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See also Part 1 (Intro); Part 2 (Big Six); Part 3 (North and Central); Part 5 (Summing Up); and Preview from 2022.
Chiayi City - 嘉義市
KMT: Nominated Chang Chi-kai (張啟楷), a TPP member, as the joint KMT-TPP candidate on May 4.
DPP: Nominated incumbent legislator Wang Mei-hui (王美惠) on October 22, 2025.
Others: TBD
T-PVI: G+4
Notes:
- Wang Mei-hui has been Chiayi City's legislator since 2020. She beat the previous DPP incumbent Lee Chun-yi (李俊俋) in a party primary in 2019, and won with a little over 50% of the vote in both 2020 and 2024. Before becoming a legislator she was a city councilor (2005-2020). She's probably the strongest candidate the DPP could run here.
- The TPP and KMT held a joint polling primary from April 2-4, and the former TPP at-large legislator Chang Chi-kai came out on top. Chang is the only TPP mayoral nominee to win the joint nomination of the KMT (Kao Hung-an is now an independent).
- Chang is a long-time reporter and media personality who joined the TPP in 2023. He was listed 8th on the party list, and because the TPP did so well in the party vote he ended up in the LY as an at-large legislator for two years. He's clearly in the blue camp; he worked for blue-leaning media TVBS and CtiTV, and in 2010 joined Eric Chu's New Taipei election team. But he's not a career politician.
- Popular incumbent KMT mayor Huang Min-hui (黃敏惠) (not to be confused with Wang Mei-hui the legislator) is term-limited out, and the KMT has a limited bench here to try to replace her. For the joint polling primary the party nominated Weng Shou-liang (翁壽良), a physician without much of a public profile.
Polls:
- TVBS survey from April 24-30, 2025, finds Wang leading Chang 43-37%.
Rating: Leans DPP. Wang is a strong candidate: she's effectively an incumbent since her legislative district is coterminous with Chiayi City. Chang is a bit unorthodox but has the benefit of a unified blue-white coalition behind him, and Wang's initial polling numbers aren't strong enough to predict a blowout here. But Chiayi is green-leaning, and the KMT has won it in the past only because Huang Min-hui's family is so politically influential. Huang's endorsement of Chang and participation in the campaign might make this more competitive; that same TVBS survey reports that Mayor Huang has 70%+ approval ratings, but only 40% of Huang's supporters would back the TPP's Chang.
Chiayi County 嘉義縣
KMT: No nominee; backing an independent candidate, Wu Pin-jui (吳品叡), the incumbent mayor of Puzi City.
DPP: Nominated Tsai Yi-yu (蔡易餘), incumbent legislator in Chiayi District 1.
Others: The TPP is also backing Wu.
T-PVI: G+7
Notes:
- Incumbent DPP mayor Weng Chang-liang (翁章梁) is term-limited out. He's consistently ranked as one of the most popular local mayors and might be destined for a cabinet position in the Lai government after he completes his term. He's chairing Tsai's election campaign committee and throwing his organizational weight behind the DPP nominee.
- Tsai won the party's polling primary in January with what was reported as a 25+ point lead over anyone the KMT could field. He defeated county councilor Huang Jung-li (黃榮利) for the nomination.
- Tsai has racked up comfortable wins since his initial election to the legislature in 2016, although he ran several points behind the DPP ticket in 2016 and 2020.
- This is the first time in KMT history that it has not run its own candidate in Chiayi County. The party center ultimately decided to back Wu instead, sparking some grumbling from KMT grassroots members that the party was giving up on an organizational presence in the county.
- The KMT has not been competitive here since Chen Ming-wen (陳明文) defected to the DPP in 2001 and brought his faction (the Lin faction 林派) into the green camp -- his son, Chen Kuan-ting (陳冠廷), now holds the Chiayi County 2 LY seat. Tsai is referred to in news sources as a DPP "party loyalist" and not part of the Lin faction, although he has Weng's backing, and Weng was on the Lin faction side of a bitter dispute between Chen Ming-wen and the previous DPP magistrate Chang Hua-kuan (張花冠) in 2018.
- Tsai was initially reluctant to run after the KMT backed her, and she took a few weeks to declare her candidacy. She announced on July 5 and was joined on stage by KMT at-large Legislator and 2022 nominee Wang Yu-min (王育敏 Alicia Wang), the incumbent Chiayi City Mayor Huang Min-hui, and TPP's Chiayi City nominee Chang Chi-kai.
Polling:
- TBD - nothing since the DPP polling primary in January.
Rating: Likely DPP. Chiayi County is second only to Tainan as the greenest locality in Taiwan. The KMT hasn't outright won the county mayor's race since 1993. So this is a good place to embrace an "Opposition Grand Alliance" (在野大聯盟), as they've branded the effort. Still, given the historic patterns and Chiayi County's deep green shade, it would be a monumental upset for Wu Pin-jui to prevail here.
Yunlin 雲林縣
KMT: Nominated at-large legislator Chang Chia-jun (張嘉郡) ) on February 6, 2026.
DPP: Nominated incumbent legislator Liu Chien-kuo (劉建國) in November 2025.
Others: TBD
T-PVI: G+4
Notes:
- I'm going to reuse some material from the 2022 preview since the matchup is very similar...
- Incumbent mayor Chang Li-shan (張麗善) is term-limited out. Chang Chia-jun is her niece and the daughter of Chang Jung-wei (張榮味). That makes her the leading light of the next generation of the Chang family, the most powerful political family in Yunlin. Chang Jung-wei (張榮味) won two terms as Yunlin County magistrate, in 1999 and 2001. He was convicted of vote-buying in the 1994 county council council election, but only exhausted his court appeals in 2005 and was removed from office then. He was later sentenced to prison for accepting bribes in a case related to the construction of the Mailiao incinerator plant, and was in prison from July 2018 to May 2021. The Chang family has maintained considerable influence in Yunlin through local agricultural cooperative associations.
- Factional politics in Yunlin are complicated, and to add to the confusion, everyone seems to be named Chang (張). The Chang Jung-wei faction which Chang Chia-jun comes from has sometimes been allied with the KMT, and sometimes independent. Even members of Chang Jung-wei's family have sometimes fought against one another in elections here.
- Chang Chia-jun studied in the UK (degrees from UCL and Southampton Univ) and then got an early start in electoral politics: she was elected to the LY in 2008 when she was only 27. She was then district legislator from Yunlin 1 from 2008-2016, did not run for reelection in 2016, ran but lost to incumbent Su Chih-fen (蘇治芬) in 2020, then rejoined the LY on the party list in 2024.
- Liu Chien-kuo is a long-time legislator from Yunlin's 2nd District. Liu got his start on the Yunlin County Council, first winning a seat in 2002. He gained national attention in 2008 when he ran for the legislature in Yunlin 2, lost, then accused his opponent Chang Sho-wen (張碩文) of the KMT of vote-buying. Chang lost the case and was stripped of his seat in 2009, and Liu won the by-election to replace him. He's represented Yunlin 2 ever since. He's not named Chang so he's got that going for himself at least.
- Liu was also the nominee in 2022, and lost narrowly (by about 40k votes) after getting a late start on the campaign. The DPP has been determined to give him a better shot this time and decided on his renomination by November 2025.
Polls:
- 2026.3.23-28. BigMedia News group poll conducted by Pearson Data found Chang at 49.5%, Liu at 39%.
Rating: leans KMT. Chang is well-positioned to carry on the family legacy in Yunlin. She's got significant electoral experience and the full backing of her family's political networks, including the support of her aunt, the outgoing (and popular) incumbent. Liu is a solid candidate for the DPP and has a political base in the inland areas that his constituency covers, but needs to build a stronger campaign organization in the coastal areas of Yunlin 1 that Chang used to represent. Yunlin leans green at the national level but factional politics here are still often decisive.
Pingtung 屏東縣
KMT: Nominated Su Ching-chuan (蘇清泉), the party's 2022 nominee.
DPP: Renominated incumbent mayor Chou Chun-mi (周春米) on February 4.
Others: TBD.
T-PVI: G+6
Notes:
- This race is a rematch of 2022. Then, Su nearly pulled off a big upset, ultimately losing only 49-47% (~11,000 votes). He was pretty salty about it, too, and tried to challenge the results. This is Su's third try at the mayor's office, and this time around he is focused on Pingtung's low GDP/capita and claimed economic stagnation -- it's a mostly agricultural county that is not connected to the HSR system on the west coast, so it's been left out of the high-tech boom.
- Chou won a three-way contest for the party primary in 2022, and barely held on in the fall election, so she's not a shoo-in. But her approval numbers are now pretty good, and it's always hard to beat an incumbent mayor where the partisan lean already favors them, absent a national wave.
- Pingtung has been trending a bit away from the DPP over the last couple election cycles, and there are some scattered signs of shakiness at the local level: party-backed candidates lost two township mayor by-elections in July 2025 and January 2026. Under Chou's watch Pingtung has also suffered from a couple of public-safety incidents -- the Ming Yang factor fire and the Antai Hospital fire (though that hospital was founded by Su, so it cuts both ways).
- Unlike 2022, when the NPP ran a candidate who took 4% of the vote, there's no third party candidate so far. That probably favors Chou, and it's a good sign that the factional battles of the previous election are behind her for now.
Polls:
- The polls were notoriously off here in 2022; they badly underestimated Su's vote share, in some cases by 20 points or more. Treat all polls with some skepticism these days, but especially here given that it's the same two opponents again, and Pingtung may just be especially hard to poll.
- That said, no polls from reputable sources yet.
Rating: leans DPP. Under normal conditions I'd predict a popular DPP mayor running for reelection in a green-leaning county would be a likely win. But the 2022 result should give some pause.
Hualien 花蓮縣
KMT: Nominated Yu Shu-chen (游淑貞) on March 4.
DPP: No nominee; may back an independent.
Others: Chang Chun (張峻), Wei Chia-hsien (魏嘉賢).
T-PVI: B+18
Notes:
- The story here has to start with Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), Hualien's current legislator. The incumbent mayor Hsu Chen-wei (徐榛蔚) is the wife of Fu, and took over after he was convicted on final appeal of insider stock trading and forced to leave office in 2018. She got appointed in his place -- they divorced to get around Taiwan's anti-nepotism law, then remarried -- is finishing her second term this year and cannot run again, ending, for now, what The Reporter (報導者) calls the "Fu family dynasty." Since Fu first won the Hualien magistracy in 2009, he and Hsu Chen-wei have together held the office for four terms spanning nearly 17 years, a record. Fu himself has served a prison term, rejoined the KMT, gotten elected to the LY, and become the KMT's legislative caucus whip where he's now a major (and deeply problematic) political force.
- The Fu clan has publicly supported Ji'an township head Yu Shu-chen (游淑貞) for the nomination. Yu won the KMT's internal polling primary in January and was duly nominated by party center on March 4.
- HOWEVA, two other pan-blue figures are challenging her outside the party nomination process. County council speaker Chang Chun (張峻) left the KMT after being denied the speaker nomination under the party's "anti-black-gold clause" (he had a previous vote-buying conviction overturned on appeal) and is running as an independent. He's been joined by county councilor Wei Chia-hsien (魏嘉賢), also formerly KMT but expelled after defying party orders and running for a council seat four years ago.
- The DPP hasn't nominated a candidate here, and it appears to be leaning towards backing Chang since he actively supported the recall election in Hualien last year. But according to polling from multiple outlets, Wei probably has the broader appeal and is the stronger candidate against Yu.
Polls:
- 2026.3.18-20. My Formosa poll pits each of the independents against Yu, finds Wei ahead of Yu 35-31%, but Chang behind 28-44%.
- 2026.7.21-23. TVBS article citing a Storm Media poll, finds a three way race: Yu in the lead with 30%, Wei with 22%, Chang with 12.5%.
Rating: leans KMT. I did not expect to find such an interesting race here. Fu Kun-chi has dominated the county government for most of the last two decades, but it's not self-evident he can transfer his influence to a newcomer. A lot depends on who the DPP ultimately decides to back; do they go for principle or pragmatism? If it's Wei they ultimately end up supporting, then this could well be a toss-up.
Bonus Photo
I have to throw this picture in here...Cheng Li-wun is very tall. That is all.
Taitung 台東縣
KMT: Nominated Wu Hsiu-hua (吳秀華) on December 24, 2025
DPP: Nominated indigenous Lowlands legislator Chen Ying (陳瑩) on October 22, 2025.
Others: none so far; former DPP legislator Liu Chao-hao (劉櫂豪) publicly bowed out on July 31.
T-PVI: B+16
Notes:
- The incumbent, Yao Ching-ling (饒慶鈴 sometimes spelled Rao instead of Yao), is term-limited out, so this is another open seat the KMT is defending.
- Wu is the incumbent county council speaker. She's the sister of former magistrate candidate Wu Chun-li (吳俊立), who took office in 2005 and then was immediately suspended for being convicted of a corruption charge. He tried to divorce and then appoint his wife as his replacement, but the MoI ruled that move illegal and appointed a replacement instead. His ex-wife Kuang Li-chen (鄺麗貞) then won the by-election for the office in 2006, and served one term. Just within the past year, Wu Chun-li is in fresh legal trouble for a stock manipulation case.
- Wu Hsiu-hua has her own corruption rumors; she's been linked to a road-widening scandal that Taitung prosecutors are investigating. (County council speakers often have a lot of influence over local public works decisions).
