Can Institutional Design Improve Democratic Survival in Divided Societies? An Empirical Investigation

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"As violence escalates, Egypt's military is trying to bridge a widening political gap by promising a rapid return to civilian rule. But its gesture of accommodation does not get to the heart of the problem: the presidential system, inherited from the Mubarak era, virtually guarantees a repetition of the tragic events of the past year. A democratic breakthrough requires a more fundamental constitutional redesign, in which the contending sides compete for power in a European-style parliamentary system."

-- Bruce Ackerman, "To Save Egypt, Drop the Presidency." *New York Times*, July 10, 2013.

Can constitutional design help create stable democracies? And if so, what institutional configurations are best suited to this task? We know surprisingly little about this question despite its importance. Confident assertions like the one above still rest on a weak empirical foundation (Selway and Templeman 2012). In this paper, we attempt to put some of the recommendations for constitutional design on firmer ground. We assess whether there is a systematic, meaningful association between different constitutional forms and democratic survival, particularly in states with highly divided societies. We build on existing research by using a larger set of cases covering a longer period of time, by employing more sophisticated measures of divided society, and by explicitly testing for interactive effects between social structure and political institutions.

Once we interact institutions with social structure, PR and semi-presidentialism increase democratic survival, but only in homogenous countries. Mixed electoral rules also increase democratic survival, but only in countries with a medium level of diversity. Conversely, majoritarianism decreases democratic survival, but only in homogenous countries. Presidentialism seems to be bad across all types of societies, except those at the two extremes, but this could be due to data scarcity. There are no individual effects for parliamentarism, federalism or bicameralism. Looking at packages of institutions, we learn that the "full" majoritarian package and a restricted consociational package (PR/parliamentarism) increase democratic survival in diverse countries, but that three "new" packages decrease democratic survival in diverse countries. In homogenous countries, the majoritarian package decreases democratic survival, while the restricted consociational package has no effect. Two other new packages increase democratic survival in homogenous countries.

I. Previous Work

There is a large and rapidly growing body of research, appearing in both academic journals and in policy papers, that takes on the topic of institutional design for divided societies. "Institutional design" in this literature can refer to a great many things: not only choices about what is written in a regime's formal constitution, but also the body of supporting laws and regulations, the organization and scope of different bureaucracies, and the rights and responsibilities of the citizenry. But for our purposes we take it to mean selecting the 'rules of the game' of politics. We focus on four fundamental differences in institutional form—type of executive (parliamentary versus presidential versus semi-presidential), type of electoral system (proportional, majoritarian, or mixed), vertical centralization (federal versus unitary state), and horizontal centralization (bicameral versus unicameral).

Existing work comes at the question of ideal institutional design from several different angles, including work aimed primarily at understanding successful transition away from autocracy (e.g. Brown 2011), on post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Brinkerhoff 2007; Jarstad and Sisk 2008), and on various factors, both domestic and foreign, that appear to be linked to democratic survival (e.g. Cheibub 2007; Elkins and Sides 2007; Dunning 2008; Gerring et al. 2009; Boix 2011; Freeman and Quinn 2012). The line of research that we take as our jumping-off point, however, is the work on *consociationalism.* Developed and defended most forcefully by Arendt Lijphart (e.g. Lijphart 2004), consociationalism argues that choosing the "right" set of institutions can significantly improve the survival prospects of democratic government by promoting "power-sharing" between representatives of as many significant political groups in society as possible. There are three fundamental institutional choices that best promote power-sharing, in this view: (1) *parliamentarism*, which allows for the formation of coalition governments and the sharing of cabinet posts among many different parties; (2) *proportional representation* electoral rules, which best ensure that all significant groups are represented in parliament; and (3) *federalism*, which better guarantees minority self-government and can take potentially explosive political issues off the agenda at the federal level.

This combination of parliamentarism, PR, and federalism has become received wisdom in both academia and the policy community as the ideal constitutional "package" for sustaining democratic government in badly divided societies. Yet we have surprisingly little solid evidence to support this consensus. While the empirical literature is huge, there are several pervasive problems that have limited the conclusions we can draw about institutional effects on democratic survival. One is the small number of cases: much work has focused on outcomes in only a handful of regimes, limiting the generalizations that can be drawn (e.g. Noel 2005). Another is a selection bias problem: researchers testing for institutional effects have often looked only at cases where minorities are already excluded or civil strife is already quite high (e.g. Elkins and Sides 2007). Yet another is a haphazard selection of regimes on which to test the argument: some researchers have, for instance, lumped together both authoritarian and democratic cases (e.g. Reynal-Querol 2002) or used quite crude measures of democracy to identify cases (e.g. Epstein et al. 2006; Gerring et al. 2009).

More subtle but equally important for valid inference, however, are problems of measurement and modeling. It is by giving these issues greater attention that we think

real empirical advances can be made in short order. The next section reviews how we proceed.

II. Measurement and Modeling Strategy

Better measurement and more careful attention to our model specifications can help us make considerable progress in this area of research. Our analysis includes four improvements on most of the previous work on institutional design in divided societies.

Measuring Democratic Survival

The first issue is how to measure "democratic survival." Past studies point to one of two approaches. We could conceptualize democracy as a "level", and then measure democracy on a cardinal scale, such as the widely-used *polity2* variable from the Polity IV dataset. Or we could conceptualize democracy as a "state of the world", and then identify democracies using a dichotomous variable, as does the well-known ACLP-DD dataset (Przeworski et al. 2000; Gandhi, Cheibub and Vreeland 2010).

For present purposes we come down strongly in favor of the "state-of-the-world" approach. Because we are interested in regime survival, rather than regime "health" per se, we adopt a minimalist conception of democracy: one in which leaders are chosen through regular multiparty elections with universal suffrage, or close to it; balloting is fair and reasonably accurate; new parties are allowed to form and appeal to all different segments of society; and there are few effective restrictions on speech. We do not attempt to account for variation beyond this minimal set of criteria, however. To use a medical analogy, questions about the "health of the patient" are not our focus; it is the fact that she is still alive that matters for us.

