

WHO'S DOMINANT?: INCUMBENT LONGEVITY IN MULTIPARTY REGIMES, 1950-2006

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ABSTRACT

In dominant party systems, a single party or coalition continuously controls the national executive by winning contested elections over an extraordinary period of time. Studies of dominant party systems have proliferated in recent years, but cross-national research on this topic has been hindered by inconsistent definitions of dominance, a focus only on “successful,” long-lasting cases to the neglect of shorter-lived ruling parties, and a “small-N” problem that precludes probabilistic inference. In this paper I describe an original dataset of ruling party duration in all electoral autocracies and democracies that existed between 1950 and 2006. I use this data to identify more than 40 dominant party systems that occurred during this period. I find that the large majority of long-lived ruling parties were “first-movers” in the party system—they either founded the competitive regime or won the first elections, then retained power for several successive elections. A comparison of survival rates and median ruling party durations for both first-mover and non-first-mover parties shows that the median first-mover party lasts about twice as long. However, there is also enormous variation in first-mover duration—party origins by themselves do not explain why some initial incumbents endure much longer in power than others. The findings hold two important implications for large-N research on dominance: (1) most dominant parties are former monopolists who have done well at retaining market share, so the *rate of decay* of these initial advantages is a better way to operationalize the dependent variable, and (2) the comparison set for testing explanations of dominance should include *all first-mover parties* in electorally-contested regimes, rather than all ruling parties or only the most long-lived ones.

INCUMBENT LONGEVITY IN MULTI-PARTY REGIMES, 1950-2006

In Chapter 1 of my dissertation (Templeman 2010b), I argue that the least-well understood feature of dominant parties is their extraordinary longevity in elected office. Part of the task of improving our understanding of dominant party longevity is in proposing better explanations; another part is in adjudicating between competing explanations. But before theorizing or testing, we first need a good sense of the facts: what actually needs to be explained? In this paper, I present those facts. Drawing on an original dataset of ruling party turnover in all sovereign, multi-party electoral regimes in the world between 1950 and 2006, I describe the frequency and patterns of ruling party duration and show how dominant parties relate to their shorter-lived counterparts. These data serve to motivate the questions taken up in the rest of the dissertation.

The paper is organized as follows. I first discuss four problems that have hampered work on the duration aspect of dominance—problems this dataset allows me to avoid. I then detail how I deal with several important case selection and measurement concerns in constructing the dataset. The third section presents a first cut of the duration data, describing the patterns of duration and situating dominant parties within this larger set of ruling parties in electorally contested regimes. Of particular note is the finding that most dominant parties began as “first-movers”—they enjoyed an initial monopoly in elections either by presiding over the founding of the state or the opening of the system to opposition parties. In the fourth section, I focus on this subset of all first-mover ruling parties—those that were the first incumbents in the regime—and I highlight the wide variation in duration in power across these parties. This variation serves to motivate a review of existing explanations, which I argue do not generally account for the divergent fates of first-mover parties. In the last section, I lay out the central research questions of the dissertation and describe how subsequent chapters address these questions.

2.1. Methodological Problems in Large-N Empirical Research on Dominant Parties

At least since T.J. Pempel’s landmark edited volume *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* was published in 1990, research on dominant party systems has attracted significant interest and attention from scholars working on a wide variety of countries. Building on the first generation of studies of mostly European party systems, recent work has looked as well at dominant parties in the developing and non-western world, significantly advancing our understanding of dominant party systems. There are now original and insightful studies of dominant party persistence and breakdown not only in Sweden (Esping-Anderson 1990), Italy (Arian and Barnes 1974; Levite and Tarrow 1983), Israel (Arian and Barnes 1974; Levite and Tarrow 1983; Aronoff 1990; Shalev 1990), and Japan (Christiansen 2000; Johnson 2000; Scheiner 2006), but also India (Speiss 2009), Mexico (Kaufman 1999; Eisenstadt 2004; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007) South Africa (Giliomee 1998; Adam 1999; Giliomee et al. 2001, Langford 2010), Taiwan (Lin 1998; Chu 1999; Fell 2004; Rigger 1999, 2001), Singapore (Jesudasen 1999; Mauzy 2001; Mauzy and Milne 2002), Malaysia (Jesudasen 1996; Mauzy 2008), and Russia (Reuter and Remington 2009). In addition to an expanding number of case studies, the sophistication and generality of theoretical models of dominance have also advanced; in particular, recent work by Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2006, 2007, 2010) has considerably raised the bar for general explanations of dominant party persistence and defeat, deriving general insights and concrete predictions from formal models of intra-party coalition dynamics and opposition party building.

The one aspect of research on dominant parties that continues to lag noticeably behind is in theory *testing*. Since Pempel’s landmark volume, there have been few if any attempts to evaluate many of the general theoretical propositions about dominant party persistence in power on a global sample of cases. The comparative work that has been done has been based on collections of case studies, uneven in quality and mostly inconclusive. One reason is that the data

needed to properly assess rival hypotheses have not been readily available. Thus, an important step in improving our understanding of dominant party systems is simply to collect the appropriate comparative data.

The dataset I describe in this chapter enables the testing of rival hypotheses about the causes of dominance in a more statistically rigorous way. In particular, the methods used to construct the dataset avoid four shortcomings affecting most existing cross-national empirical work on dominant parties. First, the data were generated using an explicit definition and transparent operationalization of dominance, and relevant cases were identified through a comprehensive review of all sovereign states over nearly 60 years. Second, these data record the key feature of dominance, long ruling party duration in power, making the use of event history analysis possible. Third, the data include observations on *all* ruling parties in electorally contested regimes, not just “successful” dominant parties, allowing me to avoid the selection bias problems that bedevil much of the comparative work on this topic. And finally, the large number of observations (over 700) permits an assessment of probabilistic, not just deterministic, causal hypotheses. I elaborate on each of these concerns in more detail below.

Identifying Dominance: Which Parties? What Places? For How Long?

First, empirical evaluation of rival theories has been hampered by *different definitions of dominance*. Researchers have tended to take the same attitude toward dominance as Justice Potter Stewart did to pornography: I know it when I see it. Yet, conflating fundamentally different phenomena under the same concept risks wrongly rejecting factors that have considerable explanatory power. The vague rules used for classification in many instances also make it difficult to identify the appropriate set of cases on which to test different explanations.

The more prominent recent comparative projects have made valuable contributions to our understanding of dominant party systems, but inconsistent selection and coding of cases across different studies and within them has limited the inferences we can draw. For instance, the edited

volume by Giliomee and Simpkins (1999) fills a clear need for research on dominant parties in the developing world, and it provides valuable information about understudied cases in Africa and Southeast Asia. But it is not clear what selection criteria led them to call South Africa’s ruling party dominant but explicitly reject that term for Botswana’s (xvii-xviii). Greene (2007: 12-17) and Magaloni (2006:40) are both careful to define and list a clear set of rules for identifying dominant parties, but they nevertheless identify quite different sets of authoritarian and democratic dominant parties.¹ And others have called party systems as different as Britain’s under the Conservative Thatcher government and China’s under the CCP “dominant party systems” (Symth 1994; Friedman and Wong 2008).

These disagreements over what constitutes a dominant party system pose problems for theory testing. Without a clearly-defined set of cases, it is difficult to assess which parties should be used to evaluate which general theoretical propositions. For instance, both Magaloni and Greene have advanced the argument that systematic ruling party resource advantages have sustained dominant parties in power. Should an assessment of this proposition include the Conservatives in Britain and the CCP in China? Both? Neither? The literature provides no clear-cut answer. Thus, employing an explicit definition, consistent coding scheme, and transparent rules for case selection itself is a prerequisite for rigorous empirical work.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variable: Disequilibrium, or Duration?

The second problem that bedevils cross-national empirical research is how the dependent variable of one-party dominance is operationalized. I argued at length in the previous chapter that the key distinguishing feature of dominant party systems is the incumbent party’s long duration in power. But if one accepts this premise, then the central outcome of interest is *the amount of time*

¹ Using similar criteria for dominance, Magaloni (40) calls Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya, Liberia, Paraguay, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe “hegemonic-party autocracies,” while Greene (16) asserts that these are “closed authoritarian regimes”; Greene includes Luxembourg and Israel as “democratic dominant parties” while they do not appear in Magaloni’s list of “predominant-party democracies.”

a party remains in office. The concept of dominance thus beckons the use of event histories: it is important to understand “not only *if* something happens, but also *when* something happens” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 1). That is, rather than focusing on *if* a ruling party has lost power, and seeking to explain why or why not, it is as important to understand *how long* the party lasted in office before its defeat.

Yet rather than taking *duration* as the dependent variable, the conventional approach² instead has been to treat dominant party defeat as the consequence of a failed political equilibrium either within the party (e.g. Magaloni 2006) or in the party system (e.g. Greene 2007). Thus, the outcome to be explained is why or why not the equilibrium “breaks down”. While Greene, in particular, has used equilibrium analysis to make impressive theoretical advances, this approach also suffers from a couple of methodological weaknesses. One challenge is in the identification of dominant party systems: how are we to distinguish between cases in which there is a true dominant party “equilibrium” and those in which one party has just “gotten lucky” in a few consecutive elections? Greene uses a longevity threshold of 20 years to make this determination, which leads him to call Mapai/Labor in Israel (28 years) and the PLP in the Bahamas (25 years) dominant parties, but not the Conservatives in Britain (18 years) or Labor in New Zealand (14 years). But how can we be sure there is a dominant party equilibrium in the former two cases but not in the latter two? The difficulty in making this determination increases the likelihood both of false positives—calling some ruling parties “dominant” even though the party system is not in equilibrium—and false negatives—excluding ruling parties in systems that are already in a competitive equilibrium. While the bias from false negatives is not likely to be serious—such parties will eventually pass the threshold and enter the dataset—the false positives are much more worrisome and may seriously bias tests of the theories. If many parties in power

² The most relevant study employing duration analysis that I have come across is by Maeda and Nishikawa (2006), who look at ruling party duration in 65 democracies. The phrase “dominant party” appears nowhere in their article, however. My dataset also covers a much larger set of regimes, including semi-presidential democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes that were excluded from their analysis.

more than 20 years are nevertheless not in a dominant party system, including them in an analysis of dominant party defeat may lead to improper inferences about what caused them to lose power. Nevertheless, this distinction is crucial to draw, because the equilibrium approach effectively requires the outcome of interest to be dichotomous: either a country has a dominant party system, or it does not. Thus, the validity of empirical tests of these theories rests heavily on the decision rule used to identify dominant party equilibria, including some kind of duration threshold (cf. Greene 2007: 15-16).

There is an alternative empirical strategy, however. If long duration in power is the central feature of dominant party systems, then a more straightforward way to model the underlying data-generating process is to measure the dependent variable as continuous, counted in units of time. Transforming the empirical problem into one of measuring and comparing durations, rather than states of the world, altogether obviates the need to single out those party systems in equilibrium *before* conducting any kind of empirical analysis. Instead of questions about equilibrium breakdown—that is, why established dominant parties are defeated—the operative research question then becomes: *what factors affect the rate at which ruling parties lose power?* One no longer needs to identify *ex ante* the subset of party systems that are “dominant”; all ruling parties, even those that are short-lived, provide relevant information and can be included in the analysis. Testing theories of dominance, then, can be done by assessing whether the purported causes have the predicted effects on ruling party hazard rates.

Selection Bias: What About Non-Dominant Ruling Parties?

The third common methodological problem in cross-national studies of dominant party systems is *selection on the dependent variable*. If the outcome of interest in these studies is the existence of dominant party systems, then including only cases of “successful”—i.e. dominant—ruling parties in the analysis eliminates much of the available information about ruling party duration and precludes the testing of rival explanations of ruling party persistence (King et al.

