- Published on
Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng and President Ma Ying-jeou, playing nice for the cameras
Although it passed mostly unnoted in the Taiwanese media, last week marked the one-year anniversary of the (failed) attempt by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to expel Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) from the KMT. It has also been about a year since I started blogging regularly on Taiwanese politics, so the Ma-Wang fight featured prominently in my first posts. At the time, I hadn’t paid much attention to intra-KMT politics or executive-legislative relations, and I quickly realized there was a lot I didn't understand. My working assumption had always been that because the KMT controlled a comfortable majority in the legislature, and President Ma was the chairman of the KMT, he could probably get most of what he wanted approved there.
The sudden attempt to purge Speaker Wang suggested that executive-legislative policy-making was more complicated, and more interesting, than I had supposed. And the slow, foot-dragging review of the Cross-Strait Services in Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (兩岸服務貿易協議) --"Fu-Mao" for short--in the legislature put the lie to the idea that President Ma could ultimately wield control over the KMT to get executive priorities passed. It eventually became clear that these two events were probably linked: that Ma's strike against Wang was motivated at least in part by his frustration with the slow pace of action on the CSSTA in the legislature.
All this happened well before a procedural dispute sparked the student protest and occupation of the legislature that became known as the Sunflower Movement. Thus, while the student protests were unexpected and dramatic, and attracted a huge amount of foreign and domestic media attention, their main political achievement so far is to have reinforced the pre-existing stalemate between the legislature and the executive. The focus on the light and heat generated by the Sunflower Movement has, I think, obscured this fact: the legislature as an institution is a formidable and powerful opponent of the executive.
The sudden attempt to purge Speaker Wang suggested that executive-legislative policy-making was more complicated, and more interesting, than I had supposed. And the slow, foot-dragging review of the Cross-Strait Services in Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (兩岸服務貿易協議) --"Fu-Mao" for short--in the legislature put the lie to the idea that President Ma could ultimately wield control over the KMT to get executive priorities passed. It eventually became clear that these two events were probably linked: that Ma's strike against Wang was motivated at least in part by his frustration with the slow pace of action on the CSSTA in the legislature.
All this happened well before a procedural dispute sparked the student protest and occupation of the legislature that became known as the Sunflower Movement. Thus, while the student protests were unexpected and dramatic, and attracted a huge amount of foreign and domestic media attention, their main political achievement so far is to have reinforced the pre-existing stalemate between the legislature and the executive. The focus on the light and heat generated by the Sunflower Movement has, I think, obscured this fact: the legislature as an institution is a formidable and powerful opponent of the executive.
Ma and Wang at the KMT party congress, September 15, 2014.
The narrative of the Ma administration is that the legislature is dysfunctional, and that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is entirely to blame for the ruling party's troubles. At the KMT's party congress this past week, for instance, President Ma criticized the DPP for its "endless" obstructionism and "abuse" of minority power.
If the main opposition party in the legislature really does have the ability to block everything it doesn't like, then that is indeed worrisome for Taiwan's democracy. But it's not as simple as that. The DPP, for all its success in harassing cabinet officials and stalling government initiatives, is not able to exercise an effective veto over legislation as long as the KMT itself is unified. Thus, I think the fundamental political problem for Ma lies not with the opposition but within the KMT itself.
If the main opposition party in the legislature really does have the ability to block everything it doesn't like, then that is indeed worrisome for Taiwan's democracy. But it's not as simple as that. The DPP, for all its success in harassing cabinet officials and stalling government initiatives, is not able to exercise an effective veto over legislation as long as the KMT itself is unified. Thus, I think the fundamental political problem for Ma lies not with the opposition but within the KMT itself.
In posts over the next few days, I'm going to elaborate on this claim, along with some thoughts on what it means for Taiwan's democracy. In particular, I think the events of the last year have demonstrated four things:
Separate posts will follow.
- The Legislative Yuan matters more than ever for policy-making.
- The KMT legislative caucus is the primary obstacle to presidential priorities--not the DPP, the Cross-Party Negotiation Committee, or Wang Jin-pyng.
- President Ma thought removing Wang Jin-pyng would solve his problems with the legislature. It won't.
- The Ma administration doesn't understand the politics of the legislature very well.
Separate posts will follow.
- Published on
For the intro post in this series, see here.
The old days of executive dominance: premier Hau Pei-tsun orders Chen Shui-bian, then a DPP legislator, back to his seat in the Legislative Yuan, Oct. 21, 1992.
For most of Taiwan's postwar history, policy-making was highly centralized in the Executive Yuan and the KMT itself. The Legislative Yuan, by contrast, was mostly a talking shop that rubber-stamped government budgets and initiatives. That began to change with democratization, but it's been a slow process. Even today, the annual budget proposal is drafted by the executive, and the legislature is prevented from adding new spending--the only way for legislators to affect this process directly is to cut funding, or freeze funds once they've been appropriated.
Nevertheless, the legislature has steadily accumulated authority at the expense of executive ministries over the last two decades. The ability of opposition party legislators to make life tough for executive branch officials became especially apparent in the later years of the Chen Shui-bian administration, when a pan-Blue (KMT-PFP) alliance held a relatively unified majority of the seats in the LY. Legislative committee inquisitions of ministers were common, key bureaus had budgets cut or frozen for transparently partisan reasons, and much of the government's proposed legislation (with key exceptions) was blocked.
At the time, the standoff between the two branches appeared due almost entirely to the intensely partisan atmosphere that prevailed from 2004-2008. Thus, when Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 election and the KMT won over 3/4 of the seats in the LY, most observers expected executive-legislative relations to become much more cordial and cooperative again. And for Ma's first term, they seemed to be improved, although even then there were complaints about LY "inefficiency" at passing high-priority legislation.
But legislative independence has reemerged with a vengeance in Ma's second term, even though the KMT remains the majority party there. What is so striking about the events of the last year and more is that even in a period of "unified" party control of both branches, the LY has prevented a quick passage of the president's top policy priority--the CSSTA--and may have killed it for good. That is not an outcome that I would have predicted in 2012, when Ma was re-elected.
