For the past 18 months, the biggest puzzle in Taiwan politics has been the curious behavior of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP). In the 2024 elections, the TPP did very well for a third party, winning 22 percent of the party list vote and eight seats -- enough to break through the DPP-KMT duopoly to deny either of the two major parties a majority for the first time since the Chen Shui-bian era. That made it the kingmaker in the Legislative Yuan and gave it significant bargaining power over the other two parties in this term -- if they were able to exploit it.

The puzzle is that the TPP does not appear to have maximized its leverage in the current legislature. The party's leaders turned down opportunities to grab the speaker or deputy speaker positions or to negotiate for cabinet positions in a Lai government, and over the last year they have instead prioritized opposition to the DPP administration rather than conditional cooperation with the ruling party. More surprising still, they have publicly aligned themselves with the KMT on many of that party's most controversial policy initiatives -- even when those policies are broadly unpopular. 

This transformation of the TPP in the public eye from a centrist swing party to a "pan-blue subsidiary" has generated a widespread sense of angst and betrayal among pan-green commentators, who have accused the TPP of "subordinat[ing] itself blindly" and "march[ing] in lockstep with the KMT," and even tacitly cooperating with the CCP to oppose the DPP and the Lai administration. The TPP's public image has shifted so dramatically that many observers of Taiwan politics now simply assert that the legislature is "KMT-controlled."

The problem with this assertion is that it's wrong. The TPP legislative caucus is not actually marching in lockstep with the KMT on every issue, as I'll argue in what follows. On the contrary, it holds preferences that are quite distinct from the KMT, it has acted as a significant check on that party's legislative caucus, and its public cooperation with the KMT against the ruling DPP will be temporary and limited, rather than comprehensive and indefinite. But for their own reasons, neither the KMT nor the TPP want to advertise this fact. For the moment, they both would rather have everyone believe they are a unified pan-blue team cooperating to stop DPP overreach.

​No other explanation is consistent with the political outcomes of the last 18 months. 

On December 20, amid shouting, shoving, fistfights, and broken furniture, Taiwan’s opposition-controlled legislature passed by a show of hands three controversial bills that threaten to kneecap its government. The first raised the threshold to recall elected officials. The second required the Constitutional Court to have a 2/3 quorum to hear constitutional cases and imposed a supermajority threshold to invalidate a law. And the third shifted the central-local revenue-sharing formula to give local governments (mostly KMT-run) 40 percent of all government revenues, up from 25 percent, at the expense of the DPP-run central government.
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Four days later, the same opposition majority in the legislature voted down all seven of President Lai’s nominees to the Constitutional Court, leaving it with only eight justices and unable to meet the new quorum requirement for hearing a case. It is now effectively paralyzed. The DPP government has nevertheless requested that the court meet and rule anyway on whether the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act are themselves unconstitutional. This increasingly destructive partisan political conflict has put Taiwan on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no obvious way to resolve it. 

This confrontation is also taking place in a democracy that Freedom House last year ranked as the second-best in Asia, behind only Japan, and significantly above the United States and most of Europe. Taiwan's political system has proven remarkably resilient to PRC influence operations over many years, and it has a capable and effective state and vibrant economy despite its diplomatic isolation. So why is it facing a political crisis now?

​The simplest answer is divided government. For the first time in 16 years (and only the second time in its democratic history), Taiwan's legislative and executive branches are controlled by different parties: the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) together hold a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and they are locked in a fierce power struggle with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government.  

This conflict was not inevitable. In the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections, the DPP's Lai Ching-te (賴清德) won the presidential election but with only 40% of the vote, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. The KMT ended up with 52 seats (plus two blue-leaning independents), the DPP won 51, and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je's (柯文哲) centrist TPP won eight (all via the party list vote). That left no party with a majority and made the TPP the crucial swing voting bloc in the LY. In theory, the TPP could have exploited that leverage to extract significant concessions from the ruling DPP -- on policy, legislative leadership, or cabinet positions. But instead, negotiations between the DPP and TPP went nowhere, and President Lai missed his chance to head off the last year of partisan warfare.   

