- Published on
This coming week is the 4th World Congress of Taiwan Studies at the University of Washington, Seattle campus. WCTS is the seminal gathering of academics and practitioners working in the Taiwan studies field. The first meeting was in 2012 in Taipei at Academia Sinica, the second in 2015 in London, and the third also at Academia Sinica in 2018. This meeting has been delayed a year because of the COVID pandemic -- well worth the wait, however, because we actually get to do this in person. For many of us this will be the first time seeing each other in almost three years.
How Democratic Is Taiwan? Evaluating 20 Years of Political Change
On Monday, June 27 I'm going to be presenting a new paper at the WCTS that attempts to evaluate the quality of democracy in Taiwan. The initial inspiration for this research was a talk that Larry Diamond gave in 2001, which provides a very useful snapshot of Taiwan's democratic strengths and weaknesses. Diamond highlighted five problem areas:
- Political corruption and "black gold" (黑金) politics
- Weak rule of law, including insufficient judicial independence and professionalism and widespread distrust of the courts
- Growing partisan polarization, especially around national identity (Taiwanese vs Chinese) and ethnicity (benshengren vs waishengren)
- Constitutional defects, including ambiguity over whether Taiwan is a presidential or semi-presidential system, and a problematic electoral system (SNTV).
- Weak support for democratic values among the mass public.
Comparative Indices
Here's the ranking and score for four prominent democracy indices used to rank overall quality of liberal democracy:
V-Dem is noticeably more negative than the other three on Taiwan (and much more positive on South Korea, for reasons that aren't clear to me.) So keep that in mind as we look at some of the V-Dem indicators below -- if there's systematic bias in the V-Dem estimates, they're probably too low rather than too high.
Here's the ranking and score for four prominent democracy indices used to rank overall quality of liberal democracy:
- Freedom House: Taiwan is 94/100, tied for 19th with Chile and Germany
- Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index: 8.99/10, 8th.
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 9.60/10, 3rd (of 137 non-OECD countries)
- Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy Index, 0.7/1, 32rd.
V-Dem is noticeably more negative than the other three on Taiwan (and much more positive on South Korea, for reasons that aren't clear to me.) So keep that in mind as we look at some of the V-Dem indicators below -- if there's systematic bias in the V-Dem estimates, they're probably too low rather than too high.
Political Corruption and Black Gold Politics
Here's the Varieties of Democracy indicator for vote-buying, 1969-2021, which shows some real improvement after 2015.
Here's the Varieties of Democracy indicator for vote-buying, 1969-2021, which shows some real improvement after 2015.
And here's V-Dem's political corruption score over the same time period. Almost imperceptible changes up to 2014, followed by real declines in corruption.
Rule of Law
Here's V-Dem's Rule of Law index, 1980-2021. Roughly similar pattern, with some improvement starting 2015, although V-Dem is pretty positive on the rule of law even in 2001...
Here's V-Dem's Rule of Law index, 1980-2021. Roughly similar pattern, with some improvement starting 2015, although V-Dem is pretty positive on the rule of law even in 2001...
Political Polarization
Finally, here's V-Dem's political polarization measure. The trend here is counter-intuitive -- it shows the Chen Shui-bian era as not particularly polarized, and significantly less than the previous Lee Teng-hui era, followed by a further decline in polarization until 2013, then significant increases since then.
This looks weird to me -- I've long thought the CSB era was the peak for polarization, and that it has declined since then -- but that's what the data show.
I've put two other countries on here for reference -- compared to South Korea and the United States, Taiwan doesn't look especially polarized at any point in the last 20 years. So despite the increases on this indicator in recent years, political polarization doesn't look like the fundamental threat to democracy that Diamond worried it might be back in 2001.
Finally, here's V-Dem's political polarization measure. The trend here is counter-intuitive -- it shows the Chen Shui-bian era as not particularly polarized, and significantly less than the previous Lee Teng-hui era, followed by a further decline in polarization until 2013, then significant increases since then.
This looks weird to me -- I've long thought the CSB era was the peak for polarization, and that it has declined since then -- but that's what the data show.
I've put two other countries on here for reference -- compared to South Korea and the United States, Taiwan doesn't look especially polarized at any point in the last 20 years. So despite the increases on this indicator in recent years, political polarization doesn't look like the fundamental threat to democracy that Diamond worried it might be back in 2001.
What's It All Mean?
