The American Political Science Association (APSA) annual conference was supposed to be in held in San Francisco this year, until COVID-19 hit. So, like everything else, it's moved online. That's probably just as well, because over the last month the Bay Area has turned into a post-apocalyptic hellscape of raging fires, record heat, and choking smoke. We've even broken some of the all-time temperature records that were set the last time APSA was in San Francisco, in 2017. Yay. At this rate it might be wise to put San Francisco (or anywhere in California, really) on the same repeat-offender list as New Orleans and never hold APSA here again. (Seattle has never looked better.) 

Anyway. It turns out we'll still have a strong lineup of Taiwan-related programming in the virtual conference. The Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) is sponsoring seven panels on Taiwan politics, spread out over four days (Thursday-Sunday, September 10-13, 2020). Details are at the CGOTS website, and reposted below. Note that you have to be registered for the conference to join the virtual sessions, but that they're otherwise open to all participants. If you'd like to see the latest Taiwan politics research, come check us out online.         

It's alive! This book volume on Taiwan politics during the Ma Ying-jeou years (2008-2016), which I've edited with Chu Yun-han and Larry Diamond, just arrived in the mail from Lynne Rienner Publishers this weekend.

This is our attempt at a deep dive into various aspects of Ma-era politics, including party politics and elections, political institutions and governance challenges, trends in public opinion and democratic values, civil society and social movements, and cross-Strait and US-Taiwan-PRC relations. This look at the Ma years parallels somewhat our earlier book on the Chen Shui-bian era.

We were fortunate to be able to assemble a great group of contributors for this book--about half based in Taiwan and half abroad--who offer a variety of perspectives on the politics of the Ma years. The scholarship here draws on years of conferences, papers, and conversations that started even before President Ma left office, including with some of the key participants in and outside of the Ma administration. (Chapter 15, for instance, is by Szu-yin Ho, who served for two years as deputy Secretary-General of Ma's National Security Council.) This sort of cross-national collaboration is less common than it should be (in part because it's logistically hard to pull off!), but I am convinced the final product is much stronger for it.  

Among the many great contributions here, let me especially highlight three that provide original, provocative answers to important questions about the Ma era:

• In Chapter 3, Austin Wang explains how Tsai Ing-wen emerged from obscurity as unrivaled leader of the DPP during its years in opposition, despite having never previously held elected office;
• In Chapter 4, Nathan Batto shows how President Ma's recurrent troubles with the legislature had more to do with deep divides within the ruling KMT than they did with the obstructionist tactics of the opposition DPP and with Ma's party rival, Speaker Wang Jin-pyng;
• In Chapter 7, Isaac Shih-hao Huang and Shing-yuan Sheng demonstrate that having a majority in the Legislative Yuan does not mean a party has complete control over the Legislative Yuan, and that the legislature's decentralized law-making process makes it challenging for the executive branch to get high-priority legislation approved, whether or not the president's party holds a majority. 

For more thoughts on those issues and a broader overview of the book, check out the introductory chapter, which is available ungated from the publisher's website. 

I have a piece out in the latest issue of the Journal of Democracy on Chinese efforts to influence Taiwan politics, and why they failed in the January 2020 elections. After the DPP lost badly in the 2018 local elections, there was a lot of speculation (see, e.g. here, here, here, here, and here) that Beijing would be emboldened by these results and expand its efforts to sway the 2020 campaign and turn President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP out of office, or failing that, would find ways to delegitimize the results and destabilize Taiwan's democracy. In the end, that didn't happen: Tsai recovered from a politically shaky first term to win an even larger share of the vote than in 2016, the DPP held onto its legislative majority, and Tsai's main opponent, Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, openly conceded defeat on election night.

In the article, I lay out several reasons why these fears did not come to pass in 2020, and why Taiwan's democracy has repeatedly proven resilient to PRC pressure campaigns. 