- Chen Ying is a strong candidate for the DPP in a race it's never won before. She has been one of three lowlands indigenous representatives in the legislature since winning in 2016 in an upset, and she's the first DPP member ever to win one of the reserved indigenous seats. About 25% of the electorate in Taitung is indigenous, so that background helps her chances. More important, her father Chen Chien-nien (陳建年) was Taitung County magistrate from 1993-2001 as a KMT member, and he was the first person with indigenous status ever to serve as city or county executive. His old networks have helped sustain Chen Ying's political career. (On the less positive side, he also was convicted of vote-buying during Chen Ying's first run for the LY in 2004).
- The DPP faced a coordination challenge here when Liu Chao-hao, the former DPP legislator from Taitung (2016-2024), indicated he wanted to run for county magistrate again. That would have been the seventh (!) time he's tried for that office; he lost the other six attempts including the by-election against Kuang Li-chen in 2006. There was a concerted effort by party heavyweights to get him to drop out of the race, apparently involving key southern DPP power-brokers Chen Ming-wen and Chuang Jui-hsiung (莊瑞雄); Liu finally announced on July 31 that he would not run. Tsai Ing-wen herself then came to Taitung to seal the deal and appear with both Chen and Liu in a demonstration of party unity.
Polls:
- 2026.5.27-28. CNEWS poll reports two results:
- Three-way scenario: Wu Hsiu-hua 44.2%, Chen Ying 15.0%, Liu Chao-hao 13.4%, undecided 27.4%
- Two-way scenario: Wu Hsiu-hua 51.3%, Chen Ying 22.4%, undecided 26.3%
Rating: Leans KMT. Start with the fact that Taitung is very blue -- Hou Yu-ih won 50% of the vote here in 2024, compared to 33.5% nation-wide -- and add the fact that a DPP candidate has never won the county executive election. That makes any KMT nominee the strong favorite in a two-way race.
But there are some glimmers of hope for the DPP nonetheless. For one, the partisan divides that seem so fierce to observers in Taipei are far shallower in Taitung. The current magistrate, Rao Ching-ling, is an "old friend" of Chen Ying and has had warm things to say about her, despite their different party affiliations. And Chen Ying and Wu Hsiu-hua aren't exactly enemies, either. Politics within indigenous communities are also complex, and Chen Ying's demonstrated ability to win over indigenous voters who are normally hostile to the DPP is a real asset. The DPP has also done surprisingly well here in the LY races recently, thanks to Liu Chao-hao's over-performance (although the Taitung LY district excludes indigenous voters).
Wu has some family baggage and a brewing corruption scandal of her own. All in all, it's probably not enough to deny her a win. Probably.
Penghu 澎湖縣
KMT: Nominated Huxi Township head Chen Chen-chung (陳振中) in April 2026.
DPP: Renominated Chen Kuang-fu (陳光復); drafted his wife Wu Shu-chin (吳淑瑾) to replace him on June 17.
Others: Former Magong mayor Yeh Chu-lin (葉竹林) is again running as an independent.
T-PVI: B+2
Notes:
- Incumbent DPP mayor Chen Kuang-fu had a fall on February 17, 2026, suffering a hemorrhage and falling into a coma. He's been in intensive care ever since. He had already gotten the DPP's nod for reelection, but given his condition, the party drafted his wife Wu Shu-chin (吳淑瑾) to run in his place.
- Chen is the only DPP member ever to win the mayor's office in Penghu; he first won in 2014, then was defeated in 2018, then snuck back into office in 2022 when two KMT candidates split the pan-blue vote. The Penghu legislator is a 4-term DPP member, Yang Yao (楊曜), but he's repeatedly turned down entreaties to run for mayor. Other than those two, Penghu has historically voted pretty blue.
- With Chen incapacitated, the DPP scrambled to find a substitute, cycling through several options before settling on Wu as the path of least resistance.
- The KMT named Hu-hsi Township head Chen Chen-chung (陳振中) as its nominee without controversy. The problem for them is that Yeh Chu-lin is also running again. He's a former KMT member and mayor of Magong, the largest city in Penghu, who in 2022 registered for the election on the last possible day and then got enough of the pan-blue vote to throw the election to Chen -- the final split was 36-33-30%. That could happen again this year.
Polls:
- 2026.7.14-8.3 ETToday poll has Chen in the lead, 30% to Wu's 21% and Yeh's 18%.
Rating: Toss-up. It's too hard to know just yet how this three-way race will shake out, especially given Wu's late entry into the campaign. There might be a sympathy vote for her husband. Yeh might stay competitive, or end up abandoned by voters if he's clearly in third place.
Kinmen 金門縣
KMT: Formally nominated incumbent legislator Chen Yu-jen (陳玉珍).
DPP: No nominee.
Others: Former mayor Yang Chen-wu (楊鎮浯) is running without the KMT nomination, as is current deputy mayor Li Wen-liang (李文良).
T-PVI: B+32
Notes:
- So here's where the three-cornered races (三腳督) are hiding this cycle. Where the DPP is too weak to field a competitive candidate, things get old-school -- the patterns here (and in Hualien) look a lot like the pre-1990s era elsewhere in Taiwan.
- The incumbent mayor Chen Fu-hai would have been eligible for re-election...except that he's not because of an amendment to the Elections and Recall Act passed in 2023 (the so-called anti-black gold clause 排黑條款) that permanently bars anyone convicted of taking bribes from holding elected office -- and he has an old conviction from the 1990s. He's attempted to pass the torch to the next generation by supporting his son, Chen Chi-hsiang (陳麒翔), for county council.
- The KMT party center nominated Kinmen legislator Chen Yu-jen, who has already deferred running for this office twice before. She's vowed not to yield the nomination again.
- Former incumbent Yang Chen-wu (楊鎮浯) lost the nomination procedure but is running anyway, in fine Kinmen tradition. He has a rivalry with Chen Yu-jen that got more personal in the 2024 legislative election, when he refused to support her reelection and endorsed a TPP challenger. He also is a rival of Chen Fu-hai, who he beat by 800 votes in 2018, then was defeated by in 2022.
- Deputy mayor Li Wen-liang (李文良) has also declared he's running, and has gotten support from Chen Chi-hsiang.
- The DPP has considered parachuting in a candidate here -- current at-large Legislator Chen Pei-yu (陳培瑜) is one name floated in some sources -- but still hasn't nominated anyone.
Rating: Safe KMT. The only question is which KMT candidate will win this Battle Royale.
Lienchiang County 連江縣
KMT: Nominated incumbent mayor Wang Chung-ming (王忠銘) on June 8, 2026.
DPP: No nominee.
Others: KMT member Tsao Erh-yuan (曹爾元) is running an independent campaign again, like in 2022.
T-PVI: B+33
Notes:
- Mayor Wang has the party center's nod since he's an incumbent eligible for re-election. This race will be a rematch of 2022, when Wang won 51-42% over Tsao.
- In 2022, the DPP member Lii Wen made a valiant attempt to build the DPP's appeal here by running a no-hope campaign for mayor; he got 7% of the vote. With that as the last data point, it's going to be hard to convince anybody else to run on the DPP label here.
Rating: Safe KMT. Two candidates running, both will keep the local government in KMT hands.
See also Part 1 (Intro); Part 2 (Big Six); Part 3 (North and Central); Part 5 (Summing Up)
- Published on
See also Part 1 (Intro); Part 2 (Big Six); Part 4 (South, East, and Offshore Islands); Part 5 (Summing Up); Preview from 2022.
Keelung 基隆市
KMT: Renominated incumbent mayor Hsieh Kuo-liang (謝國樑)
DPP: Nominated Tung Tzu-wei (童子瑋) on Dec 31, 2025.
Others: TBD
T-PVI: B+6
Notes:
- Incumbent Hsieh Kuo-liang easily survived a recall attempt in October 2024: no beat yes, 55-45%, and the yes votes fell about 8k votes short of the 25% threshold. The recall was supposedly organized because Mayor Hsieh had ordered police to break into a retail property whose owners were contesting an order to vacate, before a court had ruled on the dispute. Recall organizers also claimed a larger set of grievances: mismanaged spending, broken campaign promises, opaque no-bid contracts, and new busses breaking down. Hsieh has also had fairly low approval ratings for much of his first term. But apparently not low enough to be recalled...
- The Keelung recall vote was a preview of the Great Recall elections of 2025, when all the KMT legislators facing recalls also won. Like in 2025, the signature-gathering drive was launched by a civil society group, and DPP figures including the former DPP mayor Lin Yu-chang (林右昌) and current Taipei mayor nominee Puma Shen joined campaigners on stage to support recalling Hsieh.
- Hsieh comes from a prominent and wealthy political family in Keelung. His grandfather (謝清雲) founded the Keelung Second Credit Cooperative in the 1950s, then was a Taiwan Provincial Assembly member and ran in (but lost) the Keelung mayor's race in 1964 -- as a KMT member! -- to an independent candidate. His father Hsieh Hsiu-ping (謝修平) inherited the family business and also served as a Provincial Assembly member before becoming Keelung City Council Speaker and later serving as a National Assembly member from 1991-96. He sought the Keelung mayor's office in 1997 but was forced aside by the party center as it faced a stiff challenge from the DPP.
- Hsieh Kuo-liang holds multiple degrees from U.S. universities -- a BA from USC and an MS from MIT -- and speaks excellent English. He also has an LLM from NCCU in Taipei. He eventually followed in the family footsteps and entered politics, winning an LY seat in 2004 on the PFP label, then winning reelection in 2008 and 2012 as the sole legislator from Keelung. He either chose or was forced not to run in 2016 when Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌) wanted to parachute into what he thought was a safe blue Keelung LY seat (which Hau then lost in an embarrassing upset.) Hsieh ran the family business for a few years before making his comeback in 2022 and is the first of the Hsieh clan to actually become mayor.
- Tung Tzu-wei is a two-term Keelung city councilor who was elected council speaker in 2022, when he was only 36 years old. He's also from a political family: his grandfather is Tung Yung (童永), a policy advisor to both Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te, and President Lai is his father's cousin. Tung was the top vote-getter in his multi-member council district in both 2018 and 2022, so he's got some proven electoral appeal. This is the right kind of candidate profile for the DPP to be competitive in a blue-leaning city like Keelung.
Polls:
- 7.24-27: A Mirror Media poll finds a close race: Hsieh leads Tung 38.5-36%. Tung leads among respondents under 50.
Rating: leans KMT. Hsieh is an incumbent running for re-election in a blue-leaning city, and that should be enough for him to win. But the recall challenge, his low public approval ratings, and a spirited DPP challenger with local roots suggest this could be competitive. This race is worth keeping an eye on for a DPP upset.
Yilan 宜蘭縣
KMT: Nominated Wu Tsung-hsien (吳宗憲) on May 4 after he won the KMT-TPP polling primary.
DPP: Nominated Lin Kuo-chang (林國漳) on October 25, 2025.
Others: TBD.
T-PVI: G+5
Notes:
- Lin is a political newcomer (素人) but also a lawyer who's practiced in Yilan for 30 years, so he has deep local roots (在地深耕). He was personally recruited to run here by President Lai (in his concurrent role as DPP chairman). The DPP has suffered from factional infighting in the two previous election cycles, and that's allowed the KMT's Lin Zi-miao (林姿妙) to prevail twice in a green-leaning county. Lin's nomination here has apparently papered over these differences enough that Yilan DPP office-holders have publicly lined up behind him and he's seen as the clear favorite.
- The KMT incumbent Mayor Lin was convicted of corruption charges and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment; she is now suspended and her deputy is running the county. That messed up the KMT's succession plans here: Lin's daughter, Lin Yi-ling, has declined to run as has the county council speaker Chang Sheng-te. The KMT ended up parachuting in (空降) Wu Tsung-hsien (吳宗憲), who has no previous ties to Yilan.
- Wu is a former prosecutor with 20 years experience who worked in Taoyuan, Shilin, and Nantou. He joined Hou You-yi's administration in New Taipei in 2020, then in 2024 was placed high enough on the KMT legislative party list to win a seat. He's been in the LY since then.
- Wu was able to dodge a bullet when the TPP-KMT joint primary poll put him on top of former TPP legislator and Yilan party chapter head Chen Wan-hui (陳琬惠). She ran a third-party campaign here in 2022, but has agreed to respect the results of the poll and back Wu. This is yet another case where the KMT has ended up a big beneficiary of their pre-electoral coalition deal with the TPP, while the TPP has nothing to show for it.
Polls:
- 3.16-18. My Formosa with a high-quality poll showing Lin leading Wu 36-33%, before Wu was formally nominated.
Rating: leans DPP. Lin seems to be the right kind of candidate for Yilan: deep local roots, no ties to any of the various DPP groups feuding with each other, and has the backing of the party center. Wu has a clean reputation -- a nice contrast with the last KMT mayor -- but has no local ties and no experience running for office. Absent a major national headwind, Yilan's traditional green lean should be enough for Lin to prevail over a weak opponent.
Hsinchu City 新竹市
IND: Incumbent Mayor Kao Hung-an (高虹安) is now an independent running for reelection; she was a TPP member until she was charged with embezzlement and expelled from the party.
KMT: The KMT decided in December not to field a candidate to challenge Kao.
