Student Activism is a Good Sign

There are reasons to be heartened by the student-led occupation of the legislature. One of the signature features of Taiwan's democratic transition was the positive role played by civil society organizations. Taiwan's diverse, vibrant, and politically active civil groups have been important in broadening political participation in government and serving as watchdogs for administrative initiatives. So it is encouraging to see a resurgence of activism, especially among younger generations who have been increasingly apathetic over the last decade.

The Ma Administration's Wrong-footed Response
Yet, as Dafydd Fell notes in this editorial, the Ma administration has been really bad at responding to concerns raised by these groups. The KMT, especially the big-business-friendly and technocratic elite favored by President Ma in the Executive Yuan, retains a strong inclination toward top-down policy-making that, to put it charitably, borders on paternalism. The Ma administration has a consistent pattern of disregard for democratic procedures designed to allow civil society organizations to raise questions about government policies, and statements by executive officials about popular protests have often been remarkably tone-deaf.  

The administration's response so far to the occupation of the legislature follows this same pattern, and it has reinforced the already strong public impression that President Ma is politically inept. Ma did not publicly acknowledge the occupation of the legislature, but did attend meetings of the KMT Central Standing Committee and the Cabinet, where he reportedly praised the KMT legislative caucus and stated the administration's determination to win passage of the agreement by June. In the absence of any public statement by President Ma, members of his government started sounding off on the protestors, including the head of the Control Yuan, Wang Chien-hsien (王建煊), who called the students "ignorant" and "used by politicians," and said they needed to be forgiven, "for they know not what they do."  On Thursday, the Premier of the Executive Yuan, Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺), asserted that the students were poorly informed and being misled and used by the DPP, and the KMT caucus whip Lin Hung-chih argued the students were "trampling on the dignity of the legislature and the people of Taiwan."  

By contrast, the response from Speaker Wang was much more measured, and, critically, ruled out for now the use of police to remove protestors by force.  Given Wang's key position in the legislature, and his ability to mediate between the two main political camps, it appears that President Ma will once again be in the awkward position of depending on Wang get the agreement approved. Thus, the student protestors have at minimum succeeded in strengthening the hand of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive branch.  I have mixed feelings about that outcome, but in comparative perspective it's not obviously a bad thing for democracy to have an assertive legislature consistently able to stand up to a presidential executive.

Troubling Democratic Implications: Not Presidential Overreach, but Governmental Paralysis
That said, some of the more outraged reactions to the KMT’s "undemocratic" attempts to get this agreement approved seem a bit hyperbolic to me.  It's worth noting a couple things about this legislative outcome that are a bit odd, and worrying from the perspective of effective governance.  

First,  the KMT controls a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan.  Moreover, approval for the agreement is the top legislative priority of the Ma administration right now. And President Ma also doubles as the chairman of the KMT, from which he can threaten to expel any KMT legislators who vote against the pact. And yet the agreement is still tied up in the legislative process, and has been since June. 

To me, this episode demonstrates an under-appreciated fact about Taiwan's legislature--that minority parties are quite powerful. Think about this: on a bill that's the top priority of the ruling party's chairman, and with complete control over the executive branch and a comfortable majority in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT cannot get what it wants without some cooperation from the opposition!  Whether or not you think that is a good thing in this particular case, it is troubling in a broader, systematic perspective. Many observers thought Ma Ying-jeou's victory in 2008 would usher in a new period of more effective executive-legislative cooperation; that hasn't happened anywhere near as frequently as predicted. 

Viewed in this light, the attempt by Chang Ching-chung to bring the bill to the floor for the second reading looks more like normal maneuvering via arcane parliamentary procedure than an unprecedented "illegal action".  This kind of thing is common in democratic parliaments around the world; so are roll-call votes that require party members to support the party line. What's more worrying from an institutional perspective is that legislative procedures have once again broken down over a contentious issue, and that there's ambiguity about something as basic as who should be able to chair the committee reviewing the most important piece of business this legislature will face. 
     
