo-Pacific region have become increasingly serious and complex, threatening Taiwan’s long-term survival as a free and democratic state. Taiwan’s defense budget, for instance, remained comparable to the PRC’s up through the early 1990s, providing it with a significant qualitative military advantage over its adversary across the strait. But rapid economic growth in mainland China has made possible 20 years of double-digit annual increases in the PRC’s own defense outlays, as well as a far-reaching military modernization plan that has shifted the qualitative as well as quantitative cross-strait balance in favor of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PRC’s unconventional cyber and “sharp power” capabilities have also grown far more potent in recent years, and over the near term may pose the most serious threat to Taiwan’s democratic institutions and its de facto autonomy.

Among the most critical security questions in the Indo-Pacific region today, then, are how Taiwan should best prepare to defend itself against these rising threats, and how its allies and partners can best support this effort. It is not self-evident that Taiwan’s current defense strategy, force posture, and allocation of resources are optimized to deter PRC attempts to use military force to achieve political unification. For instance, the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen has committed to increasing Taiwan’s annual defense budget by 20 percent by 2025, a welcome shift after the more than two decades when it remained flat or even declined in real terms. But the Tsai administration has also continued to prioritize acquiring and fielding high-cost “prestige” weapons systems, redoubled efforts to expand and rationalize its economically inefficient indigenous defense industry, and continued to move forward the expensive and troubled transition from a conscript to an all-volunteer military force.

In March 2019, the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project, a part of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center, convened a workshop to examine the current cross-strait power balance. Participants included two dozen economic, diplomatic, and security experts from the United States, Taiwan, and elsewhere in
Asia. The workshop discussions were motivated by a desire to understand the evolving conventional and unconventional threats that the PRC poses to Taiwan’s security, to assess Taiwan’s capacity to deter those threats, and to devise realistic recommendations for actions that Taiwan and its partners could take to strengthen Taiwan’s defense and security.

Acknowledgements
The Taiwan Democracy and Security Project gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in San Francisco. We also wish to thank Kyle Hutzler and Vanessa Molter for their excellent research assistance, with special recognition to Kyle Hutzler for drafting this report.
REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

In the near term, the greatest threat to Taiwan’s democratic institutions comes from the PRC’s sharp-power tactics, not from its growth in hard-power capabilities. Though the PLA is rapidly developing the full range of capabilities it needs to attempt a full-scale blockade or invasion of Taiwan, such direct military action to “resolve the Taiwan issue” would still be extremely risky. The PLA has almost no previous experience with amphibious landings and joint operations in a real conflict, and it would almost certainly not enjoy the element of surprise. Chinese leaders cannot count on a rapid conclusion to any Taiwan military campaign even if the PRC possesses clear numerical and technological advantages—in part because they have to plan for the possibility that the United States would intervene. Even if those concerns do not dissuade the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership from launching a military campaign, the political costs would be enormous: perceptions of the PRC would turn sharply and instantly negative both in the region and around the world, and it would probably galvanize the organization of an anti-China coalition of most major powers in East and Southeast Asia. The disruption to the highly trade-dependent economies of the region, none more so than China’s itself, would also be extremely damaging.

By contrast, a non-military campaign using “sharp power” tools to exert control over Taiwan has both a greater chance of success and much less downside. The outlines of such a campaign are already clearly visible: the CCP could seek to undermine public trust in Taiwan’s democratic institutions; degrade the governing capacity of the state; exacerbate divisions in political and civil society; undercut political parties, media outlets, and other voices that favor independence and amplify those that support eventual political union; increase leverage over the island’s economy; and above all spread the idea that unification on Beijing’s terms is, if not desirable, then at least inevitable and irrational for Taiwanese to resist.

As this report documents, concerns about the growth in Beijing’s hard-power capabilities are well founded and should be taken seriously. But the CCP’s increasingly extensive and sophisticated use of “sharp power” to advance its political objectives should also raise similar concerns, and will require a robust, sustained response from the United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners to counter it.

Taiwan’s current responses to both the hard- and sharp-power threats it faces are insufficient to ensure its long-term security, and need to be much more robust. On the hard power side, Taiwan’s defense establishment
has for over a decade emphasized “asymmetric defense” in its response to questions about how to counter PLA modernization. However, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has made inadequate efforts to implement a truly realistic defense strategy that incorporates force asymmetries into every aspect of doctrine, planning, training, and procurement. The procurement process, in particular, still reflects a traditional bias toward quality over quantity, and toward a few high-cost, latest-generation “prestige” weapons systems over a wider array of low-cost options that use proven technology and can collectively accomplish much the same set of outcomes.

On the sharp power side, Taiwan is in many ways more familiar with, and resilient to, Chinese influence campaigns than any other country, because it has been exposed to them for far longer and at a higher intensity. Nevertheless, many of its democratic institutions remain surprisingly vulnerable to attempts at interference. For instance, in practice, it is easy for motivated parties to skirt campaign finance laws and reporting requirements, the media environment is fertile ground for the spread of false reports and unsubstantiated but damaging rumors, and the legal punishments for leaking state secrets or committing outright espionage are quite lenient. Moreover, the partisan polarization that has long affected political elites continues to impede the development of a cross-party consensus for how best to address these weaknesses.

The end of military conscription and the transition to an all-volunteer force needs to be reevaluated and reconsidered. The end of conscription has been politically popular, but it has imposed significant additional costs on the Taiwanese military at a time when it is already facing a daunting set of long-term challenges. Universal military service has an important deterrent value: at a minimum, it credibly signals a whole-of-society commitment to a country’s defense. However, reversing the transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF) now would be unpopular and is probably politically impossible. More feasible and worth exploring is a renewed focus on developing a strategic reserve, which would do a great deal to improve Taiwan’s overall military readiness in the event of a cross-strait conflict. As this report documents, the majority of Taiwanese remain willing to fight for their freedom, especially if they believe that willingness is widely held among their compatriots. But today the prestige of the Republic of China (ROC) armed forces is quite low; young people typically do not see a career in the military as appealing or honorable, and Taiwanese public opinion on the whole shows little confidence in the military’s ability to prevail in a fight with the PRC. Changing public attitudes across the board
has to be a central component of any plan to ensure Taiwan’s security for the long term.

**Recommendations for the United States**

1. **Take a more active advisory role in Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, procurement, and training.** The Taiwan arms procurement process has long been plagued by inadequate consultation, unpredictable and interminable delays, and the prioritization of political concerns over military ones. This dysfunctional process has made it impossible for Taiwanese planners to rationalize weapons acquisitions and to match strategic needs against available resources and systems options, or to stick to long-term modernization plans. “Normalizing” this process, including more regular and active consultations between representatives of the Department of Defense and the MND, should be a top priority for both countries. Significant steps to do so have been taken by both sides, but more remains to be done.

2. **Seek new opportunities to include Taiwan counterparts in multilateral initiatives and exercises.** Taiwanese military personnel have long trained in the United States. There is considerable interest within the Taiwanese military establishment in expanding these opportunities, and little downside to the United States. Their regular participation in other multilateral exercises, such as for disaster relief, would also be beneficial and, given the downturn in U.S.-China relations, a Taiwanese presence would be less prone to disrupt other important military exchanges.

   Another area where Taiwan can offer significant expertise is intelligence on the CCP’s influence operations. Taiwan has been the foremost target of these operations for decades, and its security and intelligence bureaus possess a great deal of experience and capacity for understanding and countering them. U.S. agencies, as well as those from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, could well benefit from closer coordination and intelligence sharing with their Taiwanese counterparts.

3. **Support Taiwan’s efforts to preserve its international space, including meaningful participation for Taiwan representatives in international bodies where sovereignty is not a requirement for membership.** Beijing’s pressure campaign has been particularly noticeable in international institutions, where it has forced several bodies to reverse previous decisions and deny the modest access
that was allowed to Taiwan representatives during the Ma Ying-jeou era. A U.S.-led effort would help to counteract this part of Beijing’s sharp power campaign, and would also send a valuable signal to other interested parties that the United States is intent on countering growing PRC influence in these bodies. In addition, the United States should welcome and encourage Taiwan’s nascent diplomatic efforts to deepen ties with the strategically important Pacific Island microstates with which it still has formal diplomatic relations. A robust Taiwanese presence in these countries blocks or counteracts the expansion of PRC influence and benefits the interests of the United States and other like-minded allies and partners in the region.

4. **Seek politically feasible ways to deepen bilateral economic ties, and to reduce Taiwan’s economic dependence on the People’s Republic of China.** A major worry for Taiwanese leaders of all political stripes is the economic impact of the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. As a major trading partner of both countries and a key link in the multinational production chains that are threatened by tariffs, Taiwan is in a particularly vulnerable economic position. The United States could help offset some of this damage, and indicate its confidence in the current Taiwanese administration, by pursuing a bilateral free trade agreement, investment agreement, or tax treaty. The symbolic impact of concluding an agreement during the trade war would not only strengthen Taiwan’s own position, it could well also give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing confrontation with the PRC over its trading and regulatory practices.

**Recommendations for Taiwan**

1. **Formalize the “two force” structure concept.** The balance of power across the Taiwan Strait presents a strategic dilemma for both sides: the PLA is increasingly likely to win a conventional conflict, but still unlikely to prevail in an unconventional one if the Taiwan side maximizes its asymmetric advantages. Short of a full-scale war with the PRC, Taiwan has a clear and justifiable need for a conventional force that is capable of sea and air interdiction and able to hold its own in a limited conflict. To deter PRC leaders from attempting a full-scale military invasion, however, a large standing conventional force equipped with state-of-the-art weapons platforms is no longer adequate or necessary. Instead, the best
“bang for buck” deterrent comes from being able to deploy an unconventional set of capabilities that raise to an unacceptably high level the risks and complications for an attempted invasion campaign. Taiwanese planners’ decisions about doctrine, training, resource allocations, and procurement should follow from this “two force” concept. There is real deterrent value in a force designed for asymmetric guerrilla warfare.

2. **Begin a serious reevaluation and reconsideration of the transition to an all-volunteer force.** It would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the phase-out of conscription. But a debate about whether to halt or reverse the transition could focus attention on the lack of a robust reserve force in Taiwan, and perhaps serve as a starting point for planning to develop reserves at the unit level, rather than at the individual level. A greater openness to alternative career paths into the military that allow mid-career entry for people with special skill sets could expand the military’s available talent pool as well. Ultimately, if Taiwan’s security is threatened, a credible whole-of-government and whole-of-society commitment to defend it is the most effective way to deter hostile action. This kind of conversation about society’s obligations to the defense of Taiwan is an inherently political one, and to have any chance of success, it would require allies across the political spectrum—particularly within the more China-friendly Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT)—to add their voices. Nevertheless, it is a debate worth having.