DPP: Nominated Chuang Ching-cheng (莊競程) on April 15.
Others: Former KMT party spokesman Ho Chih-yung (何志勇) announced on Nov 11, 2025 he would run and has not backed down in the face of KMT pressure.
T-PVI: B+4
Notes:
- Kao is really living a charmed political life. First she won her appeal against charges that she had embezzled funds for assistant salaries. The appeals court didn't absolve her of misbehavior but reduced her sentence to a minor violation and a fine, which reinstated her as mayor and made her eligible to run for re-election. Then she avoided a KMT challenger when the party decided to treat her like the TPP member she used to be. Now she's got the tacit support of both pan-blue parties despite being suspended as mayor for much of her first term, and running as an independent for her second.
- Forgoing a challenge to Kao in Hsinchu is the single biggest concession the KMT has made to honor their pre-electoral pact with the TPP -- and it's benefitting a candidate who isn't even a TPP member anymore.
- Chuang Ching-cheng is a former legislator who served one term representing Taichung's 5th District, from 2020-2024. In what's becoming a bit of a pattern for the DPP, after he lost re-election, he joined the Lai administration, then was nominated for the Hsinchu race. He is a parachute candidate without any obvious connection to Hsinchu. One reason he was nominated appears to be his educational background in biomedical engineering -- perhaps a plus given Hsinchu's highly educated electorate.
- Ho's intention to run complicates things for Kao, but he's a long-shot candidate. He's a political science professor (PhD UC Santa Barbara) who previously led the KMT's party cadre training center but has never run for office before. He might pick up some protest votes, but enough to play spoiler? Probably not.
Polls:
- 1.19. Mirror Media poll shows Kao leading previous DPP mayor Lin Chih-chieh 41-24%.
- 5.19-20. CNEWS poll finds Kao leading Chuang 55-21% (and didn't ask about Ho).
Rating: leans IND. Kao has somehow stayed quite popular despite being suspended as mayor for 18 months; she's gotten a jump in support from the court reversal in December 2025. Hsinchu also has the most educated and youngest electorate in Taiwan, and Kao's former TPP affiliation and high-tech background make her a better fit here than in most of Taiwan. She's well-positioned to win in the fall, but independents are inherently vulnerable if there are both KMT and DPP candidates running, and Kao has some real political baggage. Prosecutors have also appealed the lower court ruling to the Supreme Court, and Kao could also become ineligible again if it restores the full conviction -- which would blow this race wide open.
Hsinchu County 新竹縣
KMT: Nominated Hsu Hsin-ying (徐欣瑩) on March 28.
DPP: Nominated Jhubei Mayor Cheng Chao-feng (鄭朝方) on June 10.
Others: KMT Deputy Magistrate Chen Chien-hsien (陳見賢) has threatened to run as an independent.
T-PVI: B+11
Notes:
- Hsu Hsin-ying has a long history in Hsinchu County and a complicated relationship with the KMT. She left the party in 2015 when it was spiraling in the late Ma Ying-jeou era, and founded the Minkuotang (民國黨) as a kind of "protest" KMT party. She then ran as James Soong's VP candidate in 2016, and ran on the MKT label in the 2018 Hsinchu County election with the support of Ko Wen-je, losing to the current incumbent Yang Wen-ke 38-33%, with DPP nominee Cheng Chao-feng taking 28%. In 2020 she dissolved the MKT and ran as part of a Parliamentary Party Alliance that didn't win any seats. She rejoined the KMT in 2022, then was nominated and elected to the LY in Hsinchu's 1st District in 2024.
- The KMT held a primary here to determine the nominee, and Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun put her finger on the scale against Hsu by making the party member vote count for 30% of the final score. That still wasn't enough; Hsu narrowly beat Cheng's preferred candidate, deputy magistrate Chen Chien-hsien (陳見賢). Chen has pointedly not endorsed Hsu and rumors are that he will launch an independent bid, which would split the pan-blue vote.
- Cheng Chao-feng is the current mayor of Jhubei, the largest city in the county (37% of the total electorate) and effectively a suburb of high-tech Hsinchu. He won that office with only 40% of the vote in 2022 when KMT, TPP, and independent candidates split the rest. He's also run against Hsu before, in 2018, when both lost to Yang Wen-ke (楊文科).
- Hsinchu County is majority Hakka, a demographic group with which the DPP has traditionally been quite weak. Cheng is Hakka and was recruited heavily by the party center, with President Lai personally bestowing his campaign sash on him at the nomination press conference.
- The TPP is sitting this one out, and has focused their efforts instead on winning Jhubei; they've nominated Chiu Chen-yuan (邱臣遠), a former TPP legislator and Hsinchu City's deputy mayor (and acting mayor for the 18 months Kao was suspended). The KMT hasn't yielded the nomination there, though, instead putting forward county councilor Wu Hsu-chih (吳旭智). Neither side is backing down and Ko Wen-je has been unusually, publicly vocal about supporting a TPP candidate here. It's a little odd that this township-level race is where the party has decided to take a firm stand against the KMT. If the two parties do both register their own candidates, a significant part of the TPP's future hopes then will rest on Chiu's performance. FWIW, the DPP has nominated Yang-ming Chiao-tung University Professor Tseng Sheng-kai (曾聖凱) for Jhubei mayor.
- The incumbent county executive Yang Wen-ke was indicted in July 2024 for accepting bribes in a real estate development in Jhubei. He was acquitted just last month, but several other county government officials were convicted. Prosecutors may appeal. Something to watch given Jhubei's political importance this cycle.
Polls:
- 2026.1.24-26. Taiwan Power News (?) reports poll with Hsu leading Cheng 39-34%.
- 2.25-27. TVBS poll (reported in news article but not on polling site) looks at three-way race: finds Chen with 35%, Cheng with 29%, Hsu in 3rd with 22%.
- 3.4-6. MyFormosa poll finds Hsu leading Cheng 38.5%-32%.
Rating: Leans KMT. A lot depends on whether Chen Chien-hsien follows through with his threat to run as an independent. Cheng is the strongest candidate the DPP could run here, but even so it will take a serious pan-blue split for him to pull off the upset.
Miaoli County 苗栗縣
KMT: Independent mayor Chung Tung-chin (鍾東錦) rejoined the KMT on September 14, 2025, and is running for re-election.
DPP: Nominated Chen Pin-an (陳品安) on November 26, 2025.
Others: TBD
T-PVI: B+12
Notes:
- As speaker of the Miaoli County Council, Chung Tung-chin thumbed his nose at KMT party center in 2022, running as a renegade candidate when party chair Eric Chu settled instead on the obscure Hsieh Fu-hung (謝福弘) as the party's nominee. Chung was kicked out of the party but nonetheless won handily in a four-way race with 43%, although the DPP and NPP candidates combined won 45%. The party formally readmitted him in September 2025. As an incumbent KMT mayor he benefits from the party's presumption of renomination and its pact with the TPP; he's likely to have a much easier time of it this election cycle.
- The DPP's Chen Pin-an got her start in politics in 2013 by defending protestors in Miaoli who'd tried to stop an onshore wind project by InfraVest, a German wind power company. She then put down roots in Miaoli: she won a county council seat in 2018 as an independent, then joined the DPP and was re-elected in 2022 with the highest vote total in her district.
Polls:
- TBD
Rating: Likely KMT. With no pan-blue challengers, Chung is well-positioned to win re-election in one of the deepest blue counties in Taiwan. That said, the DPP did well here to recruit Chen, who is a fresh face and has high name recognition and a decent electoral track record in Miaoli. The DPP+NPP combined strength in 2022 is also an intriguing data point. And Chung has a sordid personal history that could again blow up at some point. We'll know more once candidate registration has passed -- another independent candidate entering the race could open a path for an upset.
Nantou County 南投縣
KMT: Renominated incumbent mayor Hsu Shu-hua (許淑華)。
DPP: Nominated Wen Shih-cheng (溫世政), a local dentist.
Others: TBD.
T-PVI: B+5
Notes:
- Hsu Shu-hua has already had a long political career. She got her start in politics by being elected to the Nantou County Council as a PFP member way back in 2002, when she was only 27. She joined the KMT and won the Nantou City mayor's race in 2005, serving two terms, then won an LY by-election (for Nantou 2, the bluer of Nantou's two LY districts) in 2015 and was re-elected twice (with 57% and 55% of the vote) in tough years for the KMT. She was a KMT Central Standing Committee member and served as spokesperson for Han Kuo-yu's 2018 Kaohsiung mayoral campaign. In 2022, she won the Nantou magistrate race 56-44%, becoming Nantou's first-ever female magistrate. Moreover, her satisfaction ratings have improved significantly over her first term. As an incumbent in a blue-leading county with a long history of native-son/daughter voting patterns, she's going to be hard to beat.
- That said, she does have some controversies in her recent past. During the 2022 campaign she was accused of plagiarizing her master's thesis; Feng Chia University ultimately accepted her revised thesis and let her keep the degree. In addition, her father, Hsu Tien-sung (許天送), who is a former two-term Nantou City representative council chair, is a former convict, which DPP challenger Frida Tsai Pei-hui (蔡培慧) raised as an attack line in their race in 2022; Hsu defended her father as having "already paid his debt to society." More recently, in 2024, her administration's plan to site a waste incinerator in Mingjian Township sparked organized local opposition and protester clashes during 2026 environmental review hearings.
- Wen Shih-cheng is a native (prodigal?) son who has been away for a long time: he grew up in Caotun but went to high school in Taichung, went to Taipei Medical University's dentistry program, and built a successful and famous dental implant practice in New Taipei. He hasn't lived in Nantou since, or been involved in electoral politics before.
- The DPP's efforts to recruit a more experienced candidate here struck out: their top choices were at-large legislator Lo Mei-ling (羅美玲 - a naturalized citizen born in Malaysia who served in the Nantou County council) and Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare Lin Ching-yi (林靜儀), who both declined.
Polls:
- TBD.
Rating: Safe KMT. Of all the KMT-run localities, this one seems the hardest in which to imagine an upset. It's got a popular incumbent mayor running for re-election in a blue-leaning area, facing a complete political novice who hasn't lived in the county for decades, with no third-party challengers or intra-party splits on the horizon.
Changhua County 彰化縣
KMT: Nominated Wei Ping-cheng (魏平政) on May 13, 2026.
DPP: Nominated Chen Su-yueh (陳素月) in December 2025 via internal poll.
Others: Former DPP mayor Chiu Chien-fu (邱建富); TPP's Tsai Pi-ru (蔡壁如); KMT legislator Hsieh Yi-feng (謝衣鳯) has threatened to run as an independent.
T-PVI: B+1
Notes:
- It seems like there's always at least one race that goes haywire for both major parties in each election cycle. In 2022 that was Miaoli. In 2026, it's Changhua. Both parties are dealing with disgruntled primary losers who threaten to split the vote, and there's still the threat of a renegade campaign by a TPP-linked candidate, too.
- Chen Su-yueh is the sitting legislator from Changhua's 4th District, a seat she's held since winning a by-election in 2015. Before that she was a Changhua County Councilor for two terms (2006-14). Her vote totals as a legislator: 2016 - 57% (DPP Pr 57%); 2020 - 53% (DPP Pr 57%), 2024 - 52% (DPP Pr 39%).
- Chiu Chien-fu is a 39-year DPP member and two-term mayor of Changhua City -- the largest in the county -- who was passed over for the nomination. He quit the party in June and announced a run as an independent.
- Wei Ping-cheng is a lawyer from a well-known Shetou-area silk-stocking manufacturing family who was nominated by party chair Cheng Li-wun on May 13, 2026. He has no previous electoral experience.
- The party passed over sitting Legislator Hsieh Yi-feng from Changhua's 3rd District, who had stronger polling numbers but was blocked for "family reasons," per KMT party center.
- The TPP's Tsai Pi-ru declared for the race shortly after Wei was nominated, arguing that she would be the stronger candidate for the pan-blue side. But on June 3, the TPP election committee decided not to nominate a candidate in Changhua, and Tsai publicly dropped her bid but still didn't rule out a possible run.
- Incumbent KMT magistrate Wang Huei-mei (王惠美) twice won easily here but is term-limited out, meaning this is another open-seat race where the KMT is playing defense. Wang has also been noticeably absent from Wei's campaign events so far.
Polls:
- 5.20-21. CNEWS poll looks at Chen, Wei, and Tsai; Chen in lead with 30%, Wei at 14%, Tsai at 8.5%.
- 8.10-17. ETToday poll finds Chen way ahead of Wei, 36-19%, with Chiu getting 12%.
Rating: Leans DPP. Changhua is as close to an evenly-balanced county as there is in Taiwan -- only one point bluer than the national average. Thanks to Wang Huei-mei's popularity, the KMT has held the county government without trouble for eight years, but they've nominated a weak candidate in Wei who doesn't appear to have the support of other local powerbrokers. Chen Su-yueh is vulnerable given the renegade DPP candidate, but Wei is going to struggle to unify the pan-blue vote behind him, as the latest polls show. If Hsieh or Tsai run that would make things even worse for the KMT. It would probably take a late switch in KMT candidate to make this competitive.
See also Part 1 (Intro); Part 2 (The Big Six); Part 4 (South, East, and Offshore Islands); Part 5 (Summing Up)
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From 2022, during better times for the Taiwan People's Party -- and before the Taipei City election ordinance banned most campaign billboards.