The paper has a lot more, but summarizing:
Finally, this paper was inspired partly by accusations coming from some quarters in Taiwan that it is now an "illiberal democracy" or "electoral autocracy" under President Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling DPP. I wrote a blog post last December rebutting some of these accusations; this paper builds on the data and arguments there. The conclusion is the same: you really have to stretch to argue that Taiwan is in democratic decline. Most of the data point in the other direction: Taiwan's democratic system has addressed many of its most serious weaknesses since 2001, and even since 2015.
The paper has a lot more, but summarizing:
- Comparative indices generally show Taiwan to be a high-quality liberal democracy, and one that has registered important improvements since 2015.
- Since 2001, Taiwan has made significant progress in Diamond's five problem areas.
- The remaining weaknesses -- e.g. media sensationalism, distrust of judiciary, "direct democracy" agenda gone haywire -- are not especially unique to Taiwan and don't (so far) threaten the integrity of the democratic system.
- The biggest threat to democracy in Taiwan now comes from the People's Republic of China across the Strait, including CCP-backed influence campaigns.
Finally, this paper was inspired partly by accusations coming from some quarters in Taiwan that it is now an "illiberal democracy" or "electoral autocracy" under President Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling DPP. I wrote a blog post last December rebutting some of these accusations; this paper builds on the data and arguments there. The conclusion is the same: you really have to stretch to argue that Taiwan is in democratic decline. Most of the data point in the other direction: Taiwan's democratic system has addressed many of its most serious weaknesses since 2001, and even since 2015.
- Published on
I just received a call for papers to the "World Congress of Taiwan Studies" conference, on June 16-18, 2015 in London, hosted by the Centre of Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). This is a relatively new initiative, funded in part by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a component of its support of Taiwan Studies in the UK. The first meeting was held in 2012 at Academia Sinica in Taipei. Details about the 2015 meeting are below.
I'm not sure what this means for the timing of or attendance at the other two regular Taiwan studies conferences that typically happen about the same time:
There are probably enough people working in Taiwan studies to support three different conferences in rapid succession, but it seems sub-optimal for a small field concerned about its viability to hold multiple events exclusively on Taiwan that will be in some competition with one another.
It is also not self-evident that Taiwan studies as a whole benefits from being detached from the larger disciplinary associations, which appears to be the model being promoted here. The Association for Asian Studies (AAS), for instance, used to have a strong Taiwan studies section with a highly influential newsletter (see an example here), but there's been a scant Taiwan presence there in recent years: by my count, there was one panel (out of 366) devoted to Taiwan at this year's AAS annual conference, and a total of 17 presentations (out of about 1300) with some link to Taiwan. Roughly speaking, Taiwan came up less than 2% of the time at the largest Asian Studies conference in the world. That's not much of an impact. And I doubt any non-Taiwan specialists who were at AAS will be paying attention to what happens at NATSA, EATS, or the World Congress of Taiwan Studies next summer.
There's a similar worrisome trend in Taiwan-related papers at the American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting, which is happening in Washington, DC this week. There has long been a vibrant Conference Group on Taiwan Studies at APSA, but the number of panels and papers on Taiwan has declined in recent years as well--from three guaranteed panels, CGOTS is now down to one. I don't know about other disciplines--I'd be curious what's going on at the annual meetings of history, sociology, and anthropology--but in political science and Asian Studies, Taiwan-related participation is on the decline.
I suspect these trends are due in large part to the growth of the separate Taiwan Studies conferences. Which, if you think about it, is really a self-inflicted wound. Given that Taiwan's citizens and public officials complain frequently about its official marginalization in world affairs, why actively pursue greater isolation from the disciplines in which Taiwan-related research has historically been conducted? The danger of building a separate "Taiwan Studies" field is that it will confine research on Taiwan to the margins in most of the major disciplines. And it doesn't appear that anyone promoting these conferences is thinking much about that downside.
So, might I humbly suggest that one of the panels at next year's "World Congress" on the "State of the Field" consider whether holding three separate overseas Taiwan Studies conferences in two months is really a good idea at all?
I'm not sure what this means for the timing of or attendance at the other two regular Taiwan studies conferences that typically happen about the same time:
- The European Association of Taiwan Studies annual conference was held this year from April 30-May 2 at University of Portsmouth, also in the UK;
- The North American Taiwan Studies Association annual conference was held this year from June 19-21 at the University of Wisconsin.
