Category: Security Studies - Kharis Templeman (祁凱立)

Book Talk: Divided Allies, with Hsiao-Ting Lin

5/30/2023

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force the Hoover Institution invites you to a book talk on Divided Allies: Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia, with Hsiao-ting Lin on Thursday, June 1, 2023 from 4:00 - 5:00 PM PT.

Register here to attend this virtual talk.

Professor Lin’s book explores the challenges which faced the United States and Taiwanese alliance during the Cold War, addressing a wide range of events and influences of the period between the 1950s and 1970s. Tackling seven main topics to outline the fluctuations of the U.S.–Taiwan relationship, this volume highlights the impact of the mainland counteroffensive, the offshore islands, Tibet, Taiwan’s secret operations in Asia, Taiwan’s Soviet and nuclear gambits, Chinese representation in the United Nations, and the Vietnam War. Utilizing multinational archival research, particularly the newly available materials from Taiwan and the United States, it reevaluates Taiwan’s foreign policy during the Cold War, revealing a pragmatic and opportunistic foreign policy disguised in nationalistic rhetoric.

About the Speaker
Hsiao-ting Lin is a research fellow and curator of the Modern China and Taiwan collection at the Hoover Institution, for which he collects material on China and Taiwan, as well as China-related materials in other East Asian countries. He holds a BA in political science from National Taiwan University (1994) and an MA in international law and diplomacy from National Chengchi University in Taiwan (1997). He received his DPhil in oriental studies in 2003 from the University of Oxford. He has published extensively on modern Chinese and Taiwanese politics, history, and ethnic minorities, including Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan (2016); Modern China’s Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West (2011); and Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928–49 (2006).

PTIP: Assessing the Prospects for War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait [Postponed due to speaker illness]

4/27/2023

[This talk was cancelled and will be rescheduled at a later date.]

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force the Hoover Institution invites you to The World’s Most Dangerous Place? Assessing the Prospects for War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait on Thursday, May 4, 2023 at 12:00 PM PT.

In recent years, numerous analysts have warned of an increasing risk of war in the Taiwan Strait. Others, however, have argued that military conflict remains unlikely, and that the risk of war should not be over-hyped. Drawing from his recent book, Scott Kastner outlines a framework through which to assess the prospects for military conflict between China and Taiwan. Drawing on international relations theory, Kastner outlines several causal pathways through which a Taiwan Strait conflict could occur, and assesses how broad trends in China-Taiwan-US relations are affecting the likelihood of these different scenarios. He concludes with policy suggestions for how actors in Beijing, Taipei and Washington could mitigate the risks of a war in the Taiwan Strait.

This talk will draw from Prof. Kastner's new book, entitled War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, available from Columbia University Press, November 2022.

Speaker Bio
Scott L. Kastner is a professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. He graduated from Cornell University and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego. His books include Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 2009); China’s Strategic Multilateralism: Investing in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2019; with Margaret Pearson and Chad Rector); and War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022).

PTIP: Semiconductors and Geo-technology: 'Know-how' is Power

3/6/2023

Join the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, together with the Program on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region at the Hoover Institution, on Wednesday, March 8, from Noon–1 PM Pacific, for Semiconductors and Geo-technology: ‘Know-how’ is Power, a discussion with Dr. Chun-Yi Lee, Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations, and Director of the Taiwan Studies Program, at the University of Nottingham. The session will be moderated by Charles Mok, visiting scholar at the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPi).

Geopolitics is conventionally understood as a struggle for power. The focus of geopolitical analysis is typically on states; power is understood in terms of states’ economic and military strength. In the era of globalisation, production relies on complex supply chains. While this paper focuses on the production of a hi-tech product—semiconductors—it argues more generally that technology production and supply chain ‘know how’ is implicated in geopolitical power. Through an elaboration of the concept of ‘geo-technology’, this paper argues that a consideration of technology production capacity (or ‘know-how’) can enrich conventional understandings of geopolitics.

The US, Taiwan and China play different roles in the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain. The leading semiconductor designers are based in the US, while the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces most of the world’s high-end chips. China, on the other hand, is an economic and manufacturing powerhouse, but remains at the low end of the manufacturing supply chain. This paper argues that the US and Taiwan have significant leverage in the production of semiconductors, granting them geopolitical power. It therefore asks if Taiwan, and the US, can use their technological 'know-how’ to gain further leverage in the geopolitical tug of war with China. Data of this paper will come from semi-constructed interviews in Taiwan and Japan, approximately twenty elite interviews from technology policy analysts, policy makers and high-skilled engineers, along with relevant policy analyses. The paper aims to explore the link between human talents in the semiconductor supply chain and geopolitics.