1. The CCP is still pretty bad at influencing public opinion: Beijing's covert influence operations have been surprisingly clumsy, badly disguised, and at odds with the long-term goals of Taiwan policy under Xi Jinping.
2. Partisanship can be a good thing: The high salience of the China factor and Taiwan's partisan divides make it hard to execute the kind of United Front-led, covert and coercive activities that the CCP favors for most of its influence operations elsewhere in the world.
3. State capacity lives: The Taiwanese state is still quite capable of responding effectively to the threat of foreign interference in elections when it takes them seriously, and the 2018 elections provided a belated wake-up call to this danger.
4. A free society helps: Taiwanese civil society, including parts of the media and NGOs, as well as private social media companies, managed to mitigate the impact of disinformation. Facebook, for instance, took down over a hundred Han Kuo-yu fan pages the month before the election for "inauthentic activity."  
5. Low-tech elections are an important backstop for democracy: Taiwan's election management system is very low-tech, but it is also transparent, accurate, efficient, fast, and fair. (For more details, see here.) Nobody disputed the election results, shocking as they were to some of Han Kuo-yu's core supporters who had believed the polls were fake and that Tsai would lose. The high trust in the voting and counting process had a lot to do with that.   

The full article is available via Project Muse, and access is free through August 15, 2020.

If Tsai Ing-wen is superstitious, she should be worried: second term presidents in Taiwan appear to be cursed. Much like President Tsai, her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou started his second term on a confident and triumphant note. But over the next four years, he faced a relentless series of political crises, including an intraparty power struggle with Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, massive protests against the death of a military conscript and construction of a nuclear power plant, and of course the Sunflower Movement occupation of the legislature, which effectively halted cross-Strait rapprochement with Beijing. President Ma’s approval ratings bottomed out at record lows, and he stepped down in 2016 on the heels of a sweeping electoral defeat of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), ultimately having accomplished little in his last years in office.

Somehow, Chen Shui-bian’s second term was even worse. The controversy around his re-election victory in 2004 robbed him of whatever political momentum he might have enjoyed, and he spent most of his remaining tenure fending off vicious partisan attacks, anti-corruption accusations in the press, massive street rallies by his opponents, and impeachment attempts in the legislature. In his attempt to keep core pro-independence supporters on his side, President Chen pursued a brash symbolic agenda that deliberately provoked the pan-Blue opposition, infuriated Beijing, alienated even potential allies in Washington, and left him politically isolated. In the 2008 elections, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) paid a steep electoral price, and after his term was finally over, Chen ended up in handcuffs: the corruption accusations turned out to be true, and he was sentenced to a long prison term.

The rest of this piece continues at Taiwan Insight.

No. At least, that's my prediction in this piece on Taiwan's party politics in the run-up to 2020 over at Taiwan Insight. Here's an excerpt:

"Taiwan’s party system is unusual among young democracies for its stability. In 1992, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) finished first and second in elections for the Legislative Yuan. In 2016, they finished second and first, and in the six elections in between, neither party ever finished outside the top two."

"The KMT and DPP are also well-institutionalised. They have centralised party organizations that integrate local branches into a hierarchical national structure. Both have many loyal supporters who make up a significant share of the electorate. Both have staked out distinct positions on the ‘China question’—the most fundamental divide in Taiwanese politics. And, despite going through major reversals of fortune at different times, each remains today the primary threat to unseat the other in almost every election. For better or worse, Taiwan has effectively been a KMT-DPP duopoly for the entire democratic era."

Piece continues here. 

8:00 AM – 9:30 AM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Reunderstanding Cross-Strait Relations: The Status Quo? The One-China Policy? 
Chair: Robert Sutter, George Washington University 
Discussants: Scott Kastner, the University of Maryland and Kuen-Da Lin, Georgia Institute of Technology 

• "A Neo U.S. One-China Policy? Content Analyzing Obama’s and Trump’s Positions," Dean Chen, Ramapo College of New Jersey; Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas 
• "The Polarization of Cross-Strait Relations since 2016: the Status Quo at Stake," S. Philip Hsu, National Taiwan University 
• "The One China Policy and the International Status of Taiwan," Mikulas Fabry, Georgia Institute of Technology 
• "Nationalism, Alliances, and Geopolitics: US-China-Taiwan Ties under Trump and Xi," Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Adelphi University 

