For the past 18 months, the biggest puzzle in Taiwan politics has been the curious behavior of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP). In the 2024 elections, the TPP did very well for a third party, winning 22 percent of the party list vote and eight seats -- enough to break through the DPP-KMT duopoly to deny either of the two major parties a majority for the first time since the Chen Shui-bian era. That made it the kingmaker in the Legislative Yuan and gave it significant bargaining power over the other two parties in this term -- if they were able to exploit it.

The puzzle is that the TPP does not appear to have maximized its leverage in the current legislature. The party's leaders turned down opportunities to grab the speaker or deputy speaker positions or to negotiate for cabinet positions in a Lai government, and over the last year they have instead prioritized opposition to the DPP administration rather than conditional cooperation with the ruling party. More surprising still, they have publicly aligned themselves with the KMT on many of that party's most controversial policy initiatives -- even when those policies are broadly unpopular. 

This transformation of the TPP in the public eye from a centrist swing party to a "pan-blue subsidiary" has generated a widespread sense of angst and betrayal among pan-green commentators, who have accused the TPP of "subordinat[ing] itself blindly" and "march[ing] in lockstep with the KMT," and even tacitly cooperating with the CCP to oppose the DPP and the Lai administration. The TPP's public image has shifted so dramatically that many observers of Taiwan politics now simply assert that the legislature is "KMT-controlled."

The problem with this assertion is that it's wrong. The TPP legislative caucus is not actually marching in lockstep with the KMT on every issue, as I'll argue in what follows. On the contrary, it holds preferences that are quite distinct from the KMT, it has acted as a significant check on that party's legislative caucus, and its public cooperation with the KMT against the ruling DPP will be temporary and limited, rather than comprehensive and indefinite. But for their own reasons, neither the KMT nor the TPP want to advertise this fact. For the moment, they both would rather have everyone believe they are a unified pan-blue team cooperating to stop DPP overreach.

​No other explanation is consistent with the political outcomes of the last 18 months. 

The Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region held Boom or Bust: Can Taiwan Secure the Energy Supplies It Needs to Meet Its High-Tech Aspirations? on Thursday, April 10, 2025 from 3:30-5:30 pm PT at Shultz Auditorium, George P. Shultz Building.

The prowess of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry puts it at the center of the AI boom. Chips made in Taiwan power most of the leading AI platforms, and its data centers are expanding at a rapid pace, driven by tech giants in cloud computing, AI, and the semiconductor industry. But this boom is also straining Taiwan’s energy supplies: the surge in electricity demand is happening while the transition to zero-carbon sources of energy has fallen behind schedule, and its final nuclear plant is scheduled to be shut down this year. Taiwan also faces a rising military threat from the People’s Republic of China, and its heavy reliance on imported energy supplies is a serious security vulnerability.  
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This event featured several experts with industry experience discussing these two parallel trends in Taiwan – the rapid AI-driven increases in demand for electricity, and the lagging development of new, more secure sources of carbon-free energy.  

ABOUT THE SPEAKERS

Peter Wu is the CEO of ASUS Cloud and Taiwan AI Service Corporation. He has led the development of AI Foundry Service (AFS), which advances on-premises AI deployment, cloud-based AI applications, and generative AI ecosystem to implement trust-worthy AI 2.0. In 2013, Dr. Wu represented Taiwan at the WTO Business Forum where he shared ASUS's development experience in cloud services, and he was appointed as a member of the Advisory Committee on Bio Taiwan Committee by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan in 2017 and 2019. In this capacity, he provided guidance and advice on the strategic direction of the biotechnology industry in Taiwan. From 2018 to 2020, he also managed the biggest AI supercomputer project in Taiwan, helping it to achieve its best-ever ranking of 20th in the TOP500. The project was then spun off into Taiwan AI Service Corporation, the first commercial AIHPC supercomputer cloud service provider in the Asia-Pacific. Dr. Wu is actively involved in various organizations and committees, including serving as the chairman of the Taiwan AI Alliance, and holds prominent roles in the fields of Smart Medical, AI, cloud computing, and others. 