3. **Seek ways to raise the social prestige of military service.** As part of the transition to an all-volunteer force, the MND has displayed creativity in meeting its recruitment targets, and it has progressively raised the salaries and benefits offered to volunteers. As a consequence, the financial incentives to pursue a career in the military are now relatively good. The more fundamental challenge facing the MND is improving public perceptions of military service. As this report documents, few young Taiwanese are interested in a career in the military, and it is widely seen as an option of last resort. Reversing this perception is critical to the long-term sustainability of the AVF. One method is to expand opportunities for the public to engage with military units, including hosting public visits at local military bases and family visits to service personnel at strategic outposts such as Taiping Island (Itu Aba). More regular public expressions of support for the military would
also be beneficial—in this case, especially from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), many of whose members have traditionally been suspicious of the military and viewed it as a tool of the KMT party-state.

4. **Reprioritize Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and aid strategy to emphasize Pacific states.** Taiwan has for many years been fighting a losing battle for diplomatic influence with the PRC. It is past time to shift strategy. Taiwan’s own interests would be best served by cooperating as closely as possible with the United States and other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region to check the expansion of PRC influence. Taiwan has a clear, positive role to play in this effort. It maintains formal relations with six Pacific Island nations, most of which are both strategically important to the United States and potential targets for PRC diplomatic and military expansion efforts. Taiwan’s priority should be to retain these relationships through increased development aid and socioeconomic capacity building programs. The flip side of this recommendation is to place less emphasis on maintaining relations with countries that are hostile to the interests of the United States and other like-minded countries. Neither Taiwan nor the world ultimately benefits if Taiwanese aid goes to help prop up dictators and despots.

5. **Redouble efforts to improve Taiwan’s domestic defenses against PRC sharp-power tactics.** Taiwan has long experience managing and countering PRC influence operations, but its democratic institutions remain surprisingly vulnerable to a concerted campaign of manipulation. Tightening and stepping up enforcement of campaign finance laws and regulations, improving media professionalism and best practices, and increasing penalties for spying and other forms of political subversion should be top priorities for Taiwan’s current leadership. Taiwan’s vibrant civil society and strong tradition of a free press also could be used as strengths that allow it to compete more effectively in a global fight over influence. Taiwan is the most important source of uncensored Chinese-language media in the world, and the broader promotion of Taiwan’s democratic values through these media could be both feasible and effective at countering CCP narratives.
The workshop began with a discussion of China’s exercise of “sharp power” against Taiwan. Sharp power is typically defined in contradistinction to “soft power,” the legitimate pursuit of influence in international affairs; rather than being open, voluntary, and respectful of existing domestic institutions and international norms, sharp power is, in the words of former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, “covert, coercive, or corrupting.”

The PRC has become increasingly assertive and sophisticated in the use of sharp power to promote its interests abroad, using a wide array of tactics that target public opinion and elites either directly or through proxies. Taiwan is on the front line of these efforts, both to squeeze what little remaining international space it retains, and to sway Taiwan’s domestic politics in a direction more favorable to the PRC’s ultimate goal of political unification.

Since the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen as president of the Republic of China (ROC) in May 2016, the PRC has steadily ramped up pressure on her administration. Beijing’s actions to alter the cross-strait status quo over this period have included:

- Encouraging a switch in recognition from five diplomatic allies of Taiwan (Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador).
- Suspending all cross-strait diplomatic communications, including the Taipei-Beijing crisis hotline established during the era of President Ma Ying-jeou.
- Blocking the participation of Taiwanese representatives in international bodies to which they had previously been admitted as observers, such as the World Health Assembly and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
- Reducing by more than half the number of Chinese tourist groups permitted to visit Taiwan (though this policy appears to have been at least partly reversed).
- Extraditing Taiwanese nationals accused of telecom fraud from several countries, including Malaysia, Kenya, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Spain, directly to the PRC for prosecution over objections from Taiwan’s representatives.

- Introducing a new civilian flight route (M-503) near the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait, without warning or prior consultation with Taiwan’s aviation authorities.
- Rolling out a list of 31 new financial incentives to entice Taiwanese with special skills to move to the Chinese mainland for work.
- Pressuring foreign companies, including American air carriers and hotel chains, to list destinations in Taiwan as Chinese territory on their websites.
- Pressuring the members of the East Asian Olympic Committee (mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan) to vote to rescind the rights of Taichung to host the 2019 East Asian Youth Games, originally awarded to the city in 2015—all but Japan (which abstained) supported the switch.
- Detaining and eventually sentencing a visiting Taiwanese human rights activist and DPP member, Lee Ming-che, to five years in prison for “subversion of state power” via internet posts he had made while in Taiwan.
- Increasing military patrols in or near Taiwanese territorial air and sea space, including several circumnavigations of the main island and a possibly deliberate incursion of fighter jets across the mid-line of the Taiwan Strait.

These new steps were taken in part as a reaction to Tsai’s inauguration speech, which did not endorse the “1992 Consensus” and was viewed in Beijing as falling short of acceptance of the “One-China principle.” But some workshop participants also saw them as reflecting President Xi Jinping’s personal imprimatur, and as part and parcel of Xi’s grand strategy to achieve his “China Dream” during his time as paramount leader of China by demonstrating progress toward a political resolution of the “Taiwan problem.”

As a democratic society with a Chinese cultural and political heritage, Taiwan presents an alternative model to the authoritarian PRC, and its continued existence and prosperity undercuts the narrative that China’s economic success and national greatness are only possible under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Participants warned that a significant downturn or crisis in the PRC’s economy—which has been the primary source of its post-revolutionary legitimacy—could make Xi increasingly reliant on nationalist sentiments for domestic support,
potentially raising the stakes (and potential benefits to Xi) of a decisive confrontation over Taiwan.

The PRC’s Exercise of Sharp Power in Taiwan

The PRC has become increasingly adept at leveraging its economic might to influence Taiwan’s politics. China’s economic statecraft targets both Taiwanese elites and grassroots by illicitly providing funds to pro-China politicians and local governments; by selectively opening PRC domestic markets to Taiwanese exporters and investors; and by wielding economic threats and retaliation against Taiwanese who express pro-independence views. For example, after Tsai Ing-wen assumed office, the Shanghai Fishery Group declined to renew its money-losing contracts with Taiwan’s milkfish farmers, which spurred these farmers to protest publicly against the Tsai administration’s refusal to endorse the “1992 Consensus.”

Another vector of PRC sharp power comes in the form of disinformation campaigns, particularly in the context of Taiwan’s colorful and hotly contested elections. Workshop participants heard evidence of an unprecedented effort to influence the outcome of the 2018 Taiwan local elections, which ended in a sweeping defeat for the DPP and included an upset win by the KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu in the Kaohsiung mayoral contest. While no one questioned Beijing’s intent to try to bolster the KMT’s prospects and undermine support for the Tsai Ing-wen administration and the ruling DPP, there was some disagreement about the effectiveness of Chinese efforts. As several people noted, Beijing has attempted in every recent election to influence the outcome, often with counterproductive results, and its attempts to shape public opinion in Taiwan often backfire. For instance, Xi Jinping’s address to “Taiwan compatriots” on January 2, 2019, produced a significant backlash and a bounce in support for President Tsai, rather than an increase in goodwill toward the PRC or CCP, or toward support for unification. By emphasizing the “one country, two systems” framework as the only possibility for Taiwan’s future, the speech also put the KMT on the defensive and undercut its messaging about the “1992 Consensus.” Overall, while Beijing’s influence efforts have become much more sophisticated over the past decade, it is still not clear that it has been particularly effective at reversing the prevailing trends of increasing ROC citizens’ identification as solely “Taiwanese” and their rising support for Taiwanese independence (although there has at the least been some leveling off of these trends since 2015.)
An End to the “Diplomatic Truce”

Since Tsai Ing-wen took office, five of Taiwan’s remaining 22 diplomatic partners have switched recognition to the PRC: Sao Tome (December 2016), Panama (June 2017), Dominican Republic (May 2018), Burkina Faso (May 2018), and El Salvador (August 2018). The switches represent a decisive break with the “diplomatic truce” that existed between the two sides during the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, and they are another element of Beijing’s pressure campaign on the Tsai administration.

Given the enormous and still-increasing disparity in financial resources and diplomatic clout, Taipei clearly can no longer compete with Beijing everywhere using “checkbook diplomacy.” As such, it will be hard-pressed even to hold on to the remaining 17 formal relationships it currently retains. Workshop participants noted active discussions about switching recognition among several of Taiwan’s other allies, including the Solomon Islands and the Vatican (though there remained considerable skepticism that the latter would be able ultimately to conclude an agreement with Beijing because of the intensifying crackdowns on and demolition of Christian churches in mainland China). The implications for Taiwan’s current strategy are dire: it will continue to face a difficult choice between increasing financial aid packages that are in many cases siphoned off by corrupt leaders and used to support regimes with poor human rights records, or alternatively, refusing such diplomatic blackmail and watching those regimes switch to Beijing. Over the long run, this approach appears unsustainable.

Thus, participants urged Taipei to consider a broad reassessment of its diplomatic strategy based on two principles. First, Taiwan should prioritize its existing relations with countries that are aligned with the interests of, and of particular strategic value to, the United States and other like-minded partners and allies. This approach would contribute more effectively than its present efforts to an emerging coalition of democracies in the region, and it would enhance Taiwan’s reputation as a “responsible stakeholder” and force for good. In too many instances in recent years, Taiwanese aid has in practice helped prop up bad leaders and poorly governed regimes hostile to American interests. One recent example is when Taiwan extended a USD $100 million loan (since suspended) to the Daniel Ortega government in Nicaragua, after Ortega had changed the constitution to stay in power and clamped down on opposition parties, media, and civil society. Second, Taiwan should prioritize formal diplomatic relations with countries where its limited resources will provide the most
payoffs—that is, countries with small populations or significant unmet developmental needs.

Taiwan’s relations with its six remaining Pacific Island allies—Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands—stand out as particularly consequential under these criteria. The strategic importance of the Pacific Islands to the United States has risen in recent years, as the U.S.-China rivalry has become more heated and the threat of a military confrontation with China in the Pacific has moved to the center of U.S. defense strategic planning. If any of these countries were to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing and to allow the PRC to develop strategically important ports and airfields, it would negatively impact the U.S. ability to project power in the region.

