- Published on
I have an article out today at the Journal of Democracy examining Taiwan's ongoing political stalemate and what I think is best described as a slow-motion constitutional crisis. The key theme: I don't put the whole blame on either the DPP or the KMT-TPP opposition, but rather on the way Taiwan's constitutional framework is designed (or rather, isn't) to handle divided government. I was surprised at how quickly partisan tensions escalated into inter-branch warfare after the 2024 elections, and I have been dismayed at how willing both camps have been to violate norms and push the limits of their institutional prerogatives to gain an advantage. But in hindsight, I probably shouldn't have been.
The fundamental reason is Taiwan is suffering from the classic "dual mandate" problem that Juan Linz first popularized in 1990 in his famous "Perils of Presidentialism" piece for the Journal of Democracy. I don't buy much of Linz's argument -- presidentialism can still be preferable to parliamentarian in some circumstances (see, e.g, Indonesia), and the comparative literature on this question now points to bad design choices within presidential regimes, rather than the presidentialism itself, as creating especially challenging conditions for democratic politics. But I do accept Linz's core contention that presidential regimes create an inherent tension between the executive and legislative branches, and the default pattern of politics is for each branch to be engaged in interminable conflict with the other as long as they are controlled by different parties.
James Madison in Federalist No. 51 famously characterized this conflict as a strength of presidential regimes, or at least separation of powers ones: in his phrase, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition." But for that ambition not to escalate into political warfare that ultimately destroys democracy, there has to be another branch sufficiently strong and independent to play referee and regulate the conflict. Put differently, a key constitutional design principle is that in presidential regimes, you need well-protected neutral arbiters—the judiciary, prosecutors, ombudsmen, state regulators, and above all the constitutional court—who can limit partisan conflict and keep it from spinning out of control.
The fragility of these independent institutions is the greatest weakness of Taiwan’s democracy today. As I write in the conclusion to the piece:
After several rounds of constitutional reform, Taiwan is now a strong presidential regime with only two institutions that really matter: the presidency and the legislature. Both are directly elected, giving both valid claim to a democratic mandate. When the same party has controlled both branches, partisan incentives have softened the inherent tensions in this design, and Taiwan’s policymaking process has functioned reasonably well without the need for other institutions to intervene. But with control now divided, interbranch conflict has emerged with a vengeance. Many of Taiwan’s policymaking processes have ground to a halt, and in seeking to limit the fallout from this partisan conflict, its accountability institutions have themselves become prime targets.
This piece, by the way, is the more developed version of a talk I gave at an event hosted by the Shih Ming-te Foundation in Taipei on September 9, which got picked up by a few media outlets in Taiwan, and then twisted a bit for partisan ends for a couple news cycles. For those looking for the full context of my comments, which have plenty of criticism of both political camps (e.g. the TPP-KMT retaliation against the Constitutional Court is appalling, and the DPP premier's refusal to countersign legislation is almost certainly unconstitutional), check out the article at the link.