Jane Yung-Jen Hsu is a professor and department chair of Computer Science and Information Engineering at National Taiwan University. Her research interests include multi-agent systems, intelligent data analysis, commonsense knowledge, and context-aware computing. Prof. Hsu is the director of the Intel-NTU Connected Context Computing Center, featuring global research collaboration among NTU, Intel, and the National Science Council of Taiwan. She is actively involved in many key international AI conferences as organizers and members of the program committee. In addition to serving as the President of Taiwanese Association for Artificial Intelligence (2013-2014), Prof. Hsu has been a member of AAAI, IEEE, ACM, Phi Tau Phi, and an executive committee member of the IEEE Technical Committee on E-Commerce (2000) and TAAI (2004-current).

Li-fu Lin is an adviser to Formosa Heavy Industries. He previously served as the vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission – recently renamed the Nuclear Safety Commission – which supervises Taiwan’s nuclear power plants, nuclear facilities, and the use of radioactive material in commercial and research activities. From 2009-2013, he was the program manager of Taiwan’s National Energy Program, leading the National Science and Technology Council’s Clean Coal Projects. He spent more than 30 years as a researcher at the Institute of Nuclear Research, including serving as general manager from 2004-2007. He holds a doctorate in mechanical engineering from University Karlsruhe in Germany. 

​Gwenyth Wang-Reeves is the Engagement Director for GE Vernova in Taiwan. She is responsible for establishing, and driving GE’s advocacy initiatives in Taiwan, engaging with local and central governments and other stakeholders on important public policy challenges, as well as advising the GE businesses on a broad range of regulatory issues. Prior to joining GE Vernova, Gwenyth was the Senior Director of Government and Public Affairs at the American Chamber of Commerce Taiwan. She has also held several senior policy roles at Taiwan’s National Security Council and Presidential Office, as well as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Taiwan. Gwenyth holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the National Taiwan University, Master’s degrees in Political Communication at the Royal Holloway, and Democracy and Democratisation at the University of London and University College London, as well as a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Warwick.

Vincent Chen, a Taiwan native, is an energy investment and policy specialist with a decade of experience in the private sector. From 2020 to 2023, he served as an investment manager at GSSG Solar, a U.S.-based renewable energy private equity fund, where he led the development of its power generation portfolio in Taiwan. His work included building Taiwan’s first hybrid solar energy and aquaculture project backed by a foreign investor. Before joining GSSG, Vincent led business development and fundraising at Jupiter Intelligence, a climate risk analytics provider, and Lucid Motors, an electric vehicle manufacturer. His research interests encompass power markets, environmental markets, and carbon border adjustments. He holds a master’s degree in international development economics from the Harvard Kennedy School and a bachelor’s degree in environmental economics from Stanford University.

The Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region hosted Trump and Taiwan: A Big, Beautiful Relationship or the Deal Maker’s Ultimate Bargaining Chip? on Tuesday, April 8, 2025 from 4:00-5:15 pm PT at Shultz Auditorium, George P. Shultz Building.

We are only in the first quarter of the first year of President Trump’s second term, but we’ve all already experienced a dizzying pace of activity. Whole federal agencies have been shuttered, some longstanding agency core missions have been upended, and we are suddenly in a trade war with unknown consequences. Ukraine has been dumped, then courted again. Canada is threatened with annexation, Greenland with invasion.

In the midst of this chaotic approach to governance, the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy is still to be defined. There are some disruptions such as new tariffs (though forecasted long ago), and the suspension of development assistance, but one could also cite policy continuity (e.g. AUKUS and the Quad) and a slew of traditional, conventional practices (e.g. leader visits with joint statements and annual military exercises). Yet absent the release of strategic documents such as a national security strategy, and absent a major address by the President or Cabinet official, the overriding feelings in the region are uncertainty and unease.