From a systemic perspective, what's potentially more troubling is that the current situation is about the best a governing party in Taiwan could ever hope for: the KMT controls the presidency and a majority in the legislature, and the president is the chairman of the party. The unity of purpose across the branches should be highest in this scenario. If a president can't get his agenda approved by the legislature under these circumstances, when can he?
Nevertheless, the legislature has steadily accumulated authority at the expense of executive ministries over the last two decades. The ability of opposition party legislators to make life tough for executive branch officials became especially apparent in the later years of the Chen Shui-bian administration, when a pan-Blue (KMT-PFP) alliance held a relatively unified majority of the seats in the LY. Legislative committee inquisitions of ministers were common, key bureaus had budgets cut or frozen for transparently partisan reasons, and much of the government's proposed legislation (with key exceptions) was blocked.
At the time, the standoff between the two branches appeared due almost entirely to the intensely partisan atmosphere that prevailed from 2004-2008. Thus, when Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 election and the KMT won over 3/4 of the seats in the LY, most observers expected executive-legislative relations to become much more cordial and cooperative again. And for Ma's first term, they seemed to be improved, although even then there were complaints about LY "inefficiency" at passing high-priority legislation.
But legislative independence has reemerged with a vengeance in Ma's second term, even though the KMT remains the majority party there. What is so striking about the events of the last year and more is that even in a period of "unified" party control of both branches, the LY has prevented a quick passage of the president's top policy priority--the CSSTA--and may have killed it for good. That is not an outcome that I would have predicted in 2012, when Ma was re-elected.
From a systemic perspective, what's potentially more troubling is that the current situation is about the best a governing party in Taiwan could ever hope for: the KMT controls the presidency and a majority in the legislature, and the president is the chairman of the party. The unity of purpose across the branches should be highest in this scenario. If a president can't get his agenda approved by the legislature under these circumstances, when can he?
- Published on
On October 3, 2014, the Taiwan Democracy Project will kick off our yearly speaker series with a seminar by Scott Simon on the politics of indigenous rights in Taiwan. Prof. Simon is an anthropologist in the School of Sociological and Anthropological Studies at the University of Ottawa, where he holds the Research Chair in Taiwan Studies. His talk is entitled, "All Our Relations: Indigenous Rights Movements and the Bureaucratization of Indigeneity in Taiwan." The abstract is below. The talk is free and open to the public; you are encouraged to RSVP at the official event page here.
Prof. Simon holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from McGill University, and began his career working in the anthropology of development. His previous publications include Tanners of Taiwan: Life Strategies and National Cultures (2005) and Sweet and Sour: Life-Worlds of Taipei Women Entrepreneurs (2003). Since 2004, he has worked extensively on ethnographic research with Truku and Sediq groups in both Hualien and Nantou counties, which formed the basis for his most recent book, published in French: Sadyaq Balae!: L'Autochtonie Formosane dans Tout Ses États (2012). Today, he is one of the most prominent scholars writing on the Taiwanese state's relations with indigenous "aborigines" (原住民), who by official counts make up about two percent of the island's population.
Prof. Simon holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from McGill University, and began his career working in the anthropology of development. His previous publications include Tanners of Taiwan: Life Strategies and National Cultures (2005) and Sweet and Sour: Life-Worlds of Taipei Women Entrepreneurs (2003). Since 2004, he has worked extensively on ethnographic research with Truku and Sediq groups in both Hualien and Nantou counties, which formed the basis for his most recent book, published in French: Sadyaq Balae!: L'Autochtonie Formosane dans Tout Ses États (2012). Today, he is one of the most prominent scholars writing on the Taiwanese state's relations with indigenous "aborigines" (原住民), who by official counts make up about two percent of the island's population.
All Our Relations: Indigenous Rights Movements and the Bureaucratization of Indigeneity in Taiwan
Taiwan’s indigenous social movement, active since the 1980s, has successfully lobbied to get indigenous rights included in the Republic of China Constitution, to create a cabinet level Council of Indigenous Peoples, and to pass the 2005 Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples. Taiwan’s indigenous social activists have also become regular participants in United Nations indigenous events. Especially during the Chen Shui-bian presidency, foreign observers often suspected that the state instrumentalized “indigeneity” to claim a distinct identity from China. Events since 2008, however, demonstrate that the indigenous rights movement has maintained its own momentum and that the indigenous peoples have interests that cannot be reduced to issues of national identity or party politics. In fact, the indigenous people overwhelmingly support the KMT, and indigenous movements are involved in both “pro-unification” and “pro-independence” political networks. Most indigenous social movement leaders, as well as ordinary indigenous people, hope that their movement can make progress in indigenous rights in ways that transcend the “blue” and “green” division between Han Taiwanese. This talk will explore the diversity of the indigenous movements, their mobilization strategies, and values since Ma Ying-jeou was elected President of the ROC in 2008.
Taiwan’s indigenous social movement, active since the 1980s, has successfully lobbied to get indigenous rights included in the Republic of China Constitution, to create a cabinet level Council of Indigenous Peoples, and to pass the 2005 Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples. Taiwan’s indigenous social activists have also become regular participants in United Nations indigenous events. Especially during the Chen Shui-bian presidency, foreign observers often suspected that the state instrumentalized “indigeneity” to claim a distinct identity from China. Events since 2008, however, demonstrate that the indigenous rights movement has maintained its own momentum and that the indigenous peoples have interests that cannot be reduced to issues of national identity or party politics. In fact, the indigenous people overwhelmingly support the KMT, and indigenous movements are involved in both “pro-unification” and “pro-independence” political networks. Most indigenous social movement leaders, as well as ordinary indigenous people, hope that their movement can make progress in indigenous rights in ways that transcend the “blue” and “green” division between Han Taiwanese. This talk will explore the diversity of the indigenous movements, their mobilization strategies, and values since Ma Ying-jeou was elected President of the ROC in 2008.
