Kharis Templeman
中文姓名:祁凱立
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March 18 Event: Defending Media Freedom in Taiwan

3/12/2021

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On March 18, the Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific will host an event examining the state of and challenges to Taiwan's media freedom. In December 2020, Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (國家通訊傳播委員會) voted to deny a broadcast license to CTiTV (中天電視), a pro-China news channel that had been highly critical of the Taiwanese government and ruling party, the DPP. This decision marks the first time a TV channel has been forced off the air for violation of the terms of its license since Taiwan became a democracy. CTiTV is part of the Want Want China Times media group, a media conglomerate owned and run by the pro-unification snack foods magnate Tsai Eng-meng, and it has been accused of coordinating its reporting with the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing. However, until being forced off the air, it was also a popular source of news among supporters of the opposition KMT and an important voice in Taiwan’s diverse and critical TV landscape.

In this moderated discussion, three panelists from Taiwan will consider the complex issues this decision raises and debate when -- and if -- it is ever appropriate for government to regulate media content and limit access to the broadcast spectrum in a liberal democracy. Registration is free and open to the public.

​Some additional somewhat disjointed thoughts follow... 

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Network 20/20 Talk: "Tensions over Taiwan: Implications for U.S.-China Relations"

2/22/2021

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One of the silver linings of the COVID era is the ability to engage virtually with all kinds of audiences we would never have had the opportunity to meet in the Before Times, because of cost, time, and distance. Now, we can, and do, and I hope even as shelter-in-place ends, we never fully abandon the online talk format, simply because of how convenient they are for everyone.

In my latest virtual appearance from my spare bedroom this month, I'm going to be speaking on Thursday, February 25 with the organizers of Network 20/20, a foreign policy forum based in New York City, about the latest developments in the US-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. Come for the conversation about PLA aircraft buzzing Taiwan's ADIZ, stay for some meaty discussion about the politics of pork.

Talk abstract is below. RSVP link is here. Or you can do as the sign says and scan the QR code.


Event Synopsis
As President Biden took office and outlined his foreign policy agenda, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force continuously breached Taiwanese airspace with military planes. Tensions across the Formosa Strait continue to rise and with the crackdown on Hong Kong and China’s bolstered economy, experts are warning Taiwan is in a vulnerable geopolitical position. Recently re-elected President Tsai Ing-wen has increased military weapon sales from the U.S. and is defiantly standing up to China’s expanding ambitions. This briefing will discuss the future of Taiwanese sovereignty and how Taiwan can navigate its complex geopolitical position. Join us for an in-depth discussion on these important issues and more on Thursday, February 25th from 7:00 PM to 8:00 PM, when we are joined by Dr. Kharis Ali Templeman, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and part of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. As an expert on Taiwan politics and East-Asian Affairs, Dr. Templeman will outline China’s strategy, domestic affairs on the island of Taiwan, and its implication to U.S.-Taiwan and Sino-American relations.
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Testimony for US-China Economic and Security Review Hearing

2/22/2021

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On February 18, I had the privilege of joining a strong group of witnesses in testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on the topic of "Deterring PRC Aggression toward Taiwan." The USCC has a congressional mandate "to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action."

I can still remember when I first became familiar with the depth and quality of USCC's annual report, when I was an undergraduate taking -- what else? -- Chinese politics with Melanie Manion at the University of Rochester. Parts of it were assigned reading then, and parts no doubt still are now, 20 years later, in the many Chinese security and politics courses around the country. So it is gratifying and a bit humbling to be in a position to contribute in some small way to the next iteration.

I also want to note here that, while I was an undergraduate, I received crucial funding from the National Security Education Program (NSEP, now known as the Boren Awards) to study abroad in Beijing and Taipei. That experience kindled my interest in Taiwan, set me on my current trajectory and, quite literally, changed my life. I hope that robust funding for studying the language and culture of countries that have national security implications for the United States will be available for years to come--it is a smart investment in our future, and an increasingly important incentive to learn a foreign language in an era when the numbers of American students studying abroad in China has dropped precipitously. 