​This very much includes Taiwan. While Taiwan has pro-actively taken steps to earn the “right” kind of attention of the new U.S. Administration such as announcing major investments in the United States and increases to its defense budget, many critical questions remain. Are we on the cusp of a closer, stronger relationship with Taiwan with enduring commitments, or are we building trade space for President Trump’s next big deal with China? Mr. Schriver will explore these important topics based on his three decades of policy work related to Taiwan and the Indo-pacific, as well as his services as a senior official in the first Trump Administration.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER
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Mr. Randall Schriver is the Chairman of the Board of the Project 2049 Institute and a Partner at Pacific Solutions LLC.  In January 2022, he was appointed as a Commissioner to the U.S. – China Security and Economic Review Commission and currently serves the Commission as the Vice Chairman.  He is also a lecturer for Stanford University’s “Stanford-in-Washington” program, is on the Board of Advisors to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, and Board of Directors of the US-Taiwan Business Council.

Mr. Schriver served from 2018-19 as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. He also served from 2003-05 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, during which his portfolio included China, Taiwan, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. From 2001 to 2003, he was Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State. From 1994 to 1998, he worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including as the senior official responsible for U.S. bilateral relations with the People's Liberation Army and the bilateral security and military relationships with Taiwan.

Prior to his civilian service, he served as an active-duty Navy Intelligence Officer from 1989 to 1991, including a deployment in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. After active duty, he served in the Navy Reserves for nine years, including as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an attaché at U.S. Embassies Beijing and Ulaanbaatar.

The Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region held a Conversation with Representative Alexander Tah-Ray Yui, Taiwan’s Chief Diplomatic Officer in the United States, on Friday, February 28, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. PT.

​Representative Yui assumed his position as the head of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, D.C., in December 2023. He previously served in a similar role as the Representative to the European Union and Belgium. His 35-year career in Taiwan’s Foreign Service has included appointments to posts in New York, San Salvador, and Geneva, and a three-year term as the Ambassador to Paraguay. From 2021-23, he served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.  

On December 20, amid shouting, shoving, fistfights, and broken furniture, Taiwan’s opposition-controlled legislature passed by a show of hands three controversial bills that threaten to kneecap its government. The first raised the threshold to recall elected officials. The second required the Constitutional Court to have a 2/3 quorum to hear constitutional cases and imposed a supermajority threshold to invalidate a law. And the third shifted the central-local revenue-sharing formula to give local governments (mostly KMT-run) 40 percent of all government revenues, up from 25 percent, at the expense of the DPP-run central government.
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Four days later, the same opposition majority in the legislature voted down all seven of President Lai’s nominees to the Constitutional Court, leaving it with only eight justices and unable to meet the new quorum requirement for hearing a case. It is now effectively paralyzed. The DPP government has nevertheless requested that the court meet and rule anyway on whether the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act are themselves unconstitutional. This increasingly destructive partisan political conflict has put Taiwan on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no obvious way to resolve it. 

This confrontation is also taking place in a democracy that Freedom House last year ranked as the second-best in Asia, behind only Japan, and significantly above the United States and most of Europe. Taiwan's political system has proven remarkably resilient to PRC influence operations over many years, and it has a capable and effective state and vibrant economy despite its diplomatic isolation. So why is it facing a political crisis now?

​The simplest answer is divided government. For the first time in 16 years (and only the second time in its democratic history), Taiwan's legislative and executive branches are controlled by different parties: the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) together hold a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and they are locked in a fierce power struggle with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government.  

This conflict was not inevitable. In the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections, the DPP's Lai Ching-te (賴清德) won the presidential election but with only 40% of the vote, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. The KMT ended up with 52 seats (plus two blue-leaning independents), the DPP won 51, and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je's (柯文哲) centrist TPP won eight (all via the party list vote). That left no party with a majority and made the TPP the crucial swing voting bloc in the LY. In theory, the TPP could have exploited that leverage to extract significant concessions from the ruling DPP -- on policy, legislative leadership, or cabinet positions. But instead, negotiations between the DPP and TPP went nowhere, and President Lai missed his chance to head off the last year of partisan warfare.   