1994: 128-139; Geddes 2003: 89-130). In other words, if we want to know why dominant parties occur in some times and places and not others, then we also need to look at the instances in which dominance *does not occur* as well as the instances in which it does. This problem raises concerns about much of the evidence scholars have used to support explanations of dominance (e.g. Pempel 1990; Giliomee and Simpkins 1999; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007, 2010). These studies typically focus exclusively on cases where there *is* a dominant party, then make arguments about how their favored causes did or did not sustain it. As a consequence it is impossible to say with any confidence that these arguments are general rather than case-specific, despite many claims to that effect. A large-N study of dominance that includes short-lived as well as long-lived ruling parties, then, breaks considerable new ground for this reason as well.

Testing the Theories: Are Hypotheses Deterministic or Probabilistic?

Finally, most of the causal claims in explanations of dominance should more properly be phrased and tested as probabilistic hypotheses rather than as deterministic ones. For instance, consider the question of whether dominant parties are more likely to occur in some types of electoral systems than others. One of the generalizations Pempel drew from the case studies in *Uncommon Democracies* was that a multi-party system fostered by proportional representation (PR) was a necessary condition for the existence of dominant party systems (338-9). As a deterministic statement, this claim is clearly false. Pempel overlooked a number of dominant parties that existed in majoritarian electoral systems even at the time he wrote, including those in India, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and Canada. And several dominant parties have existed with only a single major party in opposition, including Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and Australia. For this reason Greene (2007: 23-24, 257), among others, has rejected electoralist arguments to explain the persistence of most dominant party systems. However, Pempel’s argument is not so easily dismissed if it is stated in probabilistic terms—and there is no good reason not to do so (cf. Sekhon 2004). A more reasonable test of this proposition

would compare ruling party duration in PR systems to that of non-PR systems and see if there is a statistically significant and substantively meaningful difference. Finding a single instance of dominance in a non-PR regime does not by itself falsify the proposition that dominant parties occur more frequently in PR electoral systems.

The larger problem is that the typical study of dominant parties has focused on one or a handful of positive cases from which a set of theoretical expectations are developed. While valuable for developing concepts and measurements, identifying causal mechanisms and generating and refining theories, this research design is *not* well-suited for testing general claims about causation, despite language to the contrary (e.g. Greene 2007: 255-6). It is not surprising that these studies have also had a tendency to see and to highlight the details of comparison cases that support their theories, and to ignore or play down the others—the case-by-case approach all but invites such practices. For hypotheses about the causes of dominant party breakdown, one or two additional cases cannot be either confirming or disconfirming except in a deterministic sense. And there is little reason to believe that any of the general hypotheses in the literature are actually deterministic ones.

In sum, to this point general theories of one-party dominance have simply not been properly tested—on the relevant set of cases, stated as probabilistic rather than necessary hypotheses, and using the appropriate statistical techniques. A rigorous empirical evaluation of the many competing claims in the literature requires a major departure from the standard practice of existing scholarship.

2.2. Identifying the Relevant Universe of Cases: Sample Selection and Coding Issues

As I detailed in the last chapter, I define dominant party systems as those in which a single party or coalition controls the national executive for an extraordinarily long period of time

by regularly winning contested elections. Identifying “extraordinary” longevity unfortunately requires that we choose some kind of threshold to make this determination, with all the requisite problems for causal analysis that I noted above. However, as a purely *descriptive* exercise, employing a threshold can at least give us a good sense of what the longest-lived parties look like and where they occur. Thus, for the first cut of the data, I use the conventional 20-year cutoff to establish dominance. (Later, in Section 2.4, I dispense with this cutoff and look at duration of all ruling parties.) To be dominant, then, a party system must meet the following four criteria:

1. There is a *ruling party* that selects and can remove the executive leader;
2. The party wields power by virtue of having won *regular, contested elections*;
3. The party wields power through *control of the executive*;
4. The party controls the executive for *a minimum of 20 consecutive years*.

To identify the universe of cases in which dominant party systems could occur, we first need to decide on the set of countries that featured contested, multi-party elections as the primary path to power and the time periods in each for which this was true. To make this determination, I examined the procedures for selecting the de facto executive power-holders in all independent states that existed between January 1950 and December 2006.³ My objective was to identify the time periods in each regime during which (1) incumbent executives were at a non-zero risk of losing power as the result of an election outcome, and (2) election winners controlled executive power. A simple typology of regimes can help clarify how I made these decisions.

³ The reasons for these start and end dates are largely practical. Available data on the dependent variable—duration of leaders in power—are much less complete before the end of World War II, as are data on economic performance, electoral system features, and many other possible explanatory variables. It is also considerably more difficult in earlier periods to identify the procedures through which executives were selected and to assess whether winning an election was the main route to power.




Figure 2.1. Dominant parties occur only in Regions I and II

Figure 2.1 shows four regime types in a two-dimensional space organized from most contested executive election to least, and from most institutionalized executive election to least. By *contestation*, I mean the degree to which competition for executive office is open to multiple candidates and parties, and to which non-incumbents are able to make appeals for votes. The key boundary to delineate is between regimes in which the formation of new political parties for the purpose of contesting elections is both legal and possible in practice and those in which it is not.

A couple of examples will illustrate how and why this distinction was made. For instance, the New Order era of Suharto in Indonesia featured three legal parties: the ruling party GOLKAR, the secular and Christian PDI, and the Islamic PPP. But these latter two were

organized by and firmly under the grip of the ruling party, and all other opposition parties were banned. Thus, Indonesia from 1965 until 1998 clearly falls to the left of the single/multi-party contestation boundary. By contrast, over the past two decades in Turkey, two separate versions of the major Islamist party in the country have been banned by court order: the Welfare Party and its successor the Virtue Party. Nevertheless, because these were not blanket bans against all opposition parties, and because the membership of these parties was able to reconstitute itself into the current Welfare and Justice Party (AKP) and win power, Turkey falls to the right of the single/multi-party contestation boundary beginning in 1987.⁴

By *institutionalization*, I mean the degree to which the struggle for power is resolved through regularly scheduled elections that effectively determine who controls the formal executive offices of the state. The key boundary here demarcates regimes in which electoral results determined control of the executive from those in which they did not. For instance, Iran in the last decade has held regularly scheduled, hotly-contested, multi-candidate presidential elections. However, the president of Iran is not the most powerful executive figure in the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Ayatollah Khamenei is, and his position is not subject to popular election. Therefore, contemporary Iran clearly falls below the elected/unelected executive boundary. The same is true for many other Middle Eastern regimes: in Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE, among others, executive authority is primarily in the hands of unelected officials, despite the existence in some cases of competitive races for legislative offices. By contrast, in most of the constitutional monarchies of western Europe, such as the Netherlands, real executive authority is vested in the office of the prime minister and her cabinet rather than the monarch, and the procedures that determine who controls the prime ministership are well-established and clearly linked to electoral outcomes. Therefore, the Netherlands falls above the elected/unelected executive boundary, as do Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Britain, Spain, and Belgium.

⁴ The detailed coding rules and the complete set of observations are listed in the appendix.

With these differences spelled out, we can now identify the regions in Figure 2.1 in which dominant party systems occur. Regimes in Region I are *democracies*. Power-holders are not only chosen through regular, contested elections, but these are largely free and fair as well: there are few or no restrictions on opposition candidacies, dissemination of information, freedom of association, or citizen participation.

Regimes in Region II are *electoral autocracies*. They also feature regular, contested elections, but these generally violate one or more of the requirements for democracy. They nevertheless do not experience military intervention in politics or other non-institutionalized means of leader turnover (Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). Prominent contemporary examples include Belarus, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Tanzania, and Venezuela.

Regimes in Region III are contested but *non-electoral autocracies*. They may also feature formal electoral means for the allocation of power, but these rules do not generally govern how leadership turnover occurs. Regimes may fall into this category for a wide variety of reasons: losing candidates do not respect the outcome of elections and refuse to relinquish power or commit blatant fraud; leadership contests are typically resolved through non-electoral means (coups, rebellions, popular protests, etc.) rather than at the ballot box; formal leaders are elected, but unelected officials retain significant executive power and the ability to override decisions of elected officials; the country is not fully sovereign or is governed by foreign powers; or there is no effective central state at all to control. Contemporary examples range widely and include countries as different as Equatorial Guinea, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand, Jordan and Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, and Somalia.

In the final category, Region IV, fall *closed autocracies*. These are regimes that do not even make a pretense of choosing their leadership through contested multi-party elections. Included here are single-party states that ban all opposition parties, military dictatorships, theocracies, and absolute monarchies. Contemporary examples include China, North Korea, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Brunei.

Dominant parties as I have defined them can occur only in Regions I and II, where winning elections is widely accepted as the primary route to power. The relevant comparison cases where dominant parties do not occur are also to be found only in these two regions. In constructing the sample of ruling party cases, then, the first challenge is to differentiate between cases in Regions I and II to be included in the dataset, and those in Regions III or IV to be excluded. This distinction is best drawn at the regime rather than the country level: many countries do not fit cleanly on either side of this division, most often because at different points in their history the regime changes. Thus, this determination also requires specifying the period the country-regime remained in Regions I or II. For instance, the regime in Kenya first became an electoral autocracy (moving from Region IV to Region II) in December 1992, when the first multi-party election for president was held; prior to that time, opposition candidates were not allowed to contest the presidency, so the regime was a single-party autocracy. Observations of ruling party duration in power for Kenya thus begin with December 1992.

With the set of electorally contested regimes identified, we can then turn to measuring ruling party duration in power. Each ruling party constitutes a case, and the outcome of interest is the ruling party’s total time in power measured in months. That is, the dependent variable is the length of every unique period of partisan control of the executive in all democracies and electoral autocracies.

To make the determinations about regime type and to identify ruling parties and their duration in power, I drew from a variety of sources. No single existing dataset was sufficient by itself for this classification task.⁵ In response, I developed my own set of decision rules and used

⁵ For instance, the Executive Contestation variable (*eiec*) in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) comes close to capturing the single-party/multi-party distinction, but the DPI data only extend back to 1975. I also came across several cases that appeared to be coded inconsistently on this variable (e.g. Kenya vs. Egypt). The Polity IV dataset did not contain a single measure of either contestation or institutionalization that adequately captured these dimensions, although several variables (e.g. *parcomp*, *xrreg*, *xrcomp*) proved useful in cross-checking my initial assessments from the case histories. Most other datasets that code regime types have focused on the difference between democracies and everything else, rather than multiparty electoralist regimes and everything else (e.g. Maeda and Nishikawa 2006,

these to code ruling party duration in electorally-contested regimes. To ensure that the cases were coded as uniformly and consistently as possible, I examined the actual political and electoral histories of each country over the last 60 years. My main sources in this endeavor were the series of elections handbooks edited by Dieter Nohlen (Nohlen et al. 1999; Nohlen et al. 2001; Nohlen 2005). When these sources were unclear about the stability of the regime, the process of executive selection, or the quality of elections, I cross-checked these against coding from Polity IV, the Database of Political Indicators (DPI), the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) database of Coup d’Etat Events, and in some cases with country-specific sources. Data on leadership and ruling party turnover were obtained from the Zarate’s Political Collections (ZPC) website.

The actual coding rules along with the list of included regimes and their start and end months have been consigned to the appendix. There are four elements of the coding process worth highlighting here, however: how I deal with regime changes in a country; how I measure executive control; my criteria for *partisan* (as opposed to non-partisan or personalist) incumbents; and my focus on the national (as opposed to provincial or local) level.

Adjusting for Regime Changes

Counting the beginning and end of each ruling party’s duration in power is non-trivial. One challenge is in deciding how to treat ruling parties that endured through a regime change—that is, that began in single-party or military regimes which later moved into the electoral autocracy or democracy category (Regions II or I). My approach is to record both the time at which the party initially came to power (the ruling party “birth”) and the time at which it first faced contested multi-party elections (the beginning of the “at risk” period in the new, contested regime). Duration in power can then be measured in two ways: one records total time in power

Przeworski et al.’s ACLP). Levitsky and Way attempt something along these lines, but their analysis is limited to post-Cold-War regimes and does not record dates when regimes or ruling parties changed.

while the other records total time “at risk” of an election loss. (For parties that came to power in regimes that were already electoral autocracies or democracies, these values are the same.)