An example may help to illustrate. Consider the assertion that presidentialism "virtually guarantees a repetition of the tragic events of the last year" in Egypt, quoted above. At its heart, this is a claim about which institutions will best help democratic regimes survive in difficult circumstances such as Egypt's. While no one would deny that the regime established with the election of Mohamed Morsi as the new president suffered from many serious problems, it at the least represented a sincere attempt to establish a fundamentally democratic form of government: elections decided the executive and the legislature, all major groups were allowed to compete, the voting and counting was reasonably free and fair, and the winner was allowed to take control of the executive. There were many violations of democratic norms during and after this process, including systematic persecution of regime opponents, indiscriminate violence by state security against unarmed protestors, ethnic riots directed against Coptic Christians, rising crime and public disorder, and economic instability. But these did not in themselves end the attempt to build democracy. The military did that when it forcibly removed the elected president Mohamed Morsi from power.

More generally, the relationship between institutional design and democratic survival is not ultimately about whether more nasty things happen under one set of institutions—although these no doubt raise the probability that a democratic regime

fails—but instead whether democracy is more likely to endure despite experiencing all those nasty things. The dichotomous, "state-of-the-world" approach reflects this way of conceptualizing the survival of democracy in difficult settings.

To measure our dependent variable, then, we use the dataset of Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). This dataset has the advantage over others of greater coverage and a clear measure of beginning and end points of democratic regimes. It also has no partisan alternation rule to identify democracies (as does the common ACLP-DD dataset from which BMR is derived and extended), nor does it require a minimum number of years that would exclude many of the short-lived regimes in which we are particularly interested in observing. Thus, we have both a more consistent coding of democratic regimes and greater coverage of regimes that begin as democracies but quickly break down.

Modeling Democratic Survival

In addition to measuring survival, there is also the issue of how to model the *process* of democratic survival. At its heart this is an ontological question: what exactly does it mean for democracy to "survive"? Do all democracies eventually have an end point, as do all human lives, or do they continue indefinitely in this state? Do we consider democracy for all intents and purposes irreversible in some cases—is it possible for democratic regimes to achieve immortality? Put differently, what is the universe of cases on which we should test for links between constitutional design and democratic survival? Are cases like Egypt, in which the "democratic" regime lasts barely a year before being overthrown, relevant to this question, or should they be excluded? On the other extreme, should cases such as the United Kingdom, with an unbroken history of over 200 years of elections determining executive control, be weighed equally with those of South Korea or Indonesia, both young democracies with little previous democratic experience?

Here existing work in comparative politics can help guide the way. It is by now well-established that the rate of democratic failure declines sharply as regimes age—that is, the democracies at highest risk of ending are the newest ones (Svolik 2008). Democratic regimes between one and 10 years of age are quite vulnerable to authoritarian reversal, while those surviving more than about 10 years are much more robust (Kapstein and Converse 2008). Much like immunization from childhood disease greatly improves overall population life expectancy, then, factors that aid the development of "new-born" regimes may have a disproportionately large impact on their long-term survival. As a result, in our analysis we deliberately include even short-lived regimes in our universe of interest, because these are precisely the regimes in which the effects of institutional design should be most likely to show up.

This observation about survival varying with regime age also has an important implication for empirical investigation: we need to account explicitly for the time dependence of potential covariates in any model. Thus, in our analysis we include logged regime age in all our model specifications. Remarkably, very few previous empirical studies make any attempt to account for time dependence in democratic survival—so we are breaking new ground in this regard as well.

Measuring Divided Societies

The third issue is how to measure "divided societies". In recent years there have been considerable advances in broadly comparable measures of population characteristics such as ethnicity, race, language, religion, income, and geographic concentration. But much of the existing research still uses relatively primitive indicators of social characteristics to measure how "divided" societies are—particularly the common Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index. In addition to an ethno-linguistic fractionalization we employ a different and in our view much more appropriate measure, the social cross-cuttingness index.[1] The cross-cuttingness index (Selway 2011) accounts for the structure of ethnicity in relation to other salient social cleavages. It captures the degree ethnic groups in a country are identically distributed on these other cleavages. Particularly, we look at economic and geographic cleavages, using ethno-income cross-cuttingness and ethno-geographic cross-cuttingness. If our goal is to capture diversity, two equally fractionalized countries with different levels of cross-cuttingness may be more or less diverse. Consider two countries, each with two ethnic groups of identical size. In the first country, ethnic groups are equally distributed on the economic cleavage. In the second, one ethnic group is rich while the other is poor. We would consider the second one to be more diverse. In addition to considering these separate characteristics, we compute a composite measure of diversity using principle component analysis (PCA). PCA identifies a single component, which we label *diversity*, that is composed of higher ethnic fractionalization, lower ethnic-income cross-cuttingness, and lower ethno-geographic cross-cuttingness.[2]

Modeling Institutional Effects

The final issue we highlight is how to model the potential effect of institutions on democratic survival. Virtually all previous work testing institutional effects has included measures of institutions separately from measures of social structure. As a consequence, there is an implicit assumption in the coefficient estimates of these studies that institutional effects on democratic survival *are the same regardless of social structure*.

We think this assumption is not tenable (Selway and Templeman 2012). A realistic assessment of institutional effects needs to allow for the possibility that these effects are *conditional:* that is, that they improve survival much more under some social conditions than others. Indeed, this is precisely the consociationalist argument—the combination of parliamentarism, PR, and federalism should *make the greatest difference for survival* in the countries with the most challenging underlying social structure. Put differently, in countries with a largely homogenous population and little ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic division, democracy will probably survive regardless of the institutional configuration in place. But in countries with severe social divisions, institutions can potentially play a decisive role in democratic survival. To allow for this

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[1] We also considered the characteristic of *bipolarization*, the degree there are two equally-sized ethnic groups in a country, as well as fractionalization and cross-cuttingness measures along the religious cleavage.

[2] The eigenvectors are 0.58, -0.51, and -0.61 respectively for ethnic fractionalization, ethnic-income cross-cuttingness and ethno-geographic cross-cuttingness.

possibility, then, we focus on the *interactive effect* of institutions and social structure in the analysis that follows.