The formation of battle lines first became apparent on February 1, when the new legislature was seated. Its first order of business was to elect a speaker and deputy speaker. Curiously, the TPP  ultimately decided not to support either of the major party nominees -- the party's eight legislators voted for TPP member Huang Shan-shan (黃珊珊) in the first round, and abstained in the second.  As a result, the KMT's Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) won the speaker's race, and KMT legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) was elected as his deputy. Despite providing crucial help to the KMT, the TPP did not manage to win even the deputy speaker as the price for their support. Nor did they strike a deal with the DPP, either, although that should have secured at least one of the leadership positions for the party. Given that the TPP held the crucial votes that could have denied control of the legislature to either major party, this outcome seems like a major missed opportunity for both them and the DPP. 

I've heard competing explanations for this bargaining failure. One story is that the refusal came from the DPP side -- ruling party legislators were engaged in quiet conversations with the TPP about a possible power-sharing deal, but Lai Ching-te intervened to stop the negotiations. Reporting at the time suggested that the TPP's price for cooperation in the run-up to February 1 was for the DPP to support Huang Shan-shan for speaker -- a price the DPP was apparently not willing to pay, but which in hindsight they probably should have. That interpretation is also consistent with the public comments offered by party caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) that "A DPP-TPP partnership is only possible if the TPP voluntarily comes to us."​So maybe this was a strategic mistake by the DPP caucus (and ultimately, Lai himself), and they are suffering the consequences. 

But another possibility is that the TPP was just never seriously interested in cooperating with the DPP no matter what they offered -- even before  Ko Wen-je's detention in a corruption investigation several months later turbocharged the TPP's animosity toward the DPP government. Although the KMT-TPP negotiations for a joint presidential ticket broke down in spectacular public fashion in November 2023, the two parties did still enter into a pre-election coalition for the legislative races and even campaigned together, so perhaps TPP leaders had already made up their minds to team up with the KMT after the elections, too, and there really was no chance the DPP could have enticed them to defect.  

Whatever the reason, ever since the new legislature was seated on February 1, the TPP has consistently chosen to act as the KMT's junior partner and supported the opposition party's confrontational approach to the DPP government. And as the partisan divide has hardened, it has also transformed into an inter-branch conflict between the KMT-TPP majority in the legislature and the DPP in the executive. The partisan maneuvering that has followed has escalated over the last year to a level of open political warfare that is posing a severe test for Taiwan's democratic institutions. And it is a test they are failing.

The Hoover Institution Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and the Program on the US, China, and the World invite you to Guardians of Economic Sovereignty: How Taiwan and Singapore Navigate Chinese Capital Through National Security Review.

This event is free and open to the public. It will be held at the Hoover Institution in HHMB 160 on Wednesday, January 16 from 4:00-5:15pm. Register to attend in person or virtually. 

Professor Chen will discuss two distinct strategies for scrutinizing outbound investment from China, as adopted by Taiwan and Singapore—both key trade partners of China. Growing concerns over Chinese investment have led to stricter national security reviews worldwide, yet the actual enforcement of these reviews remains understudied, particularly outside the U.S. context. He contrasts Singapore's reliance on ex post monitoring with Taiwan's emphasis on ex ante screening. Additionally, he highlights how Singapore leverages privatized monitoring to reinforce investment scrutiny, while Taiwan incorporates elements of private enforcement. The discussion underscores the importance of utilizing market intermediaries as enforcement agents, serving as a crucial supplement to the traditional framework of national security reviews. Both cases demonstrate how the private sector can take a proactive role in enforcing national security reviews.

Speaker Bio
Weitseng Chen is a faculty member at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, specializing in law and economic development, law and politics, and legal history in the context of Greater China. He has recently published several books, including Regime Type and Beyond: The Transformation of Police in Asia (CUP, 2023), Authoritarian Legality in Asia: Formation, Development and Transition (CUP, 2019), The Beijing Consensus? How China Has Changed the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development (CUP, 2017), Property and Trust Law: Taiwan (with Yun-Chien Chang & Y. J. Wu, Kluwer, 2017), and Law and Economic Miracle: Interaction Between Taiwan’s Development and Economic Laws After WWII (in Chinese, 2000). Weitseng Chen earned his JSD from Yale Law School. Prior to joining NUS, he served as a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford’s Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and practiced as a corporate lawyer in the Greater China region with Davis Polk & Wardwell.

The Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region  and the Stanford Taiwan Science and Technology Hub held Enhancing Energy Security in a Time of Rapid Change: Perspectives from the US and Taiwan on Wednesday, November 13th, 2024 from 4:45 pm - 7:15 pm PT.

Over the next decade, the world will face a major energy challenge. Most of the world’s advanced economies are trying to manage a transition to net-zero emissions at the same time that electricity demand is projected to surge. In particular, the recent emergence of artificial intelligence as a rapid growth industry, and its associated electricity-hungry data centers, has led many tech companies to secure long-term carbon-free sources of electricity for their activities – including nuclear power.
In this event, we will hear from people in the energy and technology fields in both the US and Taiwan about how the surge in AI-related electricity demand – and the related impacts on semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan – is affecting energy security in both countries. We especially want to call attention to the way that new technologies may require changes in the planned transition to zero-carbon energy sources.
 
This event was hosted online and live-streamed to the public. It is co-sponsored with the Stanford Taiwan Science and Technology Hub.

Featuring
Paul Dabbar, CEO, Bohr Quantum Technology
Jared Dunnmon, Senior Advisor for Strategic Initiatives, Defense Innovation Unit
Jennifer Huffstetler, Chief Product Sustainability Officer and VP/GM of
Intel Future Platform Strategy and Sustainability
Gwenyth Wang-Reeves, Engagement Director, GE Taiwan
Kuor-hsin Chang, Independent Board Member, Sentelic, Inc. 
Tsaiying Lu, Research Fellow, Research Institute for Democracy, Society,
and Emerging Technology 

The Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, the Hoover Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), and the Taiwan Science and Technology Hub invite you to an engaging discussion on generative artificial intelligence and democracy. Join us on Tuesday, October 29, 2024, from 4:00 PM to 5:30 PM (Pacific) in the Philippines Conference Room at Encina Hall. DSET is a think tank established in 2023 under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) of Taiwan. Its future-oriented vision of science and technology policies aim to safeguard democratic values.

During this event, Dr. Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow at DSET, will launch their new report, "GenAI and Democracy: AI-Driven Disinformation in Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election and Lessons for the World." Dr. Huang will discuss Taiwan's experience using regulation to counter disinformation and he will offer technical solutions available to other democratic societies. Following the report presentation, a panel of experts from the Stanford Cyber Policy Center and the Hoover Institution will provide feedback and share their thoughts on the future of AI development and regulations globally.

Opening Remarks  
Larry Diamond,  Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Mosbacher Senior Fellow of Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Introduction
Jeremy Chang, Research Fellow & CEO, DSET

Report Presentation
Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow, DSET

Panel Discussion - Generative AI, regulation, and its impacts globally

Panelists
Kai-Shen Huang, Research Fellow, DSET
Florence G’Sell, Visiting Professor, CPC
Sergey Sanovich, Hoover Fellow
Margaret Tu, University of Washington

Moderator
Charles Mok, Research Scholar, GDPi

Participant Bios

Charles Mok is a Research Scholar at the Global Digital Policy Incubator of the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford University, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Internet Society, and a board member of the International Centre for Trade Transparency and Monitoring. Charles served as an elected member of the Legislative Council in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, representing the Information Technology functional constituency, for two terms from 2012 to 2020. In 2021, he founded Tech for Good Asia, an initiative to advocate positive use of technology for businesses and civil communities.

Kai-Shen Huang graduated from the University of Oxford and National Taiwan University, possessing interdisciplinary training in both anthropology and law. His research expertise includes China’s critical technology policies, the application of artificial intelligence in dispute resolution and public administration, and legal anthropology.