I would not be in a position today to contribute to the public conversation on Taiwan's security issues without the help of the Boren program, and I hope my testimony last week will go some small way toward repaying the investment NSEP made in me and my career.  

​The full video of the panel and the written testimony, including my own, are available at the USCC hearing website. In addition, since it is much abridged from the written testimony, I have posted my oral remarks below. 
Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I have been asked to cover quite a lot of ground in my written testimony, so in my oral remarks I’m going to focus on my comparative advantage in this hearing: How to Assess Taiwan’s Will to Fight. 
 
Assessing Taiwan’s “Will to Fight” 
 
“Will to fight” is a vague concept, and assessing it a hard thing to do rigorously. But we do have at least three kinds of data we can observe to give us some purchase on this question: public opinion, budgets, and willingness to serve in the military. 
 
Public Opinion
The first is public opinion data. There are many surveys of defense and security-related issues conducted every year. I’m not going to go through them in detail, but simply note that when you look at the general patterns that appear consistent across surveys, they support four key observations. 
 
First, Taiwanese on the whole are not very confident about their own military’s ability to defend the country—especially alone—against an attack by the PRC. There is a great deal of pessimism. 
 
Second, they are generally much more confident in their fellow Taiwanese. About 2/3 – ¾ think most others would actively resist a PRC attack.  And, their own willingness to resist is closely correlated with their estimates of how many others also do so. 
 
Third, the majority of Taiwanese – anywhere from 2/3 to ¾ -- indicate willingness to participate in the defense of Taiwan as long as the US is also involved. If the US is not involved, this share drops below half. So US participation in the defense of Taiwan has an important psychological and morale-boosting element as well as a practical one. 
 
And fourth, the majority of Taiwanese remain confident that the United States would intervene to stop a PLA invasion, even if Taiwanese leaders themselves triggered an attack by declaring independence. 
 
So, to sum up: if they believe the US will also be involved, most Taiwanese are willing to resist, and think most others will too. If they believe the US will not, then most will not. Beliefs about our presence is a critical variable in Taiwanese “will to fight.”  
 
 
Defense Budgets
A second way to assess Taiwan’s “will to fight” is to look at defense budgets. Until recently, these data have suggested a half-hearted commitment to defending itself. 
 
Starting in the mid-1990s, Taiwan’s defense budget in real terms flattened out for 20 years. It declined as a share of GDP from about 5% in 1994 to about 2% in 2016. Last year Taiwan spent in real terms roughly what it spent in 1994. Meanwhile, the PRC spent 25 times what it spent in 1994. 
 
We all know that Taiwan cannot keep up with the PRC’s increases, which have generally been in proportion to GDP growth.
 
What is more striking is Taiwan’s relative decline even compared to other states in the region. For instance, in 1989, Taiwan spent about 2/3 of what SK spent. In 2020, it spent less than 1/3. Put bluntly, going by budgets, Taiwan looks like it’s shirking on defense.  
 
However, this has changed significantly in the past four years. Taiwan’s announced defense budget has increased in local currency terms by about 40%: from 321 bn NTD in 2016, to 453 bn in 2021, and the share of the central government budget going to defense has climbed back to 20 percent, a level it has not been at since 1999. 
 
That is at least a start and suggests that under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan is committing significantly more resources to its own defense.  

 
Willingness to Serve in the Military
A third type of data we can use to assess this question is willingness to join the military. Here the patterns are not encouraging. In 2012, the Ma Ying-jeou administration approved a phase-out of conscription, to be replaced by an all-volunteer force. This transition has been repeatedly delayed, so that today, all adult able-bodied men are still required to serve four months—not enough time to learn much of use and develop into capable reserves. 
 
The main reason is repeated shortfalls in recruiting. Put simply, most young Taiwanese have no interest in joining. And their brief time as conscripts does not change their minds. Most young people see the military as a path of last resort, only if they have no other options. So, we observe a contradiction: young Taiwanese are the most pro-Taiwan, anti-China, pro-democracy and pro-independence of any generation, but the vast majority would never consider volunteering to join the military. 
 