10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: New Theories and New Evidence: Studies of Turnout and Election in Taiwan 
Chair: Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas 
Discussants: Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky University and Nick Lin, Academia Sinica 

• "Declining Voter Turnout in Taiwan: A Generational Effect?," T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University 
  
• "Reverse Coattails Effects and Electoral Fortune in Taiwan’s Local Elections," Kuan-chen Lee, Academia Sinica Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas 
  
• "Critical Citizens or Electoral Losers? A Panel Study of 2018 Taiwan’s Election," Hsin-hao Huang, National Taiwan Normal University 
  
• "The Impact of Polling Primaries on Electoral Performance," Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University 

12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Public Opinion Research in Taiwan: Old Topics and New Angles 
Chair: Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University 
Discussants: Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University and Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University 

• "Democratic Deficit in Taiwan? A Longitudinal Study of Corruption Perception," Chilik Yu, Shih Hsin University 
  
• "Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: from Ma Ying-jou to Tsai Ing-wen," T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University; Su-Feng Cheng, National Chengchi University 
  
• " 'Return' of Chinese Identity? Exploring Some Recent Developments," Shiau-chi Shen, Soochow University 
  
• "Public Support for the Use of Force in Weak States," Kuan-Sheng Wu, Purdue University; Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University; Austin Horng-En Wang, Duke University 

2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Legislative Politics and Emerging Social Issues in Taiwan 
Chair: David An, Catholic University of America/Global Taiwan Institute 
Discussants: Wei-ting Yen, Franklin and Marshall College and Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University

• "Election Cycle and Roll Call Requests: Identifying the Target Audience," Weihao Huang, Academia Sinica Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, London School of Economics and Political Science 
  
• "Electoral Rules, Party Discipline, and Parliamentary Questions in Taiwan," Nick Lin, Academia Sinica; Jinhyeok Jang, National Sun Yat-sen University 
  
• "Unpacking LGBT Acceptance in Taiwan: What Explains Taiwan’s Public Support?" Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky; University Isabel Eliassen, Western Kentucky University 
  
• "Court as Political Evasion: The Case of Interpretation No. 748 in Taiwan," Yu-Hsien Sung, University of South Carolina; Chin-shou Wang, National Cheng Kung University 

4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Social Media, Big Data Analysis, and Electoral Politics in Taiwan 
Chair: Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University 
Discussants: Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University and T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University 

• "How Connective Populism Was Made Online--A Case Study of the Han Tide in 2018," Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University; Frank Liu, National Sun Yat-Sen University 
  
• "Social Media and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Taiwan," Chia-hung Tsai, National Chengchi University; Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University 
  
• "The Effect of Social Media on Vote Choice: The Case of Taiwan," Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University; Chi Huang, National Chengchi University 
  
• "The Interaction between Politician and Netizens in Facebook: A Big Data Approach," Yu-Wei Hu, Chinese culture University; Jung Chun Chang, SOAS, University of London 

6:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) Business Meeting 

​Cross-posted from the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies website

The Conference Group on Taiwan Studies is a Related Group of the American Political Science Association. For this year's annual conference in Boston, CGOTS is sponsoring three special panels on Taiwanese politics. In addition, we encourage all APSA attendees to drop by the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies reception, Thursday, August 30, from 7:30-9:00pm in Marriott Salon K. Free (!!!) drinks and hors d'oeuvres will be served.   

All CGOTS members are also invited to attend our annual business meeting, to be held right before the reception from 6:30-7:30, next door in Marriott Salon J. We'll go over budget and membership numbers and nominate the new CGOTS leadership team. 

Please also check out the three official CGOTS panels, as well as other Taiwan-related presentations at the conference; details and a schedule can be found at the CGOTS website. 

The Taiwan Democracy and Security Project at Stanford University is hosting a presentation today by Gary Hamilton, professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Washington. Prof. Hamilton will speak about his new book from Stanford University Press, Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy. 

The talk is free and open to the public. Additional details can be found at the official event page. 