The formation of battle lines first became apparent on February 1, when the new legislature was seated. Its first order of business was to elect a speaker and deputy speaker. Curiously, the TPP  ultimately decided not to support either of the major party nominees -- the party's eight legislators voted for TPP member Huang Shan-shan (黃珊珊) in the first round, and abstained in the second.  As a result, the KMT's Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) won the speaker's race, and KMT legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) was elected as his deputy. Despite providing crucial help to the KMT, the TPP did not manage to win even the deputy speaker as the price for their support. Nor did they strike a deal with the DPP, either, although that should have secured at least one of the leadership positions for the party. Given that the TPP held the crucial votes that could have denied control of the legislature to either major party, this outcome seems like a major missed opportunity for both them and the DPP. 

I've heard competing explanations for this bargaining failure. One story is that the refusal came from the DPP side -- ruling party legislators were engaged in quiet conversations with the TPP about a possible power-sharing deal, but Lai Ching-te intervened to stop the negotiations. Reporting at the time suggested that the TPP's price for cooperation in the run-up to February 1 was for the DPP to support Huang Shan-shan for speaker -- a price the DPP was apparently not willing to pay, but which in hindsight they probably should have. That interpretation is also consistent with the public comments offered by party caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) that "A DPP-TPP partnership is only possible if the TPP voluntarily comes to us."​So maybe this was a strategic mistake by the DPP caucus (and ultimately, Lai himself), and they are suffering the consequences. 

But another possibility is that the TPP was just never seriously interested in cooperating with the DPP no matter what they offered -- even before  Ko Wen-je's detention in a corruption investigation several months later turbocharged the TPP's animosity toward the DPP government. Although the KMT-TPP negotiations for a joint presidential ticket broke down in spectacular public fashion in November 2023, the two parties did still enter into a pre-election coalition for the legislative races and even campaigned together, so perhaps TPP leaders had already made up their minds to team up with the KMT after the elections, too, and there really was no chance the DPP could have enticed them to defect.  

Whatever the reason, ever since the new legislature was seated on February 1, the TPP has consistently chosen to act as the KMT's junior partner and supported the opposition party's confrontational approach to the DPP government. And as the partisan divide has hardened, it has also transformed into an inter-branch conflict between the KMT-TPP majority in the legislature and the DPP in the executive. The partisan maneuvering that has followed has escalated over the last year to a level of open political warfare that is posing a severe test for Taiwan's democratic institutions. And it is a test they are failing.

The Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, the Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), and the Taiwan Science and Technology Hub invite you to an engaging discussion on generative artificial intelligence and democracy. Join us on Tuesday, October 29, 2024, from 4:00 PM to 5:30 PM (Pacific) in the Philippines Conference Room at Encina Hall. DSET is a think tank established in 2023 under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) of Taiwan. Its future-oriented vision of science and technology policies aim to safeguard democratic values.

During this event, Dr. Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow at DSET, will launch their new report, "GenAI and Democracy: AI-Driven Disinformation in Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election and Lessons for the World." Dr. Huang will discuss Taiwan's experience using regulation to counter disinformation and he will offer technical solutions available to other democratic societies. Following the report presentation, a panel of experts from the Stanford Cyber Policy Center and the Hoover Institution will provide feedback and share their thoughts on the future of AI development and regulations globally.

Opening Remarks  
Larry Diamond,  Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Mosbacher Senior Fellow of Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Introduction
Jeremy Chang, Research Fellow & CEO, DSET

Report Presentation
Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow, DSET

Panel Discussion - Generative AI, regulation, and its impacts globally

Panelists
Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow, DSET
Florence G’Sell, Visiting Professor, CPC
Sergey Sanovich, Hoover Fellow
Margaret Tu, University of Washington

Moderator
Charles Mok, Research Scholar, GDPi

Participant Bios

Charles Mok is a Research Scholar at the Global Digital Policy Incubator of the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford University, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Internet Society, and a board member of the International Centre for Trade Transparency and Monitoring. Charles served as an elected member of the Legislative Council in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, representing the Information Technology functional constituency, for two terms from 2012 to 2020. In 2021, he founded Tech for Good Asia, an initiative to advocate positive use of technology for businesses and civil communities.

Kai-Shen Huang graduated from the University of Oxford and National Taiwan University, possessing interdisciplinary training in both anthropology and law. His research expertise includes China’s critical technology policies, the application of artificial intelligence in dispute resolution and public administration, and legal anthropology.