What's This?
In the run-up to Taiwan's 2022 local elections, I put together a set of previews on the local mayor's races to help me track the campaign. I'm going to do that again here for 2026 and roll these out over the next few days.
Part 1. Introduction -- see below.
Part 4. South, East, and Offshore Islands
Part 5. Summing Up.
Introduction
Taiwan's local elections will take place on November 28, 2026. There are contests for over 10,000 different offices, ranging from the mayor of Taipei all the way down to village chiefs in indigenous communities in rural Taitung. In Taiwan these are often called the "9-in-1 elections" (九合一選舉) because they combine voting for nine different types of offices, most of which used to be held at different times, in one single campaign and election day held once every four years. These are:
- (1) Mayors and (2) city councilors in centrally-administered municipalities (直轄市市長,市議員) for Taipei, Kaohsiung, New Taipei City, Taichung, Tainan, and Taoyuan;
- (3) Executives and (4) councilors in counties and county-level municipalities (縣/省轄市長,縣/市議員);
- (5) Township and town heads and (6) councilors (鄉/鎮長,鄉/鎮議員);
- (7) Village and ward heads (村/里長);
- (8) Indigenous "self-governing" district heads and (9) representatives (自治區長,區代表).
This consolidation of election terms and cycles has turned local elections into something like a U.S. federal midterm election. It's obviously a big deal in local politics -- all of Taiwan's elected offices except for the president and the legislature are up for grabs. But it's also a big deal for all three parties that hold seats in the legislature right now, and there are some important if indirect implications for the 2028 races and for the current national political stalemate.
What's at Stake for the Political Parties?
For the KMT, the results will affect Cheng Li-wun's (鄭麗文) influence in the party. As party chairwoman, one of the most important jobs is to manage nominations and coordinate what is increasingly a nationalized election campaign. If the party does well overall, she's well-positioned to steer nominations for the KMT's 2028 presidential and legislative candidates. If it does poorly, there will be mounting pressure on her to step aside, and her influence is likely to decline regardless of whether she does.
For the DPP, the elections will determine whether President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) can hold onto the DPP party chair, and perhaps even whether he'll face an internal party challenger for renomination next year. The precedent here is 2018; then, Tsai Ing-wen had to resign after a terrible showing for the party and then got challenged for the DPP's presidential nomination by...Lai Ching-te, who argued that Tsai was headed for defeat if she was renominated. She beat that back and ended up crushing Han Kuo-yu in the 2020 election, but it wasn't easy. Lai could have to deal with a similar threat if the DPP struggles again in the local races.
And for the TPP, these elections are downright existential. The party peaked in January 2024, when Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) won 26.5% of the presidential vote and the TPP captured eight critical seats to make them the kingmakers in the LY.
But since then they've played a strong hand remarkably badly. They didn't win either of the Legislative Yuan leadership positions despite having the leverage to do so, their former chairman Ko is now appealing a 17-year prison sentence for corruption and banned from running in 2028, their new party chair Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) lost the KMT-TPP joint nomination for New Taipei to a colorless KMT technocrat, Ko's former deputy mayor Huang Shan-shan is no longer in the legislature, and they had to expel legislator Li Zhenxiu (李貞秀) for failing to renounce her PRC citizenship. From a really promising starting point, they've done little in public to distinguish themselves from the KMT over the last 2+ years, and they're now the most disliked of the three major parties.
So, these elections loom as a crucial moment for the TPP: they need to win a couple mayor's races and increase their councilor seats (they won only 14 of 910 in 2022) to demonstrate they are still a viable alternative to the two big parties. But the signs so far aren't great. The party entered into a joint nomination process with the KMT and got very little in return: only in Chiayi County (a deep green stronghold) did the KMT back a TPP candidate rather than the other way around. There is also Hsinchu City, where the incumbent mayor Kao Hung-an (高虹安) is running for re-election as an independent, and the KMT party center has decided not to nominate a candidate there. Kao was a TPP member when she was elected, but she got kicked out of the party after being charged with embezzlement of assistants salaries; she got the charges reduced and got reinstated as mayor, but has not rejoined the party, so the TPP can't really count her as one of their own anymore.
Without any competitive mayoral candidates of its own, the TPP needs a really strong showing in the councilor races to dispel the growing impression they're in (perhaps terminal) decline -- especially important for a party that doesn't have many (any?) consistent values or distinct policy goals. Since the TPP's founding in 2019, it has attracted ambitious candidates and staff mostly because it offered a more promising path to power than waiting behind better-connected people in the DPP and KMT. When people stop believing that the TPP will be the winning team in the future, there aren't many people who will stick with the party because they sincerely believe in its mission...or even be able to say what that mission is.
There is clearly still significant electoral demand for a centrist third party that will keep the DPP and KMT honest and push a reform agenda. But the TPP has not done much to actually deliver on that agenda, despite the extraordinary leverage it currently has in the LY. It's hard for me to escape the conclusion the party has peaked and is headed toward the electoral graveyard where the many third parties of the past are buried. We'll see if they can prove the doubters wrong this election.
The Electoral Rules
Demonstrators call on the legislature to pass an absentee voting bill.
The Campaign
Elections in Taiwan are handled by the Central Election Commission following the Public Officials Election and Recall Act. Some key dates for the 2026 elections:
- August 20, 2026: CEC issues the formal election announcement
- August 31: candidate registration opens
- September 4: candidate registration closes
- October 23: candidate ballot order determined by drawing lots
- November 8: voter rolls finalized
- November 13: official campaign period for the special municipality mayors races begins
- November 18: official campaign period for county/city mayor, councilors, township heads, indigenous district chiefs begins. Polling blackout begins.
- November 23: campaign period for local representative (ward/village head, township reps, indigenous district reps) begins
- November 28: Election Day
A couple features to note about the campaign process. First, despite the official campaign period being only 15 days long for mayors, and even shorter for the other offices, restrictions on campaigning aren't really enforced in practice. Taiwan has pretty liberal free speech and advertising regulations, and candidates have been putting up billboards and out campaigning for months already.
Second, there's a weird twist in Taipei, which in 2022 passed its own ordinance limiting campaign billboards anywhere in the city. This rule is quite a bit stricter than the national standard and moves Taipei incrementally closer to the tight electoral regulatory regimes in place in Japan and especially Korea. (That's not a good thing.) The Taipei ordinance:
- permits campaign advertisements only on official public campaign boards, party and campaign offices, and vehicles;
- defines a campaign advertisement as a poster, banner or billboard having at least three of the following five items: name, image, ballot number, campaign item, and slogan or trademark; and
- applies to everyone, including private individuals not employed by any candidate or campaign.
But it's also full of loopholes -- in 2024 it did little to limit campaign advertising for the 2024 elections. An obvious way to skirt it is to include only two of the five items on any given poster. There is also lax enforcement -- it requires someone to make a complaint before the city government will investigate. And it's also vulnerable to a constitutional challenge (if and when the constitutional court is functional again), not least since it restricts all displays of campaign posters, even on one's own property. (That's even stricter than Japan's rules.) Nevertheless, this is something to watch this election cycle, as a huge challenge for candidates is to get their names out to uninformed and disengaged voters, and billboards, flags, and posters have long been a key part of this effort. This is the first time local elections have been held under this new rule, so it's untested, and advertising is much more important in the low-salience council and ward races than in the legislative and presidential contests.
Third, Taiwan has a polling blackout period that is strictly enforced: no one can publish or share polls from 10 days before the election through Election Day. Taiwan is a poll-crazy place, and this restriction is intended to prevent last-minute polls from affecting voting behavior. The CEC can impose heavy financial penalties on violators, and the blackout is generally respected. We'll see if that remains true this cycle.
Fourth, there will be at least three referendums held alongside the local elections, on "introducing caning as a criminal punishment, abolishing the government’s 'nuclear-free homeland' policy, and using traffic fines to improve road safety." At one point the KMT and TPP were discussing using their legislative majority to refer up to 10 different referendum questions to the voters. Since the legislature also changed the law back to require referendums to be held the same day as the local elections -- reversing a DPP change introduced after a voting fiasco in 2018, which itself was a consequence of a previous DPP-enacted change to the referendum law -- there is a danger that the voting and counting process will get bogged down again. The current CEC chairman You Ying-lung (游盈隆) has pleaded with the LY for several months to cut down the number of questions to make the process run more smoothly. And today, they did.
And finally, I'll just note that Taiwan still does not have an absentee or mail voting process, nor does it have early voting. This puts a disproportionate burden on young people, active-duty military personnel, and anyone else who isn't living at their official household to return there to vote. It's been a long-standing complaint that has never been addressed, even during COVID.
The Electoral System
For the mayor, township head, and village/ward chief elections, the winner is decided by simple plurality. But for council and township and indigenous district representative seats, Taiwan still uses the old single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in multi-member districts (複數選區) . This system has an important implication for partisan competition: the electoral threshold of exclusion is much lower than in the executive races, and small parties can be competitive for a seat by winning 10% of the vote or even less in some districts. That means the usual KMT-DPP duopoly in mayor's races is weakened in local races, and small parties face a more forgiving electoral environment than in elections to the Legislative Yuan.
Traditionally, independent candidates have also fared well in local councilor races. Another truism of Taiwan politics is that the lower down one goes in the hierarchy, the less partisan affiliation matters, so that most village and ward chiefs (~90% in the last election) register as independents.
Finally, it's worth noting that Taiwan has long had a gender quota for SNTV races. Since 1999 it's been a 25% requirement -- i.e. at least one of every four seats in a district must go to a woman. If one of the top four vote-getters is already a woman, nothing changes; if none is, the fourth-place male candidate is displaced by the top female candidate. This rule only kicks in if the district magnitude is at least four, which in practice means it's applied somewhat unevenly across Taiwan's localities. Some counties elect most of their representatives from districts with three seats or fewer; for instance, in Penghu only the Magong City district elects more than four councilors and is therefore covered by the quota. In practice, the actual share of women winning elections to councils is significantly above the 1/4 requirement: in 2014, it was over 30% across all councils, and it's risen from there to about 40% (special municipalities) and 36% (city and county councils), respectively, in 2022.
Importantly, this quota has contributed over the long term to the impressive representation of women at the highest elected offices: over 40 percent in the current legislature. Huang Chang-ling and Nathan Batto both have excellent papers on this topic.
See also: Part 2 (The Big Six), Part 3 (North and Central), Part 4 (South, East, and Offshore Islands), and Part 5 (Summing Up).
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The Hoover Institution Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region is an academic and non-partisan endeavor to understand the challenges confronting democracy and security in Taiwan. Over the years, we have sought to maintain strict neutrality with regard to partisan politics in Taiwan. Toward that end, we have welcomed engagement with leaders and representatives of all major political parties in Taiwan, both at Hoover and in Taiwan. In the past months alone, we have met at Hoover with senior figures of both the KMT and the DPP. Typically, these visits involve off-the-record dialogues to ensure a free exchange of ideas.
On June 2, we hosted a closed-door roundtable with a KMT delegation led by the party chairwoman, Cheng Li-wun. Since the session was off-the-record, we do not think it appropriate to characterize her remarks. However, we find it necessary to indicate that reports suggesting that we endorsed her view of cross-strait relations are not accurate. The session elicited spirited discussion about China's intentions and the requirements for maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Although we do not endorse or align with any political party or faction in Taiwan, we do have views about what needs to be done to deter a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. We have articulated these views on multiple occasions in print and in speech. We remain concerned that China's intentions toward Taiwan are not benign, and that a process of political integration of Taiwan into the People's Republic of China would yield the same outcome that it has in Hong Kong—not "one country, two systems", but one country, one autocracy. Avoiding such a tragedy requires of Taiwan restraint, steadfastness, and bolstering of defensive military capabilities. It requires of the United States adherence to the key pillars of its longstanding policies, including a readiness to sell to Taiwan the defensive weaponry it needs to defend itself, and economic, political, and military articulations of resolve (by the United States and other democracies) to resist any attempt to use force to impose a solution to the Cross-Strait conflict.
We share the many concerns in Taiwan about the current state of Cross-Strait relations. But there is only one actor in this conflict that is using its military in a pattern of increasing intrusion and provocation against the other. That is not the Republic of China, Taiwan, but rather the People's Republic of China.
Larry Diamond and James O. Ellis, Jr., Co-chairs, Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, and
Kharis Templeman, Program Manager, Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, Hoover Institution
- Published on
A rally to defend Huang Kuo-chang against a recall vote in December 2017. Huang was the first legislator to face a recall under the new threshold. He survived, but only because turnout was too low.
According to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, public officials cannot face a recall attempt until at least one year into their term. Since the current legislators were seated on February 1, 2024, the clock didn't start ticking on the recall campaign until February 1 of this year. But the threat of a recall of legislators was brewing much earlier, as early as June 2024 with the "Bluebird Movement" rally against the legislature's attempt to exercise more power over the executive branch. In response to this rally, KMT members started talking publicly about raising the recall threshold to something closer to where it was before; one proposal was that the "yes" votes must exceed the votes the representative received in the previous election, which would have made the current mass recall strategy all but impossible. One of the puzzles of this legislative term is why the KMT never actually followed through on this proposal, which would have saved them the trouble of defending all their legislators right now.