This session is part of the Winter Seminar Series, a series spanning January through March, hosted at the Cyber Policy Center with the Program on Democracy and the Internet. Sessions are in-person and virtual, with in-person attendance offered to Stanford affiliates only. Lunch is provided for in-person attendance. Registration is required.

About the Speaker
Dr. Chun-Yi Lee is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations, and Director of the Taiwan Studies Program, at the University of Nottingham. Her first book, Taiwanese Business or Chinese Security Asset?, was published by Routledge in 2011. She is currently working on her second monograph, on semiconductor manufacturing and geopolitics. She is editor in chief of the on-line academic magazine, Taiwan Insight, and co-editor of the ‘Taiwan and World Affairs’ book series with Palgrave.

Wilson Center Research Fellowship for Taiwan Scholars, Summer 2023

3/1/2023

The Wilson Center in Washington, DC has posted a call for applications from Taiwan citizens who are interested in spending 1-2 months in residence to conduct research during the summer of 2023. The position is open to citizens or permanent residents of Taiwan. The application deadline is April 1, 2023. Details below.

Call for Applications
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is accepting applications from Taiwanese researchers for its Wilson Center Taiwan Scholar Program. The residential fellowship program will allow the scholar to spend one to two months during the summer at the Wilson Center in Washington DC, where they will pursue policy-oriented research designed to bridge the gap between the academic and policy communities. Following their residency in Washington, the Taiwan Scholar is expected to produce a policy brief and give a public presentation based on the findings at the Center.

Taiwan plays a key role in promoting democracy and ensuring free markets in East Asia and beyond. It remains a critical political, economic, and security partner for the United States in the region, and deepening U.S. understanding of Taiwan is essential at a time of significant change on both sides of the Pacific. The fellowship is open to Taiwanese scholars committed to research on contemporary Taiwanese issues that address questions related to political stability, economic growth, and regional security.
The Taiwan Scholar Program is made possible from the generous support of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.

Eligibility
The fellowship is open to citizens or legal permanent residents of Taiwan. Candidates include academics, current as well as former government officials, and journalists who are currently pursuing research on key public policy issues concerning U.S.-Taiwan relations. Preferences will be given to applicants who have published scholarly books or substantial articles in academic or policy-related journals or newspapers. Applicants must be fluent in both written and spoken English. Scholars must be able to hold a valid passport and a Wilson Center sponsored J-1 visa and are required to have health insurance.

Selection Process
This residential scholarship is for one to two months between July and August 2023. Applicants should specify the exact time for which they seek the appointment at least three months before they would like to be based in Washington. Under normal circumstances, applicants will be informed of the disposition of their application within 90 days of the Center receiving the completed application and supporting letters of recommendation.

The Application
All applications must be completed online – the Wilson Center will not accept materials submitted via email or by other means. A complete application must be submitted in English, and will include the following:

the Fellowship Application Form, submitted online;
A description of the proposed research project (maximum of five pages) outlining its policy relevance and scholarly contribution. This should include discussion of the project’s originality, as well as the methods and sources to be used, and the importance of Washington-area resources. The project must be relevant to policy issues concerning US-Taiwan relations;
a detailed CV;
two letters of reference, to be emailed separately.

Thank you for your interest.
For more information or if you have questions, email: asia@wilsoncenter.org.
Application Deadline is April 01, 2023

PTIP: Then What?: Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan

2/28/2023

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force, the Hoover Institution invites you to a talk by Caitlin Talmadge, associate professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, entitled Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan on Friday, March 3, 2023 from 12:00 - 1:15 pm PT. To attend, register at the event page.

Talk Abstract
The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of unification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines during a war, and likely increase the number of submarine attack opportunities against U.S. surface combatants. Furthermore, placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan's coasts for ocean surveillance would forge a critical missing link in China's kill chain for long-range attacks. This outcome could push the United States toward anti-satellite warfare that it might otherwise avoid, or it could force the U.S. Navy into narrower parts of the Philippine Sea. Finally, over the long term, if China were to develop a large fleet of truly quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would provide it with additional advantages. Specifically, such basing would enable China to both threaten Northeast Asian sea lanes of communication and strengthen its sea-based nuclear deterrent in ways that it is otherwise unlikely to be able to do. These findings have important implications for U.S. operational planning, policy, and grand strategy.