- Published on
I just received a call for papers to the "World Congress of Taiwan Studies" conference, on June 16-18, 2015 in London, hosted by the Centre of Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). This is a relatively new initiative, funded in part by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a component of its support of Taiwan Studies in the UK. The first meeting was held in 2012 at Academia Sinica in Taipei. Details about the 2015 meeting are below.
I'm not sure what this means for the timing of or attendance at the other two regular Taiwan studies conferences that typically happen about the same time:
There are probably enough people working in Taiwan studies to support three different conferences in rapid succession, but it seems sub-optimal for a small field concerned about its viability to hold multiple events exclusively on Taiwan that will be in some competition with one another.
It is also not self-evident that Taiwan studies as a whole benefits from being detached from the larger disciplinary associations, which appears to be the model being promoted here. The Association for Asian Studies (AAS), for instance, used to have a strong Taiwan studies section with a highly influential newsletter (see an example here), but there's been a scant Taiwan presence there in recent years: by my count, there was one panel (out of 366) devoted to Taiwan at this year's AAS annual conference, and a total of 17 presentations (out of about 1300) with some link to Taiwan. Roughly speaking, Taiwan came up less than 2% of the time at the largest Asian Studies conference in the world. That's not much of an impact. And I doubt any non-Taiwan specialists who were at AAS will be paying attention to what happens at NATSA, EATS, or the World Congress of Taiwan Studies next summer.
There's a similar worrisome trend in Taiwan-related papers at the American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting, which is happening in Washington, DC this week. There has long been a vibrant Conference Group on Taiwan Studies at APSA, but the number of panels and papers on Taiwan has declined in recent years as well--from three guaranteed panels, CGOTS is now down to one. I don't know about other disciplines--I'd be curious what's going on at the annual meetings of history, sociology, and anthropology--but in political science and Asian Studies, Taiwan-related participation is on the decline.
I suspect these trends are due in large part to the growth of the separate Taiwan Studies conferences. Which, if you think about it, is really a self-inflicted wound. Given that Taiwan's citizens and public officials complain frequently about its official marginalization in world affairs, why actively pursue greater isolation from the disciplines in which Taiwan-related research has historically been conducted? The danger of building a separate "Taiwan Studies" field is that it will confine research on Taiwan to the margins in most of the major disciplines. And it doesn't appear that anyone promoting these conferences is thinking much about that downside.
So, might I humbly suggest that one of the panels at next year's "World Congress" on the "State of the Field" consider whether holding three separate overseas Taiwan Studies conferences in two months is really a good idea at all?
I'm not sure what this means for the timing of or attendance at the other two regular Taiwan studies conferences that typically happen about the same time:
- The European Association of Taiwan Studies annual conference was held this year from April 30-May 2 at University of Portsmouth, also in the UK;
- The North American Taiwan Studies Association annual conference was held this year from June 19-21 at the University of Wisconsin.
There are probably enough people working in Taiwan studies to support three different conferences in rapid succession, but it seems sub-optimal for a small field concerned about its viability to hold multiple events exclusively on Taiwan that will be in some competition with one another.
It is also not self-evident that Taiwan studies as a whole benefits from being detached from the larger disciplinary associations, which appears to be the model being promoted here. The Association for Asian Studies (AAS), for instance, used to have a strong Taiwan studies section with a highly influential newsletter (see an example here), but there's been a scant Taiwan presence there in recent years: by my count, there was one panel (out of 366) devoted to Taiwan at this year's AAS annual conference, and a total of 17 presentations (out of about 1300) with some link to Taiwan. Roughly speaking, Taiwan came up less than 2% of the time at the largest Asian Studies conference in the world. That's not much of an impact. And I doubt any non-Taiwan specialists who were at AAS will be paying attention to what happens at NATSA, EATS, or the World Congress of Taiwan Studies next summer.
There's a similar worrisome trend in Taiwan-related papers at the American Political Science Association (APSA) annual meeting, which is happening in Washington, DC this week. There has long been a vibrant Conference Group on Taiwan Studies at APSA, but the number of panels and papers on Taiwan has declined in recent years as well--from three guaranteed panels, CGOTS is now down to one. I don't know about other disciplines--I'd be curious what's going on at the annual meetings of history, sociology, and anthropology--but in political science and Asian Studies, Taiwan-related participation is on the decline.
I suspect these trends are due in large part to the growth of the separate Taiwan Studies conferences. Which, if you think about it, is really a self-inflicted wound. Given that Taiwan's citizens and public officials complain frequently about its official marginalization in world affairs, why actively pursue greater isolation from the disciplines in which Taiwan-related research has historically been conducted? The danger of building a separate "Taiwan Studies" field is that it will confine research on Taiwan to the margins in most of the major disciplines. And it doesn't appear that anyone promoting these conferences is thinking much about that downside.
So, might I humbly suggest that one of the panels at next year's "World Congress" on the "State of the Field" consider whether holding three separate overseas Taiwan Studies conferences in two months is really a good idea at all?
The Second World Congress of Taiwan Studies will be held at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) June 16-18, 2015. The Congress is being co-organized by Academia Sinica and the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies.
The main themes for the Congress are the State of the Field in Taiwan Studies and Taiwan Studies Revisited. We are particularly seeking papers that critically assess the existing field of research in a variety of disciplines. In addition, we will have a series of papers in which authors revisit their most important work in the light of recent developments and research findings. We will have a total 19 panels that address prominent topics in the field of Taiwan Studies and also a number of practical panels that look at themes such as institution building, publishing and teaching.
We have completed the initial round of invitations and now would like to invite abstracts on the following topics:
1. State of the field on Taiwan’s political communication research
2. State of the field of research on Taiwan film (not documentaries).
3. State of the field of research on Internet Politics in Taiwan
4. State of the field on gender politics in Taiwan
5. State of the field on migration research in Taiwan
6. State of the field on research on 21st century Taiwan literature
7. Assessment of Taiwan’s economic challenges after ECFA
Abstract deadline: October 1, 2014
Abstracts should be submitted to: twstudy@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Abstracts should be no more than 600 words long.
We will announce the accepted abstracts on November 15 2014.