I have my own thoughts about that here -- I think the TPP probably blocked this change. But for this post I want to consider what would have to happen for the LY to flip control to the DPP, and how likely they are to do that.
The DPP currently sits at 51 seats, and it needs to be at 57 for a majority. The simplest way for the party to reassume control is to recall KMT legislators and win the following by-elections in at least six districts. That would give the DPP the majority for the rest of the LY term.
The second, temporary way is to succeed in recalling at least 12 KMT legislators; they're required to leave as soon as the votes are certified. So if any recalls pass, there will be a reduced number of legislators in the LY until the by-elections are held. If at least 12 are recalled, the total of KMT+TPP+2 blue independent seats will temporarily fall to 50 or less, handing the majority to the DPP for up to 60 days before by-elections are held and new legislators seated.
It is quite possible the recalls fall short of the 12 needed to shift control to the DPP immediately, but more than the 6 that could flip control if the DPP wins all the by-elections. That then sets up a hotly contested set of races in 30-60 days for the by-elections, and leaves the KMT+TPP temporarily still able to control the majority, but facing down up to another two months of uncertainty about their majority.
Mass Recalls: Why Now?
First, the 2024 election results did not deliver a decisive win for the KMT in the legislature. The headline number was the party winning 52 seats (plus two allied independents) to the DPP's 51. But if we look under the hood, the party actually came in 2nd in the party list vote, with 34.6% to the DPP's 36.2%, and in the constituencies, the KMT's vote share was five points behind the DPP's: 45.1% to 40.0%. It is only thanks to the disproportionality built into the electoral system that the KMT ended up with a plurality of LY seats at all.
Second, this plurality was built on narrow wins in several marginal constituencies. Here's the list of 13 KMT legislators who were elected with less than 50% of the vote:
- Taipei 4. Lee Yen-Hsiu. 47.6%. TSP won 11% here to split the pan-green vote.
- Taipei 8. Lai Shih-bao. 47.5%. TPP candidate won 15.4%.
- New Taipei 7. Yeh Yuan-chih: 46.1%. Obasang Party candidate won 9% here.
- New Taipei 8. Chang Chih-lun. 42.7%. TPP candidate won 20% here.
- Taoyuan 1. Niu Hsu-ting. 48.44%.
- Taoyuan 2. Tu Chuan-Chi. 48.2%. Tu beat the DPP candidate by ~1000 votes.
- Taoyuan 6. Chiu Jo-hua. 40.93%. Three-way race with independent and TPP candidate, no DPP challenger.
- Keelung City. Lin Pei-yang. 43.6%.
- Hsinchu County 2. Lin Si-ming. 44.52%. NPP and DPP candidates split the rest.
- Hsinchu City. Cheng Cheng-chien. 35.2-31.9% for the DPP candidate. A TPP candidate won most of the rest.
- Nantou 2. Yu Hao. 49.8-47.3% over the DPP candidate.
- Yunlin 1. Ting Hsueh-chung. 47.8-46.1% over DPP incumbent Su Chih-fen. Margin of about 3000 votes.
- Taitung. Huang Chien-pin. 34.8-31.6% over DPP challenger. Former DPP legislator Liu Chao-hao won most of the rest.
And here's a couple other seats that flipped to the KMT but were close races and are potentially vulnerable to a reversal:
- New Taipei 12. Liao Hsien-hsiang. 50.8-45.0% over DPP incumbent Lai Pin-yu.
- Taichung 4. Liao Wei-hsiung. 50.0-47.4% over the DPP's Chang Liao Wan-chien.
- Taichung 5. Huang Chien-hao. 51.55%.
- Taichung 6. Luo Ting-wei. 52.1%.
By my quick and dirty count, that's already 17 legislators who should have entered this term pretty worried about the next election -- and by extension, about the recall happening tomorrow.
Given how shaky the KMT's plurality win in the 2024 election was, I've been surprised that these legislators in marginal districts have not been a more powerful moderating influence on the party caucus over the last 18 months. In particular, it was not helpful to their re-election prospects for the KMT caucus to immediately make Fu Kun-chi and Han Kuo-yu the faces of the party in the legislature: both are deeply polarizing figures widely reviled by the pan-green camp. Fu Kun-chi served a prison term for insider stock trading, then got out, got back into the legislature, and then in 2024 was made caucus chair. Han Kuo-yu was the KMT's presidential candidate in 2020, when he got crushed by Tsai Ing-wen, and then recalled a few months later as Kaohsiung mayor. One of the key purposes of party leaders is to protect vulnerable legislators, and the KMT has not done a great job of that.
Third, as everyone knows now, the KMT's control of the LY depends crucially on the support of the TPP. I have gradually come to suspect that the TPP's collaboration with the KMT hasn't been as consistent or as sincere (rather than tactical) as a lot of DPP supporters are making it out to be. The TPP has publicly opposed the recall elections, but they haven't been willing to play institutional hardball on recalls in the same way they have with the constitutional court and oversight laws. I think some TPP members would be secretly fine if a few KMT legislators lost their recall campaigns.
What this adds up to is a legislative majority built on sand. It was always a risky political strategy for the KMT party caucus to be so aggressive in confronting the Lai administration. And if they lose their plurality tomorrow, here's why.
Three Critical Moments in the Partisan Battle
But then in October, when much of this package was indeed ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, both the KMT and TPP immediately sought to retaliate for the decision and voted down all of President Lai's nominees, leaving the court without its full complement. They then piled on and changed the Court Act to require a 2/3 quorum to meet, and the votes of at least 9 justices in favor of invalidating a law. That decision dramatically raised the stakes of the power struggle with the executive branch, and it led to a sense of a budding constitutional crisis.
Now, to be fair, there is a big problem with the court's appointment system: members are appointed for 8-year terms, non-renewable, and so the court is now filled entirely with Tsai Ing-wen appointees! It's easy to argue that it's a partisan court given that design. And with its decision to invalidate much of the oversight legislation, there was no reserve of goodwill from KMT-TPP to give Lai's court nominees the benefit of the doubt.
But the KMT also sought to attack the court for a previous decision that narrowed the scope of the death penalty, which was a deeply cynical political calculation. It's worth pointing out that the Constitutional Court's ruling was based in part on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the KMT majority itself ratified and adopted as Taiwan law in 2009. Here's what Article 6, Clause 2 of the ICCPR says:
"2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court."
The third big moment came in December, when the LY took a hatchet to the Lai administration's budget proposal. Again, the opposition's political strategy here in hindsight does not look great: they took aim at lots of budget items without much forewarning or justification, and they managed to tick off a lot of constituents reliant on that funding who they didn't need to make mad. It was quite clear at the time that both the KMT and TPP were simply looking for things to cut to make life hard for the central government.
They also made a critical messaging mistake: they also cut items in the budget for the Ministry of National Defense. Yes, they targeted the indigenous submarine program, which the KMT has been critical of (for good reason) for a long time. And yes, the overall amount frozen and cut was not a large share of the MND's overall budget. But the optics were terrible -- when you're trying for the next six months to explain to foreign interlocutors that you're not "anti-defense" or "pro-China," just anti-DPP, you've already lost the narrative battle.
What Do We Know from Past Recall Elections?
Huang Kuo-chang (NPP) in New Taipei 12. 16 December 2017.
Yes: 48,693
No: 21,748
Turnout: 27.75%
Yes threshold: 63,888
Result: Recall failed. Yes votes came in 15k below threshold, although yes beat no.
Han Kuo-yu (KMT) as Kaohsiung Mayor. 6 June 2020.
Yes: 939,090
No: 30,169
Turnout: 42.14%.
Yes threshold: 574,996 votes.
Result: Recall passed. Yes votes came in almost 400k votes above threshold. KMT side mostly boycotted this vote. The DPP's Chen Chi-mai easily won the by-election.
Wang Hao-yu (DPP) as city councilor in Taoyuan (SNTV district). 16 January 2021.
Yes: 84,582
No: 7,128
Turnout: 28.14%
Threshold: 81,940
Result: Wang recalled.
Huang Jie as city councilor in Kaohsiung (SNTV district). 6 February 2021.
Yes: 55,261
No: 65,391
Turnout: 41.54%
Threshold: 72,892
Result: Huang survives easily, yeses fall 17k short, and no beats yes.
Freddy Lim (Ind, formerly NPP) in Taipei 9. 9 January 2021.
Yes: 54,813
No: 43,340
Turnout: 41.93%
Threshold: 58,756
Result: recall fails by about 4000 votes.
Chen Bo-wei (TSP) in Taichung 2. 23 October 2021.
Yes: 77,899
No: 73,433
Turnout: 51.72%
Threshold: 73,744
Result: passed by about 4000 votes, Chen removed. But DPP candidate Lin Ching-yi won the by-election, 52-47%.
Hsieh Kuo-liang (KMT) as Mayor of Keelung. 12 October 2024.
Yes: 69,934
No: 86,014
Turnout: 50.44%
Threshold: 77,700
Result: recall fails -- yes falls about 8k votes short, and no beats yes by 16k
What I take away from these seven races:
Meeting the turnout threshold is still hard. Both Huang and Lim survived because the opposition couldn't drive enough "yes" voters to the polls. Chen Po-wei and Wang Hao-yu both lost but even in those cases the "yes" votes were barely above the required threshold. The only "yes" vote that was a blowout was Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung -- and he's arguably a special case since he was by that point a national figure and his polarizing campaign for president had ended just six months before.
Partisan green-on-blue still matters. When turnout was high-ish, it was because the recall triggered dueling mobilization of DPP and KMT partisans. That saved Huang Jie (in green Kaohsiung) and Hsieh Kuo-liang (in blue-ish Keelung). If the generic partisan tendency of the electorate leans against the KMT, the incumbents should be worried. If it doesn't -- as is true in several of the highest-profile cases in the current round of recalls (e.g. Fun Kun-chi, Wang Hung-wei, and Hung Meng-kai) -- then they're probably able to survive if they can turn out their base.
Winning the by-election is no sure thing either. After Chen Po-wei got recalled, the DPP still picked up the seat in a bit of an upset against Yen Kuan-heng. I haven't shown it here, but by-elections have generally had very different turnout and dynamics than general elections, and it's not certain that a recall removal will lead to a change of that seat. So we need to be cautious about how we interpret the results tomorrow if more than 6 KMT legislators go down to defeat -- it's no guarantee the DPP is headed for a majority.
Some Final Thoughts: Blue on Green Strength?
- Will there be differential turnout among DPP vs KMT partisans?
- What will TPP voters do?
- Will anyone else show up to vote?
The answers to these three questions will determine how this mass recall election goes. On each question:
Differential Turnout: If the DPP turns out their base en masse, they're probably going to be able to win a couple recalls in the marginal districts (I'm looking at the seats in New Taipei and Taoyuan especially). If there's differential turnout, then maybe a couple KMT legislators in bluer districts go down in surprise defeats, too -- think Taipei 3 or Hsinchu County.
One very crude way to estimate possible outcomes is to start with the data above, from the Election Study Center at NCCU. They updated their regular partisan trends estimate just last month. The last data point in the figure above shows the DPP outpacing the combined KMT and TPP partisanship: 31.6 to 29.5%.
Now imagine -- again, this is very crude -- that both sides mobilize their bases and in a best-case scenario get all of those partisan identifiers out to the polls to vote for their respective sides: pro-recall for DPP, anti-recall for KMT.
In that case, the KMT has to worry. There's enough DPP partisans to push the yes vote over the threshold in some of these districts all by themselves. So the KMT has to mobilize to try to win the actual vote, and can't count on low turnout saving them. Also, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence of asymmetric enthusiasm here: DPP supporters have been fired up to vote for a year or more, and it feels existential to some of them. My sense is KMT supporters, less so.
On TPP Supporters: So that then leaves the TPP voters. If TPP identifiers buy the party's messaging that this is an illegitimate power grab by the DPP and Lai, and also turn out en masse, then that will probably be enough to keep successful recalls below six. But I'm not confident of that at all -- TPP voters (and I suspect some members of the TPP caucus) wouldn't mind seeing a few KMT legislators go down and open up some LY seats as potential targets for the TPP.
On Non-Partisans: I know the partisans are fired up about this election. But my prior is that those irregular voters who turn out in general elections but not in local or irregular elections -- anywhere from 10-25% of the electorate, judging by previous turnout rates -- are probably going to sit this one out. For the DPP's wildest dreams of a massive wipeout of KMT legislators to come true, they probably need turnout from irregular voters, too -- the cases above where an incumbent survived solely because the yes votes didn't meet the threshold look like a cautionary tale to me.
Bottom Line: I think it's going to be hard for the DPP to flip control of the LY via the recall. Just about everything has to break their way tomorrow, and in the following two months, to pull that off. For intellectual honesty's sake, I think this is the most likely outcome...
More than six but less than 12 KMT legislators get recalled tomorrow.
More than zero but less than six of those seats then flip to the DPP in by-elections.
And...Taiwan is basically back where it's been for the last 18 months, with a (possibly chastened, or possibly unrepentant) KMT + TPP majority in the LY still facing off against a (possibly newly conciliatory, or possibly defiant) DPP executive branch.
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The Speaker's Podium, ready for the next battle.
- It has not sought to obtain offices (LY speaker or deputy speaker, or cabinet positions) for its members.
- It has not sought concrete policy concessions from either the DPP or KMT in return for its support.