Speaker Bio
Caitlin Talmadge is associate professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and Research Affiliate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. During fall 2022 she also holds the Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the United States Library of Congress.

Professor Talmadge’s research and teaching focus on deterrence and escalation, U.S. military operations and strategy, and security issues in Asia and the Persian Gulf. She is author of The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell, 2015), which Foreign Affairs named the Best Book in Security for 2016 and which won the 2017 Best Book Award from the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In addition, she is co-author of U.S. Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (fourth edition, Routledge, 2021), and she is currently writing a book with Professor Brendan Green on nuclear escalation risk in the emerging deterrence environment.

PTIP: Taiwan's Quest for Energy Security in an Era of Global Instability

5/2/2022

Tuesday, May 3, 2022 from 4:30 - 5:45 pm PT, the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific (PTIP) at the Hoover Institution will host a special event examining Taiwan's acute dependence on foreign energy imports. The event will be online and is free and open to the public. Please register at the event page.

In 2020, 93 percent of the energy consumed in Taiwan came from imported fossil fuels: oil, coal, and liquid natural gas. Taiwan’s government is also phasing out nuclear power, with the last nuclear generation unit scheduled to be shut down in 2025. This overwhelming reliance on imports is at odds with Taiwan’s pledges to reduce its carbon emissions to net-zero by 2050. It also presents a serious security vulnerability: a prolonged disruption of energy supplies could quickly bring Taiwan’s economy to a halt, including its strategically important semiconductor industry.

In this event, three experts on Taiwan’s energy policies will discuss Taiwan’s changing energy mix, its ambitious plans for developing renewable energy sources and lessening dependence on imports, and how Taiwan’s exclusion from important international energy bodies such as the International Energy Agency adds to its energy security challenges.

Speaker Bios

Ker-hsuan Chien is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Technology Management at National Tsing Hua University. Her research focuses on the socio-technical aspects of the energy transition in Taiwan. She is particularly interested in how the state’s industrial policies, the pressures from international corporate governance, and the materiality of the electric power system co-shape the path of Taiwan’s energy transition.

Kuan-Ting Chen (he/him) is currently the Chief Executive Officer of the Taiwan NextGen Foundation, a Taipei and Chiayi-based think tank working to make Taiwan more sustainable, diverse, and inclusive. Previously, he served as the Deputy Spokesperson and Chief Research Officer at Taipei City Government. In this position, he worked to strengthen Taipei's national and international standing, formulated methods to realize public policy objectives, researched and generated activism for new policy directions, and initiated the Taipei City Government’s international internship program.

Marcin Jerzewski (he/him) currently serves as the Taipei Office Analyst at the European Values Center for Security Policy and Research Fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation. Committed to public scholarship, Marcin is also a contributor to the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe platform of the Czech Association for International Affairs and a fellow of the BEBESEA (Building Better Connections between East and Southeast Asia) collective. As a scholar of Taiwan-Europe relations, he is a frequent commentator in Taiwanese and international media, including the BBC, Focus Taiwan, The Guardian, RTÉ, and Voice of America.

PTIP: Phillip Saunders, April 6

4/7/2022

On April 6, Phillip Saunders of National Defense University spoke about PLA modernization and its implications for Taiwan's defense strategy and U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. The talk abstract is below; the video is now available at the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific event page.

Drawing upon the new book Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, Dr. Saunders will discuss China’s available military options, how organizational reforms and new capabilities have improved the PLA’s ability to execute these options, the current cross-strait military balance, the challenges China would face in trying to resolve the Taiwan issue by force, and how Beijing weighs military, economic, and political factors in its evolving Taiwan policy calculus. His presentation will draw upon extensive open-source analysis of PLA efforts to build the necessary power projection capabilities and discuss how lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may affect thinking in China, Taiwan, and the United States.

Featuring Phillip C. Saunders Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs National Defense University, followed by conversation with Kharis Templeman, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine: Stop Linking Their Fates Together

1/28/2022

Sun Yat-sen still looms large in Taiwan.