This might be changing as a potential confrontation with the PRC looms larger, as the military threat becomes more salient—and as the military acquires new high-profile platforms. But this is an area that requires a great deal of work from the MND and civilian leadership to improve the public image of the military, and to strengthen Taiwan’s training and reserve system. 
 
 
Recommendations
 
1. Strengthen the credibility of US commitment to Taiwan through NON-military ties. The ability to deter a Taiwan Strait crisis rests crucially on beliefs that the US would act to counter PRC coercion because it is in our own interests to do so. 
 
That belief has weakened in Asia over the last four years, in part because the previous administration put up trade barriers and pulled out of the TPP. One way to reverse impressions that we will not be committed to Asia is to reengage in regional trade negotiations.
 
As one example, the USTR should open bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan as soon as is feasible. Taiwan needs economic gestures of support as well as military ones, and bilateral trade talks would be a clear sign of deepening cooperation. If the Biden administration eventually decides to re-commit to negotiations for the CPTPP, use the leverage this opportunity offers to insist on Taiwan’s (and South Korea’s) participation in membership negotiations as well.  
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December 8 Event: Dynamics of Democracy in the Ma Ying-jeou Era

12/7/2020

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The Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region will host a virtual event tomorrow (register at the link), Tuesday, December 8 at 4pm, the Dynamics of Democracy in Taiwan: The Ma Ying-jeou Era.This event will cover some of the findings from a recent new book that I have co-edited with Yun-han Chu and Larry Diamond. We're fortunate to have three of the contributors to the book able to join us for the discussion. They are: 

Szu-yin Ho, Professor of Strategic and International Affairs at Tamkang University, Danshui, Taiwan, and the former  deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council during the Ma Ying-jeou presidency. He'll be speaking about the legacies of President Ma's cross-Strait policies. 

Austin Horng-en Wang, Assistant Professor of Political Science at UNLV. He'll provide some remarks about the emergence of Tsai Ing-wen as the unquestioned leader of the DPP during the Ma era. 

Shih-hao Huang, Post-Doctoral Fellow in political science at National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. He'll present data that show the challenges the Ma administration had getting priority legislation approved by the Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, despite enjoying a large KMT majority there for both his terms. He will also compare legislative success rates under Ma to the Tsai Ing-wen era, and reflect a bit on what the differences can tell us about executive-legislative relations in Taiwan. 

For more on the book, and a link to the first chapter, see this previous blog post. 

This will be the last event of the calendar year for PTIP. Keep an eye out for announcements about our 2021 activities, coming soon. 

Finally, on a personal note, this event is my first as the Program Manger of the Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. After being out of that role for over a year, as of November 1 I've stepped back in to take over the day-to-day management of the current incarnation of the Taiwan program at its new home at the Hoover Institution. Many thanks to Glenn Tiffert for his great stewardship of PTIP over the past year while juggling many other responsibilities--including, not coincidentally, the China Global Sharp Power project.    
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China's Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren't a Sign of Imminent Attack

10/21/2020

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PictureTaiwan Ministry of National Defense figure illustrating PLA incursions into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ on September 9-10, 2020.
China's recent military bravado in the Taiwan Strait represents the end state of a failed strategy

The drums of war are growing louder in the Taiwan Strait. In the last month, at least 50 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft have entered Taiwan’s airspace. The volume of threatening language directed at Taiwan from sources in China, both official and unofficial, has reached a crescendo, and the headlines in the news grow more alarmingeach month. In the United States, mainstream foreign policy voices are now openly debating whether the U.S. should abandon strategic ambiguity and openly commit to defend Taiwan in the case of an attack — an idea advocated not so long ago by only a radical fringe.