Taiwan could potentially help the United States by making diplomatic efforts to block or limit the extension of Chinese influence in these micro-states of the Pacific. The relatively small size of these countries makes it possible for Taiwan to compete for influence with Beijing, which uses tourism and state-sponsored investments as points of leverage. Participants also thought it realistic for Taiwan to work more closely in-country with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, all of which have sought in recent years to renew or strengthen their relationships with these island nations.

On the other hand, several participants questioned the United States’ recalling of its ambassadors in Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic in response to their switch in recognition to Beijing from Taipei. Pressuring other countries to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan when the United States officially adheres to a “One China policy” that does not formally recognize the Republic of China or Taiwan puts the United States in an especially awkward position. On a related point, several participants thought that legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2018 to punish countries that switch diplomatic recognition would be counterproductive if it passed.

Including Taiwan in a Broader Coalition against Chinese Sharp Power
Participants saw Taiwan as the “front line” in a global effort by the PRC to exert sharp power, and as a place where Beijing has tested new tactics before exporting them elsewhere. In recent months, concerns have grown in both developed and developing countries about PRC attempts to interfere in their societies. Most of these efforts are intended to shape how government agencies, businesses, educational institutions, and civil society organizations refer to issues of concern to the CCP, including the status of
Taiwan. One of the most notable examples in the past year has been PRC threats of regulatory punishment and bureaucratic scrutiny against foreign airlines that do not present Taiwan as part of China on their websites.

Recent reporting has also described how the PRC has sought to direct or intimidate members of the Chinese diaspora, to control formerly independent Chinese-language media abroad, and to keep universities and think tanks from supporting events or research deemed by Beijing to be “politically offensive.” Australia has been particularly notable for its response, passing legislation intended to prevent foreign funding in its politics and establishing new regulations on foreign agents.

**Defending Taiwan against Sharp Power**

Taiwan’s leaders must do more to protect against the PRC’s attempts at interference in its democracy. Among the possible areas of concern to be addressed are weaknesses in Taiwan’s campaign finance laws and the risk that the lower threshold for initiating referendums could be exploited by domestic elements whose aims are aligned with Beijing. Workshop participants generally agreed that Taiwan’s efforts to counter sharp power must not compromise the hard-won openness and dynamism of its political system, though it will be challenging to strike the right balance between these competing concerns.

**II. PRC HARD POWER AND TAIWAN’S DEFENSE POSTURE**

In contrast to its ability to project sharp power, the growth of China’s hard power is already widely recognized and relatively well understood. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 exposed PRC military weaknesses in the event of a Taiwan contingency, the PLA began a systematic program of military expansion and modernization whose primary strategic aim was to deter Taiwanese independence, including challenging the military preeminence of the United States in the western Pacific, and eventually to provide the hard-power capabilities that would compel Taiwan’s leaders to negotiate the terms of political unification under a One Country, Two Systems framework.

This modernization program has now advanced to the point where Taiwan’s armed forces can no longer count on a qualitative advantage over their adversaries across the strait, who have long enjoyed a quantitative advantage in personnel. The PLA’s air, naval, and missile forces now not only are several times larger than those of the ROC, but they also have
reached or exceeded the capabilities of Taiwan’s most advanced military equipment in an increasing number of areas. The PLA currently possesses the firepower to simply overwhelm Taiwanese forces in a conventional head-to-head confrontation, and its advantages will continue to grow over the next decade.

Consequently, Taiwan’s military planners have belatedly adopted an “asymmetric warfare” defense posture, though this strategic shift has yet to be fully implemented in terms of doctrine development, training, operational revisions, procurement, and resource allocations. In practice, the Ministry of National Defense’s ability to develop and implement a realistic strategy to counter the rising and multidimensional threat from the PRC has been hampered by inter-service rivalries, a military culture that still values and prioritizes traditional forces over unconventional ones, and the conservatism of much of the senior officer and general officer corps.

**China’s Military and Operational Concepts**

In addition to rapid improvements in its conventional forces, the PLA has also made significant progress in multiple unconventional areas, including counterspace technology, stealth technology, hypersonic weapons, and electromagnetic railguns. The PRC leadership has likewise prioritized research on technology such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, which also have important military implications. Under Xi Jinping, the PRC has ramped up the frequency of patrols by military aircraft and warships in and around Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters, partly for training purposes, partly for testing Taiwan’s early detection and rapid response capabilities, and partly for propaganda value.

Workshop participants did not engage in a systematic review of the PLA’s evolving military doctrines and operational concepts or Taiwan’s alignment against them. There was some disagreement about whether, and for how long, Taiwan’s armed forces could effectively resist a full-scale PLA invasion given its current readiness level and force posture. On the positive side, Taiwan retains important defensive advantages, including the separation provided by the Taiwan Strait and its own mountainous geography and difficult landing zones on the west coast. Moreover, any conflict would presumably take place on its own territory, where it would enjoy—at least initially—logistical, numerical, and motivational advantages over the PLA.

In addition, there are reasons to be skeptical of the PLA’s war-fighting ability. Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign has not spared the military leadership, increasing the sense of political vulnerability among the officer
corps. The PLA last fought a war 40 years ago, and its command and control systems and warfighting culture remain untested. It is unknown, even to CCP leaders, how the Chinese military would perform in an intense conflict over Taiwan, making an already high-risk proposition appear even riskier.

Given the enormous operational difficulties and reputational costs that an attempted full-scale invasion of Taiwan would impose on the PRC, China’s leaders may be tempted to pursue unconventional means to force Taiwan’s leadership into political negotiations. At the top of the list of possibilities is a cyberattack, which could sow widespread confusion and panic, undermine confidence in Taiwanese leaders and institutions, and complicate the ability of Taiwanese representatives to rally international support against the PRC.

The CCP also has a long history of political and psychological warfare operations against Taiwan and other rivals and enemies—areas where, given the language and cultural differences, the United States may be insufficiently prepared to engage in support of Taiwan. The U.S. conception of war, one participant noted, is binary: “either we are at war or we’re not,” so America’s operational standards for responding rapidly to counter “grey zone” tactics such as the maritime militia, United Front work, the blending of commercial and military assets and actors, and so forth, will require further refinement to increase efficacy.

Though Taiwan has traditionally also had strengths in psychological and political operations, many of its capabilities in these areas have declined since the transition to democracy, the removal of KMT party cells from the military, and generational replacement in the officer corps. As such, a systematic disinformation campaign combined with cyberattacks and other unconventional psychological operations could pose a serious challenge to Taiwan’s security, and would greatly complicate the political decision in the United States about whether to intervene directly to assist Taiwan. The case for intervention would be much easier to make if an attack were kinetic and unambiguous, such as an attempted decapitation strike on the presidential office building in Taipei.

**Taiwan’s Military Investments**

Given Taiwan’s challenging fiscal picture, many workshop participants questioned the MND’s continued pursuit of expensive, high-profile weapons systems such as the F-35 fighter and diesel submarines. If Taiwan’s core strategic goal is to prevent the PRC from imposing its will via military force, then the best-value investments are asymmetric, scalable options
that dramatically increase the expected costs and risks of a PLA invasion, such as mobile missile launchers and fast attack crafts (FACs). These are relatively low-cost weapons whose presence nonetheless could deny the PLA absolute air superiority, prevent the consolidation of an effective blockade, and pose unacceptable risks to an amphibious invasion fleet.

Taiwan also needs to maintain a separate conventional force capable of protecting its airspace and territorial waters and of responding to PRC provocations that fall short of a full military conflict. However, because of cost and manpower constraints and the very different kind of force required to successfully hold off a full-scale, asymmetric conflict with the PLA, most participants agreed that the MND should prioritize acquiring and maintaining older, but still lethal and effective weapons systems and platforms that are typically much cheaper than the latest generation systems. Taiwan’s request for F-16Vs fighters rather than F-35s is one example of this tradeoff—F16s already make up the bulk of Taiwan’s air fleet, and even with the latest avionics and weapons systems included, would cost a half to a third of the price of F-35s. Another example is the recent delivery of four used Kidd-class destroyers from the United States.

The issue of submarines is more controversial. In April 2018, the U.S. State Department approved a Taiwanese request to license U.S. submarine technology as it attempts to develop and build a new submarine fleet. The MND’s submarine program has now passed the initial design stage and its target date for first launch is 2024 or 2025. The majority of workshop participants viewed this program, which has the enthusiastic support of President Tsai, as an inefficient use of scarce defense resources: submarines are slow, they are costly, and they take a long time to build. Moreover, Taiwan has no previous experience manufacturing submarines, will have to develop the capacity from scratch, and a similar deterrent effect could be obtained via a much cheaper and larger fleet of small surface craft. (Additional discussion of the tradeoffs inherent in developing Taiwan’s defense industrial base is summarized in session III).

The Role of the United States

This workshop was held a month before the fortieth anniversary of the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In reflecting on this significant anniversary, several of the American participants emphasized that the United States is a Pacific nation “by geography and outlook,” and that it will continue to maintain a “dominant presence” and work to uphold the principle of a rules-based “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” despite growing Chinese hard power in the region. Five of the seven U.S. mutual defense
treaty allies are in the Pacific, and the United States participates annually in more than 125 bilateral or multilateral exercises in the region. In addition, more than 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s forces are now positioned in the Indo-Pacific, and United States will continue to maintain and strengthen its extensive regional network of partnerships and alliances, including with Taiwan.

The foremost security consideration for both ROC and PRC strategic planning is whether, and if so how, the United States would intervene in a conflict between the two sides. The TRA and other U.S. policy statements have been carefully worded to maintain “strategic ambiguity” about what the United States would do and to provide sufficient policy flexibility in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress have both taken significant actions in recent years to reemphasize America’s support for Taiwan’s security. For instance, the most recent National Security Strategy affirmed that the United States “will maintain [its] strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with [its] ‘One China’ policy, including [its] commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion.” Congress has also passed several symbolic pieces of legislation that have included explicit statements of support for Taiwan, such as language added to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (signed by President Trump in December 2017), the Taiwan Travel Act (signed in March 2018), and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (passed by Congress and signed by the President in December 2018).

In addition, the frequency and level of diplomatic, security and military contacts between the United States and Taiwan is at its highest level in decades. In May 2017, for instance, the MND reported to the Legislative Yuan that the United States had sent over one thousand military personnel to Taiwan on 140 different visits over the previous year, and that Taiwan had sent at least 900 people on 170 different visits. Visits to Taiwan by U.S. administration officials, members of Congress, and former flag officers have also increased in frequency and visibility since the beginning of the Trump administration.