Another challenge is how to code ruling party duration over regime changes in the opposite direction, from Regions I or II into Regions III or IV. These changes could occur, for instance, as the result of a military coup, a civil war or foreign invasion, a popular uprising that deposes the incumbent, or the banning of opposition parties by a ruling party. When these types of regime changes occur, they raise suspicions about whether the previous regime in fact met the criteria for contestation and institutionalization. I treat these events in one of two ways. If the previous period of contested elections was long enough to suggest a settled pattern (at a minimum, five years and two consecutive elections), then the change signals the “death” of the entire regime, and the observation of incumbent party duration is censored. If the previous period was not long enough to suggest a settled pattern, however, then the regime is treated as having been in Region III or IV for the entire period, and the observation of the ruling party’s duration is excluded entirely from the sample.

Executive Control

Measuring executive control also raises a set of special challenges. Because my main interest is in explaining the “death,” or lack thereof, of ruling parties, I err on the side of caution and take a generous definition of what constitutes ruling party “control.” I require only that a party control the main executive office—prime minister in a parliamentary regime, and president in a presidential one—to be considered “in power.” This coding follows the intuition of my definition: only when a former ruling party is unambiguously driven into opposition does true turnover of power occur. An incumbent party forced to govern in coalition with others still maintains the leading role as long as it controls the prime minister’s office. In similar fashion, an incumbent president lacking a majority of his own party in the national assembly is still the

leading executive officer and head of government, so I code the end of an incumbent party’s duration in power only when it relinquishes the presidency.

This approach makes coding partisan turnover in presidential and parliamentary regimes straightforward. However, the issue of who is the principal executive in so-called semi-presidential regimes—those that have both a president and premier who exercise some formal control over the executive branch—is not so easily resolved. The key challenge in such regimes is determining whether the president or the assembly is the ultimate principal to which the cabinet is responsible. For my purposes, this question is relevant when government is divided; that is, when the assembly is controlled by a party or coalition opposing the president. The key to ascertaining which is the “opposition” and which is the “ruling party” in this instance is to look at the party of the prime minister. If the prime minister always or almost always is an ally of the president in this circumstance, the regime is fundamentally more like a presidential than a parliamentary one: the president, rather than the assembly, is the ultimate principal who exerts control over the makeup of the cabinet. In contrast, if the prime minister is always or almost always from the leading party in the assembly, then the president along with the minority in the assembly is the opposition, and the majority party or coalition is the ultimate principal to which the cabinet is accountable. Looking at the partisanship of the prime minister in most circumstances indicates which type of executive a particular country-regime has.

To take a concrete example, under divided government in the French Fifth Republic (i.e. “cohabitation”), the prime minister is from the leading party in the Assembly and is typically an adversary of the president. Thus, France functions much like a parliamentary system under these circumstances. I code a turnover of ruling party in France, then, whenever the party the prime minister belongs to changes, but *not* when a member of the minority party in the assembly is elected president.⁶

⁶ Of course, in France a newly elected president can call new Assembly elections in hopes of securing a friendly majority, and therefore a fellow partisan as prime minister. So turnover of the party controlling the

Parties, Not Leaders

The requirement that an incumbent leader be supported and constrained by a durable ruling party also presents some difficulty in coding. In a number of cases, a ruling party exists, but as barely more than a name and a collection of titles—real authority is exercised through the leader’s personal network of informal ties. To account for this possibility, I require that an incumbent experience at least one change of leader during the party’s tenure in power to be considered a dominant party. Ruling parties in which there was no change of leader but which met the other criteria are included in the list of dominant parties but under a separate category, *personalist dominant parties*. In addition, many ruling parties on occasion are reorganized or renamed, absorb or merge with opposition parties, or experience sizeable defections or splits. I coded such changes as a continuation in power if the same leader remained in charge of the new ruling party, or if the personnel, leadership, and support patterns of the old party were largely the same as the new. Otherwise, the new party’s assumption of power was coded as a change in ruling party.

National, Not Provincial Offices

Finally, while the dataset contains observations for all electorally contested sovereign states from 1950-2006, the focus of this study is limited to *national office*; I make no systematic attempt to identify or explain instances of long-term one-party rule at the sub-national level. This is not to assert that one-party dominance is purely a national phenomenon—as I have defined them, dominant parties clearly have existed at the state and local level in a wide range of political contexts. I am aware of a number of instances at the provincial level, including in the states of the Democratic “Solid South” in the U.S., Alberta and Saskatchewan in Canada, Bavaria in

prime minister’s office in practice usually occurs within a couple months after an opposition party’s candidate has won the presidency.

Germany, several *Land* in Austria, and West Bengal in India, although I have not attempted a comprehensive review of sub-national governments and thus have no way to know how common such occurrences are.⁷ I also make no attempt to account for the persistence of “authoritarian enclaves” within competitive regimes, although some of the explanations I develop in this study may be relevant there as well (cf. Fox 1994; Lawson 2000; Snyder and Samuels 2001; Gibson 2005; Mickey 2009; Gervasoni 2010).

I leave out sub-national dominant parties for several reasons. In addition to the practical difficulty of gathering comparative data on partisan turnover in local offices, one should be careful not to assume that sub-national dominance is driven by the same forces that give rise to dominant parties at the national level. For one, national parties can transfer resources to party branches that are weak in certain localities—a source of aid not available to parties in opposition at the national level (Greene 2007: 17 fn. 23). In addition, a party system that is competitive but highly nationalized is likely to feature many pockets of partisan strength and weakness across the country, and this partisanship should affect voting behavior in local elections as well. To give a concrete example, the demographics of Utah—mostly white, majority Mormon, and predominantly rural or suburban—mean that on the national level it is a safe Republican state. Democrats running for federal office there start out at a tremendous generic disadvantage. One should not be surprised, then, if the state’s electorate also consistently favors Republican candidates at the state level. In nationalized party systems, where the same parties compete in all regions and at all levels, localized one-party dominance is not only not uncommon, it should be expected.

⁷ The most expansive survey I am aware of is Abedi and Schneider (2006), who identify dominant parties at the state/provincial level in Canada, Australia, Germany, and Austria.

2.3. *Dominant Parties in the World, 1950-2006*

Here I present and discuss the patterns among the subset of ruling parties in the sample meeting my criteria for dominance. I then examine how they compare with the rest of the sample in Section 2.4.

Dominant Parties

By using the criteria for dominance and the coding scheme described above, I identify more than 40 dominant parties that have existed in the world between 1950 and 2006. Table 2.1 lists these, separated in the conventional⁸ way by whether they endured in democracies (Region I) or electoral autocracies (Region II). Among these are incumbent parties in a number of the most prominent “competitive authoritarian” regimes of the last two decades, including those in Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana, and Senegal. They also include long-lived ruling parties in several developed democracies, including Austria, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, West Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Given the frequency with which these party systems have been casually called “dominant,” their appearance here is expected.

[Table 2.1 about here]

There are also a few surprises, however. In western Europe, continuous one-party control of the prime minister’s office lasted for over 20 years in Belgium and Liechtenstein (twice)—cases which have received less attention in the literature. Ruling parties in West Germany (1949-1969) and Austria (1970-2000) also qualify under my definition; both cases are sometimes excluded because the major opposition parties were included in the ruling coalition for part of

⁸ For instance, Magaloni (2006: 37-42); Greene (2007: 258-59).

those periods (e.g. Di Palma 1990: 162-63). A bit further afield, long periods of one-party rule occurred in Australia, Canada, Antigua and Barbuda, and Trinidad and Tobago—countries that have not figured heavily in discussions about the causes of dominance. The collection of dominant parties in autocratic regimes also includes some lesser-known cases: in addition to prominent instances in Taiwan and Mexico, similar long-lived ruling parties survived (at least initially) the advent of multi-party elections in Cameroon, Djibouti, Kenya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Paraguay, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Turkey.

There are also several parties often called “dominant” which do not make the cut: for instance, the ANC in South Africa, United Russia in Russia, the CCP in Cambodia, and the PPP in Guyana. These parties are victims of censored observations; while they remain in power at present and look likely to endure indefinitely, none has as yet crossed the 20-year threshold in office.

I have counted autocratic dominant parties’ duration in power in two ways. Table 2.1 includes all autocratic parties that have managed to retain power for at least 20 years and *most recently did so* by winning multi-party elections. But the majority of these cases have been at risk of electoral defeat for far less than 20 years, as the last column shows. For instance, Egypt’s NDP only faced an opposition challenger for the first time in the 2005 presidential election. The NDP may be a dominant party under some definitions (e.g. Brownlee 2007), and its leader, Hosni Mubarak, may have been president since 1981, but the party has been even theoretically at risk of losing the presidency in an election for only five of 29 years as of this writing. Thus, in exploring ruling party duration among incumbents that began in closed autocracies, we have two measures we could focus on. One is *total* tenure in office, through both the closed and competitive authoritarian periods. The other is tenure *at risk of an electoral defeat*.

In this study, I focus on tenure at risk of electoral defeat as the central outcome of interest. I do so for several reasons. First and foremost, the conceptual questions raised by dominant parties are really about duration *in multi-party regimes* where winning elections is the

main path to power. Only after parties move into the multi-party period do we have a real reason to explore why they have not lost—it is hard indeed to lose an election when there is no opponent! Second, most work on leadership duration in autocratic regimes has tended to take as the dependent variable leader turnover *under any conditions and for whatever reason*, including election defeat but also intra-leadership struggles, coups, putsches, invasions, deaths from natural causes or assassinations, civil wars, and popular uprisings (e.g. Bienen and van de Walle 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Gandhi and Pzeworski 2007; Cox 2009)—or on the breakdown of the regime itself (e.g. Geddes 1999; Smith 2005; Brownlee 2007). A focus on the subset of rulers at risk of electoral defeat complements this previous work but allows for a consideration of the wide variation *within* multi-party regimes.

Finally, once we look at duration at risk of electoral defeat, a number of dominant parties look much less formidable. Ruling parties in Paraguay, Mongolia, and Turkey, for instance, lasted decades in power, but did so by forbidding meaningful opposition contestation rather than by stringing together consistent victories in contested elections. Most interesting for this study is the consequences for how the KMT in Taiwan appears. By sheer time in power, it was one of the most durable single-party autocracies ever, controlling the central government in Taiwan for more than 50 consecutive years. But as the dominant party in a *multi-party* regime, its time in power was quite short: the KMT lost the presidency only four years after the first multi-party election for that office. Viewed this way, what needs to be explained in Taiwan is not why the ruling party lasted so long but why it lost so quickly. As a single-party autocracy, it was impressive. But as a dominant party, it managed to squander a formidable electoral advantage in a remarkably short period of time.

Dominant Party Origins

A key difference among the dominant parties identified in Table 2.1 is their *origins* in one regime or another. Consider Table 2.2, in which the cases of dominance have been rearranged

by the type of regime from which they *initially* emerged. As the table shows, ruling parties followed one of three paths to end up dominant. The first set (13 in total) came to power in regimes that already had established regular, contested, multi-party elections for office (Regions I or II in Fig. 2.2). Most of these regimes were consolidated democracies: the likelihood of restrictions on press freedoms or campaigning, politically-motivated arrests of opposition candidates, or the suspension of elections appeared quite remote.

The second set (12) came to power at the same time that the regime began, and in most cases played a crucial role in its founding. In Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Gambia, India, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe, incumbent “founder parties” led the push for independence, then won the first post-independence elections and retained power for at least 20 years. In the remaining cases of Austria, West Germany, and Italy, the parties were the first to assume office when full sovereignty was restored to those countries after World War

II. The third set of parties (14 with multiple leaders, 5 without) emerged out of closed single-party autocracies, introduced multi-party elections on their own watch, and then competed in and won those elections. These “hegemonic parties” vary in the amount of time they endured as single-party autocracies and in the subsequent number of contested elections they managed to win, but they all presided over a successful (from their perspective) transition from closed to competitive authoritarianism without giving up power.