​But these dire headlines are misleading: Beijing is not gearing up for an attack on Taiwan. It still has neither the capacity to launch a successful full-scale invasion, nor the motive to risk a conflict with the United States. In reality, the increasingly bellicose language coming from China is a sign of weakness, not strength, and a cover for the failure of its own Taiwan policy. Having thrown away most of its non-military leverage in a fruitless effort to compel Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to endorse its one China principle, Beijing has now been reduced to counter-productive saber-rattling to express its discontent at U.S. arms sales and high-level diplomatic visits, while Taiwan races to strengthen its own defenses and reorient its economy away from overdependence on mainland China. In short, Xi Jinping’s approach to the “Taiwan issue” has turned into a strategic fiasco — one that may take years for Beijing to recover from...


The rest of this commentary appears at The Diplomat.
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Taiwan Studies at APSA 2020: The Virtual Conference Line-Up

9/7/2020

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Welcome to the Golden State!
The American Political Science Association (APSA) annual conference was supposed to be in held in San Francisco this year, until COVID-19 hit. So, like everything else, it's moved online. That's probably just as well, because over the last month the Bay Area has turned into a post-apocalyptic hellscape of raging fires, record heat, and choking smoke. We've even broken some of the all-time temperature records that were set the last time APSA was in San Francisco, in 2017. Yay. At this rate it might be wise to put San Francisco (or anywhere in California, really) on the same repeat-offender list as New Orleans and never hold APSA here again. (Seattle has never looked better.) 

Anyway. It turns out we'll still have a strong lineup of Taiwan-related programming in the virtual conference. The Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) is sponsoring seven panels on Taiwan politics, spread out over four days (Thursday-Sunday, September 10-13, 2020). Details are at the CGOTS website, and reposted below. Note that you have to be registered for the conference to join the virtual sessions, but that they're otherwise open to all participants. If you'd like to see the latest Taiwan politics research, come check us out online.         

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Panel 1: Politics of Immigration and Progressive Issues in Taiwan         
Thu, Sep.10, 8:00 to 9:30am (MDT) [7:00-8:30am (PDT); 9:00-10:30am (CDT); 10:00-11:30am (EDT)]
Thu, Sep.10, 10:00-11:30pm (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Shelley Rigger, Davidson College
Discussants: Wei-Ting Yen, Franklin and Marshall College
  1. The growing role of human rights issues in Taiwan’s presidential elections, Shu-An Tsai, SUNY Buffalo
  2. Toward a Greener Island: Court Decisions of Environmental Lawsuits in Taiwan, Chung-li Wu, Academia Sinica; Alex Min-Wei Lin, National Chengchi University
 
Panel 2: New Perspectives on the Elections and Voting: The Case of Taiwan 
Thu, Sep.10, 10:00 to 11:30am (MDT) [9:00-10:30am (PDT); 11:00am-12:30pm (CDT); 12:00-1:30pm (EDT)]
Fri, Sep.11, 12:00-1:30am (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Christopher Achen, Princeton University
Discussants: Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University
  1. Dynastic Politics: Evidence from Local Elections in Taiwan, Nathan F. Batto, Academia Sinica; Benjamin L. Read, University of California, Santa Cruz
  2. Do Pro-Beijing Media Affect Voting? An Experiment from Taiwan's General Election, Jay Chieh Kao, University of Texas at Austin
 
Panel 3: Emerging Issues and Puzzles in Taiwanese Politics        
Fri, Sep.11, 8:00 to 9:30am (MDT) [7:00-8:30am (PDT); 9:00-10:30am (CDT); 10:00-11:30am (EDT)]
Fri, Sep.11, 10:00-11:30pm (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Pei-te Lien, University of California, Santa Barbara
Discussants: Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University
  1. Social Inequality and Participation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Yi-Tzu Lin, University of South Carolina; Charles Chong-Han Wu, National Chengchi University
  2. Revisiting the Interplay Between Corruption Perception and Trust with Structural Equation Modeling: Unpacking the Mechanism​, Chilik Yu, Overseas Chinese University; Ting-An-Xu Liu, O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs Indiana University Bloomington
 