One important area of U.S.-Taiwan cooperation is arms sales. Since 2010, the United States has concluded at least $15 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan, though this process has often been disrupted in the United States by concerns about the impact on the U.S.-China relationship, and in Taiwan by the difficulty of prioritizing and appropriating money for weapons packages. Workshop participants were generally supportive of ongoing efforts in the U.S. government to transition toward a more regularized
process for military sales to Taiwan, but encouraged the Department of Defense to play a more direct and active role in Taiwan’s procurement decisions. The U.S. side could help by discussing the serious budget constraints facing the MND and guiding it toward the more cost-effective options, including investments in mobile weapons systems, hardening and camouflage, and smaller and more resilient weapons platforms.

On a final note of interest, at least one participant suggested that the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty could actually have positive implications for Taiwan’s security over the long term. Because the PRC is not among the INF signatories and has been free to develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles, its arsenal is now “the largest and most diverse missile force in the world,” according to the 2017 public Senate testimony by then United States Pacific Commander, Admiral Harry Harris. If a new treaty were signed that included the PRC, it would impose an important new constraint on the PLA’s ability to threaten Taiwan. If, on the other hand, Beijing refused to consider treaty limitations on its own missile force, then it would give the United States a stronger rationale to assist Taiwan in expanding its own missile defenses.

III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY

The workshop’s third session covered the political economy of Taiwan’s defense and security. The discussions generated three key findings. First, Taiwan’s leaders face difficult political decisions over how to prioritize between military spending and other demands on the central government’s budget, decisions which will only become more difficult over time as the population ages and Taiwan’s health and pension systems grow more expensive. Second, the expansion of Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry may well increase political support for military spending over the long term. However, it could also become a long-term drag on Taiwan’s economy, divert scarce resources to risky and inefficient manufacturing programs, and contribute relatively little to Taiwan’s overall capacity to deter a PRC attack. Third, the willingness of ordinary Taiwanese to resist PRC military action is both higher and more dependent on Taiwanese leadership and on an expectation of the support from the United States than is widely appreciated.
Declining Defense Spending
Taiwan spends less on defense in real terms today than it did in 1994. Although the Tsai administration has pledged to raise the defense budget by 20 percent by 2025, pressures on defense spending will intensify due to Taiwan’s long-term demographic and economic challenges.

Taiwan’s democratization has played a central role in constraining the defense budget, creating relentless pressure on elected officials to divert spending towards social welfare and civilian infrastructure programs. Defense used to comprise the single largest component of the central government budget, but in the mid-1990s, combined spending on a universal national health insurance program, social security, and unemployment benefits surpassed it. Since at least 2000, between 25 and 30 percent of all government spending has been directed to social welfare programs, while the annual share going to defense has remained relatively consistent at around 11 percent.

Democratization has also empowered the legislature to play a more decisive role in security and defense policy. The Taiwanese legislature cannot increase or reallocate items from the budget proposal submitted by the executive branch, but it can freeze or cut them, and the defense budget is a regular target for legislators looking for ways to economize. The typical Taiwanese legislator has little or no expertise on defense and security issues and few incentives to develop it, since defense is not usually a salient issue in election campaigns. The legislature emerged as a major obstacle on defense issues during the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008), when the opposition used its majority to delay or block several proposed arms sales from the United States. But even under unified government during both the Ma and Tsai administrations, legislators from both major parties have regularly intervened to freeze or cut items in the Ministry of National Defense budget. For instance, in December 2018 the legislature cut NT $200 million from an MND proposal to build 60 missile-equipped fast attack craft.

Demographics and economics will also severely limit the resources available to the military in the future. Taiwan’s population is rapidly aging—there are currently twice as many 40-year-olds as 10-year-olds—and it is projected to begin declining by the 2030s, assuming no substantial increase in the birthrate or jump in immigration numbers. In addition, as an island country of just 23 million people, Taiwan does not have the economic scale to support significant domestically oriented innovation. Taiwan’s rate of inward-directed business investment is currently low as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), and by some measures, the
quality of mainland China’s infrastructure and logistics in coastal regions has already surpassed those of Taiwan. Future growth and productivity improvements will probably require greater integration into the regional Asia-Pacific economy. However, increasing openness to the PRC, the most obvious place for Taiwanese businesses to seek new markets and partners, is both politically fraught and would exacerbate an already serious economic and security vulnerability.

The Tsai administration’s most prominent response to these challenges has been the New Southbound Policy (NSP), a government-led effort to increase trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges with the countries of Southeast Asia (most notably Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines). Several participants noted that the NSP’s prospects seemed better than past efforts, in part because the rising cost of manufacturing on the Chinese mainland had already motivated many Taiwanese businesses to look for alternative locations, in part because Beijing’s economic policies are once again favoring Chinese state-linked or state-owned enterprises over wholly foreign and private ones, and also in part because of concerns that the current trade friction between the United States and the PRC might be the start of a “new normal” that limits U.S. market access for firms producing products in China. Thus, the government’s efforts to facilitate greater engagement with Southeast Asia have found a receptive audience among Taiwanese business leaders.

**Investing in an Indigenous Defense Industry**

The Tsai administration’s national defense strategy has a well-defined set of objectives and accompanying approaches. These include:

- Safeguarding national security by continuing force modernization, including investments in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and pursuing next generation fighter aircraft.
- Cultivating a professional military by promoting defense reform, including continuing the transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF).
- Implementing defense self-reliance by developing an indigenous defense industry.
- Protecting the well-being of the Taiwanese people by enhancing civilian protection operations.
- Contributing to regional stability by expanding cooperation with partners.

A key feature of the Tsai administration’s defense strategy is promoting an indigenous defense industry focused on aerospace, shipbuilding,
and cybersecurity. The most visible symbol of this effort is the construction of submarines licensed from the United States. Proponents argue that these efforts will generate positive benefits for the economy, due to innovation spurred by R&D spending and a more capable industrial sector. An additional argument in favor is that it would change the political economy of defense in Taiwan by creating new jobs and a more influential political constituency that supports defense spending. As part of this push, the Tsai government has launched an industrial cooperation program to support technology transfer, research and development, and local investment in defense contractors. To this end, the Taiwanese government has already signed 130 cooperation agreements with 60 contractors from 12 countries.

Despite the obvious benefits of this policy, several participants noted serious potential downsides to meeting more of Taiwan’s military procurement needs through domestic manufacturing. For one, Taiwan’s defense industry is, in general, one of the more inefficient sectors of its economy, and shifting additional scarce government resources into that sector could create a drag on overall economic productivity. Since Taiwan’s long-term security depends as much on economic vibrancy as on hard power, this strategy has an element of “dismantling the east wall to repair the west” (i.e., “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”)

Another challenge is that, due to acute pressure from the PRC, there is no obvious foreign market for Taiwanese-produced arms, which would otherwise help the defense industry achieve economies of scale in some areas through exports. Taiwan’s plan to build its own submarines illustrates these dilemmas well: even with U.S. assistance and with no unforeseen disruptions, Taiwanese firms that have been contracted to build submarines will have to develop much of this manufacturing capacity from scratch for a very limited number of vessels with no obvious prospects for foreign sales, while consuming a large share of Taiwan’s military procurement budget for at least a decade.

Maintaining the Willingness to Fight
Public opinion research presented at the workshop revealed important nuances in how Taiwanese think about defense issues. The results of one nationally representative online poll found that half of all Taiwanese intended to “resist” a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. The fraction of respondents holding this view varied significantly depending on several other factors, most importantly their beliefs about what fellow citizens and the United States would do in response.
In one experiment, respondents were divided into three groups. The first was asked only about their willingness to resist. The second was told that 82 percent of Taiwanese had said they would resist, while the third was told only 18 percent of Taiwanese said they would. At baseline, 50 percent of those in the first group expressed a willingness to resist. At the high end, willingness to resist increased to 60 percent among the second group, and dropped to 40 percent among the third group. Thus, a collective response from Taiwanese to a Chinese attack will depend to some degree on what ordinary Taiwanese believe their fellow citizens will do.

In another experiment, respondents were divided into four distinct groups, and asked whether they would fight against a PRC attack. Each group was given a different scenario based on whether the attack was triggered by a declaration of independence in Taiwan and whether the United States indicated it would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the conflict. Somewhat surprisingly, the most important factor was whether the United States would intervene—willingness to fight was not affected much, if at all, by a declaration of independence triggering an attack.

The China Factor
As late as the early 1990s, military spending in the PRC was less than double Taiwan’s, but Beijing now spends nearly 25 times as much. Not all of that spending, of course, is directed toward preparing for a Taiwan contingency, but consistent double-digit increases in the military budget have underwritten a two-decade military modernization plan that is now bearing fruit. The PLA now surpasses Taiwan’s armed forces not only in quantity but increasingly in quality as well.

Nevertheless, it is easy to overlook that the last two decades of increases in PRC military spending have been sustained mostly by rapid economic growth. Until now, overall defense spending has remained relatively constant as a share of China’s GDP. However, as the Chinese economy slows and the PRC runs into its own increasingly severe demographic and economic challenges over the next two decades, China’s leaders will be faced with a more difficult tradeoff: continued growth in the defense budget will have to come at the expense of other state priorities, and it is not clear how these competing pressures will ultimately be resolved.
While most democracies have implemented all-volunteer armed forces, few face the military threat that Taiwan does. Conscription is written into the Republic of China constitution, and the Taiwanese government has since the early 1950s required all able-bodied men to serve in the active-duty armed forces. In the 1990s, despite rapid improvements in the PLA’s capabilities and periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s political leadership repeatedly reduced the terms of conscription, from three to two years, to one year and six months, and eventually down to the current requirement of only four months. The administration of Ma Ying-jeou also finalized a plan in January 2012 to transition over several years to an all-volunteer force, and the Tsai administration has continued that process. Due to repeated recruiting shortfalls, the final date for a fully volunteer force has been repeatedly postponed, and now appears likely to occur in 2020.

The fourth panel of the workshop provided two views on Taiwan’s AVF transition, as well as comparative perspectives from experts on the armed forces of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The United States transitioned to an all-volunteer force in the 1970s. Japan abolished conscription after the end of the second World War and has maintained a relatively small self-defense force ever since. The Republic of Korea, by contrast, has maintained a military service requirement for all able-bodied adult men, and unlike Taiwan, to date it has not seriously considered ending conscription in the face of the ongoing security threat posed by North Korea.

A New Paradigm

The motivation for Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force was political. Despite the persistence of an existential threat from the PRC, the reduction and eventual elimination of conscription was broadly popular, and was supported by leaders of all political parties, though the number of critics has increased in recent years.