- It has not tried to maximize its appeal to the general electorate, and it has behaved like a pan-blue party rather than a centrist one.
This behavior is puzzling!
What Is the TPP Doing?
I have argued that the TPP is trying to bring about a partisan realignment within the pan-blue camp, away from the KMT. This is the only goal for which the TPP’s current strategy appears rational. It's an unusual strategy, but one that makes some sense given the political constraints the party faces.
Taiwan’s electoral institutions and party system present a high barrier to third-party growth. There is high party system institutionalization and politics and voting are now quite nationalized. The electoral system is permissive enough to allow small parties to gain a foothold in city councils and in the party list vote for the legislature, but they can never expand beyond small-party status unless they replace one of the Big Two. And no small party has ever succeeded in doing so in 30+ years of democratic elections.
So, to try to replace the KMT, the TPP needs to do two contradictory things at the same time.
- Convince pan-blue voters they are one of them, and in particular, to appeal to older KMT supporters while holding onto their younger base.
- Undermine the KMT, to change beliefs about the long-term viability of that party and convince their supporters that the TPP, not the KMT, is the future.
Now, if you were leading the TPP, how might you go about this? Toward the first goal, you'd pursue a public strategy of alignment with the KMT, especially on issues that you think make the DPP look bad. And toward the second, you'd quietly block legislation that would strengthen the KMT's grassroots or increase its popularity.
Evidence for the first part of this strategy is obvious: Huang Kuo-chang is appearing in public regularly with the KMT, the TPP is publicly opposing the recall elections against KMT legislators, and (almost) everything controversial that has made it to a final vote in the LY has passed with joint KMT-TPP support over DPP objections.
But what about the second? Can we find evidence of divergence of interests between the two party caucuses? This is harder to spot, because the TPP doesn't want KMT supporters to notice that it is trying to undermine the party's prospects. The TPP would rather be characterized as "marching in lockstep" with the KMT in its opposition to the DPP government, and everything else that matters to the KMT.
But I don't think this is actually true.
Is the TPP Really Supporting Everything the KMT Wants in the LY?
Clearly, the engines and cockpit need to be reinforced.
Now, what does the patterns of bomber survival in WWII have to do with the Taiwanese legislature? Well, there is also a selection process that occurs before bills introduced in the legislature come up for a vote. And we haven't paid adequate attention (and I include myself in this "we") to how that process might be skewing what we actually see being debated publicly, and being passed, by the TPP-KMT coalition over DPP objections. We need to consider the possibility that stuff the two pan-blue parties don't agree on never makes it to a vote. And it's possible this is happening a lot.
The inference problem here is that we don't know what bills the TPP quietly blocked, because the vast majority of bills introduced in the LY don't come up for a vote. Moreover, as I noted above, the TPP doesn't generally want people to know when they disagree with the KMT on a bill. (And an important corollary: the KMT also doesn't want people to know that it is not all-powerful in the legislature. So it, too, has an incentive to play down disagreements.) But now that we have about 18 months of legislative actions to observe, there is a growing list of oddities in legislation that has passed, and just as importantly, not passed, during this term, and I think we have enough observations to discern a pattern here: the KMT is not getting blanket support from the TPP.
For one, here are a few changes the DPP pushed through from 2016-2023 that hit KMT interests directly, and that the KMT screamed bloody murder about at the time, that have not so far been reversed. If the TPP is doing everything the KMT wants, I would expect to see reversals on some of these issues (I'll keep updating here as I come across more):
- Farmer's and Fisherman's and Irrigation Associations changed from elected to appointed leadership.
- Pension reforms, which reduced the preferential benefits enjoyed by martial-law-era civil servants (mostly KMT supporters).
- Actions by the Ill-Gotten Party Assets Committee to freeze or confiscate KMT party assets.
- [Update 2025.8.4] The Anti-Infiltration Act. Notably, the NPP under Huang Kuo-chang and Ko Wen-je separately supported passage of this act in 2019, while the KMT has been a consistent critic of it.
And here are a few controversial bills that the KMT caucus seemed to be gung-ho about that then quietly died, or ended up looking much different when they finally passed:
- Fu Kun-chi's special infrastructure budget bill. This would have allocated at least US$60bn to build two expressways and high speed rail to Hualien -- Fu Kun-chi's constituency. (to put that in context, Taiwan's annual defense budget is less than US$20 billion.) Speaker Han Kuo-yu and Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang co-sponsored the two most controversial bills in that package. And then...crickets. Nothing ever came of this proposal. We don't know whether this was due to internal opposition from other members of the KMT or quiet TPP opposition, but it's an interesting data point.
- Constitutional Court reform. Lots of changes to the court were proposed after the CC ruled against the LY oversight bill, most of them designed to limit the court's authority over the LY or paralyze it completely. But the final legislation ended up at the last moment with a different threshold of nine justices required to rule legislation unconstitutional, rather than a return to the two-thirds requirement before 2022.
- Central-local government revenue division bill. I'm less confident about this one, but there were some more extreme proposals put forward in the debate about changing the formula for allocation of government revenues between central and local governments. What ended up in the bill was a 60-40 percent allocation, not as extreme as some of what was reported at the time. Here's what the TPP had originally proposed.
Why Didn't the KMT Raise the Recall Threshold?!
And finally, the real smoking gun -- the bill that clued me in to this whole shadow game between the TPP and KMT -- is the amendment to the Civil Servants Elections and Recall Act that passed in December 2024. Various KMT members floated proposals to raise the recall threshold as early as June 2024, to protect them from the prospect of mass recalls that they are, in fact, now facing down in less than a week. Isn't it strange that the KMT saw this threat coming a year ahead of time, and still failed to protect its own legislators?
I had long assumed this increase in the recall threshold was inevitable and that the activists preparing to collect recall signatures were wasting their time, because it was not in the KMT's interest to leave their legislators vulnerable to a potent recall movement that was clearly a threat even last summer. They simply couldn't not change this threshold if they had the votes -- it would be political malpractice not to. And in December, when the bill amending the Elections and Recall Act looked like it was headed for passage, the reporting on the proposal implied that the threshold would be raised. I thought so too.
Except it wasn't!
Why not? Well, way back in July 2024 Ko Wen-je was asked about this proposal, and he said he didn't support changing the threshold. The KMT tried, probably repeatedly over many months, to get the TPP to vote for this, and...failed. They didn't have the votes. Which is why the KMT is now facing mass recalls that could strip them of their control of the LY as soon as July 28.
This seems like it should be a huge part of the recall elections story, no? The KMT's coalition partner left them exposed to a mass recall. And while the KMT now has to engage in a desperate rear-guard struggle to preserve their seats, the TPP doesn't have to do anything because their legislators are all from the party list tier. (As an aside, if I were one of the KMT legislators facing a recall vote, I'd be pissed right now. The TPP hung them out to dry on this issue.)
And as for why the TPP might want to block raising the recall threshold, but not call attention to themselves as the reason? I will leave that question as an exercise for the reader...
Whither the TPP?
Will they succeed? I don’t think so. They're missing a couple elements to pull this strategy off.
First is talent. Right now the TPP has three names anyone has heard of: Ko Wen-je, Huang Kuo-chang, and Huang Shan-shan. Being generous, we might say Tsai Pi-ru and Kao Hung-an also have some name recognition. Beyond that? It’s a stretch. And Huang Kuo-chang is certainly not doing anything to share the spotlight with up-and-coming younger leaders.
Second is grassroots supporters. That means more than simply an online army of fans who turn into your livestreams and like your posts on TikTok. What the DPP and KMT still have is grassroots party activists who can be mobilized to come out to rallies, to turn out to vote, and to, yes, collect signatures for recall elections. I haven't seen a whole lot of evidence the TPP has core supporters they can rely on to turn out around the island -- in Taipei, maybe, and perhaps Hsinchu, but elsewhere they are extremely weak at local levels.
Contrast that with the DPP and, more importantly for present purposes, the KMT. I still remember clearly watching a KMT parade and rally in Taipei in January 2016, shortly before the presidential election that year. This was one of the most difficult periods in the KMT's recent history. It was the end of the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, and President Ma was deeply unpopular. The Sunflower Movement had succeeded in blocking Ma's signature cross-Strait trade agreement, the CSSTA, and the opposition stirred up by that project contributed to the KMT's sweeping defeat in the local elections in late 2014. The party then lurched from one political crisis to another over the next year. They ended up with the deep-blue firebrand Hung Hsiu-chu as their presidential candidate when everyone else declined to run, and then had to execute a late switch of candidate from Hung to party chairman Eric Chu in fall of 2015. The party's old nemesis James Soong then declared he would run (again!) as an independent candidate to give pan-blue voters a protest vote option. And at that point, everyone knew that Eric Chu was toast.
And yet, on January 8, 2016, tens of thousands of KMT supporters nevertheless showed up in Taipei from all over Taiwan for an old-fashioned political parade down Roosevelt Road to Ketagalan Boulevard, to support a hopeless campaign heading for a crushing electoral defeat. Here’s a few pictures of that.
I have always doubted Ko Wen-je is the right person for this kind of party-building work. Ko often has analogized party-building to running a business: cold, calculating, rational, and vote (profit?)-driven. That may be true for winning over swing voters. But if the only reason voters have to support you is that you're more "rational" than the next guy, what happens when they no longer believe that? What if there's another guy who comes along who offers better answers to their problems? The fans you've acquired, if they like you only because you "do the right thing," are going to abandon you when they no longer believe you have their best interests at heart. Success is easy come, easy go in this model.
There is, however, a different model of party-building in Taiwan, one that the DPP followed in its early days, which is based on identity appeals. "Our party stands for you. Our people are like you. We have suffered the same things you have. We speak the same language you have. You can trust us." Those appeals may turn some voters off...But for the DPP they also built a loyal following that has stuck with them through bad times as well as good. I just don't see the TPP doing the hard work of building those grassroots connections that can outlast any particular leader, either under Ko Wen-je or now, under Huang Kuo-chang.
Does the TPP Have a Future?: What To Look For
Putting this series of posts together has also clarified for me that the 2026 local elections are really critical for the TPP's future. Given Ko’s detention, Kao Hung-an’s suspension, and the party’s slump in the polls over the last year, they desperately need to demonstrate that they still have room to grow their electoral support. They need to develop a deeper bench of local talent – candidates who can win votes independently of the TPP’s brand and have crossover appeal. They need to run their own candidates – and win! – in some of the local mayor’s races. And they need to expand the number of seats they hold in the local councils (they won 14 last time – significant for a third party in Taiwan, but also only 1.5% of all seats.)
But the most fundamental question for the TPP in 2026 is whether to coordinate future nominations with the KMT. In 2023, Ko Wen-je rather naively assumed he could come to some kind of agreement with Eric Chu and Hou You-yi that would give him a clear path to the top of a joint presidential ticket. The spectacular way in which that agreement fell apart is a cautionary tale for the TPP. But for the party to have a chance of winning any of these offices in 2026, they still need to get the KMT to yield some nominations to TPP candidates. So the party is caught on the horns of a dilemma: cooperate and get absorbed, or don’t cooperate and throw elections to the DPP, or worse -- watch the KMT win these elections anyway and demonstrate the TPP is irrelevant. I’m not sure how they will resolve this dilemma. I’m more confident in predicting that the KMT will drive a hard bargain in any nomination negotiations, despite the TPP-KMT track record of cooperation in the LY right now, than I am in predicting the TPP's strategy in 2026.
So to wrap up, I’ll stick my neck out here and say flat out that I don’t think the TPP is going to succeed in initiating a partisan realignment away from the KMT, however they choose to approach 2026 (and 2028, for that matter). The party is much more likely to decline or collapse after the next election than to surge into second place and usher in a lasting change to Taiwan’s party system.
But it is going to be fascinating to watch them try.
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(The 1978 remake, set in San Francisco, is great, too -- including a cameo by the original Kevin McCarthy and a memorable performance by Donald Sutherland).
In previous posts I speculated that the Taiwan People Party's (TPP) long-term growth strategy is different from other Taiwanese third parties that have come before. It has started in the center of the political spectrum rather than on one of the flanks. And it is now aiming to attract new support from the KMT's (mostly older) base while holding onto its (mostly younger) supporters.
It is, in other words, pursuing a party-snatching strategy.
Now, I should have noted at the outset of these posts that this broader observation about the TPP's strategy is not in any way, shape or form unique to me; people in Taiwan have been ascribing some version of this motive to the party almost since the day Ko Wen-je founded the TPP in 2019. (For examples, see here, here, here, here, and here).
I should also note there's a long tradition of wishcasting for a new "third force" to emerge in Taiwan politics that would break up the green-blue divide, eliminate the KMT, and realign politics around competition among multiple "Taiwan-centric" parties (in this framing the KMT is almost always described as "pro-China," pro-unification, or even pro-CCP), and compete with what these advocates see as an increasingly conservative and even plutocratic DPP. For a while after it was founded, the TPP looked like the most promising candidate to pull this off, which may explain some of the vitriol directed towards Ko and now new party leader Huang Kuo-chang for their cooperation with the KMT over the last year.