Panel 4: Public Policy and Legislative Studies in Taiwan
Fri, Sep.11, 10:00 to 11:30am (MDT) [9:00-10:30am (PDT); 11:00am-12:30pm (CDT); 12:00-1:30pm (EDT)]
Sat, Sep.12, 12:00-1:30am (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas
Discussants: Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University; Nick Lin, Academia Sinica
  1. Policy Diffusion of Financial Regulatory Sandbox : The Experience of Taiwan, Ping-Kuei Chen, National Chengchi University; *Cheng-Yun Tsang, National Chengchi University
  2. Public Policy Preferences Revealed in Referendum Voting: The Case of Taiwan, Chi Huang, National Chengchi University
 
Panel 5: Polarization and National Identity: The 2020 General Elections in Taiwan
Sat, Sep.12, 8:00 to 9:30am (MDT) [7:00-8:30am (PDT); 9:00-10:30am (CDT); 10:00-11:30am (EDT)]
Sat, Sep.12, 10:00-11:30pm (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas
Discussants: Austin Horng-En Wang, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Kharis Templeman, Stanford University
  1. Dehumanization and Polarization in the 2020 Taiwanese Presidential Election, Jung Chen, University of California, Merced; Chih-Cheng Meng, National Cheng Kung University
  2. Partisan Polarization and Fragmentation: Evidence from the 2020 Taiwan Elections, Caleb M. Clark, Auburn University; Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas; *Alexander C. Tan, University of Canterbury
  3. Is Defending Taiwan’s Democracy Spatial? Revisit Valence Voting in Taiwan, Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University
 
Panel 6: Social Media and its Political Impact in the Contemporary Taiwan
Sat, Sep.12, 10:00 to 11:30am (MDT) [9:00-10:30am (PDT); 11:00am-12:30pm (CDT); 12:00-1:30pm (EDT)]
Sun, Sep.13, 12:00-1:30am (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Chung-li Wu, Academia Sinica
Discussants:  Yi-Chun Chien, National Chengchi University
  1. Political Returns to Facebook Ad Spending: Evidence from Taiwan, Jason Kuo, National Taiwan University
  2. A Comparative Analysis of Social Media Impacts on Hong Kong and Taiwan elections, Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas; Stan Hok-Wui Wong, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Harold D. Clarke, University of Texas at Dallas
  3. Media Literacy and the Political Convergence across Social Media Sites, *Austin Horng-En Wang, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Howard Liu, Penn State University; *Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas; *Kuan-Sheng Wu, Purdue University; *Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University
 
Conference Group on Taiwan Studies Business Meeting
Sat, September 12, 7 to 8pm (MDT) [6-7pm (PDT); 8am-9pm (CDT); 9-10pm (EDT)]
Sun, September 13, 9-10am (Taipei, GMT+8)

Please contact Yao-Yuan Yeh at yehy@stthom.edu if you would like to acquire the meeting link.
 
Panel 7: Changes and Trends in Cross-Strait Relations between Taiwan and China 
Sun, Sep. 13, 8:00 to 9:30am (MDT) [7:00-8:30am (PDT); 9:00-10:30am (CDT); 10:00-11:30am (EDT)]
Sun, Sep.13, 10:00-11:30pm (Taipei, GMT+8)

Chair: Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas
Discussants: Jason Kuo, National Taiwan University; Charles Chong-Han Wu, National Chengchi University
  1. Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump: How They Spoke about the Taiwan Strait, Dean Chen, Ramapo College of New Jersey; Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas
  2. Under Siege: Hong Kong’s Protests, Taiwan's Reactions, and China's Challenges, Wei-chin Lee, Wake Forest University
  3. COVID-19 and the Anatomy of Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan, T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University
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Taiwan Politics during the Ma Ying-jeou Years

8/23/2020

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PictureIt exists! In paperback!
It's alive! This book volume on Taiwan politics during the Ma Ying-jeou years (2008-2016), which I've edited with Chu Yun-han and Larry Diamond, just arrived in the mail from Lynne Rienner Publishers this weekend.