Data

We test our model on a sample of 225 country-regimes in 105 countries between 1946-2007, where a regime is defined as a change in any of the institutional variables. To identify democracies, we use the Boix, Rosato and Miller (2013) dataset. We use the variable *democracy_trans*, which takes on a 1 if there is a transition to authoritarianism in that year. As such, we estimate a time-series logit regression. To capture the time dependence of democracy, as discussed above, we include a lagged measure of the democracy's duration, which we also log.

Our measures of ethnic diversity are taken from Selway's (2011) Cross-National Indices of Multi-Dimensional Measures of Social Structure (CIMMSS) dataset. This dataset contains all the variables we need for our analysis. The main ethnic dimension we use is language/national origin. The supplementary appendix contains analyses on the religious dimension, but it does not yield significant results. The fractionalization variable is based on the familiar Herfindahl index, which captures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from society are of the same ethnic group. Higher values indicate higher levels of diversity. The measures of cross-cuttingness rely on Cramer's V, a measure of independence, which captures the degree that groups on one dimension of social identity (ethnicity) are identically distributed on another dimension (income or geographic region). Higher values indicate higher levels of cross-cuttingness, or lower diversity.

Our institutional variables are from Selway and Self's (2013) dataset on democratic political institutions. The electoral rules variables are an update of Golder (2005). Because Selway and Self use a more generous decision rule on which countries to count as democratic--ACLP==1, Polity VI >=0 or Freedom House<=5--this dataset better matches the Boix et al. dataset because countries, such as Botswana, that failed the change in party requirement are excluded from Golder. We use the dichotomous variables for majoritarian, PR, or mixed electoral rules. The remaing variables on executive type, bicameralism and federalism are all dichotomous as well.

We also control for two economic variables. First, we take the log of GDP per capita (loggdp_UN) as a measure of a country's level of development: the wealthier a country, the lower the likelihood of reversion to authoritarianism. We log and lag this variable. Data comes from the World Economic Historical Statistics (WEHS), the only cross-national dataset that goes back to 1946. We also include a short-term measure of economic progress, a simple growth measure as a percentage of gdp, which we calculate from the WEHS dataset. This is also lagged. We expect that lower growth rates are associated with a higher likelihood of democratic reversal.

III. The Variety of Institutional Packages Around the World

We have 131 countries in our dataset for which we have information on at least one of the four political institutions we focus on in this paper. Some of these countries have had numerous changes in their constitutions, such that we have 225 country-

regimes. The maximum number of regimes is seven, by France, which has had three different electoral rules and two executive types. Our first question, then, was how many countries have ever had the full majoritarian or consensus packages that Lijphart outlines? The answer is just three consensus countries: Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. If we drop the parliamentary requirement, we get four more countries with presidentialism (there are no semi-presidential countries): Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. We get more majoritarian countries: seven "pure" type (majoritarian electoral rules, presidential, unitary and unicameral), but thirty-two if we drop the executive.

Even after dropping the executive from these ideal-type packages, we are still left with 186 country-regimes not accounted for. In other words, there is a much larger variety of institutional packages in the empirical world than has been considered in the theoretical literature. We find an additional fifteen PR-parliamentary and 47 PR-non-parliamentary country-regimes that have different combinations of vertical and horizontal centralization. Likewise, we find an additional eleven Majoritarian-presidential and 46 Majoritarian-non-presidential country-regimes. This leaves us with fifty-seven mixed electoral rule country-regimes. In short, the empirical world of institutional packages is much more diverse than Lijphart's two ideal types, which account for just 17% of the world's variation.

Given that we have 3x3x2x2, or thirty-six different types of packages we use principal component analysis (PCA) to try and identify additional packages that exist in the empirical world. PCA identified five different types of packages. The ideal-type consensus and majoritarian packages did not feature. The first two new packages are a unitary-unicameral package (U^2), and a PR-presidential package (P^2). The remaining three new packages we name after countries: South Austfrica (mixed, federal), Trinidominica (majoritarian and semi-presidential), and Portuguay (semi-presidential, federal). We compare these new institutional packages to Lijphart's ideal types in the analysis, eight in total. Our empirical strategy is three-fold. First, we create a dummy for these eight institutional packages. Second, we analyze the effect of each institution controlling for the other institutions in the package. Third, we use the scores generated by PCA for each of the institutional packages. This final approach allows us to compare countries by the degree they fulfill each of these new ideal-type packages, if we can call them that.

IV. Empirical Analysis

Individual Institutions and Democratic Failure

We begin the analysis by regressing democratic failure on each institutional variable separately, along with the three control variables—logged age of democracy, logged GDP/capita, and growth. Results are shown in Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

As expected, our three control variables—age of democracy, gdp/capita, and growth—all have a negative relationship to democratic failure. The effect of regime age is particularly strong and robust to a wide array of model specifications, as we will see.

The relationship between institutional variables and democratic failure is generally much weaker. Majoritarian electoral rules are positively associated with failure, while mixed systems are negatively associated; proportional representation has no relationship. No one executive type stands out, and neither federalism nor bicameralism seems to have any relationship either.

Individual Measures of Social Structure and Democratic Failure

We next turn to the social structure measures. As we did with the institutional variables, we regress democratic failure on each of the social structural measures separately, along with the three control variables. Results are show in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

Religious income-cross-cuttingness is the only religious characteristic that has any relationship to democratic failure. Suprisingly, it is associated with a greater risk of failure, which runs counter to our intuition. Linguistic geographic cross-cuttingness has the opposite effect: it is associated with a lesser risk of democratic failure. None of the other measures have a significant relationship, although linguistic fractionalization and bipolarization both have the expected positive sign.

Combined Institutions and Democratic Failure

We next estimate the institutional "packages" without a control for social structure. We first estimate the individual components of each institutional package as separate variables. The first package, what we term the "consociationalist" combination of proportional representation, parliamentarism, and federalism, has no significant institutional effects, although both PR and parliamentarism have the expected negative sign. Even when we pull out bicameralism because of its moderate-high correlation with federalism there are still no significant institutional effects.