There are probably enough people working in Taiwan studies to support three different conferences in rapid succession, but it seems sub-optimal for a small field concerned about its viability to hold multiple events exclusively on Taiwan that will be in some competition with one another.
It is also not self-evident that Taiwan studies as a whole benefits from being detached from the larger disciplinary associations, which appears to be the model being promoted here. The Association for Asian Studies (AAS), for instance, used to have a strong Taiwan studies section with a highly influential newsletter (see an example here), but there's been a scant Taiwan presence there in recent years: by my count, there was one panel (out of 366) devoted to Taiwan at this year's AAS annual conference, and a total of 17 presentations (out of about 1300) with some link to Taiwan. Roughly speaking, Taiwan came up less than 2% of the time at the largest Asian Studies conference in the world. That's not much of an impact. And I doubt any non-Taiwan specialists who were at AAS will be paying attention to what happens at NATSA, EATS, or the World Congress of Taiwan Studies next summer.
There's a similar worrisome trend in Taiwan-related papers at the American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting, which is happening in Washington, DC this week. There has long been a vibrant Conference Group on Taiwan Studies at APSA, but the number of panels and papers on Taiwan has declined in recent years as well--from three guaranteed panels, CGOTS is now down to one. I don't know about other disciplines--I'd be curious what's going on at the annual meetings of history, sociology, and anthropology--but in political science and Asian Studies, Taiwan-related participation is on the decline.
I suspect these trends are due in large part to the growth of the separate Taiwan Studies conferences. Which, if you think about it, is really a self-inflicted wound. Given that Taiwan's citizens and public officials complain frequently about its official marginalization in world affairs, why actively pursue greater isolation from the disciplines in which Taiwan-related research has historically been conducted? The danger of building a separate "Taiwan Studies" field is that it will confine research on Taiwan to the margins in most of the major disciplines. And it doesn't appear that anyone promoting these conferences is thinking much about that downside.
So, might I humbly suggest that one of the panels at next year's "World Congress" on the "State of the Field" consider whether holding three separate overseas Taiwan Studies conferences in two months is really a good idea at all?
The Second World Congress of Taiwan Studies will be held at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) June 16-18, 2015. The Congress is being co-organized by Academia Sinica and the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies.
The main themes for the Congress are the State of the Field in Taiwan Studies and Taiwan Studies Revisited. We are particularly seeking papers that critically assess the existing field of research in a variety of disciplines. In addition, we will have a series of papers in which authors revisit their most important work in the light of recent developments and research findings. We will have a total 19 panels that address prominent topics in the field of Taiwan Studies and also a number of practical panels that look at themes such as institution building, publishing and teaching.
We have completed the initial round of invitations and now would like to invite abstracts on the following topics:
1. State of the field on Taiwan’s political communication research
2. State of the field of research on Taiwan film (not documentaries).
3. State of the field of research on Internet Politics in Taiwan
4. State of the field on gender politics in Taiwan
5. State of the field on migration research in Taiwan
6. State of the field on research on 21st century Taiwan literature
7. Assessment of Taiwan’s economic challenges after ECFA
Abstract deadline: October 1, 2014
Abstracts should be submitted to: twstudy@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Abstracts should be no more than 600 words long.
We will announce the accepted abstracts on November 15 2014.
The organizers will cover the costs of participants’ accommodation for three nights in London but not travel costs.
The main themes for the Congress are the State of the Field in Taiwan Studies and Taiwan Studies Revisited. We are particularly seeking papers that critically assess the existing field of research in a variety of disciplines. In addition, we will have a series of papers in which authors revisit their most important work in the light of recent developments and research findings. We will have a total 19 panels that address prominent topics in the field of Taiwan Studies and also a number of practical panels that look at themes such as institution building, publishing and teaching.
We have completed the initial round of invitations and now would like to invite abstracts on the following topics:
1. State of the field on Taiwan’s political communication research
2. State of the field of research on Taiwan film (not documentaries).
3. State of the field of research on Internet Politics in Taiwan
4. State of the field on gender politics in Taiwan
5. State of the field on migration research in Taiwan
6. State of the field on research on 21st century Taiwan literature
7. Assessment of Taiwan’s economic challenges after ECFA
Abstract deadline: October 1, 2014
Abstracts should be submitted to: twstudy@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Abstracts should be no more than 600 words long.
We will announce the accepted abstracts on November 15 2014.
The organizers will cover the costs of participants’ accommodation for three nights in London but not travel costs.