This is our attempt at a deep dive into various aspects of Ma-era politics, including party politics and elections, political institutions and governance challenges, trends in public opinion and democratic values, civil society and social movements, and cross-Strait and US-Taiwan-PRC relations. This look at the Ma years parallels somewhat our earlier book on the Chen Shui-bian era.

We were fortunate to be able to assemble a great group of contributors for this book--about half based in Taiwan and half abroad--who offer a variety of perspectives on the politics of the Ma years. The scholarship here draws on years of conferences, papers, and conversations that started even before President Ma left office, including with some of the key participants in and outside of the Ma administration. (Chapter 15, for instance, is by Szu-yin Ho, who served for two years as deputy Secretary-General of Ma's National Security Council.) This sort of cross-national collaboration is less common than it should be (in part because it's logistically hard to pull off!), but I am convinced the final product is much stronger for it.  

Among the many great contributions here, let me especially highlight three that provide original, provocative answers to important questions about the Ma era:
  • In Chapter 3, Austin Wang explains how Tsai Ing-wen emerged from obscurity as unrivaled leader of the DPP during its years in opposition, despite having never previously held elected office;
  • In Chapter 4, Nathan Batto shows how President Ma's recurrent troubles with the legislature had more to do with deep divides within the ruling KMT than they did with the obstructionist tactics of the opposition DPP and with Ma's party rival, Speaker Wang Jin-pyng;
  • In Chapter 7, Isaac Shih-hao Huang and Shing-yuan Sheng demonstrate that having a majority in the Legislative Yuan does not mean a party has complete control over the Legislative Yuan, and that the legislature's decentralized law-making process makes it challenging for the executive branch to get high-priority legislation approved, whether or not the president's party holds a majority. 

For more thoughts on those issues and a broader overview of the book, check out the introductory chapter, which is available ungated from the publisher's website. 


Table of Contents:
  1. The Dynamics of Democracy During the Ma Ying-jeou Years, by Kharis Templeman, Yun-han Chu, and Larry Diamond
  2. The 2012 Elections, by Shelley Rigger
  3. The DPP in Opposition, by Austin Horng-en Wang
  4. The KMT in Power, by Nathan F. Batto
  5. The Party System Before and After the 2016 Elections, by Kharis Templeman
  6. The Challenges of Governance, by Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang
  7. Legislative Politics, by Isaac Shih-hao Huang and Shing-yuan Sheng
  8. Watchdog Institutions, by Christian Göbel
  9. Managing the Economy, by Pei-shan Lee
  10. Assessing Support for Democracy, by Yu-tzung Chang and Yun-han Chu 
  11. Trends in Public Opinion, by Ching-hsin Yu
  12. The Impact of Social Movements, by Dafydd Fell
  13. Who are the Protestors? Why Are They Protesting? by Min-hua Huang and Mark Weatherall
  14. Social Media and Cyber-Mobilization, by Eric Yu and Jia-hsin Yu
  15. Cross-Strait Relations, by Szu-yin Ho
  16. In the Shadow of Great-Power Rivalry, by Dean P. Chen

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How Taiwan Stands Up to China

7/15/2020

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I have a piece out in the latest issue of the Journal of Democracy on Chinese efforts to influence Taiwan politics, and why they failed in the January 2020 elections. After the DPP lost badly in the 2018 local elections, there was a lot of speculation (see, e.g. here, here, here, here, and here) that Beijing would be emboldened by these results and expand its efforts to sway the 2020 campaign and turn President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP out of office, or failing that, would find ways to delegitimize the results and destabilize Taiwan's democracy. In the end, that didn't happen: Tsai recovered from a politically shaky first term to win an even larger share of the vote than in 2016, the DPP held onto its legislative majority, and Tsai's main opponent, Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, openly conceded defeat on election night.