Florence G’sell is a visiting professor of private law at the Cyber Policy Center, where she leads the Program on Governance of Emerging Technologies. She also holds the Digital, Governance, and Sovereignty Chair at Sciences Po (France) and is a professor of private law at the University of Lorraine (currently on leave). G’sell began her academic career focusing on tort law, judicial systems, and comparative law. In recent years, her work has concentrated on digital law, particularly in the regulation of online platforms, the legal challenges posed by emerging technologies such as blockchain and the metaverse, and the concept of digital sovereignty.

Sergey Sanovich is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before joining the Hoover Institution, Sergey Sanovich was a postdoctoral research associate at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University. Sanovich received his PhD in political science from New York University and continues his affiliation with its Center for Social Media and Politics. His research is focused on disinformation and social media platform governance; online censorship and propaganda by authoritarian regimes; and elections and partisanship in information autocracies. 
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Margaret Tu also known as Nikal Kabala'an, hailing from Taiwan's Indigenous communities, is a dynamic young leader with a passion for interdisciplinary pursuits. She actively engages in Indigenous self-determination and decolonization, contributing to social justice movements and curating exhibitions at prestigious institutions like the Burke Museum and the Tateuchi East Asia Library. Margaret is an accomplished legal researcher with expertise in Intellectual Property laws and a keen interest in technology-related policies, including Artificial Intelligence and Data Governance.

On behalf of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and The Global Policy and Strategy Initiative, the Hoover Institution invites you to Taiwan After the 2024 Elections Annual Conference, Thursday, May 23, 2024, from 8:30 AM - 5:15 PM to Friday, May 24, 2024 from 8:45 AM - 2:00 PM in HHMB 160.
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Taiwan’s next president William Lai (賴清德) takes office on May 20, 2024. His victory in the January 2024 elections ensures that the ruling Democracy Progressive Party (DPP) will hold the presidency for an unprecedented third consecutive term. But Lai won only 40 percent of the presidential vote, and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) together now control a majority of the seats in the legislature. President-elect Lai’s new administration is also likely to face continued pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and he will have to deal with an increasingly complex and uncertain international environment.  
 
Join us as we bring together a diverse group of experts to discuss the policy challenges and opportunities that the incoming Lai administration will face. It will feature panels on the 2024 election results, governance challenges, the future of Taiwan’s economy, security and defense issues, US-Taiwan-PRC relations, and perspectives of key U.S. allies and partners on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
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This conference will bring together a diverse group of experts to discuss the policy challenges and opportunities that the incoming Lai administration will face. It will feature panels on the 2024 election results, governance challenges, the future of Taiwan’s economy, security and defense issues, US-Taiwan-PRC relations, and perspectives of key U.S. allies and partners on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force the Hoover Institution invites you to Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential and Legislative Elections: What Happened and What It Means on Thursday, January 25, 2024 from 4:00 - 5:30 PM PT. 

On January 13, the Taiwan voters delivered a split verdict: the DPP’s Lai Ching-te won the presidential election and secured an unprecedented third consecutive term for the ruling party. But 60 percent of voters cast ballots for someone else, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. The biggest shift in voting patterns was the rise of third-party candidate Ko Wen-je, the former mayor of Taipei, who received 26 percent of the vote and did especially well among young voters. Ko’s Taiwan People’s Party will also hold the balance of power in a closely divided legislature.

In this event, three panelists discuss what happened, why it happened, and what it means for Taiwan’s domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. 
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ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor, by courtesy, of political science and sociology at Stanford. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution’s programs on China’s Global Sharp Power and on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.  
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Kharis Templeman is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and part of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. Templeman is a political scientist (Ph.D. 2012, Michigan) with research interests in Taiwan politics, democratization, elections and election management, party system development, and politics and security issues in Pacific Asia.

Stephen Tan is Managing Director of International Policy Advisory Group, a Taipei-based consulting firm, providing corporate clients with solutions to issues relating to geopolitical risks, strategic planning on supply chain, regulatory policy and government relations matters. Stephen was President of Cross-Strait Policy Association in 2016-2022, Visiting Fellow of Brookings Institute in 2018-2019, and Partner of Baker McKenzie from 2004 to 2016. He previously served as a board member of American Chamber of Commerce Taiwan for more than a decade, and is currently sitting on the board of directors of a handful of non-profit organizations as well as listed companies based in Taiwan.  Stephen frequently appears on Taiwan’s television, radio and other programs as a political commentator, and shares his perspectives on issues including Taiwan-US relations, cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic policy issues. He is a graduate of National Taiwan University, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and Carnegie Mellon University School of Business.