[Table 3a here]

The second package, what we term the "majoritarian" combination of majoritarian electoral rules, presidentialism, and a unitary (non-federal) system, has two significant effects. Majoritarian electoral rules look bad for democratic survival: the effect is large and significant. Presidentialism also has a positive relationship with democratic failure. Taken together, these results suggest that a democratic regime that begins with a strictly majoritarian electoral system combined with a presidential executive fares systematically worse than other regime types. These results persist when we remove unicameralism for collinearity concerns.

The first of the "new" packages, which we label U^2 has no significant institutional effects. However, in the P^2 package, presidentialism is again positive and significant. It

seems that it does not matter what institutional package presidentialism features in; it will be bad for democratic survival. The same seems to be true about majoritarianism. In the second package it features in, Trinidominica where it is combined with semi-presidentialism, majoritarian electoral rules are also positive and significant with the effect almost as large as previously.

Likewise, the effect of mixed electoral systems persists in the South Austfrica institutional package of mixed electoral rules and federalism. Again, the effect is negative suggesting thus far that mixed electoral rules are the only institution that increases the chances of democratic survival.

[Table 3b here]

We model the effect of these packages in two additional ways. In Table 3c and 3d, we create dummy variables for the various packages. From this we learn that a more restricted version of consociationalism—just PR and parliamentarism—has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of democratic reversal (model 3 of table 3c). The "full" package (model 1 of table 3c) is not even able to produce results because the number of these regimes is so small (just three). Two other packages yield significant results. The first, P^2—the combination of PR and presidentialism—has a positive effect on democratic failure. The other package, Trinidominica, is also positive with the coefficient almost twice as large as P^2's. This is again bad news for majoritarian electoral rules, which constitute the Trinidominica package along with semipresidentialism.

[Table 3c and 3d here]

The third way we model the new packages is through principle component analysis. Trinidominica continues to be positive and significant. P^2 is no longer significant. However, U^2 is now negative and significant, though the effect is much smaller.

[Table 3e here]

Combined Social Structure Variables and Democratic Failure

As with the institutional analysis, here we fit estimates for social structure "packages" with democratic failure. For the religious "package", only religious-income cross-cuttingness is significant, but it is strongly positive: as religion and income become more cross-cutting, the prospects for democratic survival fall. The linguistic "package" has no significant effects for any of the variables. However, the ethnic diversity composite measure, generated by principle component analysis of all the linguistic measures, is positive and significant. A similar religious composite measure, not shown, is not significant.

[Table 4 here]

Combined Social Structure and Institutional Variables

Our final set of estimates include both the social and institutional variables together in the same regression. For the social structure variable, we only use the composite "ethnic diversity" measure, though separating out the individual components may be an important part of future research. Of special note is that we run two separate model specifications: an additive one, in which there are no interactive effects, followed by a multiplicative one to allow for the possibility that institutional effects on democratic survival may be conditioned by social structure (and vice versa). We estimate the individual institutional variables separately as well as part of the packages. Tables 5a-5e shows the additive model for each package. Comparing these results to those in Tables 3a-3e, we see very little difference. Were we to stop here we would find not much more than the existing literature: presidentialism and majoritarian electoral rules increase the likelihood of democratic failure. A new result would be that mixed electoral rules seem fairly robust in reducing the likelihood of democratic failure.

[Table 5a and 5b here]

Tables 6a-6e shows the multiplicative model for each of the separate institutional variables as well as the packages. For the separate institutional variables, we control for the other institutions. We follow recent convention by immediately discussing the interactive plots of the effects of each institution, shown in Figures 1.1-4.1.

[Figures 1.1-4.1 here]

We illustrate the 90 percent confidence intervals (the curved, dotted lines). The conditional effect is significant at a given value of diversity if the confidence intervals do not include the origin.

The first figure (1.1) shows the conditional effect of PR on democratic failure at different levels of diversity. At very low levels of diversity, the effect is significant and negative. However, as diversity increases, this effect goes away—in the most diverse societies PR has no discernable effect on democratic survival. Put differently, in the societies that are most challenging for democratic consolidation, there is no evidence that PR offers a meaningful improvement. The converse is true for majoritarianism (Figure 1.2): it increases the likelihood of democratic failure in non-diverse societies, but the effect goes away at high levels of diversity. Lastly for electoral rules, mixed systems still reduce democratic failure, but now only at medium levels of diversity; the effect is not significant either in highly diverse societies, or highly homogenous societies.

Figures 2.1-2.3 shows the conditional effect of executive types on democratic failure, again across different levels of diversity. Presidentialism still has a positive and significant effect except at exceptionally high and low levels of diversity. Once again, there is no evidence that adopting parliamentarism in any type of society significantly improves the prospects of democracy over the alternative institutions. However, there is evidence that semi-presidentialism reduces the likelihood of democratic failure in homogenous countries.

Figure 3.1 shows the conditional effect of federalism on democratic failure at different levels of diversity. The effect again is not significant at any level. The same is true for bicameralism (Figure 4.1).

Lastly, we turn to the success of institutional packages in reducing democratic failure across different levels of diversity. In Figure 5.3, we see that the version of the consociational package limited to just PR and parliamentarism reduces the likelihood of democratic failure in diverse societies. The full package has no effect. The full majoritarian package, in contrast, seems to have a negative effect in highly diverse societies, but a positive effect in homogenous countries. However, this effect goes away in less strict definitions of majoritarianism.

Lastly, we turn to the new packages. The U^2 package is negative and significant in the pca model, but only in homogenous countries (Figure 7.1). The P^2 package, in contrast, is positive and significant in the non-pca model, but only in diverse countries. The South Austfrica package is not significant in either of the models. The Trinidominica package is positive and significant in moderate- to highly- diverse countries, depending on which model we estimate. Lastly, the Portuguay model is negative and significant in homogenous countries in the pca model, but positive and significant in diverse countries in the non-pca model.