Proponents of the shift argue that it will result in better-motivated and better-trained defense forces, and that the transition will eventually lead to improvements in civil-military relations. Opponents argue that the rising cost of salaries and benefits for military personnel will crowd out other items in the defense budget, that four months of basic training is effectively useless, and that the military will be forced to draw its personnel from a smaller, less capable pool of talent as a result.
To attract and retain volunteers, the MND has significantly increased pay and benefits. For example, those personnel who are stationed outside the main island of Taiwan, such as Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea, have received increases in hardship pay of up to 60 percent. Those who re-enlist for an additional three years after their four-year terms are completed are eligible for an NT $100,000 bonus (approximately USD $3,000, or one-fifth of Taiwan’s median income). Improvements in living facilities and other benefits, including lifelong learning opportunities, have also been implemented.

As of 2018, the MND had filled only 82.5 percent of its authorized strength. To meet its target of 90 percent by 2020, the MND has increased investments in its recruiting centers, introduced or expanded ROTC programs on college campuses, and strengthened relationships with high schools.

Promoting Prestige
The most significant barrier to attracting and retaining personnel is the relatively low prestige of Taiwan’s military. On a strategic level, the majority of Taiwanese do not believe that the ROC armed forces could defeat the PRC in a conflict. A recent survey found that two-thirds of respondents had “little or no confidence” that the Taiwanese military could prevail in a fight with the PLA. On a personal level, military service has little cache in contemporary society and is viewed by many young people as a career of last resort. The low social status of military service creates a particularly challenging environment for recruitment, and the MND has been forced to offer aggressive and competitive salaries and benefits to attract volunteers.

Elite signals of support for Taiwan’s military personnel are generally quite good. President Tsai, for instance, has visited a military establishment on average once a week during her presidency, and she routinely praises the importance of military service and the armed forces’ readiness to defend Taiwan. But increasing mass public support for, and confidence in, the military is a major and pressing challenge in Taiwan. Workshop participants noted various examples of promotion activities done in other countries, including K-pop celebrations of military themes in South Korea and military cooperation with Hollywood and with flyovers at sporting events in the United States. One Taiwanese participant noted that the MND is moving toward hosting public open houses at military bases, though security remains a concern at these events.
Taiwan in Comparative Perspective

Even with the impending end of conscription, the ROC military-to-population ratio remains quite high in comparative perspective, at 0.69%—third only to North and South Korea, and higher than the United States (0.41%), Japan (0.19%), and the PRC (0.14%).

In the United States, the shift to an all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War has had significant social and economic impacts, not all positive for the armed forces and for civil-military relations. It led to a greater dependence on recruiting from disproportionately poor and minority populations. As late as the 1970s, military experience was relatively evenly distributed across all socioeconomic groups. But after its transition to an all-volunteer force, the bulk of the AVF is now drawn from the third and fourth income quintiles, and volunteers from the top fifth of households are now rare. The decline in military experience among political and economic elites, combined with the disproportionate burden of service borne by a relatively narrow group of Americans, has arguably made it less politically costly for American leaders to begin and continue military conflicts. Competition with the private sector has driven a surge in personnel costs as the Pentagon tries to retain its most highly skilled soldiers. In addition, the costs of healthcare benefits provided to veterans continue to rise above the rate of inflation and annual budget increases.

Japan offers a different experience. It illustrates the demographic challenges that Taiwan will face as its population ages and declines. The working-age population in Japan has already been shrinking for almost two decades, and by 2040 it is projected to be 20 million fewer than it was in 2000. As the number of students graduating from high school continues to shrink each year, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has followed the example of the national police force and begun to focus recruiting efforts at college graduates and at women. The size of the JSDF is now at about 247,000, a number not too different from Taiwan’s current size of 215,000, and personnel costs now account for 44 percent of Japan’s defense budget, which is about five times the size of Taiwan’s. JSDF recruiting has been sensitive to the health of the overall economy: the number of applications spikes in times of economic stress and declines as the economy improves.

The Republic of Korea offers perhaps the most compelling alternative to the AVF model. Its political and military leadership has never seriously considered ending conscription, although there are plans to reduce the overall size of the force by 100,000 troops by 2025, and to shorten the length of mandatory service. The salience of the military threat from North Korea has to date helped support a social consensus in favor of
conscription, despite its unpopularity among young people required to serve. Nevertheless, there remain similar structural challenges to military readiness. As in Taiwan and Japan, Korea’s population is rapidly aging and projected to start declining within 20 years. Korean courts have recently ruled in favor of allowing “conscientious objectors” to apply for alternative service. And the military, concerned about ensuring an adequate talent pool, has opened additional positions to women.

**Strengthening Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Force**

Given the political consensus in Taiwan in favor of a shift to an all-volunteer force, and the broad unpopularity of military service among young people, halting or reversing the AVF transition appears infeasible. Workshop participants suggested several steps that would nonetheless be realistic to take to improve Taiwan’s armed forces in the current political environment. One possibility is retaining and trying to leverage the mandatory four-month training period to develop specialized reserve forces, such as a cyberwarfare unit that could be activated during national emergencies. Another is to introduce more lateral entry points for early- and mid-career professionals with special skill sets. A third is to prioritize expanding the share of women serving in the military, perhaps by incorporating them into basic training. Although women constitute a relatively small proportion of the overall force, at about 11 percent of personnel, one participant noted that they were generally already well integrated into the armed forces and expanding their numbers would not face much resistance or create significant disruptions.

**V. ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE**

The final workshop panel covered asymmetric options for Taiwan’s defense. There was a near-consensus among participants that Taiwan’s armed forces would be unlikely to prevail alone in a conventional military conflict with the PLA that lasts more than a few weeks. The Chinese numerical advantages are simply too great to overcome in a head-to-head fight that turns into a battle of attrition. Thus, the ability to “win” a direct fight cannot be the ultimate strategic objective for Taiwan’s defense planners. Instead, the goal should be to raise enough doubt among Chinese political and military leaders about a successful military resolution of the “Taiwan problem” that such a course of action is deterred altogether.
That in turn raises the question of what a “successful resolution” via military action would look like. From a PLA planner perspective, resolution requires the elimination or capitulation of the Taiwanese political and military leadership, the collapse of command and control of the armed forces above the unit level, PLA occupation and unchallenged control of major population centers, and passive acceptance of the outcome by the vast majority of the Taiwanese civilian population. In addition, a military resolution would have to preempt or deter U.S. intervention to assist Taiwan, which puts a premium on a surprise attack and a swift (and risky) campaign that would substantially conclude before the United States has time to mobilize in response.

As one of the participants pointed out, this kind of “blitzkrieg” campaign would be nearly impossible for the PLA to mobilize for without being detected well in advance—realistically, days and most likely weeks before an attack could be launched. Any amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait would require the relatively slow buildup of troops and landing craft in China’s southeast, and it would have to be preceded by an extended campaign to establish local superiority in the air, sea, and electromagnetic domains. It would also most likely have to be limited to certain times of year; the Taiwan Strait is vulnerable to typhoons and violent thunderstorms that could disrupt an invasion force any time between May and November. The Taiwan side also enjoys other inherent defensive advantages, including long, exposed approaches to landing zones on the west coast mudflats; dense urban and suburban terrain that can be exploited to hinder rapid offensive movements, and to set ambushes; and a civilian population friendly to the defenders.

Thus, the strategic context of the Taiwan Strait presents a paradox: the PLA is increasingly likely to prevail in a conventional war, but still unlikely to achieve its strategic objectives in an unconventional one. The balance of power continues to grow worse for Taiwan, and as it does, there is increasingly little doubt that the ROC armed forces would be rapidly degraded in a conventional force-on-force conflict. However, it is still feasible for Taiwan’s leaders to pursue an asymmetric defense strategy that does not directly challenge PLA dominance but instead aims to impose unacceptably high costs on the attackers. Deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is still possible as long as the Taiwan defenders can credibly prevent a quick “resolution of the Taiwan issue” via military means. To continue to prevent a conflict, however, Taiwan’s defense strategy and force posture need to better reflect this underlying calculus.
With this strategic context in mind, several participants suggested a more radical “two-force” defense concept: planning for and developing two separate forces with overlapping personnel but fundamentally different missions, organization, command-and-control structures, and training. The first would be a conventional force for missions short of full-scale war: monitoring and protection of Taiwan’s sea and airspace against hostile incursions, detecting and responding to attempted decapitation strikes or covert operations, and countering psychological operations and cyberattacks, among other possible limited threats. The second would be in effect a guerrilla force: it would not seek to protect air and sea space, or even all Taiwanese territory, but would instead attempt only to deny complete, reliable control of those domains to the PLA.

Fielding the first, conventional force has been the focus of almost all ROC armed forces planning for decades, and the military leadership retains an organizational and cultural preference for qualitative advantages over their adversaries across the strait, even if maintaining these capabilities results in a less resilient but cost-effective deterrent. Fielding the second kind of force, however, would require a major shift in organizational mindset. Though the MND has repeatedly emphasized “asymmetric warfare” in its national defense strategy, it still has not seriously prepared for a conflict in which it will lose control of its air and sea space for long periods of time; in situations where it must operate in a threat environment in which it is severely outmatched; and at times when it has to deploy guerrilla tactics against a quantitatively and qualitatively superior adversary. Making this force objective explicit, and developing strategy, doctrine, training and operations to further its goals, could help reorient the military away from its traditional mindset of a conventional strength-on-strength encounter with the PLA.

**Deterrence Options**

As they had throughout the workshop, participants questioned the MND’s continued preference for high-cost, “prestige” weapons systems over simpler, more cost-effective ways to counter the threats posed by the PLA.

One especially compelling illustration of this point came in a presentation on air defense options. Taiwan’s fighter jets are vulnerable to PLA missile strikes. Even if they were to remain protected in hardened hangars during an attack, runways could quickly be disabled, and even if they were able to get airborne in time to intercept enemy aircraft, they would be outnumbered anywhere from 2–1 to 10–1 by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). (One estimate is that the PLAAF would be able to mount 1,200 sorties a
day against the ROC Air Force at peak operations.) In addition, Taiwan’s three main types of fighter—the IDF, Mirage 2000, and F-16A/B—all have negative exchange ratios versus the PLAAF’s current generation aircraft, the J-10/J-11B. That is, the Taiwan side would lose more than one aircraft for every enemy target it successfully removed from the battle. This ratio will worsen further as the PLA introduces the next-generation J-20 and J-31, although upgrades of the F-16s and additional acquisitions of F-16Vs could help mitigate. The next-generation F-35 would be significantly better against even the latest PLAAF fighters, but its cost at USD $100–125 million per plane is prohibitive for a military as resource-constrained as Taiwan’s.