Tiffany (Chun-An) Wang is a fourth-year PhD candidate in Applied Physics at Stanford University. Her research interests focus on novel material synthesis for electronics and energy applications. She currently serves on the board of directors at the North America Taiwanese Engineering and Science Association (NATEA) (2022–present) and was the president of the Stanford Taiwanese Student Association (STSA) (2021–2022). She founded Stanford Salon PSI and has organized g0v Silicon Valley civil-tech hackathons since 2023.

As we wait for the votes to roll in here, I'll highlight five races that I think are likely to tel lthe story of the election for the legislature. 
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1. New Taipei 7. Lo Chih-cheng vs Yeh Yuan-chih. If the DPP has any chance of holding their majority in this election, they need to win this race. Lo Chih-cheng is vulnerable in a district he won with only 47% in 2020, and he's been the target of a rumor campaign and an apparent deepfake video. But the district is a little greener than Taiwan as a whole: Tsai Ing-wen won 59% here in 2020 and 58% in 2016. If the DPP can't hold on in this kind of marginal district it bodes poorly for their overall chances.  

2. New Taipei 12. Lai Pin-yu vs. Liao Hsien-hsiang. This district is the NPP member Huang Kuo-chang's old constituency; he won here when the DPP yielded the seat to him in 2016. In 2020, the DPP's Lai Pin-yu won a wild, close race here 45-44%, with an NPP candidate pulling 7%. This time around the campaign appears to be a straight-up green-blue race, with Lai facing off against the KMT's Liao Hsien-hsiang. The outcome will tell us something about which party is better able to win cross-over voters.   

3. Taichung 2. Lin Ching-yi vs. Yen Kuan-heng. This district has been a constant battlefield over the last 8 years: the KMT's Yen Kuan-heng, son of the notorious gangster-politician Yen Ching-piao, won it in 2016, then was upset in 2020 in the biggest shocker of the cycle by the Taiwan Statebuilding Party candidate Chen Po-wei. Chen was then recalled in 2021, but Yen lost the by-election to the DPP's Lin Ching-yi. Now Lin is facing off against Yen again, except it's a general election with much higher turnout. The result will say something about the declining effectiveness of factional "black gold" politics in one of its remaining bastions in central Taiwan. 

4. Kaohsiung 6. Huang Jie vs Chen Mei-ya vs Kuo Pei-hung. This district looked to be a safe hold for the DPP--until legislator Chao Tien-lin was exposed as having a mainland Chinese mistress. Chao dropped out of the race, and the DPP then nominated the former NPP councilor Huang Jie to step in, angering the deep green former chairman of FTV Kuo Pei-hung, who had his eyes on the seat. So now there's a pan-green split in the district, with the KMT candidate Chen Mei-ya well-positioned to win if green voters divide along the traditional progressive-conservative divide within the DPP.  

5. Highlands Indigenous Constituency. Saidhai Tahovecahe​ vs many others. These special indigenous seats always get overlooked in narratives about the campaign, but they're competitive and potentially important to the balance of power in the LY this time around. In 2020, the DPP candidate Saidhai Tahovecahe won in a stunning upset, becoming the first DPP member ever to hold a seat in that constituency. If she can hold on for a second term, that would be especially valuable to the DPP this cycle, and it would break with past precedent. In the plains constituency, the DPP representative Chen Ying is in a similar situation. 

I've been in Taiwan now for almost three weeks, first with a group of Stanford students on a study trip and then as part of the North American Fulbright observation tour. These groups have both met with all the campaigns and a huge number of people, and it's been a firehose of information. Now that the campaign is officially over (as of midnight Jan 12 Taiwan time), I have some jumbled thoughts on what just transpired.

This campaign seems pretty subdued. i was also here in 2020, when Han Kuo-yu was the KMT nominee. He was an exceptionally polarizing candidate -- the deep blue KMT base loved him and many of them were convinced he was going to win. The green camp saw him as an existential threat to Taiwan. That campaign featured Lai Ching-te challenging Tsai Ing-wen for the DPP nomination, and the eruption of protests in Hong Kong. By the end of the campaign, most of the swing voters made up their minds for Tsai. Turnout jumped 9 points from 66-75% and she won easily. 