V. Implications

Overall, we find support for some of the past negative findings on presidentialism and majoritarianism in relation to democratic survival. In addition, we find evidence that mixed electoral rules have a positive effect on democratic survival. We also find evidence that the PR/parliamentarism elements of the consociational package have a combined positive effect on democratic survival, while no effect positive or negative for the majoritarian package. We investigate several other "new" packages, finding that the P^2 (PR and presidentialism) and Trinidominica (majoritarian and semipresidentialism) packages have a negative effect on democratic survival. These results depend heavily on the underlying social structure.

Once we interact institutions with social structure, PR and semi-presidentialism increase democratic survival, but only in homogenous countries. Mixed electoral rules also increase democratic survival, but only good in countries with a medium level of diversity. Conversely, majoritarianism decreases democratic survival, but only in homogenous countries. Presidentialism seems to be bad across all types of societies, except those at the two extremes, but this could be due to data scarcity. There are no individual effects for parliamentarism, federalism or bicameralism. Looking at packages of institutions, we learn that the "full" majoritarian package and a restricted consociational package (PR/parliamentarism) increase democratic survival in diverse countries, but that three "new" packages—P^2, Trinidominica, and Portuguay—decrease democratic survival in diverse countries. In homogenous countries, the majoritarian package decreases democratic survival, while the restricted consociational package has no effect. Two other new packages—U^2 and Portuguay increase democratic survival in homogenous countries. A final new package, South Austfrica, has no effect.

The takeaway from our results is that democracy can survive and fail under a wide variety of institutional forms. Which package a country chooses should be informed by its social structure, particularly its level of ethnic diversity.

We thus should not be so quick to point a finger at a single institutional variable as the culprit in a highly visible democratic failure such as Egypt's. Our results suggest that presidentialism is not a systematic culprit in democratic breakdown. Nor that a European-style parliamentary democracy will necessarilybe the solution.

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Table 1: Institutions and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Regime failure								
Regime age (log)	-0.569***	-0.563***	-0.570***	-0.532***	-0.533***	-0.568***	-0.551***	-0.574***
	(-6.00)	(-5.85)	(-6.08)	(-5.24)	(-5.03)	(-5.82)	(-5.64)	(-5.78)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.109	-0.125	-0.0698	-0.120	-0.118	-0.134	-0.155	-0.148
	(-1.52)	(-1.73)	(-1.01)	(-1.60)	(-1.54)	(-1.78)	(-1.90)	(-1.69)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-2.259	-2.092	-2.334	-1.630	-1.358	-1.795	-1.536	-1.712
	(-1.34)	(-1.25)	(-1.36)	(-0.85)	(-0.76)	(-0.98)	(-0.89)	(-0.83)
Majoritarian	0.649*							
	(2.43)							
Proportional		-0.0983						
		(-0.36)						
Mixed			-1.280**					
			(-3.26)					
Presidential				0.458				
				(1.61)				
Parliamentary					-0.207			
					(-0.58)			
Semipresidential						-0.475		
						(-1.18)		
Federal							0.390	
							(0.95)	
Bicameral								0.373
								(1.08)
Constant	-1.569*	-1.154	-1.488*	-1.576*	-1.310	-1.035	-1.034	-1.143
	(-2.21)	(-1.59)	(-2.18)	(-2.07)	(-1.77)	(-1.41)	(-1.36)	(-1.45)
Observations	2942	2942	2942	2929	2929	2929	2928	2831

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Regime failure								
Regime age (log)	-0.547***	-0.559***	-0.582***	-0.564***	-0.506***	-0.544***	-0.616***	-0.566***
	(-4.92)	(-5.35)	(-4.60)	(-5.13)	(-4.59)	(-5.09)	(-5.79)	(-5.46)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.109	-0.134	-0.0997	-0.113	-0.178*	-0.158	-0.0977	-0.127
	(-1.17)	(-1.49)	(-1.03)	(-1.25)	(-1.97)	(-1.75)	(-0.99)	(-1.50)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-2.401	-2.438	-2.485	-2.278	-3.386	-2.598	-2.770	-2.491
	(-1.23)	(-1.35)	(-1.12)	(-1.20)	(-1.86)	(-1.41)	(-1.68)	(-1.36)
Linguistic fractionalization	0.927							
	(1.66)							
Religious fractionalization		-0.0483						
		(-0.07)						
Linguistic-income CC-ness			-3.721					
			(-1.16)					
Religious-income CC-ness				7.574*				
				(2.00)				
Linguistic-geographic CC-ness					-1.617*			
					(-2.34)			
Religious-geographic CC-ness						1.845		
						(1.11)		
Linguistic bipolarization							0.363	
							(0.63)	
Religious bipolarization								-0.108
								(-0.19)
Constant	-1.718	-1.121	1.779	-8.131*	0.288	-2.436	-1.550	-1.153
	(-1.85)	(-1.18)	(0.57)	(-2.34)	(0.31)	(-1.55)	(-1.45)	(-1.33)
Observations	2767	2839	2625	2799	2638	2773	2444	2827

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3a: Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	Consoc1	Consco2	Maj1	Maj2	U^2
Regime failure					
Regime age (log)	-0.535*	-0.562*	-0.541*	-0.563*	-0.577*
	(-5.16)	(-5.32)	(-5.56)	(-5.72)	(-5.86)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.156+	-0.167+	-0.138+	-0.139	-0.165+
	(-1.92)	(-1.77)	(-1.70)	(-1.48)	(-1.74)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-1.455	-1.729	-2.033	-2.415	-1.795
	(-0.85)	(-0.89)	(-1.11)	(-1.19)	(-0.91)
proportional	-0.121	-0.0958			
	(-0.45)	(-0.34)			
Parliamentary	-0.214	-0.211			
	(-0.62)	(-0.57)			
Federal	0.387	0.289			
	(0.96)	(0.74)			
upper_house		0.294			
		(0.84)			
majoritarian			0.726*	0.739*	
			(2.96)	(2.99)	
Presidential			0.569*	0.648*	
			(2.07)	(2.24)	
Unitary			-0.358	-0.318	-0.290
			(-0.90)	(-0.84)	(-0.74)
unicameral				-0.132	-0.289
				(-0.38)	(-0.84)
Constant	-0.936	-0.892	-1.372	-1.323	-0.402
	(-1.18)	(-1.03)	(-1.37)	(-1.09)	(-0.34)
Observations	2925	2823	2925	2823	2826

t statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 3b: Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	P^2	South Austfrica	Trinidominica	Portuguay
Regime failure				
Regime age (log)	-0.528*	-0.591*	-0.571*	-0.598*
	(-5.30)	(-6.21)	(-5.99)	(-6.12)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.128+	-0.104	-0.124+	-0.180+
	(-1.74)	(-1.19)	(-1.65)	(-1.96)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-1.652	-2.336	-2.001	-2.254
	(-0.87)	(-1.16)	(-1.09)	(-1.11)
proportional	-0.219			-0.101
	(-0.91)			(-0.36)
Presidential	0.526*			
	(1.99)			
Federal		0.275		
		(0.73)		
unicameral		-0.0508		
		(-0.15)		
mixed		-1.312*		
		(-2.86)		
Semi-Presidential		-0.368	-0.432	-0.584
		(-0.80)	(-1.04)	(-1.35)
majoritarian			0.562*	
			(2.09)	
upper_house				0.230
				(0.67)
Unitary				-0.288
				(-0.74)
Constant	-1.441+	-1.092	-1.323+	-0.294
	(-1.88)	(-1.16)	(-1.73)	(-0.29)
Observations	2929	2823	2929	2823

t statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 3c: Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime failure						
Ethnic diversity	0.329**	0.310**	0.376**	0.321**	0.307**	0.330**
	(2.45)	(2.34)	(2.74)	(2.33)	(2.28)	(2.38)
Regime age (log)	-0.485**	-0.504**	-0.432**	-0.527**	-0.521**	-0.528**
	(-3.75)	(-4.06)	(-3.34)	(-4.38)	(-4.34)	(-4.39)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.159	-0.154	-0.183*	-0.172*	-0.168	-0.169*
	(-1.59)	(-1.52)	(-1.87)	(-1.73)	(-1.63)	(-1.69)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.428*	-3.269	-3.752*	-3.334	-3.335	-3.335
	(-1.69)	(-1.60)	(-1.72)	(-1.63)	(-1.63)	(-1.63)
consociational1	.					
	.					
consociational2		-1.020				
		(-1.21)				
consociational3			-1.876*			
			(-1.70)			
majoritarian1				-0.462		
				(-0.66)		
majoritarian2					0.120	
					(0.27)	
majoritarian3						-0.401
						(-0.88)
Constant	-1.048	-1.051	-0.835	-0.857	-0.943	-0.874
	(-1.06)	(-1.05)	(-0.87)	(-0.88)	(-0.91)	(-0.89)
Observations	2343	2484	2484	2484	2484	2484

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 3d: Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Regime failure					
Ethnic diversity	0.318**	0.339**	0.312**	0.255**	0.293**
	(2.45)	(2.34)	(2.37)	(1.99)	(2.27)
Regime age (log)	-0.525**	-0.498**	-0.522**	-0.515**	-0.510**
	(-4.36)	(-3.77)	(-4.34)	(-4.28)	(-4.14)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.223*	-0.138	-0.175*	-0.137	-0.190*
	(-1.91)	(-1.38)	(-1.69)	(-1.35)	(-1.84)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.420*	-3.786	-3.330	-2.835	-3.216*
	(-1.71)	(-1.64)	(-1.63)	(-1.31)	(-1.75)
u2	-0.497				
	(-1.33)				
p2		0.625*			
		(1.95)			
southaustfrica3			0.0995		
			(0.12)		
trinidominica1				1.117*	
				(1.85)	
portuguay3					0.797
					(1.21)
Constant	-0.0905	-1.480	-0.851	-1.322	-0.745
	(-0.07)	(-1.41)	(-0.84)	(-1.29)	(-0.74)
Observations	2484	2484	2484	2484	2484

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 3e: Institutional Packages (PCA) and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Regime failure					
Ethnic diversity	0.294**	0.255*	0.208	0.261*	0.288**
	(2.03)	(1.93)	(1.54)	(1.86)	(2.19)
Regime age (log)	-0.526**	-0.581**	-0.478**	-0.554**	-0.533**
	(-3.76)	(-4.73)	(-3.66)	(-4.44)	(-4.29)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.151	-0.227*	-0.162	-0.121	-0.132
	(-1.46)	(-1.91)	(-1.54)	(-1.20)	(-1.24)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.005	-3.482	-3.010	-3.041	-3.237
	(-1.30)	(-1.51)	(-1.37)	(-1.37)	(-1.39)
P^2	0.0860				
	(0.51)				
U^2		-0.263**			
		(-2.04)			
Trinidominica			0.420**		
			(2.22)		
South Austfrica				-0.137	
				(-1.04)	
Portuguay					-0.162
					(-1.04)
Constant	-1.153	-0.181	-1.109	-1.352	-1.282
	(-1.08)	(-0.15)	(-1.07)	(-1.32)	(-1.18)
Observations	2392	2392	2392	2392	2392

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4: Combined Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(1) Linguistic	(2) Religious	(3) Ethnically Diverse
Regime failure			
Regime age (log)	-0.551***	-0.528***	-0.521***
	(-4.88)	(-4.13)	(-4.31)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.115	-0.171	-0.172
	(-1.28)	(-1.70)	(-1.73)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-2.496	-3.330	-3.332
	(-1.27)	(-1.57)	(-1.62)
Religious fractionalization	0.415		
	(0.53)		
Religious-income CC-ness	9.504*		
	(1.98)		
Religious-geographic CC-ness	0.467		
	(0.29)		
Linguistic fractionalization		0.491	
		(0.68)	
Linguistic-income CC-ness		-2.011	
		(-0.46)	
Linguistic-geographic CC-ness		-1.090	
		(-1.13)	
Ethno-linguistic diversity			0.311*
			(2.35)
Constant	-10.38**	1.502	-0.875
	(-2.62)	(0.39)	(-0.89)
Observations	2733	2484	2484