Russia’s military buildup around Ukraine has triggered the most serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. Over 100,000 Russian troops are deployed near the border with Ukraine, poised to launch a major military assault at a moment’s notice. While these developments appear only to affect European security, American commentators have been quick todraw parallels to Taiwan.

The similarities seem obvious. Like Ukraine, Taiwan faces an existential threat from one of Eurasia’s great autocratic powers, and it is also a Western-oriented democracy that the United States has an interest in keeping free from coercion. Both Ukraine and Taiwan are being framedas critical test cases of America’s willingness to uphold global norms against the use of military force to seize territory. Some observers have even gone so far as to argue that their fates will be linked: a failure to respond to military action against Ukraine would weaken American credibility and invite an attack on Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China.

Put simply, this is lazy analysis. In the current geopolitical moment, the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan are far more important than their similarities — and linking together the security threats that the two countries face can make both situations worse. The United States should not continue to divert limited resources away from the Indo-Pacific, where the military balance is shifting in China’s favor over the next decade, to a region that is both less crucial to American interests and where the balance of power is more advantageous to Washington. U.S. prioritization, not reputation, is what really matters for Taiwan’s security.

The rest of this commentary appears at War on the Rocks.

Testimony for US-China Economic and Security Review Hearing

2/22/2021

On February 18, I had the privilege of joining a strong group of witnesses in testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on the topic of "Deterring PRC Aggression toward Taiwan." The USCC has a congressional mandate "to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action."

I can still remember when I first became familiar with the depth and quality of USCC's annual report, when I was an undergraduate taking -- what else? -- Chinese politics with Melanie Manion at the University of Rochester. Parts of it were assigned reading then, and parts no doubt still are now, 20 years later, in the many Chinese security and politics courses around the country. So it is gratifying and a bit humbling to be in a position to contribute in some small way to the next iteration.

I also want to note here that, while I was an undergraduate, I received crucial funding from the National Security Education Program (NSEP, now known as the Boren Awards) to study abroad in Beijing and Taipei. That experience kindled my interest in Taiwan, set me on my current trajectory and, quite literally, changed my life. I hope that robust funding for studying the language and culture of countries that have national security implications for the United States will be available for years to come--it is a smart investment in our future, and an increasingly important incentive to learn a foreign language in an era when the numbers of American students studying abroad in China has dropped precipitously.

I would not be in a position today to contribute to the public conversation on Taiwan's security issues without the help of the Boren program, and I hope my testimony last week will go some small way toward repaying the investment NSEP made in me and my career.

The full video of the panel and the written testimony, including my own, are available at the USCC hearing website. In addition, since it is much abridged from the written testimony, I have posted my oral remarks below.

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I have been asked to cover quite a lot of ground in my written testimony, so in my oral remarks I’m going to focus on my comparative advantage in this hearing: How to Assess Taiwan’s Will to Fight.

Assessing Taiwan’s “Will to Fight”

“Will to fight” is a vague concept, and assessing it a hard thing to do rigorously. But we do have at least three kinds of data we can observe to give us some purchase on this question: public opinion, budgets, and willingness to serve in the military.

Public Opinion
The first is public opinion data. There are many surveys of defense and security-related issues conducted every year. I’m not going to go through them in detail, but simply note that when you look at the general patterns that appear consistent across surveys, they support four key observations.

First, Taiwanese on the whole are not very confident about their own military’s ability to defend the country—especially alone—against an attack by the PRC. There is a great deal of pessimism.

Second, they are generally much more confident in their fellow Taiwanese. About 2/3 – ¾ think most others would actively resist a PRC attack.  And, their own willingness to resist is closely correlated with their estimates of how many others also do so.

Third, the majority of Taiwanese – anywhere from 2/3 to ¾ -- indicate willingness to participate in the defense of Taiwan as long as the US is also involved. If the US is not involved, this share drops below half. So US participation in the defense of Taiwan has an important psychological and morale-boosting element as well as a practical one.

And fourth, the majority of Taiwanese remain confident that the United States would intervene to stop a PLA invasion, even if Taiwanese leaders themselves triggered an attack by declaring independence.

So, to sum up: if they believe the US will also be involved, most Taiwanese are willing to resist, and think most others will too. If they believe the US will not, then most will not. Beliefs about our presence is a critical variable in Taiwanese “will to fight.”

Defense Budgets
A second way to assess Taiwan’s “will to fight” is to look at defense budgets. Until recently, these data have suggested a half-hearted commitment to defending itself.