[Table 2.2 about here]

A closer look at these groups suggests an even more basic distinction between the first group and the others: their initial place in the regime’s party system. The ruling parties in the first group by and large clawed their way toward the top of an established party system, dislodging rivals and incumbents, then strung together an impressive series of electoral victories to remain there. In contrast, the founder and hegemonic parties both began the multi-party era at

the apex of the party system—indeed, in many cases, as the only party on the scene—then retained enough votes to prevent any upstart competitor from displacing it in power. Put differently, the latter dominant parties were *first-movers* in the party system. As the term implies, first-movers enter the electoral market with a head-start in the competition for votes—market share, in the parlance of economics—while non-first-movers begin as merely one choice among several equals.

What is particularly striking about the list of dominant parties in Table 2.2 is the number that can fairly be characterized as “first-mover” parties. If the personalist cases are included, over 70 percent of all dominant parties (31 of 44) either presided over a transition to multi-party elections or took office in those first elections. Moreover, this estimate is probably low: of those ruling parties I have identified as potential dominant-parties-in-the-making, *all seven* came to power before or during a regime change.

Why might so many dominant parties be first-movers? Potential explanations are not hard to come by. As the “fathers of independence,” for instance, party leaders in founders typically enjoy immense popularity and a close identification with the new state itself. Most also have a strong hand in shaping the institutions through which they subsequently competed for office. And as the first incumbents, at least some are able to take precedent-setting decisions that shaped the nature of political competition for decades to follow. Likewise, the advantages of most of the hegemons dwarf those of the nascent opposition in those regimes: they can add repression, media control, and virtually unchecked access to state funds to the list of incumbent benefits that they enjoyed. And their previously established monopoly over the state and its institutions provided them the means to shape the rules governing multi-party competition to their advantage. Perhaps, then, we should not be so surprised to see the first ruling parties in states such as India and Israel endure in power for nearly three decades after independence—it may simply have taken that long for the ruling party’s structural advantages to erode. And for similar

reasons, one might not expect, for instance, incumbents in Egypt or Mozambique that tightly control the rules of the new multi-party regime to lose those elections, either.

Yet we would be too hasty in concluding from these data alone that party origins explain dominance. In order to draw any valid inferences about causes, we need to look as well at the duration of first-mover parties which did *not* become dominant. Indeed, without some information about the proper comparison set, we cannot know how common it is for first-movers to last more than 20 years in office, or even whether first-movers on average last longer in power than non-first-movers.

Paths to Dominance: Two Origins, Two Questions

The most important finding from these data is not about causation at all, but instead about how dominant parties should be categorized. The distinction between first-movers and non-first-movers illustrates that there are two different processes by which ruling parties become dominant. One is by winning power in a pre-established multi-party democracy, then stringing together a long series of electoral victories, while the other is by beginning as a monopolist in the electoral market, then retaining enough votes to prevent any other upstart competitor from displacing it in power. Note the crucial question here: *did the ruling party found the regime?* This dichotomy is not the usual one between dominant parties in authoritarian versus democratic regimes, or between parties in the industrialized West versus the developing world; yet in my view, it better captures the key difference between the two main paths to dominance.

This distinction is crucial to draw, because the two processes by which first-mover and non-first-mover parties become dominant raise different questions for the study of dominant party systems. For the set that developed in pre-established democracies, the central question is one of *emergence*: under what conditions do ruling parties string together a long series of electoral victories? And are there certain regime characteristics that make this more likely—for instance, the ease with which political institutions can be reshaped to the incumbent party's permanent

electoral advantage? The questions raised by the first-mover parties, by contrast, are mainly about *persistence*: variation in the rate at which advantages decline over time, rather than where those advantages came from, is the outcome to be explained.

What I have not yet established is what this variation is. That is, of those incumbents who *win* the first multi-party elections, for instance, what is the expected hazard rate of ruling party defeat in such regimes? Just how rare is it for former one-party states not only to survive the transition to a multi-party system but also endure in power for decades after? And just how exceptional are the 30-year reigns of first-mover parties such as Labor in Israel and Congress in India?

To answer these questions, it is not enough to know which parties lasted more than 20 years in office. We need to know something as well about the cases of *non*-dominant ruling parties—those that lost power early as well as those that endured for decades. It is to that task that I turn next.

2.4. The Comparison Set: Ruling Party Duration in Electorally Contested Regimes, 1950-2006

If dominant parties are outliers, then just how different are they from the typical ruling party? What do the more usual cases look like? To answer this question, we need to look at the full dataset of ruling parties in electorally-contested regimes.

Table 2.3 summarizes some of the key descriptive statistics. In total the dataset contains observations on 711 separate ruling parties that held power in 163 regimes in 147 different states. Of those parties, 594 (83.5%) exited the dataset with their defeat, leaving 117 censored observations in the dataset. Of those, 20 (17.0%) were censored because of a regime change (coup, suspension of elections, or other disruption), while the remaining 97 (83.0%) were still in

power at the end of the observation period.⁹ In other words, only 2.8% (20 of 711) of the ruling parties in the dataset were removed from power through non-institutionalized means, which should bolster confidence that the regimes included in the analysis are in fact institutionalized and extra-constitutional turnover is rare. Observations were most likely to be censored in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Table 2.3. Observations by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of parties</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Median duration</i> ¹⁰	<i>Censored</i>	<i>% censored</i>
Sub-Saharan Africa	60	8.44	171	34	56.67
South Asia	31	4.36	56	5	16.13
East Asia	23	3.23	49	4	17.39
Southeast Asia	17	2.39	76	7	41.18
Pacific Islands / Oceania	95	13.36	37	5	5.26
Middle East / North Africa	29	4.08	60	5	17.24
Latin America	97	13.64	60	20	20.62
Caribbean and non-Iberic America	68	9.56	96	9	13.24
Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Republics	97	13.64	45	16	16.49
Western Europe	194	27.29	47	12	6.19
Total	711	100	48	117	16.5

The estimated median duration across all regions was 55 months, although there appear to be meaningful differences between regions: the median ruling party in Africa lasted 171 months in power, or more than 14 years at risk of electoral defeat, while that in the Pacific region lasted only 37 months, or just over three years. A plurality (27%) of all ruling parties in the dataset were in Western European regimes, reflecting the long democratic history and regular partisan rotation of most countries in this region. The longest-lived ruling party was the PRI in

⁹ After the original data were collected and ruling party durations recorded through December 2006, I added all defeats that had subsequently occurred through September 2009. The remaining parties were still in office as of that month.

¹⁰ Calculated from the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function, which accounts for censored data.

Mexico, which endured a total of 653 months at risk, followed by the CSV in Luxembourg at 575 months; at the minimum, 11 ruling parties lasted only a single month in office. Notably, the longest-lived ruling parties appear widely distributed around the world; of the top ten, three are in Western Europe, one is in Latin America, two are in sub-Saharan Africa, one is in East Asia, and two are in Southeast Asia. Dominant parties are a global phenomenon, at least as measured by duration in power.




Fig. 2.2. Ruling party survivor function

These data also allow us to evaluate how sensitive the dominant party definition is to the 20-year threshold. Figure 2.2 plots the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function, which predicts the percentage of ruling parties expected to remain in office through any given number of months. The 20-year (240-month) threshold falls just below the 93rd percentile. Thus, the

estimated survival function predicts that about 7% of all ruling parties will last more than 20 years in office. We could just as well use other cutoffs. For instance, the survival function estimated here predicts that only 10% of all ruling parties will survive through 198 months (16.5 years), and only 5% will survive past 294 months (24.5 years). In this sense, then, the 20-year threshold appears as a reasonable, if arbitrary, method of identifying outliers.

In the end, the choice of threshold matters much more for conceptual purposes than for empirical ones. By using duration in power as the dependent variable, rather than the persistence or breakdown of dominant party equilibria, we free ourselves from having to rely on this arbitrary cutoff at all in the actual testing of theories. Instead, all ruling parties in the sample provide some information about what affects ruling party survival—not just those that survive 20 years.




Fig. 2.3. First-mover vs. non-first-mover survivor functions

These data can also tell us whether first-mover parties are disproportionately likely to survive to 20 years or whatever other threshold we choose for dominance. Figure 2.3 shows the estimated survival functions for first-movers—those parties which won the first election in the new regime—versus all other ruling parties in the dataset. As expected, first-movers have better survival rates than do other parties: the median first-mover lasts an estimated 115 months in office, while the median non-first-mover lasts only 48, or less than half as long. Moreover, this difference exists at every point in time, from the first month onward. Thus, the data indicate that there is a systematic advantage to being the first party to take office in a new regime.

As importantly, there is wide variation in longevity even within the set of first-mover parties, from a minimum of 5 months (the UWP in St. Lucia) to a maximum of 653 months (the PRI in Mexico, again). Not all first-movers, it appears, are equally viable as ruling parties, and we will need to understand why in order to account for the longest-lived ones. There are also some suggestive regional patterns. For instance, many of the shortest-lived first-movers were in Eastern Europe: the winners of the first fully contested elections in Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia each lasted less than two years in office. Something about this particular transition from communism created conditions that were especially hostile to the first ruling parties in the new regimes—a topic I take up in more detail in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.

Overall, these data provide valuable context for the dominant parties identified earlier, and they demonstrate wide variation in ruling party duration. The theoretical task now is to understand the factors that increase ruling party longevity relative to the average party. In the following chapters, I take up this challenge in earnest. But first, I briefly review the most prominent existing explanations for why dominant parties endure.

2.5. *Dominance Explained?: A Brief Critique of Existing Theories*

In the previous section I found wide variation across the cases of interest: ruling parties in electorally contested regimes. Of the “successful” dominant parties, a large majority began in power with some kind of first-mover advantage; yet this advantage is not sufficient to become dominant. In some instances, being the first party to hold office in a new regime appears to have resulted in tremendous, enduring advantages over all competitors: this is the familiar story behind the persistence of prominent dominant parties in such countries as Botswana, India, Mexico, Malaysia, and Singapore. But in other, apparently quite similar cases, the first incumbents had much less staying power, as in Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Mauritius, and Taiwan.

What explains the persistence or electoral defeat of these first incumbents in multi-party regimes? Existing explanations of incumbent durability tend to make one of three arguments. The first is about the long-term benefits to incumbents of strong ruling parties (Geddes 1999, 2007; Smith 2005; Brownlee 2002, 2007). Most prominently, Geddes has argued that parties help autocrats prevent elite defection, by providing institutionalized channels to give potential opponents benefits in return for not challenging the incumbent leader (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Magaloni 2006). In personalist or military regimes, by contrast, the ability to make this commitment is greatly reduced.

The “strong parties” argument, while plausible as a rationale for why leaders *form* parties, cannot account for most of the variation we see among the incumbents in electorally-contested regimes. Figure 2.4 below shows incumbents broken out by presence or absence of a meaningful ruling party in support. Non-partisan figures do appear somewhat less likely to survive. But even so, the wide variation *within* the partisan group of incumbents is still unexplained. Granted, there may still be some important differences in the organizational capacity of these ruling parties. But at a glance, the parties which lost power soon after winning the first elections do not appear *ex ante* to be significantly less disciplined than those which won:

for every strong, centralized party that easily survived the transition to multi-party elections, such as the CCM in Tanzania, there is another that did not, such as the KMT in Taiwan.




Fig. 2.4. Non-partisan vs. partisan survivor functions

The second argument is about the degree of repression the incumbent uses against opposition party challengers in elections. In this view, the most durable autocrats are those most able to employ effective force to intimidate and silence serious opponents (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965; Wintrobe 1990, 1998a, 1998b; Slater 2003; Case 2006). Clearly, repression plays a role in the closed authoritarian regimes; no one should be surprised that opposition parties have not taken power in North Korea or China, because political movements that threaten the regime are quickly snuffed out by the coercive apparatus of the state. The main drawback of this explanation is that, within the set of electorally *contested* regimes, repression appears only

weakly related, if at all, to incumbent duration (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2007).