The organizers will cover the costs of participants’ accommodation for three nights in London but not travel costs.
The main themes for the Congress are the State of the Field in Taiwan Studies and Taiwan Studies Revisited. We are particularly seeking papers that critically assess the existing field of research in a variety of disciplines. In addition, we will have a series of papers in which authors revisit their most important work in the light of recent developments and research findings. We will have a total 19 panels that address prominent topics in the field of Taiwan Studies and also a number of practical panels that look at themes such as institution building, publishing and teaching.
We have completed the initial round of invitations and now would like to invite abstracts on the following topics:
1. State of the field on Taiwan’s political communication research
2. State of the field of research on Taiwan film (not documentaries).
3. State of the field of research on Internet Politics in Taiwan
4. State of the field on gender politics in Taiwan
5. State of the field on migration research in Taiwan
6. State of the field on research on 21st century Taiwan literature
7. Assessment of Taiwan’s economic challenges after ECFA
Abstract deadline: October 1, 2014
Abstracts should be submitted to: twstudy@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Abstracts should be no more than 600 words long.
We will announce the accepted abstracts on November 15 2014.
The organizers will cover the costs of participants’ accommodation for three nights in London but not travel costs.
- Published on
One of the nice things about studying Taiwan is that it has a top-notch statistical bureau, with lots of high-quality economic data made readily available to the public, if you know how to access it. These data are really an underutilized resource in scholarship on Taiwan, which often cites cursory or incomplete statistics reported in the media that can give a misleading impression of the overall state of the economy (for an example, see this Taipei Times write-up of unemployment trends.)
As a way to keep track of some of these data, I thought I'd post a couple figures I made a while back for a talk, along with the sources. I'd encourage anyone who's interested and can read some Chinese to explore them further at the ROC National Statistics homepage, here.
As a way to keep track of some of these data, I thought I'd post a couple figures I made a while back for a talk, along with the sources. I'd encourage anyone who's interested and can read some Chinese to explore them further at the ROC National Statistics homepage, here.
Source data: ROC Statistical Bureau.
First, in the figure above I've broken out unemployment level by age cohort, focusing on the two key "youth cohorts" (I've left out the 16-19 category, which can be misleading given that many people are not actively looking for work at this age). It's striking how much higher youth unemployment is than overall unemployment, which by international standards is quite low at about 4%. By contrast, unemployment in the 20-24 year age cohort is more than triple that, at near 13%. Equally interesting, and easier to miss, is that the gap between the young cohorts and the rest has also increased over the last 14 years: that difference was a factor of two in 2000, but a factor of over three in 2014. This figure gives us some sense of why the forceful opposition to the cross-Strait Services in Trade Agreement (CSSTA) included so many students: they've done proportionately worse over the last decade and more, even as the total labor unemployment rate has returned to a level near what it was a decade ago.
Source data: World Bank and ROC Statistical Yearbook.
Second, the figures above show GDP change in several economies to which Taiwan's is often compared. The presentation is a little messier than I'd like, but one can still get a good sense of how Taiwan's economy has performed in relative terms over the last 30 years.
What's especially striking to me is the recent comparison with South Korea. The narrative of the Ma campaign in 2008 was that Taiwan's economy had drastically underperformed and was losing ground. By contrast, the data above show that, at least using GDP growth rates, Taiwan's growth was higher than Korea's for five consecutive years, from 2003-2007. (The economic shock that hit all of East Asia in 2008-09 originated in the United States, so it's hardly fair to blame either Chen Shui-bian or Ma Ying-jeou for the deep recession that followed.) But that generally positive story about the Chen years (2000-2008) gets turned into this (from the KMT's party website):
What's especially striking to me is the recent comparison with South Korea. The narrative of the Ma campaign in 2008 was that Taiwan's economy had drastically underperformed and was losing ground. By contrast, the data above show that, at least using GDP growth rates, Taiwan's growth was higher than Korea's for five consecutive years, from 2003-2007. (The economic shock that hit all of East Asia in 2008-09 originated in the United States, so it's hardly fair to blame either Chen Shui-bian or Ma Ying-jeou for the deep recession that followed.) But that generally positive story about the Chen years (2000-2008) gets turned into this (from the KMT's party website):
That is, the KMT is attempting to lump the entire eight years of the DPP presidency together, in which the gap between Taiwan and South Korea narrowed, and contrast them with the increasing rates of the subsequent Ma administration. At best, that's an incomplete picture, as the data in the first two tables demonstrate. While the gap narrowed, it did so during Chen's first term, not his second. And the increase in the Taiwan-Korea gap during the Ma years is due entirely to a giant spike in 2010, when Taiwan's economy rebounded much faster from the recession than did Korea's.
One other point: this is a pretty rudimentary comparison. Average per-capita income growth can also be misleading, in that rapid income growth among a small elite can move the whole average up. (In fact, that is what appears to have happened: as this article notes, average wages for salaried workers are about the same as they were in 1998, adjusted for inflation.) It would be nice to see median salary, and even better, a comparison of income inequality and its cousin, wealth inequality, measured various ways over time.
The first of these, income inequality, is shown in the figures below.
One other point: this is a pretty rudimentary comparison. Average per-capita income growth can also be misleading, in that rapid income growth among a small elite can move the whole average up. (In fact, that is what appears to have happened: as this article notes, average wages for salaried workers are about the same as they were in 1998, adjusted for inflation.) It would be nice to see median salary, and even better, a comparison of income inequality and its cousin, wealth inequality, measured various ways over time.
The first of these, income inequality, is shown in the figures below.
ROC Statistical Bureau source data
ROC Statistical Bureau source data
The last two figures show income inequality measured two different ways: as a Gini coefficient, and as a ratio of the top 1/5 to bottom 1/5 of all households. The pattern in both graphs is similar: Taiwan's income inequality was on a pretty steady upward trajectory from 1980 until 2000, then it leveled off. (The spikes are during the recessions of 2001 and 2008-9, when unemployment jumped, driving income inequality higher during these periods.)