Instead of seeking the latest-generation fighters to try to regain a (temporary) qualitative superiority over the PLAAF, Taiwan’s ability to deter Chinese military action would be better strengthened by deploying weapons systems that are cheap, plentiful, and able to survive a first strike. In general, these systems are smaller in size, mobile, easily concealed, available in large numbers at reasonable prices, and yet lethal to attackers under typical battlefield conditions.

For instance, Taiwan could develop or purchase and deploy many small, overlapping mobile surface-to-air anti-aircraft systems that could better evade targeting by the PLA and still present enough of a threat to deny Chinese aircraft air superiority over Taiwan through a campaign lasting several weeks. Compared to the handful of F-35s that could be purchased for an equivalent amount, a combination of retrofitted F-16s and a greatly expanded number of air defense units would enable significantly better outcomes in three scenarios presented during the workshop session: to counter air threats for modest periods of time in the event of an attempted blockade; to resist a disarming strike of 200 simultaneous attackers; and to maintain air sovereignty for several weeks, which would allow them to hold out long enough until external support arrives. A key reason why such a strategy would work is that it would force China’s planes to fly at higher altitudes, making targeting of small, mobile assets more difficult.

In the sea domain, one presenter mentioned Iran as a promising model for how Taiwan could economically build an “anti-navy” able to deter a PRC blockade or invasion attempt. Key features of this approach are the use of mines, coastal defense weapons, and small missile boats.

**Recognizing Unconventional Threats**

Participants also considered Taiwan’s vulnerability to the PRC’s unconventional threats, including cyberattack, disinformation, and espionage.
As is true for Beijing’s “sharp power” techniques, Taiwan is also a “testing ground” for unconventional tactics ultimately intended for deployment against other adversaries.

Taiwanese agencies are among the most frequent targets of cyberattacks in the world: according to one presenter, in 2017, Taiwanese government websites and databases were attacked about 20 million times a month on average. Over time, the number of these attacks has declined, but their sophistication has increased. Most appear to result from a coordinated effort, as they predominantly occur during the East Asian workday. Taiwan has a four-tier rating system for attack severity, with “1” denoting the defacing of a webpage and “4” the serious compromising of infrastructure. In 2017, the Taiwanese authorities counted 360 successful attacks, most of which were at level 1 or 2, and only 12 at level 3. Attacks targeting personnel and health information were particularly common, perhaps as a means to try to affect the morale of Taiwan’s all-volunteer force.

The PRC has also accelerated its disinformation campaigns since President Tsai Ing-wen took office. Examples include disseminating misleading pictures of PLA aircraft near Taiwan, spreading rumors that Taiwan was at imminent risk of losing further diplomatic allies, and promoting false reports that Taiwan was considering lending Taiping Island to the U.S. military. The most serious incident involves the allegations of PRC manipulation of social media during Taiwan’s 2018 local elections to depress support for the ruling DPP, but no public investigation has yet produced definitive evidence that China’s efforts during this campaign significantly affected the outcome of the elections.

Taiwan has become more vulnerable to espionage as the border with the mainland has become more porous. In the past five years, Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau has uncovered 52 espionage cases involving 115 people. Current or former military officers are key targets. PRC agents have also attempted to infiltrate Taiwanese civil society and provide financial support to pro-unification groups.

The Taiwanese government has attempted to counter these disinformation campaigns by raising public awareness of them, with mixed results. Taiwan’s highly partisan and competitive media environment remains especially fertile ground for spreading false and potentially damaging rumors, and the National Communications Commission, which has responsibility for regulating media outlets, has struggled to combat false reporting without being accused of overreach and censorship.
U.S. Arms Sales

In 2017, President Tsai pledged to support annual increases in the defense budget, aiming to raise it by 20 percent by 2025. She also promised to appropriate special budgets outside the normal annual budget process to purchase arms packages approved for sale by the United States.

In the past, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been repeatedly delayed or rejected because of concerns in the United States government about the effect on the U.S.-China relationship. More surprisingly, they have also occasionally been delayed because of resistance from the Taiwanese legislature. The consensus among workshop participants was that the previous obstacles to arms sales on both sides of the relationship were receding. Three major arms sales, totaling more than $14 billion, were approved and carried out during the Obama administration. These sales included missile defense systems, helicopters, minesweepers, and a retrofit and upgrade of Taiwan’s current F-16 fighter jets. The Trump administration, to date, has approved $1.7 billion in additional arms sales. One participant noted that the current administration appears to be transitioning toward “normalizing” the Taiwan arms sales process—that is, treating Taiwan more like a standard foreign military sales partner eligible for smaller and more frequent weapons acquisitions. These have the added political benefit of attracting less scrutiny and generating less disruption to the U.S.-China relationship.

Several participants again reiterated concerns about the MND’s process for seeking to buy certain weapons systems from the United States. Recent purchases have not always reflected the national defense strategy of maximizing deterrence, and instead have been a mix of offensive and defensive platforms that do not clearly fit a coherent plan. Participants thought ROC planners could also benefit from more regular and rigorous wargaming, perhaps in partnership with war colleges in the United States, to better inform Taiwan’s defense strategy and procurement priorities. The U.S. Department of Defense could also play a more active role in evaluating Taiwan’s military posture and emphasizing sales of lower-cost, asymmetric packages of systems.

Other Risks and Opportunities

Participants raised a handful of other possible opportunities and concerns that Taiwan’s defense establishment might explore further. One was increasing the role of unmanned aerial and submarine vehicles, especially those small enough to be launched by hand or from trucks rather than from exposed and vulnerable runways. One participant also speculated
that the PLA might eventually seek to build the capacity to attack Taiwan simultaneously from the east as well as the west, and that Taiwan planners needed to take this possibility into account. The prospect of a multi-directional threat highlights the renewed strategic importance of the Pacific Islands to the east of Taiwan such as Palau, and less obviously, of some of the island microstates of the South Pacific. As one participant noted, a Chinese military presence even in the South Pacific would “strain the U.S. Navy and take away from its ability to fight further up north.”
## WORKSHOP AGENDA

**MONDAY, MARCH 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:15am</td>
<td><strong>BOARD SHUTTLE TO ENCINA HALL</strong>&lt;br&gt;Kharis Templeman will meet participants in the Sheraton Palo Alto lobby</td>
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<tr>
<td>8:30am–9:00am</td>
<td><strong>CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST</strong>&lt;br&gt;Bechtel Conference Center, 1st floor, Encina Hall, 616 Serra Mall</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00am–9:15am</td>
<td><strong>OPENING REMARKS</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Gi-Wook Shin</strong> Director, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)&lt;br&gt;<strong>Karl Eikenberry</strong> Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Shorenstein APARC</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:15am–10:45am</td>
<td><strong>Panel I PRC Sharp Power Strategy toward Taiwan</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: <strong>Larry Diamond</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. <em>Cross-Strait Economic Policy: Carrots and Sticks</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Ming-chi Chen</strong> 陳明祺 Deputy Minister, Mainland Affairs Council&lt;br&gt;2. <em>Taiwan’s Diplomatic Challenges during the Tsai Administration: The State of Play</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Derek Grossman</strong> RAND&lt;br&gt;3. <em>China’s Sharp Power around the Globe</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Orville Schell</strong> Asia Foundation&lt;br&gt;4. <em>China’s Sharp Power toward Taiwan</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Tzu-Chieh Hung</strong> 洪子傑 INDSR</td>
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<td>10:45am–11:00am</td>
<td><strong>BREAK</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00am–12:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Panel II PRC Hard Power Threats toward Taiwan</strong>&lt;br&gt;Chair: <strong>Tom Fingar</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. <em>PLA Capabilities and Planning for a Taiwan Contingency</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Si-fu Ou</strong> 歐錫富 INDSR&lt;br&gt;2. <em>U.S. Capabilities in the Western Pacific</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Olivia Degenkolb</strong> Lt. Cmd. U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet&lt;br&gt;3. <em>Taiwan Capabilities and Planning to Counteract Hostile Action</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Ian Easton</strong> Project 2049 Institute&lt;br&gt;4. <em>U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>David An</strong> Global Taiwan Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30pm–12:45pm</td>
<td><strong>BREAK</strong>&lt;br&gt;Move upstairs to Oksenberg Conference Room, 3rd floor, for lunch and keynote address</td>
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12:45–2:00pm  
LUNCH
Oksenberg Conference Room, Encina Hall, 3rd floor
Introduction: Karl Eikenberry
Keynote Speech: The 40th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act
  Brent Christensen  Director, American Institute in Taiwan
  There will be an off-the-record Q&A following the keynote speech.

2:00pm–2:15pm  
BREAK
Return downstairs to Bechtel Conference Center for afternoon sessions

2:15pm–3:45pm  
Panel III  The Political Economy of Defense and Security in Taiwan
Chair: Mike Lampton
1. Taiwanese Public Opinion about Defense and Security Issues
   Austin Wang  UNLV
2. The Politics of Defense in Taiwan
   Kharis Templeman  Stanford University
3. Defense and Security Strategy under the Tsai Ing-wen Administration
   Liang-chih Chen  INDSR
4. Taiwan’s Long-Term Economic Challenges
   Bruce Gilley  Portland State University

3:45pm–4:00pm  
BREAK

4:00pm–5:45pm  
Panel IV  Transitioning to an All-Volunteer Force: Taiwan’s Experience Compared
Chair: Karl Eikenberry
1. An Insider’s Perspective on Taiwan: Motives for the AVF Transition
   Tse Chun Pu 蒲澤春  Admiral, ROC Navy, and Office of the President
2. An Outsider’s Perspective: Prospects and Challenges in the AVF Transition
   Lauren Dickey  CNA
3. Comparative Perspective I: United States—Recruitment and Retention in the U.S. Military after the End of the Draft
   Dennis Laich  Major General (Ret.), U.S. Army
4. Comparative Perspective II: Republic of Korea
   Youngjun Kim  Korea National Defense University
5. Comparative Perspective III: Japan
   Noboru Yamaguchi  Sasakawa Peace Foundation

5:45pm–6:30pm  
BREAK
Head upstairs to the 3rd floor for the reception

6:30pm–7:00pm  
RECEPTION
Oksenberg foyer, Encina Hall, 3rd floor
7:00pm–8:45pm  DINNER  
*Encina Hall, Oksenberg Room, Encina Hall, 3rd Floor*
Introduction: Kharis Templeman  
Keynote speech: *Taiwan’s Economic Security*  
**Shih-chung Liu (劉世忠)** Vice Chairman, TAITRA

8:45pm  BOARD SHUTTLE BUS FOR RETURN TO SHERATON PALO ALTO  
*Meet at the front steps of Encina Hall*

**TUESDAY, MARCH 5**

8:15am  BOARD SHUTTLE TO ENCINA HALL  
*Meet in the Sheraton Palo Alto lobby*

8:30am–9:00am  CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

9:00am–10:30am  **Panel V  Defending Taiwan: Asymmetric Options**

Chair: Kharis Templeman

1. *The Strategic Picture: Deterring PRC Coercive Actions against Taiwan*  
   **William S. Murray** U.S. Naval War College.