The third set of explanations move past state repression to look at other resource advantages the ruling party employs to win elections. One is its control over the institutions of political competition. Ruling parties can sometimes design institutions—legislatures, electoral rules, and the like—to “trap” or divide potential opponents and force them into contestation that is patently unfair (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Lust-Okar 2005; Gandhi and Pzeworski 2006). These explanations suffer from the same problem as the repression arguments: to the extent they focus on the *presence or absence* of an institution such as a legislature or multi-party elections, rather than the institutional rules themselves, institutional explanations do not account for the variation within the set of electorally contested regimes. In addition, “first-mover” parties by definition have some ability to shape the rules of the political arena, so there is no obvious a priori difference between long-lived and short-lived first-movers on this dimension.

Seemingly more promising are explanations that highlight the financial and personnel advantages that first-mover parties enjoy. The degree to which ruling parties use control over state jobs and patronage, public spending, and media for partisan ends, in this view, may determine how great a generic electoral advantage incumbents have over competitors.

There are at least three ways resource asymmetries have been argued to sustain ruling parties in power. One version of the story focuses on ruling party *elites*: resources are a way to maintain elite cohesion, as ambitious politicians are recruited into the ruling party and kept from defecting to rivals by the material benefits they obtain (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Reuter 2008b). A second version focuses on *voters*: the incumbent uses clientelist networks to target benefits to supporters and get them to the polls, while withholding them from ruling party opponents (Scheiner 2006). A large slice of the electorate then becomes captive; even if they do not like the ruling party itself, voters risk being denied access to state largess and employment if they vote for a challenger. A third version emphasizes the effects ruling party advantages have

on the development of *opposition parties*. When the electoral playing field is inherently unequal, ambitious office-seekers will want to affiliate with the ruling party rather than alternatives, all else equal. Only politicians who are both motivated by policy more than office and highly dissatisfied with the status quo create or join opposition parties (Greene 2007). Thus, even when there are few overt restrictions on entry into the electoral arena, opposition parties tend to develop as both policy-focused and extremist, and are therefore unable to appeal to moderate voters. Resource advantages, then, produce a stable party system in which the incumbent occupies the middle of the political spectrum and multiple challenger parties are arrayed toward the extremes (cf. Meguid 2005).

Resource theories have the advantage of being able to account for the timing of ruling party defeat: as ruling party resource advantages decline, incumbent defeat in elections becomes more likely. The main drawback of this explanation, however, is its tenuous empirical relation to incumbent defeat across the universe of cases, both in large-N (Howard and Roessler 2006) and small-N (Lust-Okar 2005) studies. Proponents of resource theories have tended to develop such arguments to account for one particular case: both Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007) are principally concerned with explaining the PRI's defeat in Mexico, for instance, and Scheiner's (2006) focus is on LDP persistence in Japan. To the extent they provide cross-national evidence in support of their theories, it is also on a strictly case-by-case basis (e.g. Greene 2007: 255-296).

The weakness of this evidence is that there are seemingly just as many cases that can be employed *against* a resource-advantages argument as in support of it. For instance, the end of KMT rule in Taiwan has been misconstrued in explanations that focus on resource advantages. The argument that the decline in material resources was the chief cause of the KMT's defeat, as Greene claims (2007: 266-269), is in fact at odds with the empirical record; at the time it lost power in the 2000 presidential election, it was one of the world's richest political parties with estimated assets of at least US \$5 billion, and Taiwan's economy had grown at an average rate of 6% throughout the 1990s. It is true that elite splits played a crucial role in the KMT's troubles in

the 1990s, as Magaloni (2006: 22) correctly observes. But elite defection from the ruling party was not driven primarily by a decline in party resources but rather by disputes over national identity (Templeman 2010a). Resource advantages also appear to be a poor explanation in Malaysia, where the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional has survived a number of external economic shocks, including the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Likewise, economic troubles in Kenya did not prevent the ruling party KANU from retaining power through two competitive election cycles, and economic liberalization in Mozambique and Tanzania did not lead to ruling party defeat in those countries, either (Sulemane and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003; Tsikata 2003).

At best, then, resource theories of dominance on a cross-national basis remain largely speculative. To date, the comparative empirical evidence either in support or in opposition has been haphazard, inconsistent and far from definitive. Why first-mover advantages endure for some ruling parties but quickly decay for others remains an open question.

2.6. The Research Agenda: What’s New Here

This paper is adapted from Chapter 2 of my dissertation. The research presented in subsequent chapters departs from existing research on dominant parties in at least four ways. First, I use the concept of first-mover advantage to identify a clear set of comparison cases from which to develop explanations of ruling party persistence. My primary focus is on instances of “strong” initial incumbency, in which former monopolists open to or tolerate competition in the electoral market. Thus, many of my cases of interest are substantially different from those in previous scholarship, and the way I conceive the research question is new, as well.

I focus on the subset of first-movers for several reasons. First, it is striking how many dominant parties began as first-movers in a newly-opened electoral arena. Roughly three-quarters of the total in Table 2.2 began as either the single ruling party in a closed autocracy or

else were the main force in leading the country to independence. Thus, at the heart of most of these dominant parties’ success is an ability to hold on to *pre-existing* voter support, or to lose it less slowly, than other ruling parties. Put differently, there is something conceptually quite different about starting as a monopolist versus starting as an opposition party. In the former case, the assumption is that the ruling party *should* lose vote share over time, while in the non-first-mover case, the ruling party begins in the opposition, and has both to *gain* and to *retain* market share over time to become dominant. In addition, the two types of parties face different hazard rates, as Figure 2.3 shows: first-mover parties, all else equal, last in power more than twice as long on average as their successors.

The processes that produce dominant parties in pre-established democracies, by contrast, are quite different, and in this study they will be of secondary interest. It is true that the theory developed in subsequent chapters may hold important implications for party systems in these regimes. Institutional arguments in particular are quite pertinent to these cases, because the “rules of the game” matter most in precisely these established democracies. Thus, in testing some of the explanations I develop in the following chapters, I examine the patterns of competition and election outcomes in liberal regimes. Nevertheless, at its core, the theory of party system development that I articulate is directed at accounting for the rate of decay of first-mover parties’ initial advantages in a newly competitive electoral market, rather than explaining when and how incumbent party advantages accumulate over time in existing markets.

Second, my focus is on changes in the *party system* rather than either the regime or the ruling party itself. I am centrally concerned with the development of opposition parties under initial conditions of near-monopoly: why in some cases does the entry of competitors lead to the swift demise of the incumbent party’s reign, and why in others does it pose little threat to the ruling party’s ability to win elections? The market analogy I draw on here highlights the importance of understanding the behavior of electoral challengers, not just incumbents. As quasi-monopolists, first-movers have advantages that are *relative*; we cannot say much about incumbent

persistence and defeat without also understanding the behavior and resources of their competitors. In other words, I view questions of ruling party duration as being at their core about the party system rather than about the ruling party itself, and my explanations of ruling party persistence and defeat are pitched at this level as well.

In contrast, much recent research has focused on the *party* level and sought to explain ruling party persistence and defeat by describing what dominant parties themselves do right or wrong. In many of these accounts, opposition parties are rather passive creatures, dependent on the incumbent for their opportunities and only able to threaten the ruling party’s grip on power if and when it “screws up” (Chu 1999; Jesudason 1999; Solinger 2001; Case 2001, 2006; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006; Gonzales 2007; Reuter and Remington 2009). The literature has less to say about how successful opposition parties emerge to defeat entrenched incumbents. Recent work by Howard and Roessler (2006) and Bunce and Wolchik (2010), among others, has found opposition party coordination and strategy to be key determinants of whether ruling parties will be seriously threatened with defeat in a given election. But the underlying reasons why opposition parties manage to coordinate in some elections and not others remains poorly understood (cf. Gandhi and Reuter 2008a).

In my view, this ontological focus on the internal dynamics of ruling parties has tended to give them far too much credit for their victories and blame for their defeats. While it is true that incumbents can take proactive steps to weaken potential competitors, even when they do not, oppositions face a number of daunting hurdles they must overcome in order to build a credible and attractive electoral alternative to the ruling party. Some ruling parties have clearly endured less because of their own actions than because of the lack of a coherent opposition (Maeda 2009). The focus on ruling parties also tends to obscure the importance of factors which are exogenous to ruling party strategy but which contribute to opposition party strength and unity, including the presence of a vibrant civil society, the distribution of socioeconomic resources, the ethnic, racial, linguistic or religious cleavage structure, and international influences. In sum, there is a

considerable need to enhance our understanding of party system development in regimes with strong “first-movers.” This gap serves to motivate the general theory of opposition party development that I present in **Chapter 3**.

The third way in which I depart from existing work is in advancing two non-resource explanatory factors—institutions and ethnicity—to account for some of the divergent outcomes in seemingly similar circumstances. In **Chapter 4** I build on my general theory by considering how institutional differences may affect the difficulty of opposition party recruitment and coordination. Existing work on this topic is problematic. For one, there is a curiously tangled and contradictory set of claims about what kinds of institutional arrangements are most advantageous for ruling parties competing against a nascent opposition. On electoral systems, for instance, different scholars have asserted that dominance is especially likely to be sustained under PR (Pempel 1990), SNTV (Cox 1997), SMD-P (Greene 2007), Mixed-Member Majoritarian (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001) and Party Bloc Vote (Mauzy 2001). These claims are necessarily at odds with one another: to say that PR makes dominance more likely to occur is to say that the other non-PR systems make it *less likely*. The discrepancy is both theoretical and empirical.

In addition to electoral system, there is a striking and as-yet-unexplained empirical difference between ruling party longevity in presidential and parliamentary regimes. Consider the divide between dominant parties in democratic and autocratic regimes, previously shown in Table 2.1. The astute reader may have already noticed a curious pattern: while the autocratic dominant parties have occurred in both presidential and parliamentary regimes, *all* of the democratic DPs are in parliamentary systems. There are three presidential parties that came close: ruling parties in the US, El Salvador, and Chile finished just shy or right at 20 years before losing power. But there is certainly nothing in presidential democracies like the 1954-93 period of LDP rule in Japan, the 1926-1974 CSV period in Luxembourg, or the 1936-1976 SAD period in Sweden. Remarkably, long periods of one-party rule in established democracies have occurred

exclusively in parliamentary systems; there is not a single instance of a ruling party surviving more than 20 years in office in an established presidential democracy from 1950-2006, as Figure 2.5 shows.

Dominant Parties by Regime Type, 1950-2006		
	<i>Presidential</i>	<i>Parliamentary</i>
<i>Democratic</i>	None	Antigua and Barbuda Austria Australia Belgium Canada West Germany India Israel Italy Japan Liechtenstein Luxembourg Norway Samoa South Africa Sweden Trinidad and Tobago
<i>Autocratic</i>	Algeria Cameroon Djibouti Ivory Coast Kenya Mexico Mozambique Paraguay Senegal Seychelles Taiwan Tanzania Zimbabwe	Botswana Gambia* Malaysia Singapore Mongolia Turkey

*Parliamentary 1965-1982; presidential 1982-1994

Fig. 2.5. Dominant parties are rare in pre-established presidential democracies

I am not the first to note this pattern. Magaloni (2006: 42) also finds that the majority of her cases of autocratic DPs are presidential while all democratic DPs are parliamentary, and Scheiner has suggested that one-party dominance is “unheard of” in presidential democracies (2006: 24). More generally, Maeda and Nishikawa (2006) find in a sophisticated study of ruling party duration in 65 democracies that ruling party hazard rates have quite different shapes over time in the two system types. In presidential systems, ruling parties initially lose power at much lower rates than those in parliamentary ones. But presidential hazard rates increase over time, while parliamentary rates decline, and at about seven years in office, ruling parties in presidential regimes become more likely to lose power in any given month than in parliamentary ones. At 20 years, the difference is profound: the hazard rate in parliamentary regimes is about .01, meaning the likelihood of losing power in a given month is about one percent, while in presidential systems it is .05, or five times higher. In democracies, at least, presidentialism appears to be quite inhospitable to long-lived ruling parties. I show that an extension of my basic theory of opposition party development provides a parsimonious explanation for this quite striking divergence across institutional types.