In contrast, this time around the election campaign cycle was rather quiet for months -- one might even say boring. The polls showed little movement after Hou and Lai were formally nominated in June. There was a spike in interest when Terry Gou (remember him?) registered for a signature drive to run as an independent. And there was another in the run-up to November 24, when the prospect of Blue-White KMT-TPP cooperation on a joint presidential ticket got real, and then the deal fell apart, and then all three candidates announced their VP nominees and Gou declined to run (and now, to endorse anyone -- he's completely dropped out of sight!) The last month has felt more amped up, but the policy rollouts, debates, late breaking scandals, and insults have all felt very...normal...for a Taiwan presidential election campaign. There's just not the same sense of existential threat or inspiration that we saw in 2020 or 2016. 

On Cross-Strait and US-Taiwan relations, there really isn't much difference between the three presidential candidates. The distinctions between them are harder to parse out than they were in past elections. Hou has tacked the KMT to the center, especially on defense policy and relations with the U.S.; Lai promises to continue Tsai's approach and shake off the accusation he's deeper green than she is; and to the extent Ko can be pinned down at all he's tried to squeeze himself somewhere in the constricting space between the two, supporting the call for defense budget increases while also embracing the KMT's call to revive the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with Beijing. 

The stakes look very different to international audiences. The gap between the general domestic vibe and the framing of this race in many international media outlets has become a chasm. Read the English-language press and the headlines framed this as the election that could change the world. Meanwhile, the reaction of young voters, especially, that we've talked to has been a collective shrug. All three candidates are flawed in their own ways, and even people from their own campaigns will admit it privately. Nor do most people expect fundamental changes to come about as a result of this election. Add it all up and it's a recipe for low turnout. 

The legislative races are once again overshadowed, but quite important. The conventional wisdom we're heard is that the DPP will lose its majority -- it has 63 seats right now but is likely to lose at least 10, putting it below the 57/113 it needs. The KMT will be the main beneficiary -- possibly picking up 10 seats or more in the districts. And the TPP is likely to increase its seat share mostly via the party list vote -- last time it won five seats on 11.7% of the vote, and if it doubles that (23-4%) it would have 10 seats. The KMT has also yielded four districts to the TPP but they're all quite green, so I'd be surprised if the TPP has a single district legislator next month. 

So, what we're looking at most likely is a split legislature, with both the DPP and KMT at roughly 48-53, and the TPP in the middle with 9-11. It's even possible that 2-5 independents could win and collectively be crucial to the legislative majority. Whoever wins the presidency is going to have to deal with multi-party politics and do coalition-building issue by issue in the LY. 

In the interest of intellectual honesty, let me put down a few expectations for today's results. 

Turnout will be down. My prior here is that it will be close to the 2016 level, at say 66-69%. The weather is good but, again, subdued campaign with flawed candidates.  

The TPP's party list vote will be close to Ko's vote share. For once, the party list, which is decided by voters' second vote, is potentially crucial to determining the balance of power in the LY. In the absence of other information I'm guessing the TPP's list will do about as well as Ko does in the presidential race. 

The KMT comes close but does not surpass the DPP as the largest party in the Legislative Yuan. The electoral system has a slight (2-5 seats) bias in favor of the KMT, and at this point I think we can say the party's candidates typically do better in the district races, where family legacy, constituent service, factional ties, and other things that localize voting patterns matter more than in the presidential election. Going through district by district, my best guess is that the KMT picks up a net of 5 seats in the greater Taipei area (Taipei, New Taipei, and Keelung [UPDATE: and Taoyuan]), holds in Hsinchu and Miaoli, nets 4 seats in central Taiwan (Taichung, Nantou, Changhua), and flips 2 elsewhere (Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Taitung, Yilan, etc. [UPDATE: and Yunlin, Chiayi]) KMT candidates will probably also win back at least one of the two seats in the indigenous districts (1 highland, 1 lowland) that the DPP holds now. That would net the party 12 seats, putting them at 50. The DPP drop in this scenario is around the same which would put them at 51 seats.   

It's also not fully appreciated how close they were in the PR list last election: the DPP won 34% and the KMT 33% there (both got 13 seats). If both parties are mostly relying on core supporters to cast a party vote, as they did last time, then I'd expect them to look similar again, maybe down a seat or two from 2020. Let's call it 1 seat down for each.

Add that up and we've got KMT 49, DPP 50, TPP 10, and others 4.  

​And finally...