Finally, the pact is the result of a bilateral negotiation, and the method of its review and potential approval has implications well beyond trade issues or cross-Strait relations.  Amending it would require negotiations to be reopened, which is effectively the same as killing the deal. It is for this reason American presidents have to get Fast Track Authority from the US Senate in order to conclude free trade agreements--Fast Track ensures that any deal reached in negotiations will not be filibustered and cannot be amended, only be put to an up-or-down vote. Even if one thinks most trade agreements are terrible for Taiwan, the precedent set by the legislature's insistence on line-by-line review of agreements is really problematic: no country’s negotiators will believe that Taiwan is able to commit to deals that it signs. Taiwan already has huge disadvantages in its international relations--if it wants to be taken seriously as a good-faith ally or counterpart, it needs to be able to promise that its negotiators can deliver an up-or-down vote on any agreements they strike, as President Ma has tried to argue, without much success. The continued insistence by legislators that trade agreements be subject to renegotiation after they are signed is not in Taiwan's long-term interest. 

Premier confidence.  On October 15, a formal vote of no confidence in premier Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺) failed in the legislature, with 67 of 112 legislators voting against the motion (1 seat is currently vacant).  No big surprise here at the result, as the KMT holds 65 seats.  There were no defections from the party, demonstrating the KMT's ability to enforce party discipline on critical votes despite the failed attempt to purge speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平).  In fact, Premier Jiang paid a visit to Speaker Wang shortly after the vote to thank him for his support in keeping the caucus unified.  Voting with the KMT caucus were two independents, Kao Chin Su-mei (高金素梅) and Chen Hsueh-sheng (陳雪生).    

Takin' it to the streets.  The regular protests and demonstrations to call attention to the cause du jour near the Legislative Yuan continued over the last month.  One issue getting a lot of attention: gay marriage.  On October 25, a bill  introduced by DPP legislators that would revise the Civil Code to allow same-sex marriage was referred to the Judicial Affairs Committee for review and possible first reading.  The issue has triggered competing demonstrations in downtown Taipei, including a gay pride parade on October 27 and a counter-demonstration opposing the bill on November 30.

Taiwan has a reputation as being fairly tolerant towards homosexuality, contrasting favorably with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and especially mainland China, and if the bill passes, it would make Taiwan the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage.  So the sizable turnout for the anti-gay-marriage protest has attracted a lot of international coverage, including pieces in the Economist and AFP, as well as U.S.-based advocates on both sides of the issue.  Perhaps less well-known is that Taiwan has a significant Christian community, estimated at between 4-5% of the population, that has played a disproportionately large role in Taiwan's post-war political history.  Christian evangelical churches, a newer phenomenon in Taiwan, played a central role in organizing the counter-demonstration, as this blog post details.

An old horse knows the way (老馬識途).  DPP party nomination contests continue for local mayor and county executive races, due to be held in December 2014.  The biggest to be decided so far is in New Taipei City, where former premier Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃) won the nomination after his main competition, county party chief Lo Chih-cheng, withdrew, complaining of an "unfair polling mechanism."  (The DPP has long used telephone polls as a central part of its nomination procedure, as this article by Dafydd Fell details.)  Yu is not exactly a fresh face for the DPP, having previously served as Yilan County executive, premier, and DPP chairman.  Given that New Taipei City leans slightly blue, the party probably hurt its chances here:  a younger candidate who does not carry baggage from the Chen Shui-bian era would be better positioned to attract swing voters than Yu.  

The battle over nominations is also uncovering old factional fault lines within the DPP.  Especially striking is the success of the New Tide faction (新潮流派系)--the nominees for Pingtung, Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin Counties all have ties to the faction, and another New Tide member, Tsai Chi-chang (蔡其昌), is battling for the nomination in Taichung City.  