Starting in the mid-1990s, Taiwan’s defense budget in real terms flattened out for 20 years. It declined as a share of GDP from about 5% in 1994 to about 2% in 2016. Last year Taiwan spent in real terms roughly what it spent in 1994. Meanwhile, the PRC spent 25 times what it spent in 1994.

We all know that Taiwan cannot keep up with the PRC’s increases, which have generally been in proportion to GDP growth.

What is more striking is Taiwan’s relative decline even compared to other states in the region. For instance, in 1989, Taiwan spent about 2/3 of what SK spent. In 2020, it spent less than 1/3. Put bluntly, going by budgets, Taiwan looks like it’s shirking on defense.

However, this has changed significantly in the past four years. Taiwan’s announced defense budget has increased in local currency terms by about 40%: from 321 bn NTD in 2016, to 453 bn in 2021, and the share of the central government budget going to defense has climbed back to 20 percent, a level it has not been at since 1999.

That is at least a start and suggests that under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan is committing significantly more resources to its own defense.

Willingness to Serve in the Military
A third type of data we can use to assess this question is willingness to join the military. Here the patterns are not encouraging. In 2012, the Ma Ying-jeou administration approved a phase-out of conscription, to be replaced by an all-volunteer force. This transition has been repeatedly delayed, so that today, all adult able-bodied men are still required to serve four months—not enough time to learn much of use and develop into capable reserves.

The main reason is repeated shortfalls in recruiting. Put simply, most young Taiwanese have no interest in joining. And their brief time as conscripts does not change their minds. Most young people see the military as a path of last resort, only if they have no other options. So, we observe a contradiction: young Taiwanese are the most pro-Taiwan, anti-China, pro-democracy and pro-independence of any generation, but the vast majority would never consider volunteering to join the military.

This might be changing as a potential confrontation with the PRC looms larger, as the military threat becomes more salient—and as the military acquires new high-profile platforms. But this is an area that requires a great deal of work from the MND and civilian leadership to improve the public image of the military, and to strengthen Taiwan’s training and reserve system.

Recommendations

1. Strengthen the credibility of US commitment to Taiwan through NON-military ties. The ability to deter a Taiwan Strait crisis rests crucially on beliefs that the US would act to counter PRC coercion because it is in our own interests to do so.

That belief has weakened in Asia over the last four years, in part because the previous administration put up trade barriers and pulled out of the TPP. One way to reverse impressions that we will not be committed to Asia is to reengage in regional trade negotiations.

As one example, the USTR should open bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan as soon as is feasible. Taiwan needs economic gestures of support as well as military ones, and bilateral trade talks would be a clear sign of deepening cooperation. If the Biden administration eventually decides to re-commit to negotiations for the CPTPP, use the leverage this opportunity offers to insist on Taiwan’s (and South Korea’s) participation in membership negotiations as well.

China's Military Incursions Around Taiwan Aren't a Sign of Imminent Attack

10/21/2020

Taiwan Ministry of National Defense figure illustrating PLA incursions into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ on September 9-10, 2020.

China's recent military bravado in the Taiwan Strait represents the end state of a failed strategy

The drums of war are growing louder in the Taiwan Strait. In the last month, at least 50 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft have entered Taiwan’s airspace. The volume of threatening language directed at Taiwan from sources in China, both official and unofficial, has reached a crescendo, and the headlines in the news grow more alarming each month. In the United States, mainstream foreign policy voices are now openly debating whether the U.S. should abandon strategic ambiguity and openly commit to defend Taiwan in the case of an attack — an idea advocated not so long ago by only a radical fringe.

But these dire headlines are misleading: Beijing is not gearing up for an attack on Taiwan. It still has neither the capacity to launch a successful full-scale invasion, nor the motive to risk a conflict with the United States. In reality, the increasingly bellicose language coming from China is a sign of weakness, not strength, and a cover for the failure of its own Taiwan policy. Having thrown away most of its non-military leverage in a fruitless effort to compel Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to endorse its one China principle, Beijing has now been reduced to counter-productive saber-rattling to express its discontent at U.S. arms sales and high-level diplomatic visits, while Taiwan races to strengthen its own defenses and reorient its economy away from overdependence on mainland China. In short, Xi Jinping’s approach to the “Taiwan issue” has turned into a strategic fiasco — one that may take years for Beijing to recover from...

The rest of this commentary appears at The Diplomat.