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5a: Ethnic Diversity, Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	Consoc1	Consoc2	Maj1	Maj2	U^2
Regime failure					
Ethnic diversity	0.315*	0.284*	0.256+	0.228	0.281*
	(2.27)	(2.11)	(1.66)	(1.50)	(2.16)
Regime age (log)	-0.454*	-0.484*	-0.496*	-0.517*	-0.544*
	(-2.99)	(-3.19)	(-3.70)	(-3.79)	(-4.42)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.217+	-0.219	-0.209	-0.203	-0.206
	(-1.71)	(-1.52)	(-1.63)	(-1.42)	(-1.53)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-2.824	-3.083	-3.467	-3.786	-3.110
	(-1.32)	(-1.34)	(-1.49)	(-1.54)	(-1.34)
proportional	-0.218	-0.209			
	(-0.66)	(-0.63)			
Parliamentary	-0.574	-0.524			
	(-0.99)	(-0.92)			
Federal	0.350	0.197			
	(0.71)	(0.41)			
upper_house		0.321			
		(0.75)			
majoritarian			0.590	0.600	
			(1.56)	(1.63)	
Presidential			0.740*	0.826*	
			(2.03)	(2.18)	
Unitary			-0.368	-0.311	-0.140
			(-0.77)	(-0.67)	(-0.30)
unicameral				-0.119	-0.322
				(-0.28)	(-0.78)
mixed					
Semi-Presidential					
Constant	-0.396	-0.411	-0.822	-0.838	-0.196
	(-0.32)	(-0.30)	(-0.56)	(-0.49)	(-0.12)
Observations	2470	2392	2470	2392	2395

t statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 5b: Ethnic Diversity, Institutional Packages and Democratic Failure

	P^2	South Austfrica	Trinidominica	Portuguay
Regime failure				
Ethnic diversity	0.317*	0.214	0.274+	0.271*
	(2.33)	(1.57)	(1.88)	(2.09)
proportional	-0.339			-0.237
	(-1.10)			(-0.71)
Parliamentary				
Federal		0.176		
		(0.40)		
Regime age (log)	-0.468*	-0.580*	-0.538*	-0.575*
	(-3.58)	(-4.66)	(-4.30)	(-4.65)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.185+	-0.166	-0.187+	-0.221
	(-1.76)	(-1.33)	(-1.80)	(-1.63)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.248	-3.439	-3.161	-3.522
	(-1.28)	(-1.51)	(-1.44)	(-1.49)
upper_house				0.252
				(0.59)
majoritarian			0.405	
			(1.07)	
Presidential	0.699*			
	(2.00)			
Unitary				-0.184
				(-0.41)
unicameral		-0.161		
		(-0.39)		
mixed		-0.849+		
		(-1.79)		
Semi-Presidential		-0.359	-0.351	-0.591
		(-0.68)	(-0.74)	(-1.19)
Constant	-1.079	-0.508	-0.755	0.00550
	(-0.93)	(-0.38)	(-0.72)	(0.00)
Observations	2472	2392	2472	2392

t statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 6a: Interactive Effects of Institutions, Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)
Regime failure				
Ethnic diversity	0.159	0.384*	0.223	0.193
	(0.93)	(2.67)	(1.36)	(1.09)
proportional	-0.517			
	(-1.63)			
proportional*Ethnic Diversity	0.396			
	(1.44)			
executive	0.491*	0.572**	0.372	0.558*
	(1.74)	(2.11)	(1.30)	(1.85)
Federal	0.381	0.491	0.275	0.204
	(0.75)	(0.99)	(0.57)	(0.43)
upper_house	0.359	0.137	0.0841	0.176
	(0.76)	(0.33)	(0.20)	(0.42)
Regime age (log)	-0.478*	-0.508*	-0.504*	-0.476*
	(-3.32)	(-3.49)	(-3.25)	(-3.31)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.271	-0.236	-0.149	-0.227
	(-1.45)	(-1.42)	(-1.04)	(-1.43)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.708	-3.862	-3.364	-3.465
	(-1.43)	(-1.57)	(-1.41)	(-1.34)
majoritarian		0.964**		
		(2.17)		
majoritarian*Ethnic Diversity		-0.405		
		(-1.38)		
mixed			-0.887**	
			(-2.03)	
mixed*Ethnic Diversity			0.100	
			(0.26)	
electoralsystem_type2				-0.377
				(-1.52)
federal*Ethnic Diversity				0.144
				(0.51)
Constant	-0.567	-1.341	-1.502	-0.402
	(-0.35)	(-1.02)	(-1.19)	(-0.25)
Observations	2392	2392	2392	2392

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.01$

Table 6b: Interactive Effects of Institutions, Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Regime failure				
Ethnic diversity	0.282	0.147	0.397**	0.253
	(1.16)	(1.13)	(2.33)	(1.34)
executive				0.505*
				(1.89)
Federal	0.201	0.0271	0.443	0.258
	(0.41)	(0.06)	(0.80)	(0.55)
upper_house	0.148	0.176	0.259	0.213
	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.46)
Regime age (log)	-0.515*	-0.584*	-0.463*	-0.481*
	(-3.82)	(-4.56)	(-2.81)	(-3.42)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.219	-0.206	-0.241	-0.221
	(-1.45)	(-1.51)	(-1.43)	(-1.47)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.829	-4.041	-3.286	-3.441
	(-1.47)	(-1.48)	(-1.39)	(-1.39)
electoralsystem_type2	-0.405*	-0.166	-0.167	-0.376
	(-1.69)	(-0.72)	(-0.66)	(-1.52)
Presidential	0.969*			
	(2.62)			
presidential*Ethnic Diversity	-0.0849			
	(-0.30)			
Semi-Presidential		-1.500		
		(-1.59)		
semipresidential*Ethnic Diversity		0.879**		
		(1.97)		
Parliamentary			-0.483	
			(-0.91)	
parliamentary*Ethnic Diversity			-0.483	
			(-1.11)	
upper_house*Ethnic Diversity				-0.0300
				(-0.11)
Constant	-0.132	0.0507	-0.0232	-0.401
	(-0.08)	(0.03)	(-0.02)	(-0.25)
Observations	2392	2392	2392	2392