The second non-resource argument I take up in this dissertation is about the effects of ethnic difference. Not all dominant parties are kept in power by clientelist tactics or are brought down by a failure of those tactics, as the Taiwan example suggests. The politics of identity, in particular, may provide a friendlier playing field for a nascent opposition because it does not require material resources to compete for votes. But neither is it a given that the opposition will be able to defeat the incumbent if it can successfully change electoral competition to one about group identity: identity politics may just as likely divide oppositions as unite them. In **Chapter 5** I develop a formal model of how and when ethnic differences sustain or undermine incumbents in single-member district races. The most striking result is that when ethnic voting is high, there is a curvilinear relationship between the expected competitiveness of a race and the heterogeneity of the electorate. In the most homogeneous districts, there are opportunities for opposition

candidates to attract voters by making explicit ethnic appeals to the ethnic majority group in the electorate. In minority-majority districts, a similar opportunity exists, although there the opposition attracts votes through appeals to the ethnic minority. In districts with a single ethnic majority but a sizeable ethnic minority, however, the dominant party’s candidates are likely to win overwhelmingly, because potential opposition supporters fear a minority candidate could sneak through with only a plurality of the vote.

For two reasons, then, I find that strong ethnic voting can sustain unpopular ruling parties in power. First, at the district level, fear of ethnic minority candidates can lead ethnic majority voters to vote strategically for dominant party candidates even when they detest the dominant party itself. Second, at the national level, the opposition parties that win at the two ends of the district heterogeneity spectrum are likely to be polar opposites of one another, and thus more inclined to cooperate with the dominant party than with each other. I illustrate this argument with two contrasting cases, Taiwan and Malaysia. Whereas the ethnic makeup of Malaysia has helped sustain the BN in power, the KMT in Taiwan was hurt by having to straddle an increasingly salient ethnic divide there while the opposition could focus its appeals exclusively on “native” Taiwanese. I use the model and the case studies to argue that ethnicity is an important and heretofore overlooked cause of ruling party persistence and defeat in newly-contested regimes.

Finally, current empirical work on ruling party duration in power is incomplete in a number of ways. To my knowledge, no one has attempted to gather the appropriate data to test whether the many theoretical claims in the literature actually stand up to empirical scrutiny. As I detailed in section 2.1, explanations of ruling party durability have not usually been stated in probabilistic terms, tested on the relevant sets of cases, or evaluated using the appropriate statistical techniques. A rigorous evaluation of the many competing claims in the literature requires both better data and a major departure from the methodological approaches of existing scholarship. **Chapter 6** represents my attempt to respond to that challenge.

In the final substantive chapter of the dissertation, **Chapter 7**, I apply the findings to the case of Taiwan, which is poorly explained by existing theories. The Taiwan case study serves two purposes. First, it helps to illustrate the key mechanisms which link social-structural and institutional causes to election outcomes. Second, it helps resolve a central puzzle in Taiwan's political transition: why the enormous material, organizational, and policy advantages possessed by the incumbent KMT sustained it in office for a mere four years after the first direct election of the executive there. The dual factors of institutions and national identity, I show, account for this startling and unexpected outcome much better than do resource-centered explanations.

APPENDIX 1 – CODING RULES

Sample Selection Criteria, w/ Coding Rules and Examples: Country-regimes included in the dataset must meet the following criteria.

Criterion 1 - Elections: Elections consistently determine who wields executive power.

1. The following types of cases are ruled out *in toto* by this criterion:
 - a. Military regimes, e.g. Myanmar at present, Argentina under the military junta of 1976-1983
 - b. Theocracies or absolute monarchies, e.g. the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-present; Bhutan; Saudi Arabia
 - c. Other regimes where executive power is awarded based on a non-elective process, e.g. Communist regimes such as Vietnam, China, Eastern Europe pre-1989; regimes installed by foreign intervention such as Iraq 2003-2009.
2. The election outcome determines control of central government *executive* power, not *legislative*.
 - a. In presidential regimes, the party of the president is coded as the single executive party
 - b. In parliamentary regimes, the party of the prime minister is coded as the single executive party
 - c. In semi-presidential regimes, executive power is determined by the following:
 - i. If the prime minister is appointed and can be removed by the president without parliamentary approval, then the key executive is the president. The incumbent party is the president’s party.
 - ii. If the prime minister’s appointment and removal requires parliamentary approval, then cannot be removed by the president), then the key executive is the prime minister. The incumbent party is the prime minister’s party.
 - iii. **Divided government rule:** when they occur, periods when the presidency and parliament are controlled by different parties (“cohabitation”) are used to determine whether the parliament or the president is the ultimate principal.
3. Indirect elections for executive power count if the following hold; otherwise, the regime is excluded:
 - a. For parliamentary regimes, if the parliament is directly elected
 - b. For presidential regimes, if the electoral college is directly elected

Criterion 2 - Competition: Elections must be contested.

1. Opposition (i.e. non-incumbent or incumbent-friendly) parties must be allowed to field candidates, and these candidates must gain a “meaningful” percentage of the vote.
2. Unless otherwise noted, a contest was treated as uncontested if the incumbent party or candidate received >90% of the vote.
 - a. Coded using descriptions of elections and election results from elections handbooks edited by Dieter Nohlen. These were:
 - i. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook* (ed. Nohlen et al. 1999),
 - ii. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook* (ed. Nohlen et al. 2001), and
 - iii. *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook* (ed. Nohlen 2005).
 - b. Cross-checked against the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC) variable (1975-2006):

- i. EIEC scores the vote share of the winning candidate, with the following ranking:
 - 1. 5 = multiple parties, only one party wins seats (parl.) or votes (pres.)
 - 2. 6 = multiple parties win seats (votes) but one wins at least 75%
 - 3. 7 = multiple parties win seats (votes) and largest party wins less than 75%
 - ii. Contestation requires a score of 6 or 7.
 - c. Cross-checked against the POLITY IV PARCOMP variable:
 - i. PARCOMP gives the competitiveness of political participation, with the following ranking:
 - 1. 1=repressed, no opposition activity allowed outside ruling party
 - 2. 2=suppressed, some opposition but sharply limited by government
 - 3. 3=factional, parochial or ethnic-based factions
 - 4. 4=transitional, any transitional arrangements from 1,2,3 to 5 or vice versa
 - 5. 5=competitive, regular, institutionalized competition with alternative of power
 - ii. Contestation requires a score of 2 or greater.
- 3. In country-cases in which descriptions were inconsistent with DPI and POLITY IV scores, decisions about contestation were made based on country-specific sources. In several instances, these sources led me to adjust the period of contestation or to exclude the case altogether.

Criterion 3 – Institutionalization: Elections not only determine who controls power but also are held regularly and are uninterrupted by non-institutionalized changes of power

- 1. **Two election rule:** at least two consecutive, contested executive elections must be held, and the term between them uninterrupted by successful non-institutionalized leadership turnover, for the country-regime to be included in the sample. These elections must occur *after* 1950.
- 2. **Independence rule:** the two consecutive elections must occur *after* the country has gained independence.
 - a. Regimes which ban opposition parties after winning the first post-independence elections are excluded, e.g. Chad, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania
 - b. States which are in “free association” with another state are treated as independent from the month they assume that status, e.g. Cook Islands, Marshall Islands.
 - c. Colonies which are highly autonomous but *not* formally independent are not included until they achieve full independence, e.g. Bahamas internal self-government granted in 1969, independence granted July 1973, satisfies two-election rule in 1982.
- 3. **Five year rule:** the period of consecutive, contested elections must span at least five full years for the country-regime to be included in the sample, e.g. Benin 1960-1965 is included, Nigeria 1979-1983 is excluded
- 4. **Coup d’Etat rule:** coups are an indication that elections are not the main route to power.
 - a. The period prior to the coup is included in the sample only if the case satisfies the two-election rule, the independence rule, and the five year rule
 - b. A coup that occurs after two consecutive contested elections is treated as a truncation of the observation, rather than as a ruling party “death”

- c. Unsuccessful coups are not coded. An “unsuccessful” coup is one in which the incumbent executive returns to power within a month of the coup attempt, e.g. Chavez in Venezuela 2002
 - d. A non-military suspension of multi-party contestation that occurs after two consecutive elections, such as a declaration of martial law or proclamation of a one-party state, is treated like a coup, i.e. the observation is truncated.
 - e. Coded based on data from Nohlen handbooks and the CSP Coup d’Etat Database.
5. **Popular protest rule:** popular protests that lead to a change in ruling party are treated differently depending on whether they occurred in response to an election.
- a. If an election campaign or result, such as oppression of the opposition or ruling party attempts at electoral fraud, was the main immediate cause of a popular uprising, the result is coded as follows:
 - i. An incumbent’s loss of power due to a popular, election-related uprising is coded as ruling party “death” in the month the ruler leaves office.
 - ii. Popular protests that do not result in the incumbent leaving office are coded as no turnover
 - b. If an election was *not* the main cause of a popular protest that led to a change of the ruling party, the event is coded as follows:
 - i. If the change in ruling party occurred through constitutionally-prescribed means, such as resignation and replacement by a constitutionally-designated successor, then the event is a ruling party “death.”
 - ii. If the change did *not* occur through constitutionally-prescribed means (e.g. military intervention to install a new civilian leader, popular rebellion, rebel victory, etc.), then the event is treated like a coup—the observation is truncated rather than a ruling party “death”.

Coding for the Dependent Variable - Ruling Party Duration in Power: The sample includes all ruling parties in electorally-contested country-regimes over the time period January 1950 to December 2006. Duration in power is measured in months.

1. **Birth observation:** The ruling party “birth”—the first period in the duration count—occurs in the month the party takes office, *not* the month the party is elected to office.
2. **Death observation:** The ruling party “death”—the last period in the duration count—occurs in the month the party leaves office
3. **Right-censored observations rule:** Duration counts that end with either a coup or the end of the dataset are treated as right-censored, i.e. truncated. That is, the ruling party remained in power during the last observed period, and subsequent periods are unobserved. A coup is *not* counted as a ruling party “death.”
4. **Left-censored observations rules:** Duration counts for incumbent party rule that begins before the first observation in the dataset (left-censored) are treated as follows:
 - a. **Competitive regimes rule** (Democracies and electoral autocracies only): If the ruling party took office before January 1950, observations on all variables for the month the party took office are recorded and included in the dataset, and the duration count is adjusted accordingly.
 - i. E.g. in the U.S., the Democratic Party is the ruling party in January 1950, enters office March 1933, so the duration count is adjusted so that March 1933 is month 1, January 1950 is month 301 of ruling party duration in power.
 - b. **Non-competitive regimes (“at risk”) rule:** If the ruling party took office before the first *competitive* election, as determined above by the Competition Criterion,

then ruling party duration in power is counted from the month the party took office.