I think Lai wins the presidential race, but it's pretty close. He's been ahead in the polls all year, by a little to a lot; not one reliable polling company ever found Hou in the lead. I expected dissatisfaction with the DPP government to manifest in soft numbers for Lai, which it did -- he's rarely if ever broken 40% in polls over the last six months, and clear majorities support a change in ruling party in this election. But I also expected eventually anti-DPP voters would finally converge around Hou, and that doesn't appear to have happened. Instead they have remained divided on who they would prefer to see instead, and even on who is the strongest candidate (Ko or Hou) if they are to vote strategically. In the end this probably dooms Hou's chances of pulling the upset. Ko's enduring strength has surprised me, but his chances depend greatly on support from the most fickle potential voters: those in the youngest cohorts (below roughly 28yo), and I still expect him to finish a clear third.

With Ko soaking up a lot of the disaffected voters, and with both parties turning out their bases and not attracting much beyond, I expect the larger generic size of the green camp to be decisive. I'll predict: Lai wins with about 40%, Hou with 35%, and Ko with 25%. I'm not going to venture a guess about the final raw vote tallies but I will go out on a limb and predict Hou won't hit Han Kuo-yu's 5.5 million in 2020; and Lai will fall short of the 6 million mark that Tsai hit in all three of her campaigns.  

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, the Hoover Institution held Taiwan's 2024 General Elections: The Campaign So Far on Wednesday, November 29, 2023. The recording of this event is now available at the PTIP program website. 

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan voters will go to the polls to elect a new president and legislature. The results could have major implications for Taiwan’s relationship with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific.

​In this event, three experts on Taiwan’s domestic politics weigh in on the state of the race, including the leading presidential candidates and parties, the messages of each campaign, and the issues animating the race so far. As the campaign enters the home stretch, they discuss the role of the PRC and the United States in the election, the most likely outcomes, and the consequences for the trilateral U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relationship. 

Chiaoning Su is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, Journalism, and Public Relations at Oakland University, where she also serves as the Director of the Barry M. Klein Center for Culture and Globalization. Su is a communication scholar (Ph.D., 2015, Temple University) with a dual focus on two interrelated strands: the journalism of crisis and journalism in crisis. Her first line of inquiry delves into the representation and production of crisis news, while her second line of research centers on the role of journalism in the context of diminishing democracy. Her work has been published in Media, Culture, and Society, International Journal of Communication, Asian Journal of Communication, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, and Communication Review. Prior to her academic career, Su gained valuable professional experience as a communication specialist at Ogilvy Public Relations and worked on several political campaigns in Taiwan.

Dennis Lu-Chung Weng is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University and the founding Director of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute (APPRI). He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Dallas in 2014. Dr. Weng has formerly taught at institutions including Wesleyan University and SUNY-Cortland. He currently holds research fellowships at Stellenbosch University and National Chengchi University, Taiwan. His research centers on comparative politics, international relations, and the dynamics between domestic political behavior and international politics, particularly in the US and Asia-Pacific regions. A recognized expert in his field, Dr. Weng's insights have been featured in scholarly publications, op-eds, and various media outlets. He is a noted commentator on US China-Taiwan relations and political events in both the US and Asia.

MODERATOR
Kharis Templeman is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and part of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. Templeman is a political scientist (Ph.D. 2012, Michigan) with research interests in Taiwan politics, democratization, elections and election management, party system development, and politics and security issues in Pacific Asia.
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INTRODUCTION BY
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor, by courtesy, of political science and sociology at Stanford. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution’s programs on China’s Global Sharp Power and on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.  

On May 25, I'm going to join a panel of American Taiwan-watchers at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., for a discussion of cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan relations and the upcoming January 2024 presidential and legislative elections. The event will be live-streamed. Details below.  

After eight years under President Tsai Ing-wen, the people of Taiwan will elect a new president in January 2024. The new leader will face major choices about Taiwan’s internal situation, cross-Strait relations, and Taiwan’s ties with the United States and other international actors. How Taiwan navigates these issues will inform its future trajectory.
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On May 25, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution will host a public event featuring a conversation with top Taiwan scholars Richard Bush, Bonnie Glaser, Shelley Rigger, and Kharis Templeman, moderated by Brookings Senior Fellow Ryan Hass. The panel will examine the future of Taiwan domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and U.S.-Taiwan relations.
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Online viewers can submit questions via e-mail to [email protected] or via Twitter at #TaiwanFuture.