This picture is surprising given the narrative in the media about rapidly increasing inequality in Taiwan--so surprising I'm not entirely sure what's going on here. I suspect using income instead of wealth is painting a much better picture of inequality than actually exists on the ground. For one, capital gains and real estate gains are not treated like ordinary income for tax purposes in Taiwan--if a household's wealth gains come mostly from these sources, then they are potentially classified as low-income! For another, the use of quintiles in the comparison above, rather than five percent margins (as reported in this article), or even something smaller like comparing gains to the top 1% or top 0.1%, would probably paint a starker contrast. At any rate, worth investigating further, given how prominent this issue is becoming in public discourse in Taiwan. Grist for a future post...
This picture is surprising given the narrative in the media about rapidly increasing inequality in Taiwan--so surprising I'm not entirely sure what's going on here. I suspect using income instead of wealth is painting a much better picture of inequality than actually exists on the ground. For one, capital gains and real estate gains are not treated like ordinary income for tax purposes in Taiwan--if a household's wealth gains come mostly from these sources, then they are potentially classified as low-income! For another, the use of quintiles in the comparison above, rather than five percent margins (as reported in this article), or even something smaller like comparing gains to the top 1% or top 0.1%, would probably paint a starker contrast. At any rate, worth investigating further, given how prominent this issue is becoming in public discourse in Taiwan. Grist for a future post...
- Published on
Worth checking out if you are in Taiwan over the next two months: on August 11, the 2014 Asian Barometer Conference (conference website not yet available) at National Taiwan University; and on September 15-17, the 2014 International Conference on Formosan Indigenous Peoples: Contemporary Perspectives, at Academia Sincia (conference website here.) The Taiwan Democracy Project and CDDRL are co-sponsoring the first. I will post more info here as it becomes available. Descriptions below.
Democracy in a Divided Society: East Asia in Comparative Perspective
An Asian Barometer Workshop
Organized by Program for East Asia Democratic Studies, IAS-NTU
Co-Sponsored by the Asian Democracy Research Network and
Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
Taipei, Taiwan, August 10-12, 2014
This workshop seeks to examine the functioning of democracy in divided societies by bringing together leading scholars from Asia and the United States. In particular, the workshop will focus on the politics of polarization: how it erodes or cripples young democracies in Asia and how we might mitigate its damaging effects. The on-going political crisis in Thailand and Taiwan timely reminds us how fragile young democracies can become when the push comes to shove. Most East Asian young and emerging democracies suffer from politics of polarization to some extent, including Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In a broader context, this problem has become epidemic as riot police trying to ward off angry demonstrators in Ukraine and Turkey. While the focus is on East Asia, our colleagues from the United States will help us to cast the regional experiences in comparative perspective. Some of our paper contributors will use data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS Wave III) as this cross-national data base provides rich source for individual-country investigation and for region-wide comparative analysis. Other contributors might employ historical, institutional, cultural or structural approaches to tackle the issue. We encourage innovative ways to combine survey data with macro-level factors, such as institutional design, culture, ethnicity, religion and class structure. We hope to evoke synthesis about the impact social division on the functioning of democracy and identify the institutional designs and compensating measures to moderate the tension. All country studies are encouraged to address some institutional arrangements, electoral institution or government structure, and other socioeconomic measures which could moderate or exacerbate the conflicts.
An Asian Barometer Workshop
Organized by Program for East Asia Democratic Studies, IAS-NTU
Co-Sponsored by the Asian Democracy Research Network and
Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
Taipei, Taiwan, August 10-12, 2014
This workshop seeks to examine the functioning of democracy in divided societies by bringing together leading scholars from Asia and the United States. In particular, the workshop will focus on the politics of polarization: how it erodes or cripples young democracies in Asia and how we might mitigate its damaging effects. The on-going political crisis in Thailand and Taiwan timely reminds us how fragile young democracies can become when the push comes to shove. Most East Asian young and emerging democracies suffer from politics of polarization to some extent, including Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In a broader context, this problem has become epidemic as riot police trying to ward off angry demonstrators in Ukraine and Turkey. While the focus is on East Asia, our colleagues from the United States will help us to cast the regional experiences in comparative perspective. Some of our paper contributors will use data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS Wave III) as this cross-national data base provides rich source for individual-country investigation and for region-wide comparative analysis. Other contributors might employ historical, institutional, cultural or structural approaches to tackle the issue. We encourage innovative ways to combine survey data with macro-level factors, such as institutional design, culture, ethnicity, religion and class structure. We hope to evoke synthesis about the impact social division on the functioning of democracy and identify the institutional designs and compensating measures to moderate the tension. All country studies are encouraged to address some institutional arrangements, electoral institution or government structure, and other socioeconomic measures which could moderate or exacerbate the conflicts.
2014 International Conference on Formosan Indigenous Peoples: A Contemporary Perspective
Organized by:
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica;
ROC Council of Indigenous Peoples;
Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines;
And co-sponsored by:
Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London;
European Association of Taiwan Studies
This year marks the 15 years since we had the First International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples in 1999. Taiwanese indigenous peoples have encountered dramatic socio-cultural and environmental changes in recent years, including the rectification of indigenous people’s names that have created new tribes for indigenous peoples, the passage of indigenous people’s basic rights in the legislation, the increase of natural calamities that threaten their living environments, and so on and so forth. All these developments require new research and discussions. The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, with funding support from the Council of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, will cooperate again to hold the Second International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples from September 15 through 17, 2014, at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
Organized by:
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica;
ROC Council of Indigenous Peoples;
Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines;
And co-sponsored by:
Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London;
European Association of Taiwan Studies
This year marks the 15 years since we had the First International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples in 1999. Taiwanese indigenous peoples have encountered dramatic socio-cultural and environmental changes in recent years, including the rectification of indigenous people’s names that have created new tribes for indigenous peoples, the passage of indigenous people’s basic rights in the legislation, the increase of natural calamities that threaten their living environments, and so on and so forth. All these developments require new research and discussions. The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, with funding support from the Council of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, will cooperate again to hold the Second International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples from September 15 through 17, 2014, at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Published on
On Wednesday, May 7, 4:30-6:30pm in Green Library at Stanford, Dr. Lant Prichett of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University will deliver the Hsieh Memorial Lecture. Like the Liang Memorial Address given at Stanford last week, this annual lecture honors a former governor of the Central Bank of Taiwan, Dr. Sam-chung Hsieh (謝森中), who held that position from 1989-1994. The official event page can be found here. The abstract for Dr. Prichett's talk is below.