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.01$

Figure 1.1. Marginal effect of PR conditional on diversity, 90% confidence level



Figure 1.2. Marginal effect of Majoritarian conditional on diversity, 90% confidence level



Figure 1.3. Marginal effect of Mixed conditional on diversity, 90% confidence level



Figure 2.1. Marginal Effect of Presidentialism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 2.2. Marginal Effect of Parliamentarism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 2.3. Marginal Effect of Semi-presidentialism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 3.1. Marginal Effect of Federalism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 4.1. Marginal Effect of Bicameralism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Table 6c: Interactive Effects of Institutional Packages, Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime failure						
Regime age (log)	-0.485**	-0.503**	-0.428**	-0.530**	-0.530**	-0.525**
	(-3.75)	(-3.99)	(-3.28)	(-4.39)	(-4.45)	(-4.37)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.159	-0.154	-0.186*	-0.168*	-0.165	-0.165*
	(-1.59)	(-1.51)	(-1.89)	(-1.69)	(-1.61)	(-1.65)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.428*	-3.278	-3.723*	-3.322	-3.386	-3.347
	(-1.69)	(-1.59)	(-1.71)	(-1.63)	(-1.64)	(-1.64)
consociational1	.					
	.					
Ethnic diversity	0.329**	0.311**	0.387**	0.327**	0.329**	0.322**
	(2.45)	(2.30)	(2.74)	(2.36)	(2.20)	(2.24)
consociational1*Ethnic diversity	.					
	.					
consociational2		-0.993				
		(-1.17)				

consociational2*Ethnic diversity		-0.0787				
		(-0.21)				
consociational3			-1.501			
			(-1.45)			
consociational3*Ethnic diversity			-0.396			
			(-1.44)			
majoritarian1				22.84**		
				(14.27)		
majoritarian1*Ethnic diversity				-14.12**		
				(-14.04)		
majoritarian2					0.224	
					(0.46)	
majoritarian2*Ethnic diversity					-0.152	
					(-0.49)	
majoritarian3						-0.895
						(-1.38)
majoritarian3*Ethnic diversity						0.282
						(0.80)
Constant	-1.048	-1.057	-0.816	-0.893	-0.954	-0.913
	(-1.06)	(-1.05)	(-0.84)	(-0.91)	(-0.92)	(-0.93)
Observations	2343	2484	2484	2484	2484	2484

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 6d: Interactive Effects of Institutional Packages, Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(3)	(4)	(7)
Regime failure			
Ethnic diversity	0.339**	0.213*	0.259*
	(2.39)	(1.69)	(1.93)
Regime age (log)	-0.519**	-0.519**	-0.500**
	(-4.24)	(-4.36)	(-3.94)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.177*	-0.122	-0.207*

	(-1.69)	(-1.22)	(-1.91)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.405*	-2.995	-3.795
	(-1.65)	(-1.46)	(-1.49)
southaustfrica3	-0.0710		
	(-0.09)		
southaustfrica3*Ethnic diversity	-0.469		
	(-1.28)		
trinidominica1		-1.803	
		(-0.89)	
trinidominica1*Ethnic diversity		1.542	
		(1.55)	
portuguay3			-1.757
			(-0.55)
portuguay3*Ethnic diversity			1.217
			(1.07)
Constant	-0.847	-1.460	-0.565
	(-0.83)	(-1.45)	(-0.54)
Observations	2484	2484	2484

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 6e: Interactive Effects of Institutional Packages, Social Structure and Democratic Failure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Regime failure					
Regime age (log)	-0.517**	-0.574**	-0.479**	-0.558**	-0.551**
	(-3.64)	(-4.60)	(-3.60)	(-4.43)	(-4.45)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.154	-0.214*	-0.163	-0.123	-0.158
	(-1.43)	(-1.83)	(-1.55)	(-1.21)	(-1.37)
Growth (1-yr lag)	-3.143	-3.763	-3.010	-3.003	-3.523
	(-1.34)	(-1.58)	(-1.37)	(-1.31)	(-1.40)
P^2	0.0643				

	(0.39)				
Ethnic diversity	0.264*	0.312**	0.210	0.267*	0.298**
	(1.71)	(2.39)	(1.55)	(1.94)	(2.33)
P^2*Ethnic diversity	0.0968				
	(0.83)				
U^2		-0.319**			
		(-2.28)			
U^2*Ethnic diversity		0.138			
		(1.63)			
Trinidominica			0.429**		
			(2.51)		
Trinidominica*Ethnic diversity			-0.00985		
			(-0.10)		
South Austfrica				-0.162	
				(-1.27)	
South Austfrica*Ethnic diversity				0.0804	
				(0.82)	
Portuguay					-0.278**
					(-2.38)
Portuguay*Ethnic diversity					0.153*
					(1.69)
Constant	-1.125	-0.344	-1.100	-1.324	-1.025
	(-1.04)	(-0.29)	(-1.06)	(-1.29)	(-0.87)
Observations	2392	2392	2392	2392	2392

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Figure 5.1. Marginal Effect of Consociationalism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 5.2. Marginal Effect of Consociationalism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 5.3. Marginal Effect of Consociationalism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 6.1. Marginal Effect of Majoritarianism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 6.2. Marginal Effect of Majoritarianism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 6.3. Marginal Effect of Majoritarianism Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 7.1. Marginal Effect of U^2 Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence



Figure 7.2. Marginal Effect of P^2 Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence





Figure 7.3. Marginal Effect of South Austfrica Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence





Figure 7.4. Marginal Effect of Trinidominica Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence





Figure 7.5. Marginal Effect of Portuguay Conditional on Diversity, 90% confidence


Percent
0
1
2
3
4
-2
0
2
4
diversity2
Marginal Effect of portuguay3 on Democratic Failure
-10
-5
0
5


Percent
0
1
2
3
4
-10
-5
0
5
10
diversity2
Marginal Effect of pca_diversity5 on Democratic Failure
-2
-1
0
1
2