Florence G’sell is a visiting professor of private law at the Cyber Policy Center, where she leads the Program on Governance of Emerging Technologies. She also holds the Digital, Governance, and Sovereignty Chair at Sciences Po (France) and is a professor of private law at the University of Lorraine (currently on leave). G’sell began her academic career focusing on tort law, judicial systems, and comparative law. In recent years, her work has concentrated on digital law, particularly in the regulation of online platforms, the legal challenges posed by emerging technologies such as blockchain and the metaverse, and the concept of digital sovereignty.

Sergey Sanovich is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before joining the Hoover Institution, Sergey Sanovich was a postdoctoral research associate at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University. Sanovich received his PhD in political science from New York University and continues his affiliation with its Center for Social Media and Politics. His research is focused on disinformation and social media platform governance; online censorship and propaganda by authoritarian regimes; and elections and partisanship in information autocracies. 
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Margaret Tu also known as Nikal Kabala'an, hailing from Taiwan's Indigenous communities, is a dynamic young leader with a passion for interdisciplinary pursuits. She actively engages in Indigenous self-determination and decolonization, contributing to social justice movements and curating exhibitions at prestigious institutions like the Burke Museum and the Tateuchi East Asia Library. Margaret is an accomplished legal researcher with expertise in Intellectual Property laws and a keen interest in technology-related policies, including Artificial Intelligence and Data Governance.

On behalf of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and The Global Policy and Strategy Initiative, the Hoover Institution invites you to Taiwan After the 2024 Elections Annual Conference, Thursday, May 23, 2024, from 8:30 AM - 5:15 PM to Friday, May 24, 2024 from 8:45 AM - 2:00 PM in HHMB 160.
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Taiwan’s next president William Lai (賴清德) takes office on May 20, 2024. His victory in the January 2024 elections ensures that the ruling Democracy Progressive Party (DPP) will hold the presidency for an unprecedented third consecutive term. But Lai won only 40 percent of the presidential vote, and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) together now control a majority of the seats in the legislature. President-elect Lai’s new administration is also likely to face continued pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and he will have to deal with an increasingly complex and uncertain international environment.  
 
Join us as we bring together a diverse group of experts to discuss the policy challenges and opportunities that the incoming Lai administration will face. It will feature panels on the 2024 election results, governance challenges, the future of Taiwan’s economy, security and defense issues, US-Taiwan-PRC relations, and perspectives of key U.S. allies and partners on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
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This conference will bring together a diverse group of experts to discuss the policy challenges and opportunities that the incoming Lai administration will face. It will feature panels on the 2024 election results, governance challenges, the future of Taiwan’s economy, security and defense issues, US-Taiwan-PRC relations, and perspectives of key U.S. allies and partners on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force the Hoover Institution held a Taiwan Roundtable Discussion On Cold War / Martial Law Formations of Taiwanese America on Monday, May 13, 2024 from 2-3:30 p.m. PT in Stauffer Auditorium. 

This event features Wendy Cheng, Professor of American Studies and core faculty in the Intercollegiate Department of Asian American Studies at Scripps College. She is the author of Island X: Taiwanese Student Migrants, Campus Spies, and Cold War Activism (University of Washington Press, 2023) and The Changs Next Door to the Díazes: Remapping Race in Suburban California (University of Minnesota Press, 2013), and coauthor of A People’s Guide to Los Angeles (University of California Press, 2012).

From the 1960s to 1980s, more than a hundred thousand Taiwanese students migrated to the US for graduate study in science, technology, engineering, and medicine fields as part of the special Cold War relationship between the US and the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) government in Taiwan. This same time period overlapped with a 38-year period of martial law in Taiwan, during which the KMT surveilled and terrorized Taiwanese nationals not only in Taiwan but also in the U.S., Japan, and other locations around the world. In the U.S., this occurred with the full knowledge and tacit permission of the US state.

With information drawn from extensive interviews and archival research, we'll discuss how Taiwanese students were politicized and organized themselves on U.S. university campuses under these dual conditions of selective Cold War migration and martial law, and how their politics were more heterogeneous and far-reaching than how they are typically remembered today.

My opening remarks are below: 

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