The Varieties of the 'Deals Capitalism' Experience: The Past and Future of Asian Growth.
Economic prosperity has come to be associated with good institutions--open markets, electoral democracy, capable bureaucracies. However, it is hard to take that narrative to East Asia where either historically (e.g. Korea in the 1960s) and today (e.g. China, Vietnam) the successful episodes hardly fit the model of open markets supported by "rule of law." Pritchett emphasizes the notion of "deals capitalism" in which proprietor rights grounded in person and organization specific deals dominate neutrally enforced rules of property rights.
Economic prosperity has come to be associated with good institutions--open markets, electoral democracy, capable bureaucracies. However, it is hard to take that narrative to East Asia where either historically (e.g. Korea in the 1960s) and today (e.g. China, Vietnam) the successful episodes hardly fit the model of open markets supported by "rule of law." Pritchett emphasizes the notion of "deals capitalism" in which proprietor rights grounded in person and organization specific deals dominate neutrally enforced rules of property rights.
- Published on
In keeping with this blog's mission of highlighting Taiwan-related events on campus:
The Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) has established a Memorial Award and Lecture Series to celebrate the life and accomplishments of Dr. Kuo-Shu Liang, who was Governor of the Central Bank of Taiwan, 1994 – 95. [The official announcement has these years wrong; Dr. Liang was vice governor of the Central Bank from 1975-1979, not governor.]
The third bi-annual event will take place at Stanford on Monday, April 28, 2014, 4:30-6:00pm. Dr. Jianhai Lin, Secretary of the Fund and the International Monetary and Financial Committee, will be the invited recipient of the Kuo-Shu Liang Award and will deliver the Kuo-Shu Liang Memorial address, entitled "Global Economic Landscape and Challenges." The event page is here.
Jianhai Lin is the Secretary of the Fund and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. He oversees the Secretary's Department that has operational responsibility for the 24-member Executive Board, and serves as the official contact point of the IMF's 188 member countries on institutional matters, including work of the Board of Governors. The Secretary's Department also organizes Spring and Annual Meetings, and is the creator and custodian of the IMF's official record.
A Chinese native, Mr. Lin was appointed to his current position in March 2012. He previously served in senior positions in the Secretary's, Finance, Policy Development and Review, and Asian and Pacific Departments. During his IMF career, he has worked across a wide range of country, policy, and administrative issues.
Mr. Lin studied at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, China, and the University of California at Berkeley, and earned his doctorate from the George Washington University. Before joining the Fund, he worked in the financial sector and academia.
The Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) has established a Memorial Award and Lecture Series to celebrate the life and accomplishments of Dr. Kuo-Shu Liang, who was Governor of the Central Bank of Taiwan, 1994 – 95. [The official announcement has these years wrong; Dr. Liang was vice governor of the Central Bank from 1975-1979, not governor.]
The third bi-annual event will take place at Stanford on Monday, April 28, 2014, 4:30-6:00pm. Dr. Jianhai Lin, Secretary of the Fund and the International Monetary and Financial Committee, will be the invited recipient of the Kuo-Shu Liang Award and will deliver the Kuo-Shu Liang Memorial address, entitled "Global Economic Landscape and Challenges." The event page is here.
Jianhai Lin is the Secretary of the Fund and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. He oversees the Secretary's Department that has operational responsibility for the 24-member Executive Board, and serves as the official contact point of the IMF's 188 member countries on institutional matters, including work of the Board of Governors. The Secretary's Department also organizes Spring and Annual Meetings, and is the creator and custodian of the IMF's official record.
A Chinese native, Mr. Lin was appointed to his current position in March 2012. He previously served in senior positions in the Secretary's, Finance, Policy Development and Review, and Asian and Pacific Departments. During his IMF career, he has worked across a wide range of country, policy, and administrative issues.
Mr. Lin studied at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, China, and the University of California at Berkeley, and earned his doctorate from the George Washington University. Before joining the Fund, he worked in the financial sector and academia.
- Published on
As an alternative to the way cross-Strait policy has been dealt with (or rather, not dealt with) in Taiwan over the last year, I've been thinking a lot about how similar foreign policy or trade controversies have historically been resolved in other democracies. One example I like a lot comes from the former West Germany.
Ostpolitik: Procedural Legitimacy, German Style
In 1969, West Germany had been a democracy for less than 20 years*. In a situation with some striking parallels** to Taiwan's current one, the newly-elected Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt pushed for a policy of engagement rather than confrontation with the communist East Germany and its Soviet patron. Under this so-called Ostpolitik, or "eastern policy," Brandt signed a series of treaties renouncing the use of force, recognizing post-war European borders, establishing diplomatic recognition of Warsaw Pact states in eastern Europe, and culminating in a peace treaty, the Basic Treaty, with East Germany itself in 1972.
Ostpolitik was hugely controversial in German political life. Brandt was the first non-conservative to hold the chancellorship in the post-war era, and his sharp change in policy was fiercely opposed by the former ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). After the Basic Treaty was signed in early 1972, several MPs from Brandt's coalition partner the FDP defected to the opposition, and it looked like Ostpolitik might be stalled or reversed.
But in a crucial showdown in April 1972, the CDU fell two votes short*** of winning a no-confidence vote to replace Brandt's government with a conservative coalition. Seven months later, Brandt's coalition was re-elected in federal elections, and the treaty was then approved by the German parliament. By winning both a no-confidence vote and an election after the Basic Treaty was signed, Brandt endowed his policies toward Eastern Europe with a great deal of democratic legitimacy despite the controversy. Most impressively, when the CDU eventually returned to power in 1982, it retained Ostpolitik, which by that point was supported by all the major political parties.