2. *Taking Constraints Seriously: A Hard Look at Taiwan’s Strategic Objectives vs Available Resources*  
   **Michael Lostumbo** RAND

3. *Arms Sales: The Taiwan Military Procurement Process*  
   **Fu-lung Liu 刘復龍** INDSR  
   [to be presented by Cheng-yi Lin]

4. *China’s Unconventional Threats: Attack, Disinformation, and Espionage*  
   **Jun-deh Wu** INDSR

10:30am–10:45am  BREAK

10:45am–12:15pm  **Panel VI  Concluding Roundtable**

Chairs: Karl Eikenberry  
**Cheng-yi Lin 林正義** President, Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR)

- Rapporteurs’ summary of workshop discussions  
- What have we learned?  
- What is to be done?

12:15pm–1:30pm  LUNCH  
*Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall*
WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

David An is the senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute, where he speaks and publishes his writings on diplomacy, security, and economics in the East Asia region. He was previously a political-military affairs officer covering the East Asia region at the U.S. State Department, where he coordinated bilateral diplomatic dialogues, arms sales decision-making, and worked closely with the Pentagon. An received his first State Department Superior Honor Award for initiating a series of official Taiwan political-military visits to the United States, and also for taking the lead on congressional notification of $6.4 billion dollars in U.S. arms sales—Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles—to Taiwan in 2010. An received a second Superior Honor Award for improving the U.S.-Australia security relationship. Prior to joining the State Department, An was a U.S. Fulbright Scholar traveling and researching democracy in Taiwan and village elections in China. After five years at the State Department, An became a senior project manager on the THAAD missile system at Lockheed Martin. He received an MA from the UCSD Graduate School of Global Policy and Strategy and a BA from UC Berkeley.

Ming-chi Chen 陳明祺 is the deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC (Taiwan). Before joining the government, Chen spent more than 10 years at National Tsing Hua University, where he was an associate professor at the Institute of Sociology and served as the institute’s director between August 2016 and June 2018. Prior to that, he was the director of graduate studies of the MA degree program in contemporary China studies at NTU. In addition, he has been the executive member of the Center for Contemporary China at NTU since May 2003. Chen received the MA and PhD in sociology from Yale University and BA in sociology from National Taiwan University.

Liang-chih Evans Chen 陳梁智 is currently assistant research fellow and acting director of the Division of National Defense Strategy and Policy at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in Taiwan. Before he joined INDSR, he was an assistant professor at Transworld University (2012–18) and National Chung Cheng University (2009–12). Chen completed his doctorate in political science at the University of California at Riverside. His research interest centers on U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asia security, in particular from the theoretical perspectives of balance of power, security dilemma, and power transition. His published journal articles include “An Analysis for Dominant Powers’ Policy Options toward Rising Powers: Examples of the U.S. Reactions to Japan’s Rise and China’s Rise,” Issues and Studies (in Chinese),

**W. Brent Christensen** assumed the position of director of the American Institute in Taiwan in August 2018. Christensen has been in the United States Foreign Service for more than 29 years and has extensive experience in senior positions relating to Taiwan and China. He was deputy director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office. Prior to that, he was director of the State Department’s Office of Taiwan Coordination. He has served three assignments at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the most recent being Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor.

Other overseas postings include Hong Kong and South Africa. Christensen has also served as the foreign policy advisor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and as a congressional fellow for Senator Olympia Snowe. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, he served as a captain in the U.S. Air Force.

Christensen is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and holds the personal rank of Minister-Counselor. Mr. Christensen earned an MA in East Asian studies from the George Washington University, a BA in Chinese language and literature from Brigham Young University, and a DMD degree from the Oregon Health and Sciences University.

**Lieutenant Commander Olivia K. Degenkolb**, a native of Berkeley, California, enlisted in the U.S. Navy as an Electrician’s Mate in 2002. After successful completion of her training and a follow-on instructor tour, she was offered a commission through the Seaman to Admiral Twenty-One program.

Degenkolb graduated from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 2006 with a BS in nuclear engineering and engineering physics. Degenkolb earned an MA in administrative leadership from the University of Oklahoma and earned a second MA in contemporary China studies from Renmin University (Beijing).

Her previous operational tours include Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE ONE TWO (VAW-112), where she served as a Naval Flight Officer, and a tour as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer aboard the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77).

Ashore, Degenkolb was selected as the flag aide to Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific. In 2012, she was selected as an Olmsted scholar and studied at Renmin University. Following re-designation as a Foreign Area Officer in 2017, she transferred to U.S. Pacific Fleet and is currently serving as a regional Desk Officer.
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. For more than six years, he directed FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, where he now leads its Program on Arab Reform and Democracy and its Global Digital Policy Incubator. He is the founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and also serves as senior consultant at the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends and conditions around the world, and on policies and reforms to defend and advance democracy. His 2016 book, In Search of Democracy, explores the challenges confronting democracy and democracy promotion, gathering together three decades of his writing and research, particularly on Africa and Asia. He has just completed a new book on the global crisis of democracy, which will be published in 2019, and is now writing a textbook on democratic development.

Diamond’s other books include The Spirit of Democracy, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria. He has also edited or co-edited more than 40 books on democratic development around the world. He has served as Fulbright Visiting Lecturer at Bayero University Kano, Nigeria (1982–83) and as a visiting scholar at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan (1997–98). He directed the Stanford Program on Democracy in Taiwan for more than ten years and has been a regular visitor to Taiwan since 1995.

During 2002–3, Diamond served as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International Development and was a contributing author of its report Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has also advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior advisor on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America’s postwar engagement in Iraq.

Diamond writes a monthly column for the American Interest and frequently consults on policies and programs to promote democracy.

Lauren Dickey is a research analyst in the China and Indo-Pacific Division at the Center for Naval Analyses in Arlington, Virginia. She has submitted her PhD dissertation in war studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore, titled “In Search of Strategy: Xi Jinping’s Approach to Taiwan.” Her dissertation traces the evolution and adaptation of Chinese statecraft toward Taiwan and was supported by extensive fieldwork on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Lauren was a 2017 recipient of the Taiwan Fellowship and spent four months as a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University. Prior to her PhD, Lauren worked as a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received a BA in Asian studies and Chinese from the University of Oregon and an MA in international studies and diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.
Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute and author of *The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia*. He previously was a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo and a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses.

Ian has testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and given lectures at the Naval War College, Japan’s National Defense Academy, and Taiwan’s National Defense University. He holds an MA in China studies from National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a BA in international studies from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Easton studied Chinese at Fudan University in Shanghai and National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei.

Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry (Ret.) is director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and faculty member at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, faculty member of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Professor of Practice at Stanford University. He is also an affiliate with the FSI Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, and The Europe Center.

Prior to his arrival at Stanford, he served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (2009–11). Before appointment as Chief of Mission on Kabul, Eikenberry had a 35-year career in the U.S. Army, retiring in April 2009 with the rank of lieutenant general. His military operational posts included commander and staff officer with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the commander of the American-led Coalition forces. He held various policy and political-military positions, including deputy chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium; director for strategic planning and policy for U.S. Pacific Command at Camp Smith, Hawaii; U.S. security coordinator and chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Kabul, Afghanistan; assistant Army and later defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China; senior country director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and deputy director for strategy, plans, and policy on the Army Staff.

He was a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian studies and Stanford University in political science, and was a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Eikenberry earned an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office while studying at the UK Ministry of Defence Chinese Language School in Hong Kong and has an advanced degree in Chinese history from Nanjing University.

Eikenberry’s articles and essays on U.S. and international security issues have appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, the *Washington Quarterly*, the *American Interest*, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Foreign Policy*, *Survival*, *Dædalus*, and the *Financial Times*. 
Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2003 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000–01 and 2004–05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–94), and chief of the China Division (1986–89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969, and PhD, 1977, both in political science). His most recent books are Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security, The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (editor), and Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform.

Bruce Gilley is a professor of political science at Portland State University. His 2010 article in Foreign Affairs—“Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security”—has made him persona non grata in the pro-Taiwan community in the United States. He pleads good intentions and stands by the article. He co-edited with Larry Diamond the 2008 book Political Change in China: Comparisons With Taiwan in which the two co-editors disagreed about whether Taiwan’s democracy is a model for China. They remain friends.

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He is particularly interested in China’s relationships with Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas. Grossman has over a decade of experience in the intelligence community (IC), where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific security affairs at the Pentagon. Grossman leveraged this experience to write an award-winning paper for the IC’s “Galileo Competition,” which solicits innovative ideas to optimize IC enterprise management practices.

Prior to DIA, Grossman worked at the National Security Agency (NSA) where he pioneered a new assessment format to enhance NSA’s intelligence support to policy. He
also served at the CIA and on the President’s Daily Brief staff. Grossman worked at the Jamestown Foundation as the China program manager and editor of *China Brief*. He previously supported the then Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

Grossman holds an MA from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in U.S. national security policy and received the BA with Honors from the University of Michigan in political science and Asian studies. He has published articles for *Asia Policy, China Brief, Defense Dossier, Foreign Policy, Global Taiwan Brief, International Security, Journal of International Security Affairs, Newsweek, PacNet, Studies in Intelligence, The Diplomat, The Hill, the National Interest, and War on the Rocks.*

**Tzu-Chieh Hung 洪子傑** is an assistant research fellow at the Division of Chinese Politics and Military Affairs, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan. He received an MSc in international relations from University of Bristol, UK, and a PhD in international studies from Waseda University, Japan. Hung previously worked as an associate research fellow in the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. He is one of the few Taiwanese who has had the experience of participating in formal negotiations with China. His research interests include China's sharp power, public diplomacy, cross-Strait relations, and Chinese politics.

**Youngjun Kim** earned a MSc at King’s College London and a PhD at the University of Kansas. Kim is a professor of National Security at Korea National Defense University. His book, *Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People’s Army and the Korean War*, was published by Routledge in 2017. He is an international senior research fellow at the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office and a member of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Commander Strategic Shaping Board (CSSB).