But assertions that the KMT's destruction would come at the hands of a "third force" that was both more pro-independence and more progressive than the DPP have never made much sense to me, because they never spelled out exactly how the KMT's core supporters would be persuaded to switch to a new party whose positions on the China issue are so far away from their own. For instance, despite all the bravado surrounding the emergence of the NPP out of the Sunflower Movement, it always presented a much larger electoral threat to the DPP than the KMT -- one that Tsai Ing-wen as party chair recognized and smartly headed off through a pre-electoral coalition in 2016. The KMT has long had many electoral problems, but losing chunks of its base to upstart progressive pro-independence parties has never been a big concern for it.
Instead, the biggest threats to the KMT in the past have come from party defectors who walk and talk a lot like the official nominees but reject control from the party leadership -- think Terry Gou, or James Soong, or way back in the 1990s, Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun. So if you want to build a party that can convince life-time KMT supporters to defect en masse in a national election, that party has to look a lot like the KMT. It has to be firmly in the pan-blue camp. It has to take a position on the China question that is more China-friendly than the DPP. And most of all, it has to actively oppose the DPP at every turn--despise it, even.
I do not think it is a coincidence that the TPP is looking more and more like this party. I am skeptical they can actually succeed in causing a political realignment in which they replace the KMT as one of the Big Two. But they are certainly behaving in a way that makes sense if this is their ultimate goal. And, given Taiwan's institutional context, it is probably the TPP's best shot to survive past the next election.
Party System Realignments as Coordination Games
Putting aside the unfortunate sexist stereotypes of this example, the essence of a coordination problem is nicely demonstrated here; to quote Cox, "the players in the game would prefer to coordinate their actions on...one of two...possibilities, but they disagree over which of these possibilities ought to be the one on which they coordinate. There is thus an admixture of common and divergent interests, and the possibility of both successful coordination (to the relative advantage of one or more of the players over the others) and failed coordination (to the disadvantage of all)."
Later in the book, Cox considers the possibility of partisan realignments as coordination problems. "Realignment projects," he writes, "require that a large number of politicians and voters change their behavior in a coordinated fashion." And not all realignments are equally plausible or consequential. Realignments in majoritarian electoral systems, Cox suggests, are both more difficult to pull off and more consequential if they succeed or fail. He illustrates the point with a discussion of the Liberal Party in Great Britain in the 1910s and 1920s, and the attempt by its dominant figure, David Lloyd George, to realign British politics along a socialist/anti-socialist axis.
In Cox's telling, Lloyd George attempted to manipulate perceptions of the potential alternatives to the Liberal Party, which he believed to be facing an existential threat from the rise of the Labour Party. As prime minister leading a war-time coalition government, Lloyd George used his privileged position to communicate with his own Liberals and members of the Conservative Party to try to convince them to join forces after the end of World War I against Labour. His efforts to achieve an anti-Labour coalition had their greatest success in the December 1918 "Coupon Election," when the coalition Liberal-Conservative government that had just won the war endorsed a subset of members from both parties, isolating and defeating the Liberal faction led by Lloyd George's predecessor and rival, H.H. Asquith. But the coalition eventually broke apart in 1922, and the subsequent election saw the Conservatives contest and win on their own. The Liberals were reduced to minor party status and never recovered their previous position, as voters opposed to Labour converged on Conservative, rather than Liberal, candidates. And Lloyd George never again served in government.
Cox portrays this failed attempt as a specific example of a realignment coordination game, with Lloyd George serving in the critical role of a "heresthetician" (to use William Riker's term) or "focal arbiter" (Thomas Schelling's):
“The key feature of such a game is that there are multiple possible equilibria and that which one is chosen depends crucially on which one people expect to be chosen. Moreover, the more people there are who act in accord with a given equilibrium (e.g., that the two major parties are Labour and the Conservatives), the more it is in the interest of others to act in accord with that equilibrium. The consequence of these two features is that manipulating expectations - something that great leaders,
with their bully pulpits, are in a position to do - can powerfully affect the course of events, leading to fairly rapid and important changes in regime.”
First, in both cases there is a party that the protagonists view as being in long-term decline because of shifting demographics -- the Liberals in the UK and the KMT in Taiwan. Second, in both there is high PSI, high nationalization, and a majoritarian electoral system -- less majoritarian in Taiwan than in the UK circa 1920, but as I noted in Part 2, still sufficiently so to deny a third party much of a future unless it replaces one of the Big Two parties. And third, one of the Big Two parties looks like a lot harder target to break apart than the other -- Labour in the UK, and the DPP in Taiwan.
I also find this framework helpful for clarifying the challenge Ko Wen-je faced as he sought to win the presidency in 2024. As mayor of Taipei for two terms, and then the leader of the TPP, Ko had a prominent position from which to try to reshape expectations among both political elites and the mass public about his electoral viability. He first tried to leverage this platform to convince KMT elites to coordinate on him for the presidential election--apparently under the belief that KMT leaders would recognize him, not Hou Yu-ih, as the stronger general election candidate. When that attempt failed, he then fell back on trying to persuade pan-blue voters to coordinate on him rather than Hou. Unfortunately for both Ko and Hou, that didn't happen: the anti-Lai vote ended up split between both. And doubly unfortunate for Ko, that split favored Hou over him; pan-blue and swing voters did not support him in large enough numbers even to bump him into second place.
So that left Ko and the TPP with a fairly hollow result: despite doing better than any third-party presidential candidate since James Soong in 2000, and winning a critical block of seats in the LY, the TPP still didn't eclipse the KMT in either the presidential or the LY PR vote. And in the current legislature, they may have the most influence that any third party has ever had -- but they're still the third party, not the second. To have a future, they need to move into second place. And the best way to do that is not self-evident.
Now, if you were leading the TPP, how would you try to grow from here? What Ko -- and now Huang Kuo-chang, since he has replaced Ko as party chair -- seem to have decided on is to try to execute a realignment of pan-blue voters away from the KMT and to the TPP. If that really is their ultimate goal, then they need to execute a two-pronged and somewhat contradictory strategy. First, they need to convince pan-blue voters that the TPP is one of them. And second, they need to find ways to weaken the KMT, or at least change core supporters' perceptions of the party, to the point that it looks less viable than the TPP in SMD elections -- the mayor's races in 2026, and the presidential and SMD LY races in 2028.
I think we can see evidence of both prongs of this strategy in the TPP's behavior over the last year. I'll pick that up in Part 4.
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TPP legislators call for public streaming of court activities / Taipei Times
I think I understand now. The TPP is all-in on votes, not offices or policy, but they are pursuing votes in an unusual way: rather than try to pull equally from both blue and green camps, which is what most observers thought they were doing in the run-up to 2024, they are now prioritizing pan-blue votes. The reason is that they are trying to take over the KMT's space in the political spectrum through a fundamental realignment of the pan-blue camp.
So, rather than be a swing bloc in the legislature jumping between the camps issue by issue, they have instead decided for the moment to mimic the KMT. Even though most of their members are not ideologically aligned with the KMT--especially on the China issue--they nevertheless need to sound and act like a pan-blue party because they want deep blue voters to consider voting for their candidates in the future.
To see both the rationale for this kind of strategy in Taiwan, and why the party's recent behavior and rhetoric makes sense if replacing the KMT is their ultimate goal, we first need to understand the political context in which they are operating.
Third Parties In Taiwan Face Distinct Disadvantages
1. It has high party system institutionalization. Taiwan is unusual among young democracies in having a well-institutionalized party system. Party system institutionalization, or PSI, is the extent to which a party system is stable, predictable, and characterized by established patterns of interaction between political parties. We can measure PSI by looking at electoral volatility across elections, at the level of partisanship in the electorate, and the degree of coherence and organization of the individual political parties. On all these measures, Taiwan looks more like a mature democracy than a young Third Wave one -- it has relatively low electoral volatility, high partisanship, and well-organized and hierarchical political parties that compete with one another almost everywhere.
2. It tends toward two-partism. Taiwan's effective number of parties (ENPs) in the legislature this term is 2.38. Since the new electoral system was used for the first time in 2008, this number has never exceeded 2.5: it was 2.44 in 2020; 2.17 in 2016, 2.23 in 2012, and 1.75 in 2008. The same two parties that finished 1-2 in 1992, the KMT and DPP, finished 2-1 in 2024, and they have been the top two vote and seat-winners in every legislative election in between. They also are almost always the top two finishers in mayoral races around the island. There are not many other Third Wave democracies that have had such a consistent pattern of two-party competition, and even among older democracies, the persistence of the same two parties winning in every election for 30 years is quite unusual.
3. Voting patterns are highly nationalized. Party system nationalization refers to how consistent voting patterns are across a country. It has two components: static nationalization, or how much party vote shares vary across different localities or regions, and dynamic nationalization, or how much vote swings between the parties vary across these same jurisdictions. On the first, static, nationalization measure, although the two major parties have regional strongholds -- the DPP in the south, the KMT in the rural north, east coast, and offshore islands -- they both compete everywhere. There is no regionally-based party akin to the Parti Quebecois in Canada, or the Scottish National Party in the UK, or DMK, Shiv Sena, or Trinamool Congress Party (among many) in India. Nor do Taiwan's regional party strongholds look anywhere near as extreme as South Korea's, where the liberal camp routinely wins 80+% of the vote in the southwest (Jeolla), and the conservative camp wins 80+% in the southeast (Gyeongsang). And on the second, dynamic, nationalization measure, the swing between the DPP and KMT in each election has been remarkably consistent across the island. For instance, in the 2016 election, Tsai Ing-wen improved her vote share over her 2012 campaign in every single jurisdiction in Taiwan, and that increase varied only from about 5% in Penghu to about 12% in Taipei.
Why does Taiwan's party system look this way? Three reasons. First, Taiwan's unusual pattern of bottom up democratization, starting with electoral competition at the local level and gradually culminating in direct election of the LY and the president, plus the survival of the formerly authoritarian KMT into the democratic era, led to the emergence of two big parties with strong grassroots chapters, a hierarchical structure, and similar party organizations. For the last 30 years, KMT and DPP candidates have run against each other almost everywhere in Taiwan, and they also dominate the majoritarian elections for the president, legislature, and city and county executives.
Second, the China question is by far the most salient issue in Taiwan politics and the only one on which all major political parties take distinct positions. The DPP and KMT are distinguished mostly by their different approaches to managing relations with the PRC; on most other policy issues, the Big Two are as divided internally as they are with each other.
Third, and most important for present purposes, are Taiwan's electoral institutions. The LY is about 65% elected from single-member districts (SMDs) under plurality rule; about 30% from a proportional representation closed-list tier elected via a second party list ballot with a 5% threshold; and about 5% from two reserved indigenous multi-member districts (MMDs) using single-non-transferable vote (SNTV), each with three seats (M=3). The president is directly elected under plurality rule with no runoff, as are all local chief executives. And local councils are still elected using SNTV in relatively high-magnitude MMDs (typically M≥5).
The consequences of this institutional setup are twofold. First, it is relatively easy for small parties to win a few seats in the legislature through the PR tier, and in local councils because of the high district magnitudes (meaning a lower share of the vote is needed to win a seat). The electoral systems for assemblies at both levels are permissive enough to allow the most successful third parties to survive for a while, and they can even occasionally end up in a kingmaker role controlling the balance of power, as the TPP has managed to do in the current legislature. But third parties face a much more daunting challenge if they want to become more than just small niche parties: they also have to win some of the SMD plurality races outright and not simply play a spoiler role in these elections. And to date, no third party in Taiwan has managed to succeed at this challenge.
Two Strategies for Third Party Growth in Taiwan
Most new parties in Taiwan have responded to this electoral context by adopting one of two strategies. Some of them have chosen to play down or ignore the China question altogether and campaign solely on a second-dimension issue: labor rights, environmental protection, religion, LGBTQ issues, indigenous rights, health care and social welfare, and so on.
A good example of this type of party is the Green Party Taiwan, whose history is detailed in Dafydd Fell's new book. The GPT was founded in the 1990s, and although it has stuck around much longer than most other third parties from that era, it has never succeeded in winning more than a single LY seat over that time period. And yet the Green Party Taiwan is actually one of the most successful examples of parties choosing this path, which is littered with electoral failures. There are hundreds of second-dimension parties that ran on an issue orthogonal to the China question and did not attract sufficient attention or votes to break through in races for the legislature or for local councils. Today, most of them are long gone and forgotten.
The other strategy has been to take a more extreme position than the Big Two on the China question. This path has been more successful, and it is the one that the small parties people have actually heard of have used. For instance, to the pro-independence side of the DPP are the Taiwan Independence Party 建國黨, the Taiwan Solidarity Union 台聯, the New Power Party 時代力量, and the Taiwan State-Building Party 台灣基進黨; to the more pro-unification side of the KMT are the New Party 新黨, the People First Party 親民黨, and the China Unification Promotion Party 中國統一促進黨. (These are what Dafydd Fell, following Paul Lucardie, calls "purifier" parties).
Some of these parties have also leaned into a second-dimension issue on which one of the big parties is divided; for instance, the TSU was more protectionist and socially conservative than the DPP, and as Lev Nachman's new book details, the NPP was more socially liberal and pro-environment. Going further back in Taiwan, in the 1990s the New Party was pro-democratic reform and anti-corruption and sometimes teamed up with the DPP against the KMT on these issues, even though the two held polar opposite positions on the China question.