Ostpolitik: Procedural Legitimacy, German Style
In 1969, West Germany had been a democracy for less than 20 years*. In a situation with some striking parallels** to Taiwan's current one, the newly-elected Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt pushed for a policy of engagement rather than confrontation with the communist East Germany and its Soviet patron. Under this so-called Ostpolitik, or "eastern policy," Brandt signed a series of treaties renouncing the use of force, recognizing post-war European borders, establishing diplomatic recognition of Warsaw Pact states in eastern Europe, and culminating in a peace treaty, the Basic Treaty, with East Germany itself in 1972.
Ostpolitik was hugely controversial in German political life. Brandt was the first non-conservative to hold the chancellorship in the post-war era, and his sharp change in policy was fiercely opposed by the former ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). After the Basic Treaty was signed in early 1972, several MPs from Brandt's coalition partner the FDP defected to the opposition, and it looked like Ostpolitik might be stalled or reversed.
But in a crucial showdown in April 1972, the CDU fell two votes short*** of winning a no-confidence vote to replace Brandt's government with a conservative coalition. Seven months later, Brandt's coalition was re-elected in federal elections, and the treaty was then approved by the German parliament. By winning both a no-confidence vote and an election after the Basic Treaty was signed, Brandt endowed his policies toward Eastern Europe with a great deal of democratic legitimacy despite the controversy. Most impressively, when the CDU eventually returned to power in 1982, it retained Ostpolitik, which by that point was supported by all the major political parties.
Why a German-Style Solution Isn't Available in Today's Taiwan
It’s instructive to consider all the ways Taiwan’s current institutions prevent a kind of “German solution” to the CSSTA controversy. There are four big ones:
1. Ostpolitik Agreements were Treaties. The Basic Treaty signed by the Brandt government with East Germany was beset by ambiguity about the official status of the East German state: West Germany had claimed since partition to represent the entire German nation and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of an independent East Germany (sound familiar?). Brandt’s linguistic work-around was to assert that two states existed “in Germany,” but that they could not regard one another as foreign countries. Nevertheless, when the Basic Treaty was signed, everyone agreed that it required parliamentary approval to take effect--like the Treaty of Moscow and Treaty of Warsaw before it.
Unlike in the Taiwan case, the West German procedure for approving the Basic Law remained the same as for approving agreements with other foreign powers: an up-or-down vote in both houses of parliament. In Taiwan, however, it's not clear whether the CSSTA even requires a vote in the Legislative Yuan, even though trade agreements with other countries do.
2. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (I): Executive Actions depend on Parliamentary Confidence. As head of government in a parliamentary regime, Brandt’s actions implicitly depended on the continued support of a majority in the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament. Ostpolitik, and especially the Basic Treaty, were controversial enough that Brandt nearly lost this majority. Had the opposition CDU managed to win the no-confidence vote, Brandt would have been replaced by a new conservative coalition, and the Basic Treaty would likely have been modified or withdrawn.
In contrast to the Taiwan case, there was an obvious institutional way to settle the conflict over Brandt’s policy: hold a vote in parliament. Brandt’s victory in that vote confirmed he still had the minimum support needed to advance the treaty. In Taiwan, the legislature has a formal no-confidence power, but it's much weaker: it can be used only against the premier, not the president; it gives the president the right in turn to dissolve the legislature, so most LY members don't want to use it lest they have to face the voters in early elections; and it can only be used once every 12 months.
Moreover, in a move that looks rather stupid in hindsight, the DPP brought a no-confidence measure against premier Jiang Yi-huah last October, which, given the KMT's majority, predictably failed badly. So even if enough members of the LY were willing to risk early elections to bring down the premier and his cabinet, that option is closed off for the next six months.
3. Proportional Electoral Systems Make Coalition Governments Likely. Since the founding of the FDR, Germany has almost always had stable coalition governments. A key reason is the German electoral system, the so-called mixed-member compensatory system. Under the German system, all parties which win over five percent of the party vote get a proportional share of seats in the lower house. Thus, for much of Germany’s postwar history, a small centrist party, the FDP, held the balance of power in the Bundestag. Brandt relied on FDP support to stay in office; the vice chancellor and foreign minister under Brandt was the head of the FDP, Walter Scheel. When FDP members opposed to the Basic Treaty started defecting, the Brandt coalition was in trouble.
In contrast, Taiwan’s 2005 electoral reform created a much more majoritarian electoral system: the KMT’s current majority in the Legislative Yuan is due in part to a highly disproportional conversion of votes into seats. As a consequence, there is no coalition partner on which the KMT depends to get bills passed in the legislature, and no direct way for non-KMT parties to ensure they are included in the cabinet.*^
4. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (II): Early Elections. Fourth, despite winning the no-confidence motion, Brandt was still in a precarious political position. He had lost several members of his coalition, and it soon became clear that he no longer held a working majority in the Bundestag. So, he called early elections: in November 1972, seven months after the no-confidence vote, German voters got to weigh in on the Brandt government and, by association, Ostpolitik. The result of the polls left little doubt that Brandt had the support of a popular majority: both the SDP and FDP gains seats at the expense of the CDU. Brandt had for all intents received a popular mandate to continue with Ostpolitik.
Again, the contrast with Taiwan is stark. There is no requirement that the Ma administration face the voters again before implementing the CSSTA. Nor can Ma call early elections even if he wanted to; that would require a no-confidence vote to pass the legislature, which, as I noted above, isn't even a constitutional option until October 2014. In short, there's no easy way to have the voters weigh in directly on the current controversy or the Ma administration's performance until the 2016 general election--two years away. The consequence is that the CSSTA controversy is likely to remain unresolved, exacerbating political gridlock in Taiwan until at least 2016. It's hard to see that as a good outcome for Taiwan's democracy.