In the article, I lay out several reasons why these fears did not come to pass in 2020, and why Taiwan's democracy has repeatedly proven resilient to PRC pressure campaigns. 
  1. The CCP is still pretty bad at influencing public opinion: Beijing's covert influence operations have been surprisingly clumsy, badly disguised, and at odds with the long-term goals of Taiwan policy under Xi Jinping.
  2. Partisanship can be a good thing: The high salience of the China factor and Taiwan's partisan divides make it hard to execute the kind of United Front-led, covert and coercive activities that the CCP favors for most of its influence operations elsewhere in the world.
  3. State capacity lives: The Taiwanese state is still quite capable of responding effectively to the threat of foreign interference in elections when it takes them seriously, and the 2018 elections provided a belated wake-up call to this danger.
  4. A free society helps: Taiwanese civil society, including parts of the media and NGOs, as well as private social media companies, managed to mitigate the impact of disinformation. Facebook, for instance, took down over a hundred Han Kuo-yu fan pages the month before the election for "inauthentic activity."  
  5. Low-tech elections are an important backstop for democracy: Taiwan's election management system is very low-tech, but it is also transparent, accurate, efficient, fast, and fair. (For more details, see here.) Nobody disputed the election results, shocking as they were to some of Han Kuo-yu's core supporters who had believed the polls were fake and that Tsai would lose. The high trust in the voting and counting process had a lot to do with that.   

The full article is available via Project Muse, and access is free through August 15, 2020.
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Can Tsai Ing-wen Avoid the Second Term Curse?

6/23/2020

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If Tsai Ing-wen is superstitious, she should be worried: second term presidents in Taiwan appear to be cursed. Much like President Tsai, her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou started his second term on a confident and triumphant note. But over the next four years, he faced a relentless series of political crises, including an intraparty power struggle with Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, massive protests against the death of a military conscript and construction of a nuclear power plant, and of course the Sunflower Movement occupation of the legislature, which effectively halted cross-Strait rapprochement with Beijing. President Ma’s approval ratings bottomed out at record lows, and he stepped down in 2016 on the heels of a sweeping electoral defeat of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), ultimately having accomplished little in his last years in office.

Somehow, Chen Shui-bian’s second term was even worse. The controversy around his re-election victory in 2004 robbed him of whatever political momentum he might have enjoyed, and he spent most of his remaining tenure fending off vicious partisan attacks, anti-corruption accusations in the press, massive street rallies by his opponents, and impeachment attempts in the legislature. In his attempt to keep core pro-independence supporters on his side, President Chen pursued a brash symbolic agenda that deliberately provoked the pan-Blue opposition, infuriated Beijing, alienated even potential allies in Washington, and left him politically isolated. In the 2008 elections, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) paid a steep electoral price, and after his term was finally over, Chen ended up in handcuffs: the corruption accusations turned out to be true, and he was sentenced to a long prison term.

The rest of this piece continues at Taiwan Insight.
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Is Taiwan's Party System Headed for a Crackup?

9/23/2019

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PictureIs this the future of party politics in Taiwan?
No. At least, that's my prediction in this piece on Taiwan's party politics in the run-up to 2020 over at Taiwan Insight. Here's an excerpt:

"Taiwan’s party system is unusual among young democracies for its stability. In 1992, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) finished first and second in elections for the Legislative Yuan. In 2016, they finished second and first, and in the six elections in between, neither party ever finished outside the top two."

"The KMT and DPP are also well-institutionalised. They have centralised party organizations that integrate local branches into a hierarchical national structure. Both have many loyal supporters who make up a significant share of the electorate. Both have staked out distinct positions on the ‘China question’—the most fundamental divide in Taiwanese politics. And, despite going through major reversals of fortune at different times, each remains today the primary threat to unseat the other in almost every election. For better or worse, Taiwan has effectively been a KMT-DPP duopoly for the entire democratic era."


Piece continues here. 


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    I am a political scientist with research interests in democratization, elections and election management, parties and party system development, one-party dominance, and the links between domestic politics and external security issues. My regional expertise is in East Asia, with special focus on Taiwan.

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