Abstract
Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy is a record of a thirty-year research project that Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu began in 1987.  A distinguished sociologist and university administrator in Taiwan, Kao and his research team (which included Prof. Hamilton during his frequent visits to Taiwan) interviewed over 800 owners and managers of Taiwanese firms in Taiwan, China, and Vietnam.  Some were re-interviewed over ten times during this period.  The length of this project allows them a vantage point to challenge the conventional interpretations of Asian industrialization and to present a new interpretation of the global economy that features an enduring alliance between, on the one hand, American and European retailers and merchandisers and, on the other hand, Asian contract manufacturers, with Taiwanese industrialists becoming the most prominent contract manufacturers in the past forty years.

Bio
Gary G. Hamilton is a Professor Emeritus of International Studies and Sociology at the University of Washington.  He specializes in historical/comparative sociology, economic sociology, with a special emphasis on Asian societies. He is an author of numerous articles and books, including most recently Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths, Economic Organization and International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan (with Robert Feenstra) (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Commerce and Capitalism in Chinese Societies (London: Routledge, 2006), The Market Makers: How Retailers Are Changing the Global Economy (co-editor and contributor, Oxford University Press, 2011; paperback 2012), and Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy (with Kao Cheng-shu, Stanford University Press, 2018).

My latest review essay, entitled "The China Model: How Successful is the Chinese Regime?" is now out at the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.

More on the themes of that piece below, but first, If you are a China-watcher, you really need to read Edward Wong's terrific new article in the New York Times, "A Chinese Empire Reborn." Wong was a China correspondent for the NYT for a decade, and he cuts through a lot of the crap about the nature of the Chinese regime. China's rise as a global power, he rightly notes, is occurring mostly through its accumulation of economic and military clout, rather than through emulation of its system and values by ordinary people and elites in other countries. That is, China's rise to date has been mostly about increasing its "hard", not "soft", power, and that order shows few signs of changing anytime soon.

There's one assumption in that essay that bothers me a bit, though. It's that the Chinese regime is inevitably going to continue its ascension in the world--that is, though it probably won't attract more admirers or imitators any time soon, China's relative hard power will continue its rapid increase. Here's the end of Wong's essay:

What I question is Wong's implicit assumption that China will inevitably continue on an upward trajectory over the next several decades. It's true that the relative power of the United States is declining ("fading" is a bit strong, but we'll leave that aside for now), as it has been since its early post-Cold War peak. It's also true that the "liberal hegemony" of the current global order, and especially the capacity, and willingness, of the United States to maintain it, is under considerable short-term threat right now.

But it is not obvious to me that China is especially well-positioned to benefit from these trends, because it's not self-evident that its current economic expansion will continue much longer, or that Chinese leaders will be able to adapt very effectively to the challenges looming on the horizon. The Chinese economy has grown quickly over the last 35 years, but despite many assertions that China's growth record is unprecedented, it is not--over a similar time interval, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and before them Japan registered equally impressive growth, with a much more equal distribution of gains, to boot. And those earlier "economic miracles" followed a broadly similar pattern--a greater role for market forces, increasing connectivity to the global economy, export-oriented development, high savings rates, broad investment in education and infrastructure, but a continued privileged role for an activist state. 

Here's the kicker: in all of those cases, the economy inevitably slowed down, and at the same time their  "demographic dividends" also ended. The transition to a different growth model has been wrenching, and it's not clear that Japan, or South Korea, or Taiwan or Singapore has hit on the right balance of reforms--in particular, improved corporate governance, strengthened rule of law, and banking reforms--that would improve their long-term economic prospects. (Singapore has probably come the closest so far.) So why should we expect China to? On all these dimensions, China actually looks much worse than its Asian predecessors, and it has the added burden of a hugely unequal distribution of wealth and a political system that suffers from a grievous, long-term legitimacy deficit. (This leaves aside, too, the question of whether its reported GDP figures actually reflect anything close to reality.) It also is facing a dire demographic picture made worse by the One-Child Policy: its workforce-age population is already declining, and its total population is projected to begin falling in less than 20 years. That does not sound like a country destined for global hegemony to me.

For a more detailed discussion, check out my essay at the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.