It’s instructive to consider all the ways Taiwan’s current institutions prevent a kind of “German solution” to the CSSTA controversy. There are four big ones:
1. Ostpolitik Agreements were Treaties. The Basic Treaty signed by the Brandt government with East Germany was beset by ambiguity about the official status of the East German state: West Germany had claimed since partition to represent the entire German nation and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of an independent East Germany (sound familiar?). Brandt’s linguistic work-around was to assert that two states existed “in Germany,” but that they could not regard one another as foreign countries. Nevertheless, when the Basic Treaty was signed, everyone agreed that it required parliamentary approval to take effect--like the Treaty of Moscow and Treaty of Warsaw before it.
Unlike in the Taiwan case, the West German procedure for approving the Basic Law remained the same as for approving agreements with other foreign powers: an up-or-down vote in both houses of parliament. In Taiwan, however, it's not clear whether the CSSTA even requires a vote in the Legislative Yuan, even though trade agreements with other countries do.
2. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (I): Executive Actions depend on Parliamentary Confidence. As head of government in a parliamentary regime, Brandt’s actions implicitly depended on the continued support of a majority in the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament. Ostpolitik, and especially the Basic Treaty, were controversial enough that Brandt nearly lost this majority. Had the opposition CDU managed to win the no-confidence vote, Brandt would have been replaced by a new conservative coalition, and the Basic Treaty would likely have been modified or withdrawn.
In contrast to the Taiwan case, there was an obvious institutional way to settle the conflict over Brandt’s policy: hold a vote in parliament. Brandt’s victory in that vote confirmed he still had the minimum support needed to advance the treaty. In Taiwan, the legislature has a formal no-confidence power, but it's much weaker: it can be used only against the premier, not the president; it gives the president the right in turn to dissolve the legislature, so most LY members don't want to use it lest they have to face the voters in early elections; and it can only be used once every 12 months.
Moreover, in a move that looks rather stupid in hindsight, the DPP brought a no-confidence measure against premier Jiang Yi-huah last October, which, given the KMT's majority, predictably failed badly. So even if enough members of the LY were willing to risk early elections to bring down the premier and his cabinet, that option is closed off for the next six months.
3. Proportional Electoral Systems Make Coalition Governments Likely. Since the founding of the FDR, Germany has almost always had stable coalition governments. A key reason is the German electoral system, the so-called mixed-member compensatory system. Under the German system, all parties which win over five percent of the party vote get a proportional share of seats in the lower house. Thus, for much of Germany’s postwar history, a small centrist party, the FDP, held the balance of power in the Bundestag. Brandt relied on FDP support to stay in office; the vice chancellor and foreign minister under Brandt was the head of the FDP, Walter Scheel. When FDP members opposed to the Basic Treaty started defecting, the Brandt coalition was in trouble.
In contrast, Taiwan’s 2005 electoral reform created a much more majoritarian electoral system: the KMT’s current majority in the Legislative Yuan is due in part to a highly disproportional conversion of votes into seats. As a consequence, there is no coalition partner on which the KMT depends to get bills passed in the legislature, and no direct way for non-KMT parties to ensure they are included in the cabinet.*^
4. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (II): Early Elections. Fourth, despite winning the no-confidence motion, Brandt was still in a precarious political position. He had lost several members of his coalition, and it soon became clear that he no longer held a working majority in the Bundestag. So, he called early elections: in November 1972, seven months after the no-confidence vote, German voters got to weigh in on the Brandt government and, by association, Ostpolitik. The result of the polls left little doubt that Brandt had the support of a popular majority: both the SDP and FDP gains seats at the expense of the CDU. Brandt had for all intents received a popular mandate to continue with Ostpolitik.
Again, the contrast with Taiwan is stark. There is no requirement that the Ma administration face the voters again before implementing the CSSTA. Nor can Ma call early elections even if he wanted to; that would require a no-confidence vote to pass the legislature, which, as I noted above, isn't even a constitutional option until October 2014. In short, there's no easy way to have the voters weigh in directly on the current controversy or the Ma administration's performance until the 2016 general election--two years away. The consequence is that the CSSTA controversy is likely to remain unresolved, exacerbating political gridlock in Taiwan until at least 2016. It's hard to see that as a good outcome for Taiwan's democracy.
* It might not be obvious at first glance, but this is roughly the same age as Taiwan's democracy today: the first elected postwar government in Germany took office in September 1949, and Taiwan has had a fully elected legislature since 1992 and a popularly elected president since 1996.
** I should emphasize I do not mean to draw any lessons from this example about how cross-Strait rapprochement should proceed. I highlight this case only because of the admirable way in which a highly divisive foreign policy issue was resolved domestically to West Germany's long-term benefit, not because I think Taiwan-PRC relations should be handled in the same way.
*** The CDU lost the vote when two of its own members unexpectedly failed to support the party's motion. After the unification of Germany in 1990, East German secret files revealed that both MPs were paid by the East German secret service to vote against the motion.
*^ In practice, the Cross-Party Negotiation Committee (政黨協商) in the Legislative Yuan gives minority parties the ability to slow or block legislation; it does not, however, give them any say in, or claim to, Executive Yuan cabinet positions, as a real cross-party coalition would in a pure parliamentary regime.
** I should emphasize I do not mean to draw any lessons from this example about how cross-Strait rapprochement should proceed. I highlight this case only because of the admirable way in which a highly divisive foreign policy issue was resolved domestically to West Germany's long-term benefit, not because I think Taiwan-PRC relations should be handled in the same way.
*** The CDU lost the vote when two of its own members unexpectedly failed to support the party's motion. After the unification of Germany in 1990, East German secret files revealed that both MPs were paid by the East German secret service to vote against the motion.
*^ In practice, the Cross-Party Negotiation Committee (政黨協商) in the Legislative Yuan gives minority parties the ability to slow or block legislation; it does not, however, give them any say in, or claim to, Executive Yuan cabinet positions, as a real cross-party coalition would in a pure parliamentary regime.
- Published on
The Stanford Night Market, an annual tradition going back over a decade, is being held this evening, 6:30-9 pm on the Stanford campus at White Plaza. It's hosted by the Taiwanese Cultural Society at Stanford. Check it out if you're around! Details can be found at the event webpage.