The Small Party "Valley of Death" in Taiwan Politics
The problem for parties following the second path has been how to grow beyond the extremist fringe. When small parties have attempted to expand beyond the relative safety of MMDs to compete in SMDs, time and time again they have fallen into the "valley of death" (to borrow a term from the venture capital world): they cannot ever break through in enough single member district races to convince voters they are on track to replacing one of the Big Two, and they instead lose support and fade away.
This pattern of failure occurs for two reasons. First, the Big Two don't just stand idly by. When third parties that are more extreme on the China issue run candidates in SMDs, they pose a more serious threat to the big party in their camp than simply competing in the PR list or local council races. Sometimes this party responds by offering a pre-electoral coalition, as the DPP did with the NPP in 2016, and the KMT did with the PFP in 2008; in both of these cases, the small party later got mostly absorbed into the larger party. Other times the big party goes on the offensive and attempts to knock out the smaller challenger, rallying its voters against the small party by portraying it as a traitor to the cause, as the DPP did with the Taiwan Independence Party in the late 1990s. But either way, the small party runs up against an insurmountable wall: they cannot win in the single member districts without attracting votes from some of the big party's supporters, and the big party has both the incentives and the means to prevent defections like this in most cases.
Second, small parties are consistently disadvantaged by strategic voting. In Taiwan, the China factor is so important to so many voters that the incentives for strategic voting are quite strong in the SMD races: for the president and legislature for sure, and even occasionally in the local city and county executives. Voters don't want to waste their votes on a third-party candidate if it will throw the election to the big party they hate, so third party candidates have to convince people they are running not just to play spoiler but to actually win a three-way race against both of the Big Two. And breaking through in these single-member district elections is hard: there's a discontinuity between being perceived as the likely 2nd-place party and being in 3rd or lower. (The jargon-y political science term for this pattern is the M+1 rule: in any district of magnitude M, there will be at most M+1 viable candidates because most voters will ignore or abandon the rest).
Put differently, although Taiwan's electoral institutions consistently provide some space for small parties to compete and win a few seats here and there, they do not provide room for more than two big parties -- at least as long as the party system remains highly institutionalized and voting patterns are nationalized. That means that if you lead a small party and hope to stick around in politics for the long term, you have only two choices: (1) join one of the big parties, or (2) replace one with your own.
The TPP Is Trying Something Different
TPP chairman Huang Kuo-chang and KMT chairman Eric Chu at the self-styled "Bring Democracy Back to Taiwan" summit on April 22, 2025.
By historical standards, this strategy worked. In the 2024 elections the party garnered over 20% of the party list vote, eight seats in the LY, and a kingmaker position in the LY for four years. No other party since 2008 has pulled that off. It's an impressive achievement!
And yet, it's not enough. All of the LY seats the TPP holds are via the party list; it didn't win a single district race. For a third-party candidate, Ko Wen-je did remarkably well in the presidential election -- but he still came in third. And now that he is detained indefinitely while he faces corruption charges, the TPP cannot count on Ko to win votes for them in the future and has to find some other way to appeal to the electorate. The party also no longer holds any local executive offices -- in 2022, Ko's preferred successor in Taipei, Huang Shan-shan, came in third behind the KMT's Chiang Wan-an and the DPP's Chen Shih-chung, and the party's one success story that year, Kao Hung-an's upset victory in the mayor's race in Hsinchu City, has effectively been reversed by Kao's subsequent suspension for padding her salary through reimbursements to non-existent staff while she was a legislator; she is likely to be recalled as mayor later this month.
So, despite holding a prime position in the LY right now, the TPP is also facing existential challenges. Can it reinvent itself as something more than the Ko-P party, now that Ko Wen-je is indefinitely sidelined? And if it wants not only to survive but also to thrive, it needs to find a way to displace one of the Big Two in some of the SMD seats. And what's the best strategy for that? Does it remain a free agent, swinging between green and blue depending on the issue, and get squeezed out in the next election (a la James Soong and the PFP)? Does it enter a pre-electoral coalition with one or the other, at the risk of absorption (like the NPP in 2016)? Or is there a third option?
I think they've decided on a more ambitious strategy: replacing the KMT.
For more on that strategy, see Part 3.
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Four days later, the same opposition majority in the legislature voted down all seven of President Lai’s nominees to the Constitutional Court, leaving it with only eight justices and unable to meet the new quorum requirement for hearing a case. It is now effectively paralyzed. The DPP government has nevertheless requested that the court meet and rule anyway on whether the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act are themselves unconstitutional. This increasingly destructive partisan political conflict has put Taiwan on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no obvious way to resolve it.
This confrontation is also taking place in a democracy that Freedom House last year ranked as the second-best in Asia, behind only Japan, and significantly above the United States and most of Europe. Taiwan's political system has proven remarkably resilient to PRC influence operations over many years, and it has a capable and effective state and vibrant economy despite its diplomatic isolation. So why is it facing a political crisis now?
A Divided Legislature and a Missed Opportunity
This conflict was not inevitable. In the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections, the DPP's Lai Ching-te (賴清德) won the presidential election but with only 40% of the vote, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. The KMT ended up with 52 seats (plus two blue-leaning independents), the DPP won 51, and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je's (柯文哲) centrist TPP won eight (all via the party list vote). That left no party with a majority and made the TPP the crucial swing voting bloc in the LY. In theory, the TPP could have exploited that leverage to extract significant concessions from the ruling DPP -- on policy, legislative leadership, or cabinet positions. But instead, negotiations between the DPP and TPP went nowhere, and President Lai missed his chance to head off the last year of partisan warfare.
The formation of battle lines first became apparent on February 1, when the new legislature was seated. Its first order of business was to elect a speaker and deputy speaker. Curiously, the TPP ultimately decided not to support either of the major party nominees -- the party's eight legislators voted for TPP member Huang Shan-shan (黃珊珊) in the first round, and abstained in the second. As a result, the KMT's Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) won the speaker's race, and KMT legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) was elected as his deputy. Despite providing crucial help to the KMT, the TPP did not manage to win even the deputy speaker as the price for their support. Nor did they strike a deal with the DPP, either, although that should have secured at least one of the leadership positions for the party. Given that the TPP held the crucial votes that could have denied control of the legislature to either major party, this outcome seems like a major missed opportunity for both them and the DPP.
I've heard competing explanations for this bargaining failure. One story is that the refusal came from the DPP side -- ruling party legislators were engaged in quiet conversations with the TPP about a possible power-sharing deal, but Lai Ching-te intervened to stop the negotiations. Reporting at the time suggested that the TPP's price for cooperation in the run-up to February 1 was for the DPP to support Huang Shan-shan for speaker -- a price the DPP was apparently not willing to pay, but which in hindsight they probably should have. That interpretation is also consistent with the public comments offered by party caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) that "A DPP-TPP partnership is only possible if the TPP voluntarily comes to us."So maybe this was a strategic mistake by the DPP caucus (and ultimately, Lai himself), and they are suffering the consequences.
But another possibility is that the TPP was just never seriously interested in cooperating with the DPP no matter what they offered -- even before Ko Wen-je's detention in a corruption investigation several months later turbocharged the TPP's animosity toward the DPP government. Although the KMT-TPP negotiations for a joint presidential ticket broke down in spectacular public fashion in November 2023, the two parties did still enter into a pre-election coalition for the legislative races and even campaigned together, so perhaps TPP leaders had already made up their minds to team up with the KMT after the elections, too, and there really was no chance the DPP could have enticed them to defect.
Whatever the reason, ever since the new legislature was seated on February 1, the TPP has consistently chosen to act as the KMT's junior partner and supported the opposition party's confrontational approach to the DPP government. And as the partisan divide has hardened, it has also transformed into an inter-branch conflict between the KMT-TPP majority in the legislature and the DPP in the executive. The partisan maneuvering that has followed has escalated over the last year to a level of open political warfare that is posing a severe test for Taiwan's democratic institutions. And it is a test they are failing.
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My boldest prediction: Chen Kuan-ting wins his race in Chiayi County!
In contrast, this time around the election campaign cycle was rather quiet for months -- one might even say boring. The polls showed little movement after Hou and Lai were formally nominated in June. There was a spike in interest when Terry Gou (remember him?) registered for a signature drive to run as an independent. And there was another in the run-up to November 24, when the prospect of Blue-White KMT-TPP cooperation on a joint presidential ticket got real, and then the deal fell apart, and then all three candidates announced their VP nominees and Gou declined to run (and now, to endorse anyone -- he's completely dropped out of sight!) The last month has felt more amped up, but the policy rollouts, debates, late breaking scandals, and insults have all felt very...normal...for a Taiwan presidential election campaign. There's just not the same sense of existential threat or inspiration that we saw in 2020 or 2016.
On Cross-Strait and US-Taiwan relations, there really isn't much difference between the three presidential candidates. The distinctions between them are harder to parse out than they were in past elections. Hou has tacked the KMT to the center, especially on defense policy and relations with the U.S.; Lai promises to continue Tsai's approach and shake off the accusation he's deeper green than she is; and to the extent Ko can be pinned down at all he's tried to squeeze himself somewhere in the constricting space between the two, supporting the call for defense budget increases while also embracing the KMT's call to revive the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with Beijing.
The stakes look very different to international audiences. The gap between the general domestic vibe and the framing of this race in many international media outlets has become a chasm. Read the English-language press and the headlines framed this as the election that could change the world. Meanwhile, the reaction of young voters, especially, that we've talked to has been a collective shrug. All three candidates are flawed in their own ways, and even people from their own campaigns will admit it privately. Nor do most people expect fundamental changes to come about as a result of this election. Add it all up and it's a recipe for low turnout.
The legislative races are once again overshadowed, but quite important. The conventional wisdom we're heard is that the DPP will lose its majority -- it has 63 seats right now but is likely to lose at least 10, putting it below the 57/113 it needs. The KMT will be the main beneficiary -- possibly picking up 10 seats or more in the districts. And the TPP is likely to increase its seat share mostly via the party list vote -- last time it won five seats on 11.7% of the vote, and if it doubles that (23-4%) it would have 10 seats. The KMT has also yielded four districts to the TPP but they're all quite green, so I'd be surprised if the TPP has a single district legislator next month.
So, what we're looking at most likely is a split legislature, with both the DPP and KMT at roughly 48-53, and the TPP in the middle with 9-11. It's even possible that 2-5 independents could win and collectively be crucial to the legislative majority. Whoever wins the presidency is going to have to deal with multi-party politics and do coalition-building issue by issue in the LY.
Some Pre-Election Expectations
Turnout will be down. My prior here is that it will be close to the 2016 level, at say 66-69%. The weather is good but, again, subdued campaign with flawed candidates.
The TPP's party list vote will be close to Ko's vote share. For once, the party list, which is decided by voters' second vote, is potentially crucial to determining the balance of power in the LY. In the absence of other information I'm guessing the TPP's list will do about as well as Ko does in the presidential race.
The KMT comes close but does not surpass the DPP as the largest party in the Legislative Yuan. The electoral system has a slight (2-5 seats) bias in favor of the KMT, and at this point I think we can say the party's candidates typically do better in the district races, where family legacy, constituent service, factional ties, and other things that localize voting patterns matter more than in the presidential election. Going through district by district, my best guess is that the KMT picks up a net of 5 seats in the greater Taipei area (Taipei, New Taipei, and Keelung [UPDATE: and Taoyuan]), holds in Hsinchu and Miaoli, nets 4 seats in central Taiwan (Taichung, Nantou, Changhua), and flips 2 elsewhere (Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Taitung, Yilan, etc. [UPDATE: and Yunlin, Chiayi]) KMT candidates will probably also win back at least one of the two seats in the indigenous districts (1 highland, 1 lowland) that the DPP holds now. That would net the party 12 seats, putting them at 50. The DPP drop in this scenario is around the same which would put them at 51 seats.
It's also not fully appreciated how close they were in the PR list last election: the DPP won 34% and the KMT 33% there (both got 13 seats). If both parties are mostly relying on core supporters to cast a party vote, as they did last time, then I'd expect them to look similar again, maybe down a seat or two from 2020. Let's call it 1 seat down for each.
Add that up and we've got KMT 49, DPP 50, TPP 10, and others 4.
And finally...
I think Lai wins the presidential race, but it's pretty close. He's been ahead in the polls all year, by a little to a lot; not one reliable polling company ever found Hou in the lead. I expected dissatisfaction with the DPP government to manifest in soft numbers for Lai, which it did -- he's rarely if ever broken 40% in polls over the last six months, and clear majorities support a change in ruling party in this election. But I also expected eventually anti-DPP voters would finally converge around Hou, and that doesn't appear to have happened. Instead they have remained divided on who they would prefer to see instead, and even on who is the strongest candidate (Ko or Hou) if they are to vote strategically. In the end this probably dooms Hou's chances of pulling the upset. Ko's enduring strength has surprised me, but his chances depend greatly on support from the most fickle potential voters: those in the youngest cohorts (below roughly 28yo), and I still expect him to finish a clear third.
With Ko soaking up a lot of the disaffected voters, and with both parties turning out their bases and not attracting much beyond, I expect the larger generic size of the green camp to be decisive. I'll predict: Lai wins with about 40%, Hou with 35%, and Ko with 25%. I'm not going to venture a guess about the final raw vote tallies but I will go out on a limb and predict Hou won't hit Han Kuo-yu's 5.5 million in 2020; and Lai will fall short of the 6 million mark that Tsai hit in all three of her campaigns.