- i. The incumbent party becomes *at risk* for “death” beginning with the month the first contested elections for the executive are held. Note that this period may be different from the month the winner of the elections takes office.
 - ii. If the party was founded by a non-elected incumbent, such as a military leader, the duration count begins the month that leader took office, *not* the month the party was officially founded
- c. **Independence rule:** If the party was in power before the country achieved independence, ruling party duration in power is counted from the month of independence.
- i. E.g. in the Bahamas, the PLP took power in 1967, won reelection in 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987, was defeated in August 1992. PLP ruling party duration count begins with Bahamas’s independence, July 1973, ends August 1992.
5. **Name rule:** Incumbent parties frequently are renamed. Name changes are not coded as a change of ruling party if the following are true:
- a. The leaders, organization, and supporters of the new party are substantially the same as the old
 - b. If the name change is due to a merger or split, the incumbent leader remains the same
6. **Caretaker government (“six month”) rule:** In some regimes, caretaker (non-partisan) governments often assume power between a government’s resignation and the next election. These are treated as follows:
- a. If the caretaker government lasts *less than six full months*, then it is considered an extension of the previous government, regardless of what party replaces it. No turnover of power is recorded until a new PM from a different party assumes office. If the same party wins the subsequent elections, no turnover occurs despite the interim caretaker period.
 - i. E.g. In Bangladesh since 1996, all elections held only after the (partisan) government has resigned and handed over power to a non-partisan cabinet led by the chief justice. So the ruling BNP’s duration is coded as ending in June 1996, when the election winner BAL replaced the non-partisan caretaker government, rather than in March 1996, when the BNP resigned and handed over power.
 - b. If the caretaker government lasts *more than six full months*, then it is considered an independent government in its own right, and a turnover of power is recorded for the month the “caretaker” PM takes office, and again when a new partisan PM replaces the caretaker government.
 - i. E.g. in Finland the partisan PM resigned and handed power to a non-partisan PM in Dec. 1963; new elections not held and n/p PM not replaced until Sept. 1964, so both Dec. 1963 and Sept. 1964 are coded as a change of party.
 - c. “Caretaker” and non-partisan presidents in presidential regimes are coded using the same rule

Definition of a Dominant Party: For a ruling party to be included in the set of dominant parties, the following conditions must hold:

1. **20-Year Rule:** The ruling party has controlled the executive for an unbroken period of at least 20 years
 - a. In a parliamentary regime, the PM has come from the same party
 - b. In a presidential regime, the president has come from the same party
2. **Contested Election Rule:** The ruling party has won at least one contested, multiparty election for the executive
 - a. If the ruling party has not yet been defeated, it won the previous election for the executive, and that election was contested by at least one opposition party
 - b. If the ruling party loses power due to an electoral defeat, it won the election immediately previous to its defeat, and that election was contested by at least one opposition party
3. **Party Rule:** The chief executive must have turned over at least once during the ruling party’s duration in power. Otherwise, the party is coded as a “personalist dominant party.”

First-Election Winners: Ruling parties with first-mover advantages occur in the universe of first-election winners. These are identified as follows:

1. **Hegemonic Winners:** the regime was preceded by a period of closed autocracy and is newly contested. In the *first* contested, multi-party election held in the new regime, the incumbent autocrat wins the election.
 - a. The incumbent’s tenure begins with the first month the leader took office during the period of closed autocracy
 - b. The regime begins in the month the first contested, multiparty election is held
 - c. The incumbent’s tenure ends in the month the ruler is removed from power
 - i. The end of tenure due to electoral loss is coded as ruling party “death”
 - ii. The end of tenure due to a coup or annulment of elections is coded as a truncation of the observation, *not* a ruling party death.
2. **Founder Winners:** the regime is newly independent. In the first contested, multi-party elections held *after* the regime begins, the incumbent leader wins the election.
 - a. The incumbent’s tenure begins with the first month the leader took office. When it was possible to determine that the incumbent took power before independence, the incumbent’s tenure is counted from this month. Otherwise, tenure is counted from the month of independence
 - b. The regime begins the month independence was declared by representatives of that regime, *not* the date it was recognized by outside authorities
 - i. E.g. Lithuania: independence declared by Supreme Soviet Council March 11, 1990; not recognized until after August 1991 coup in Soviet Union; regime begins March 1990.
 - c. The incumbent’s tenure ends in the month the ruling party’s control of the chief executive ends. If the initial ruling party is replaced before the first election, then the new party is treated as a founder if the party runs, and a caretaker if the party does not
 - i. E.g. Estonia: independence declared March 1990, PM from PFE April 1990-Jan. 1992, replaced by non-partisan PM until elections in Sept. 1992, new PM from RKI seated in Oct. 1992, coded as open-seat winner.
 - ii. E.g. Moldova: independence declared August 1991, initial ruling party is PFM, replaced by PM from PCRM Jan. 1992, replaced by PM from

DAPM July 1992, first elections held Feb. 1994, won by DAPM. DAPM coded as founder first-winner.

3. **Incumbent Defeaters:** the regime was preceded by a period of closed autocracy and is newly contested. In the first contested, multi-party elections, the former autocratic incumbent is defeated.
 - a. The election winner’s tenure begins the month it takes office
 - b. The regime begins the month the first contested election is held
 - c. The election winner’s tenure ends when it loses control of the chief executive
 - i. E.g. South Africa: ANC defeats NP in elections held April 1994, takes office May 1994. April 1994 is beginning of regime, May is beginning of ANC tenure in office
4. **Open-Seat Winners:** the regime was preceded by a period of closed autocracy or a transitional chief executive who does not run in the first contested election. The open-seat winner gains control of the chief executive after the first election.
 - a. The election winner’s tenure begins the month it takes office
 - i. A candidate whose victory in a previous contested election was overturned or delayed is coded as a transitional figure, not a first-election winner.
 1. E.g. Panama 1989: election winner Galimany appointed president only after foreign intervention, coded as transitional chief executive, PLA party defeated in May 1994 election, treated as defeated incumbent. 1994 winner PRD is open-seat winner.
 - b. The regime begins the month the election winner takes office, *not* the month the first election is held
 - c. The election winner’s tenure ends the month it loses control of the chief executive

Miscellaneous Notes:

1. Four regimes were excluded because of power-sharing or party-rotation requirements in the executive: Lebanon, Switzerland, Uruguay (1952-1967), Colombia (1958-1974).

Regimes Included in Dataset

<i>Regime</i>	<i>Regime Months</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Regime Months</i>
Albania	Mar-91 to Dec-06	Estonia	Sep-91 to Dec-06
Algeria	Nov-95 to Dec-06	Ethiopia	May-95 to Dec-06
Andorra	Jan-82 to Jun-09	Fiji	Oct-70 to May-87
Antigua and Barbuda	Nov-81 to Dec-06	Finland	Mar-48 to Dec-06
Argentina	Dec-83 to Dec-06	France	Oct-49 to Dec-06
Armenia	Dec-91 to Dec-06	Gabon	Dec-93 to Dec-06
Australia	Dec-49 to Dec-07	Gambia (I)	Feb-65 to Jul-94
Austria	Jul-55 to Jan-07	Gambia (II)	Sep-96 to Dec-06
Azerbaijan	Oct-98 to Dec-06	Georgia	Oct-92 to Dec-06
Bahamas	Jul-73 to May-07	Germany	Sep-49 to Dec-06
Bangladesh	Mar-91 to Jan-07	Ghana	Nov-92 to Jan-09
Barbados	Nov-66 to Jan-08	Greece (I)	Jan-50 to Apr-67
Belarus	Jul-94 to Dec-06	Greece (II)	Nov-74 to Oct-09
Belgium	Aug-49 to Mar-08	Grenada	Dec-84 to Mar-90
Belize	Sep-81 to Feb-08	Guatemala	Jan-86 to Jan-08
Benin (I)	Aug-60 to Nov-65	Guinea	Dec-93 to Dec-06
Benin (II)	Apr-91 to Dec-06	Guyana (I)	May-66 to Oct-80
Bolivia (I)	Jun-56 to Nov-64	Guyana (II)	Oct-92 to Dec-06
Bolivia (II)	Aug-85 to Dec-06	Honduras	Jan-82 to Dec-06
Botswana	Sep-66 to Dec-06	Hungary	May-90 to Dec-06
Brazil (I)	Jan-51 to Mar-64	Iceland	Dec-49 to Feb-09
Brazil (II)	Mar-85 to Dec-06	India	Aug-47 to Dec-06
Bulgaria	Jun-90 to Jul-09	Indonesia	Oct-99 to Dec-06
Burkina Faso	Nov-98 to Dec-06	Ireland	Feb-48 to Dec-06
Cambodia	Jul-98 to Dec-06	Israel	May-48 to Mar-09
Cameroon	Oct-92 to Dec-06	Italy	Dec-45 to May-08
Canada	Oct-35 to Dec-06	Ivory Coast	Oct-90 to Dec-99
Cape Verde	Jan-91 to Dec-06	Jamaica	Aug-62 to Sep-07
Chad	Jun-96 to Dec-06	Japan	Apr-52 to Sep-09
Chile (I)	Nov-46 to Nov-73	Kazakhstan	Jan-99 to Dec-06
Chile (II)	Mar-90 to Dec-06	Kenya	Dec-92 to Dec-06
Colombia	Aug-74 to Dec-06	Kiribati	Jul-79 to Dec-06
Comoros	Apr-02 to Dec-06	Korea, S. (I)	Aug-48 to May-61
Cook Islands	Aug-65 to Dec-06	Korea, S. (II)	Oct-63 to Oct-72
Costa Rica	Jul-53 to Dec-06	Korea, S. (III)	Feb-81 to Feb-08
Croatia	Jun-91 to Dec-06	Kyrgyzstan	Aug-91 to Dec-06
Cyprus (I)	Aug-60 to Jul-74	Latvia	Sep-91 to Dec-07
Cyprus (II)	Dec-74 to Feb-08	Lesotho	Apr-93 to Dec-06
Czech Republic	Jan-93 to May-09	Liechtenstein	Sep-45 to Mar-09
Denmark	Nov-47 to Oct-50	Lithuania	Sep-91 to Dec-08
Djibouti	May-93 to Dec-06	Luxembourg	Jul-26 to Dec-06
Dominica	Nov-78 to Dec-06	Macedonia	Sep-91 to Dec-06
Dominican Republic	Jul-66 to Aug-08	Madagascar	Mar-93 to Feb-02
Ecuador (I)	Sep-48 to Nov-61	Malawi	May-94 to Dec-06
Ecuador (II)	Aug-79 to Feb-97	Malaysia	Aug-65 to Dec-06
Egypt	Sep-05 to Dec-06	Mali	Jun-92 to Dec-06
El Salvador	Jun-84 to Jun-09	Malta	Sep-64 to Dec-06

Marshall Islands	Oct-86 to Jan-08	Sweden	Sep-36 to Dec-06
Mauritania	Jan-92 to Aug-05	Taiwan	Mar-96 to May-08
Mauritius	Mar-68 to Dec-06	Tanzania	Oct-95 to Dec-06
Mexico	Jul-46 to Dec-06	Thailand	Sep-92 to Sep-06
Micronesia	Nov-86 to May-07	Trinidad and Tobago	Aug-62 to Dec-06
Moldova	Aug-91 to Sep-09	Turkey (I)	Jul-46 to May-60
Mongolia	Jul-90 to Dec-06	Turkey (II)	Nov-87 to Dec-06
Mozambique	Oct-94 to Dec-06	Turkish Cyprus	Nov-83 to May-09
Myanmar	Jan-48 to Mar-62	Tuvalu	Oct-78 to Dec-06
Namibia	Mar-90 to Dec-06	Uganda	May-96 to Dec-06
Nauru	Jan-68 to Dec-07	Ukraine	Aug-91 to Dec-07
Nepal	May-91 to Oct-02	United Kingdom	Jul-45 to May-10
Netherlands	Aug-48 to Dec-06	United States	Mar-33 to Jan-09
New Zealand	Dec-49 to Nov-08	Uruguay	Mar-85 to Dec-06
Nicaragua	Apr-90 to Jul-07	Vanuatu	Jul-80 to Dec-08
Niger	Dec-99 to Dec-06	Venezuela	Feb-59 to Dec-06
Nigeria	May-99 to Dec-06	Yemen	Apr-97 to Dec-06
Norway	Mar-35 to Dec-06	Zambia	Nov-91 to Dec-06
Pakistan	Dec-88 to Oct-99	Zimbabwe	Apr-80 to Dec-06
Palau	Oct-94 to Jan-09		
Panama	Nov-49 to Oct-68		
Panama (II)	Sep-49 to Jul-09		
Papua New Guinea	Sep-75 to Dec-06		
Paraguay	May-93 to Aug-08		
Peru (I)	Jul-50 to Jul-62		
Peru (II)	Jul-80 to Dec-06		
Philippines (I)	Apr-48 to Sep-72		
Philippines (II)	Feb-86 to Dec-06		
Poland	Dec-91 to Nov-07		
Portugal	Jul-76 to Dec-06		
Romania	May-90 to Dec-08		
Russia	Dec-91 to Dec-06		
St Kitts and Nevis	Sep-83 to Dec-06		
St Lucia	Feb-79 to Dec-06		
St Vincent	Oct-79 to Dec-06		
Samoa	Jan-62 to Dec-06		
Sao Tome and Principe	Feb-91 to Feb-08		
Senegal	Feb-78 to Dec-06		
Serbia and Montenegro	Apr-92 to Jun-06		
Seychelles	Jul-93 to Dec-06		
Singapore	Aug-65 to Dec-06		
Slovakia	Jan-93 to Dec-06		
Slovenia	Jun-91 to Nov-08		
Solomon Islands	Jul-78 to Dec-06		
Somalia	Jul-60 to Oct-69		
South Africa	Jun-48 to Dec-06		
Spain	Jun-77 to Dec-06		
Sri Lanka	Feb-48 to Dec-06		
Suriname	Sep-91 to Dec-06		

An Example: The Philippines.