The DPP's nomination for Taipei City has yet to be decided, but Wellington Koo (顧立雄) is drawing endorsements from many New Tide members as well.  He's going up against another "old face" in the DPP: former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮).  The best candidate the DPP could run, according to polls, is National Taiwan University physician Ko Wen-je (柯文哲). There's only one problem: Ko is not a party member, wants to remain independent, and recently called the DPP "chaotic and dangerous", while at the same time looking increasingly likely to run.  If the DPP can't persuade Ko to join the party, it will face an unpalatable choice between running a spoiler candidate and not running one at all.  The fight over the Taipei nomination has signs of being a proxy battle for the 2016 presidential nomination: current DPP chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌 ) appears to favor Koo, while 2012 nominee Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been linked to Ko.

On the KMT side, Sean Lien (連勝文) is still polling better than anyone else and looks to have the inside track on the nomination if he wants it.  His stiffest potential challenge would probably be from current New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫), who might be interested in switching seats to improve his presidential prospects.

You win this one, Mr. Wang.  The Ma-Wang dustup is settling down into something approaching detente, with Wang having survived an intra-party assault on his position initiated by President Ma, and Ma now looking to cut his losses and make up.  On Monday, the KMT's central leadership decided not to appeal the latest court decision by the Taiwan High Court upholding the injunction against expelling Speaker Wang from the party, suggesting that they held little hope of overturning the ruling at the Supreme Court.  

The courts in Taiwan have been understandably reluctant to intervene in politically charged cases in recent years, as this manuscript by Wei-tseng Chen and Chia-hsin Hsu argues.  Some speculation on my part here, but because the lower court rulings temporarily stopped Wang's expulsion, the Supreme Court would have had to overturn those decisions for the KMT action to take effect.  The path of least resistance for the Court in this instance is to sustain the injunction and allow the legal process to play out at the district court.  That appears to be what the KMT expected--hence the decision not to appeal.

So, Wang lives to fight another day, holding onto not only his party list seat but also the speakership--a remarkable turn of events given just how dire his political future looked a month ago.  The case at the district court probably won't be decided before the next legislative election, at which point Wang can run for, and probably win, a district seat in his base of Kaohsiung County.    

Hello, I must be going (皮笑肉不笑).  October 10 is the National Day of the Republic of China, or more informally, Double-Ten Day (雙十節).  This year's festivities were a bit more interesting than usual.  Since Wang Jin-pyng was director of the National Day Celebration organizing committee, tradition dictated that he and President Ma sit on the same stage together, separated only by the first lady, Chow Mei-ching (周美青).

In the end, Ma and Wang played nice for the cameras and struck conciliatory tones toward one another in their respective speeches.  Another sign of reconciliation, perhaps: both wore the same silly hats.  The shot below is tailor-made for a caption contest:  

More interesting is that the rallies are the latest manifestation of an upswing in intensity of street protests over the Ma administration's second term.  Taiwan has a long history of street protest dating back to the martial law days, but the frequency and size of demonstrations has varied considerably over the years, waxing during the gradual transition to direct election of the legislature and president in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Now, there's something of a return to earlier times in these rallies, as advocacy groups seem more willing than in the past decade to try public demonstrations as a way to bring attention to their causes and to shape the national political discourse.  

There are a couple of intriguing questions here.  One, is this apparent rise in protest real, or are the numbers and demands of street demonstrators not much different from a decade ago?  And two, if it is real, what is driving it? To what degree can this upswing be attributed to the fact that the DPP is completely shut out of power, versus a "supply-side" explanation focusing on rising grievances--housing prices, nuclear power, stagnant wages, perceived government corruption, and so forth?  I suspect that unified KMT control has shut many channels for social advocacy groups to have real influence on policy-making, although the ultimate success of these groups under the Chen Shui-bian administration was also limited (gated article).  

Unfortunately, I haven't been able to locate much in the way of recent academic work on social movements in Taiwan that speaks to these questions, or even that describes these groups in much detail.  (For instance, it would be really helpful to know more about the origins of some of the protests, such as the rather odd Citizen 1985 movement described here.)  An opportunity for some future researchers, perhaps...