**Major General Dennis Laich** retired from the U.S. Army in 2006 after more than 34 years service. His last assignment was Commander of the 94th Regional Readiness Command at Ft. Devans, Massachusetts, where he commanded all Army Reserve Forces in the six New England states. He has served in Iraq, Kuwait, Germany, the Netherlands, and Honduras. Laich is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and the National Security Management Program. His military awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the Meritorious Service Medal. He holds a BA from Lafayette College and two earned master’s degrees (MBA and MA) and has completed post-graduate
studies at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Laich is the author of *Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots*, in which he questions the fairness, efficiency, and sustainability of the all-volunteer force.

David M. “Mike” Lampton is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI and is affiliated with Shorenstein APARC. Lampton (Stanford University BA ’68, MA ’71, PhD ’74), an expert in Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations, is the Hyman Professor of China Studies, Emeritus, and former director of the China Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Lampton’s current book project is focused on the development of high-speed railways from southern China to Singapore. He is the author of a dozen books and monographs, including *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping* and *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*. He has testified at multiple congressional and commission sessions and published numerous articles, essays, book reviews, and opinion pieces in many venues popular and academic in both the Western world and in Chinese-speaking societies, including *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the American Political Science Review*, *the China Quarterly, the New York Times, the Washington Post*, and many others.

Over the course of his career, Lampton accompanied American public and private sector leaders to China, and Chinese leaders to the United States. Formerly president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Lampton consults with government, business, and social-sector organizations, and has served on the boards of several non-governmental and educational organizations, including the Asia Foundation for which he served as chairman. The recipient of many academic awards, he is an honorary senior fellow of the American Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, former Gilman Scholar at Johns Hopkins, and the inaugural winner of the Scalapino Prize in 2010, awarded by the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in recognition of his exceptional contributions to America’s understanding of the vast changes underway in Asia.

Cheng-yi Lin 林正義 is CEO of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and is currently on leave from his position of research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received the PhD in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia in 1987. He has conducted extensive studies on U.S.-Taiwan-China relations and Taiwan’s national security policy. His articles have been published in journals including *American Foreign Policy Interests, Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Issues & Studies, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, and *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*. He co-edited (with Michael Hsiao) *Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific*, (with Denny Roy) *The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations*, and (with Ian Storey) *The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions*. Lin served as director of the Institute

Shih-Chung Liu 刘世忠 is a board member of the Cross-Strait Prospect Foundation in Taiwan. He joined the Taiwan External Trade Development Council in October 2017 as vice chairman. His past working experiences include serving as the deputy secretary-general of Tainan City Government, the president and CEO of the Taipei-based think tank the Taiwan Brain Trust, the director of International Affairs department of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and an advisor to the Mainland Affairs Council. From September 2008 to December 2009, Mr. Liu was a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies of the Washington-based Brookings Institution.

Liu also spent eight years in the DPP government as a senior foreign policy advisor to former president Chen Shui-bian in the Presidential Office (2000–06), after which he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the vice chairman of its Research and Planning Committee.


Michael J. Lostumbo is a senior defense policy analyst. He markets and leads research projects on a wide range of topics including strategy, force structure, force posture, new operational concepts, regional security, wargaming, and logistics. He served as the director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy from 2011 to 2014. From 2002 to 2012 he served as the associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND, the largest research center at RAND by the end of his tenure. Prior to joining RAND, he served as the special assistant to the under secretary of defense for policy, Walter B. Slocombe, where he was involved in policy formulation on a variety of national security topics including U.S. military strategy, national missile defense, and numerous bilateral security issues. Previously, Lostumbo worked for six years in the United States Senate for Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) as his senior foreign policy advisor.

Lostumbo received a master’s degree in public policy from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies and a BA in South Asian studies from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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William S. Murray is a professor at the United States Naval War College where he is the director of the Halsey Bravo Research Group. He joined the navy in 1983 immediately after graduating from the State University of New York at Buffalo with a BS in electrical engineering. Murray served on and is qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines. He has deployed in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In 1994 he received an MA from the United States Naval War College. He retired from the Navy and became a member of the faculty at the U.S. Naval War College in 2003.

Murray is the co-editor of *China’s New Nuclear Submarine Force* and *China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies* and has published articles in *International Security*, *Naval War College Review*, and many other journals.

Si-fu Ou 歐錫富 is the director of the Division of Advanced Technology and Warfighting Concepts at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Previously he served as the secretary of the Mainland Affairs Council; a research fellow in the Homeland Security division of the Executive Yuan; and secretary for the Deputy Minister’s Office for Policy at the Ministry of National Defense. Ou has been an adjunct assistant professor at the Graduate School of Future Studies in Tamkang University, a research fellow at Taiwan Research Institute, and an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Policy Research.

Ou received the PhD from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami.

Admiral Tse Chun Pu 蒲澤春 assumed duties as strategy advisor to the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in March 2018. He had previously served as the vice minister for policy of national defense since April 2017. His former assignments at the Ministry of National Defense also included vice chief of the General Staff (Executive). Prior to working at the ministry, Pu served as vice chief of Navy, commander of Fleet Command, and deputy chief of the General Staff for Logistics.

Pu has extensive experience working in areas of defense policymaking, naval operations, foreign military sales, and project and logistics management, and was personally in charge of some major U.S. FMS programs to Taiwan, such as the deliveries of the Knox-class, the Kidd-class warship and P-3C aircraft to the Taiwan Navy and Air Force, respectively. From his time as vice defense minister to his current role as strategy advisor, he has dedicated himself to recruiting efforts for Taiwan’s Volunteer System, which in recent years has achieved good results.

Pu has a BA from the Chinese Naval Academy and an MBA from Southeastern University, and was a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College.
Orville Schell is the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society in New York. He is a former professor and dean at the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism. Schell was born in New York City, graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University in Far Eastern history, was an exchange student at National Taiwan University in the 1960s, and earned a PhD (Abd) at University of California, Berkeley, in Chinese history. He worked for the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, covered the war in Indochina as a journalist, and has traveled widely in China since the mid-70s.

Schell is the author of fifteen books, ten of them about China, and a contributor to numerous edited volumes. His most recent books are: *Wealth and Power, China’s Long March to the 21st Century; Virtual Tibet; The China Reader: The Reform Years; and Mandate of Heaven: The Legacy of Tiananmen Square and the Next Generation of China’s Leaders*. He has written widely for many magazine and newspapers, including the Atlantic Monthly, the *New Yorker, Time, the New Republic, Harpers, The Nation, the New York Review of Books, Wired, Foreign Affairs, the China Quarterly, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.*

He is a fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, a senior fellow at the Annenberg School of Communications at USC, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Schell is also the recipient of many prizes and fellowships, including a Guggenheim Fellowship, the Overseas Press Club Award, and the Harvard-Stanford Shorenstein Prize in Asian Journalism.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; the founding director of the Korea Program; a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and a professor of sociology, all at Stanford University. As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, and international relations.

Shin is the author/editor of more than twenty books and numerous articles. His recent books include *Strategic, Policy and Social Innovation for a Post-Industrial Korea: Beyond the Miracle; Superficial Korea; Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War; Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea; Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II; New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan; Asia’s Middle Powers?; and Troubled Transition: North Korea’s Politics, Economy, and External Relations.* Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many of them have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic journals including *American Journal of Sociology, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Political Science Quarterly, International Sociology, Nations and Nationalism, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey,* and *Journal of Democracy.*

Before coming to Stanford, Shin taught at the University of Iowa and the University of California, Los Angeles. After receiving the BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded the MA and PhD from the University of Washington.
Kharis Templeman is the project manager of the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project and a social science research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University. He is also a teaching affiliate at Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies, where he teaches a regular course on Taiwan politics and advises undergraduate and master’s students with interests in Taiwan, mainland China, and East and Southeast Asia. A proficient Mandarin speaker, he has lived, worked, and traveled extensively in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Templeman's research interests include causes and consequences of democratization, elections and election management, parties and party systems, and regional security challenges in Pacific Asia, particularly as they pertain to Taiwan. He is the editor (with Larry Diamond and Yun-han Chu) of *Taiwan’s Democracy Challenged: The Chen Shui-bian Years*. Other peer-reviewed work has appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Ethnopolitics*, the *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, and the *APSA Annals of Comparative Democratization*. Templeman is also a regional manager for the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, and he previously served as coordinator of the American Political Science Association’s Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS). He holds a BA (2003) from the University of Rochester and a PhD (2012) in political science from the University of Michigan.

Austin Horng-En Wang is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research interest focuses on political psychology and political behavior. He is a recipient of the 2018 Global Taiwan Institute Scholarship. His research has been published in *Political Research Quarterly*, *Electoral Studies*, *Asian Survey*, among other journals.

Jun-deh Wu received the PhD in political science at the University of North Texas. His research interests include cybersecurity strategy, information warfare, and China’s cyber campaigns. He previously was an adjunct assistant professor at Soochow University. Wu is currently an assistant research fellow in the Division of Cyber Warfare and Information Security in the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan.
Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi (Ret.) is a professor at the International University of Japan and an advisor to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. He graduated from the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAI) in 1974. Yamaguchi received an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in 1988, and was a national security fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University (1991–92). After serving as senior defense attaché at the Japanese embassy in the United States (1999–2001), he held positions as deputy commandant of the GSDF Aviation School (2001–2), director for research of the GRDC (2002–5), and vice president of the National Institute for Defense Studies (2005–6). He held responsibilities as commanding general of the GSDF Research and Development Command from 2006 until he retired from active duty in December 2008. From 2009 to 2015 he taught at the NDAl. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, he served at the prime minister’s office as special advisor to the Cabinet for Crisis Management until September. In 2017, Yamaguchi was appointed by the foreign minister as a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament.

Belinda A. Yeomans is the associate director for the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) at the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Her research focuses on U.S. security policy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Her current projects include a graduate seminar on U.S.-China security relations taught via high definition video teleconferencing facilities (called the Highly Immersive Classroom) at the Stanford’s Graduate School of Business and at the Stanford Center at Peking University; the creation of a Track 1.5 U.S.-Asia Security Dialogue Series (inaugurated in May 2016 with a United States—Japan workshop; expanding soon to Southeast Asia and China); mentorship of FSI-APARC senior military fellows; and a distinguished speakers series featuring high-level foreign policy dignitaries who represent the United States, countries throughout Asia, international organizations, influential think tanks, etc. She has worked previously with government, higher education, and policy research programs, notably the Presidio of Monterey’s Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center; Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Asia Society of Washington, DC; and the Monterey (now Middlebury) Institute of International Studies.

Yeomans began her undergraduate education at the United States Military Academy, completing a BA at Harvard University with a double major in government and in East Asian languages & civilizations. She went on to earn an MA in political science at the University of California at Berkeley as well as an MA in East Asian studies and a PhD in political science at Stanford University.