- Gained independence July 4, 1946.
- Roxas of the Nacionalista Party elected first president in April 1946, prior to independence
- Roxas dies in office, April 15, 1948, succeeded by vice president Quirino, of the Liberal Party.
- Quirino re-elected 1949, in office until 1953, defeated by Magsaysay of the Nacionalista Party, left office in December.
 - **Enters dataset April 1948, because incumbent party as of January 1950 took office then**
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, December 1953**
 - **Satisfies two election rule, December 1953**
 - **Satisfies independence rule, December 1953**
 - **Liberal Party is a Founder Party, because took power before first post-independence election, won that election**
- Magsaysay in office until March 1957, killed in plane crash. Succeeded by Garcia, also of the Nacionalista Party.
 - **Coded as no change in ruling party**
 - **Satisfies five year rule, January 1955**
- Garcia re-elected in 1957, serves until defeated in Nov. 1961, leaves office in December 1961, succeeded by Macapagal of the Liberal Party.
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, December 1961**
- Macapagal defeated for reelection in Nov. 1965, leaves office in December. Succeeded by Marcos of the Nacionalista Party.
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, December 1965**
- Marcos reelected in 1969.
- Marcos declares martial law in September 1972. No direct election of the presidency until 1981.
 - **Coded as regime change; observation of incumbent duration censored**
 - **September 1972 - January 1986 coded as non-competitive; observations not included in sample**
- Martial law lifted January 1981.
- June 1981, Marcos re-elected president, inaugurated for another term. Opposition boycotts.
 - **Coded as non-competitive election; observations not included in sample**
- Nov. 1985, Marcos calls for early presidential election in Feb. 1986
- Presidential election held in Feb. 1986, contested by opposition, highly competitive, results disputed
 - **Coded as regime change, competitive regime beginning February 1986**
 - **Incumbent “at risk” beginning February 1986**
- Feb. 15, Marcos declared winner, EDSA protests begin
- Feb. 25, Marcos leaves country, Aquino of the UNIDO inaugurated as president
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, February 1986**
 - **Total incumbent duration coded as October 1972 – February 1986: 161 months**
 - **Incumbent lost power in first at-risk period**
 - **UNIDO coded as First-Election Winner, Incumbent-Defeater Party**
- Aquino not eligible for re-election. Ramos of the LE-NUCD elected in May 1992, takes office in June 1992
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, June 1992**

- Ramos not eligible for re-election. Estrada of the LMP elected in May 1998, takes office in June 1998.
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, June 1998**
- Estrada impeached, removed from office by ruling of the Supreme Court, January 2001. Succeeded by Arroyo of the LE-NUCD-UMDP.
 - **Coded as a constitutionally-prescribed change in incumbent, January 2001**
 - **Coded as change in ruling party, January 2001**
- Arroyo re-elected in competitive elections in May 2004, inaugurated for full term in June 2004. Current incumbent.
 - **Data series ends December 2006; coded as censored observation**

The entry for the Philippines in the dataset then appears as follows:

Country	Party #	Start Month	End Month	Duration at risk (m)	Censored? (y=1)
Philippines	1	Apr-48	Dec-53	68	0
	2	Dec-53	Dec-61	96	0
	3	Dec-61	Dec-65	48	0
	4	Dec-62	Sep-72	117	1
	5	Feb-86	Feb-86	0	0
	6	Feb-86	Jun-92	76	0
	7	Jun-92	Jun-98	72	0
	8	Jun-98	Jan-01	31	0
	9	Jan-01	Dec-06	71	1

APPENDIX 2 – TABLES

Table 2.1: Dominant Parties in Democracies and Autocracies, 1950-2006

<i>Country</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Start Month</i>	<i>End Month</i>	<i>Month Exec at Risk¹</i>	<i>Tenure (Months)</i>	<i>At Risk (Months)¹</i>
<i>Democracies</i>						
Antigua and Barbuda	LP	Feb-76	Mar-04		337	
Austria (I)	OVP	Dec-45	Apr-70		292	
Austria (II)	SPO	Apr-70	Feb-00		358	
Australia	LP	Dec-49	Dec-72		276	
Belgium	CVP	Apr-74	Jul-99		303	
Canada	LP	Oct-35	Jun-57		260	
Germany, West	CDU/CSU	Sep-49	Oct-69		241	
India	INC	Aug-47	Mar-77		355	
Israel	ILP	May-48	Jun-77		349	
Italy	DC	Dec-45	Jun-81		426	
Japan	LDP	Dec-54	Aug-93		464	
Liechtenstein (I)	FBP	Sep-45	Mar-70		294	
Liechtenstein (II)	VU	Apr-78	Apr-01		276	
Luxembourg (I)	CSV	Jul-26	Jun-74		575	
Luxembourg (II)	CSV	Jul-79	-		329*	
Norway	NLP	Mar-35	Aug-63		341	
Samoa	HRPP	Apr-88	-		224*	
South Africa (I)	NP	Jun-48	May-94		551	
Sweden	SAP	Sep-36	Oct-76		481	
Trinidad and Tobago	PNM	Aug-62	Dec-86		292	
<i>Autocracies</i>						
Algeria	FLN	Jul-62	-	Nov-95	533*	133*
Botswana	BDP	Sep-66	-		483*	
Gambia	PPP	Feb-65	Jul-94		353	
Cameroon	CPDM	Jan-60	-	Oct-92	563*	170*
Djibouti	RPP	Jun-77	-	May-93	354*	163*
Ivory Coast	PDCI	Aug-60	Dec-99	Oct-90	472	110
Kenya	KANU	Dec-63	Dec-02	Dec-92	468	120
Malaysia	UMNO	Aug-57	-		592*	
Singapore	PAP	Aug-65	-		496*	
Mexico	PRI	Dec-24	Dec-00	Jul-46	847	653
Mongolia	MPRP	Sep-21	Jul-96	Jul-90	898	72
Mozambique	FRELIMO	Sep-74	-	Oct-94	387	146
Paraguay	PC	Aug-48	Aug-08	May-93	720	183
Senegal	PS	Aug-60	Apr-00	Feb-78	476	266
Seychelles	SPPF	Jun-77	-	Jul-93	354*	161*
Taiwan	KMT	Oct-48	May-00	Mar-96	619	50
Tanzania	CCM	Apr-64	-	Oct-95	512*	134*
Turkey	RPP	Oct-23	May-50	Jul-46	319	46

Zimbabwe	ZANU-PF	Apr-80	-		320*	
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Autocracy -- Personalist

Burkina Faso	CDP	Oct-87	-	Dec-91	230*	180*
Egypt	NDP	Oct-81	-	Sep-05	302*	15*
Gabon	PDG	Mar-68	-	Dec-93	465*	156*
Guinea	PUP	Apr-84	Dec-08	Dec-93	296	180
Uganda	NRM	Jan-86	-	May-96	251*	127*

Borderline Cases

Chile	Concertacion	Mar-90	Mar-10	Mar-90	240	240
El Salvador	ARENA	Jun-89	Jun-09	Jun-89	240	240
United States	Democratic	Mar-33	Jan-53	Mar-33	238	238

Future DPs?

Cambodia	CPP	Jul-97	-	Jul-98	113*	101*
Ethiopia	EPRDF	May-91	-	May-95	187*	139*
Guyana (II)	PPP/Civic	Oct-92	-	Oct-92	170*	170*
Namibia	SWAPO	Mar-90	-	Dec-94	201*	144*
Russia	UR	Dec-91	-	Jul-96	180*	125*
South Africa (II)	ANC	May-94	-	May-94	151*	151*
Zambia	MMD	Nov-91	-	Nov-91	181*	181*

¹ Formerly closed autocracies only; date contestation first permitted or resumed

* Incumbent still in power; tenure through December 2006

Table 2.2: Dominant Parties by Origin

<i>Country</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Start Month</i>	<i>End Month</i>	<i>Month Exec at Risk</i>	<i>Tenure (Months)</i>	<i>At Risk (Months)</i>
<i>Pre-Established Multi-Party Regime</i>						
Austria (II)	SPO	Apr-70	Feb-00		358	
Australia	LP	Dec-49	Dec-72		276	
Belgium	CVP	Apr-74	Jul-99		303	
Canada	LP	Oct-35	Jun-57		260	
Japan	LDP	Dec-54	Aug-93		464	
Liechtenstein (I)	FBP	Sep-45	Mar-70		294	
Liechtenstein (II)	VU	Apr-78	Apr-01		276	
Luxembourg (I)	CSV	Jul-26	Jun-74		575	
Luxembourg (II)	CSV	Jul-79	-		329*	
Norway	NLP	Mar-35	Aug-63		341	
Samoa	HRPP	Apr-88	-		224*	
South Africa (I)	NP	Jun-48	May-94		551	
Sweden	SAP	Sep-36	Oct-76		481	
<i>Regime Founder</i>						
Antigua and Barbuda	LP	Feb-76	Mar-04		337	
Austria (I)	OVP	Dec-45	Apr-70		292	
Botswana	BDP	Sep-66	-		483*	
Gambia	PPP	Feb-65	Jul-94		353	
Germany, West	CDU/CSU	Sep-49	Oct-69		241	
India	INC	Aug-47	Mar-77		355	
Israel	ILP	May-48	Jun-77		349	
Italy	DC	Dec-45	Jun-81		426	
Malaysia	UMNO	Aug-57	-		592*	
Singapore	PAP	Aug-65	-		496*	
Trinidad and Tobago	PNM	Aug-62	Dec-86		292	
Zimbabwe	ZANU-PF	Apr-80	-		320*	
<i>Closed Autocracy</i>						
Algeria	FLN	Jul-62	-	Nov-95	533*	133*
Cameroon	CPDM	Jan-60	-	Oct-92	563*	170*
Djibouti	RPP	Jun-77	-	May-93	354*	163*
Ivory Coast	PDCI	Aug-60	Dec-99	Oct-90	472	110
Kenya	KANU	Dec-63	Dec-02	Dec-92	468	120
Mexico	PRI	Dec-24	Dec-00	Jul-46	847	653
Mongolia	MPRP	Sep-21	Jul-96	Jul-90	898	72
Mozambique	FRELIMO	Sep-74	-	Oct-94	387*	146*
Paraguay	PC	Aug-48	Aug-08	May-93	720	183
Senegal	PS	Aug-60	Apr-00	Feb-78	476	266
Seychelles	SPPF	Jun-77	-	Jul-93	354*	161*

Taiwan	KMT	Oct-48	May-00	Mar-96	619	50
Tanzania	CCM	Apr-64	-	Oct-95	512*	134*
Turkey	RPP	Oct-23	May-50	Jul-46	319	46

Closed Autocracy -- Personalist

Burkina Faso	CDP	Oct-87	-	Dec-91	230*	180*
Egypt	NDP	Oct-81	-	Sep-05	302*	15*
Gabon	PDG	Mar-68	-	Dec-93	465*	156*
Guinea	PUP	Apr-84	Dec-08	Dec-93	296	180
Uganda	NRM	Jan-86	-	May-96	251*	127*

* Incumbent still in power; tenure through December 2006

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