The Hoover Institution's Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region held a public session on Resilient Realists: How Taiwan Navigates Its Future in a Turbulent World on March 2, 2026 from 1:00-2:30 PM PT.

Event Theme
Since the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rapidly intensified, and the global order has faced growing strains. Through it all, Taiwan has remained remarkably resilient. In the face of relentless diplomatic, economic, and military pressure from Beijing, Taiwan’s leaders have leveraged the island’s critical role in global technology supply chains, its reputation as a robust liberal democracy, and its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific to deepen engagement with key world powers. As many Americans question core assumptions of the post-Cold War global order, the PRC’s military power continues to grow, and the world stands on the cusp of a technological revolution in artificial intelligence, can Taiwan continue to navigate so deftly through turbulent geopolitical waters?
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To address these topics, the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region at the Hoover Institution held a fireside chat featuring Dr. Hung-mao Tien, President of the Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) in Taipei and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Dr. Tien joined in conversation by Adm. (Ret.) James O. Ellis, the Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, and Dr. Larry Diamond, the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.  

The Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region held a Panel Discussion on Partners in Need?: Tracking Europe-Taiwan Relations amidst Global Disruption on Friday, February 27, 2026 from 12:00-1:30 p.m. PT in the Annenberg Conference Room, George P. Shultz Building. 

The Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region held a Panel Discussion on Partners in Need?: Tracking Europe-Taiwan Relations amidst Global Disruption on Friday, February 27, 2026 from 12:00-1:30 p.m. PT in the Annenberg Conference Room, George P. Shultz Building. 

Since 2020, ties between Taiwan and Europe have seen a sharp uptick, both with the European Union and with individual states. Europe’s approach to Taiwan has shifted from relative marginality toward greater strategic relevance. Growing parliamentary engagement, expanding economic and technological cooperation, and more frequent political exchanges reflect a broader reassessment of Europe’s external partnerships. Rather than a single policy turn, this shift results from incremental adjustments across EU institutions and individual states, driven by changing assessments of risks and benefits associated with engagement with Taiwan.
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To explore these developments, the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific held a discussion between Matej Šimalčík, the Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, and Gabrielius Landsbergis, a visiting fellow at Stanford. Mr. Šimalčík is the co-author of a new report exploring the patterns of relations between Taiwan and the states of Europe. Mr. Landsbergis was the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania and oversaw the opening of a a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. The People’s Republic of China reacted to this step by demanding that Lithuania close or at least rename the office, and Beijing imposed a full boycott of Lithuanian products. This economic retaliation violated EU rules and ultimately provoked pushback from Brussels, in a dispute that continues today.  

On January 27, 4:30-6:00pm the Center for East Asian Studies and the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region at the Hoover Institution are cosponsoring a talk by Anna Beth Keim about her new book, Heaven Does Not Block All Roads: A History of Taiwan through the Life of Huang Chin-tao. 

The talk will be held in Lathrop Library Room 224, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305.

This event is free and open to the public. Please RSVP here.  Copies of the book will be available for sale at the Stanford Book Store on the day of the event.  Grab a copy and bring it to the talk to get the book signed. ​

The Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region at the Hoover Institution held The International Dimensions of China’s Lawfare against Taiwan on Friday, November 14, 2025 from 12 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. PT in the Herbert Hoover Memorial Building, Room 160.
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For several years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has ramped up its pressure on international organizations and on third countries to endorse its preferred position on the legal status of Taiwan. This campaign has born fruit for Beijing: it has made significant gains in the number of countries now signing joint statements that accept the “one China principle” – that there is only one China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that the legal representative of China is the PRC with its capital in Beijing and led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These shifts in policy have been made possible in part by the PRC’s growing economic and diplomatic clout in the world, and by its increased willingness to make the one-China principle a precondition for bilateral cooperation on other issues.

To explore this issue further, this symposium brought together several experts on the topic of People’s Republic of China (PRC) coercion against Taiwan, including its efforts to deepen Taiwan’s international isolation, bolster the claim that cross-Strait relations are China’s “internal affairs,” and build international legal justifications to legitimate further coercion and potentially the use of military force against Taiwan. 

About the Speakers

Ja Ian Chong is an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident scholar at Carnegie China, Carnegie’s East Asia-based research center on contemporary China, where he examines U.S.-China dynamics in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific. He received his PhD from Princeton University in 2008 and previously taught at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research covers the intersection of international and domestic politics, with a focus on the externalities of major power competition, nationalism, regional order, security, contentious politics, and state formation. He also works on U.S.-China relations, security and order in Northeast and Southeast Asia, cross-strait relations, and Taiwan’s politics.

Elisa Zhai Autry is a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, where she contributes to the Human Security Project, advancing security, liberty, and prosperity in authoritarian countries. Previously, Dr. Autry served as principal policy advisor on Global China and East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the US Department of State. As the bureau’s China expert and chief liaison for diplomatic affairs involving China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, she played a key role in shaping public diplomacy strategies and advancing US foreign policy objectives worldwide.
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Glenn Tiffert is a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a historian of modern China. He co-chairs Hoover’s program on the US, China, and the World, and also leads Stanford’s participation in the National Science Foundation’s SECURE program, a $67 million effort authorized by the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 to enhance the security and integrity of the US research enterprise.

The Hoover Institution's Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, and Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) held a dinner and screening of A Chip Odyssey on Wednesday, November 5, 2025 from 5:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. PT at the Hoover Institution's Hauck Auditorium, along with a question and answer session with the producer and director of the film. 

FILM SUMMARY
In 2019, director Hsiao Chu-Chen was deeply moved by stories shared at the memorial of semiconductor pioneer Hu Ding-Hwa—accounts of engineers who, driven by a sense of national mission, journeyed overseas to acquire the crucial knowledge that ignited Taiwan’s chip industry. Their spirit of sacrifice and collective resolve not only laid the foundation for Taiwan’s semiconductor revolution, but also marked a pivotal chapter in the island’s struggle for survival and global relevance. 

Directed by award-winning Hsiao Chu-Chen and produced by semiconductor veteran Ben Chen and acclaimed Oscar member Ben Tsiang, this five-year project draws on insights from voices across generations—from early contributors to today’s professionals in the semiconductor industry. A Chip Odyssey traces Taiwan’s journey from humble beginnings to its emergence as a critical pillar of the digital world. Through the eyes of pioneering engineers, female line technicians, frontline policymakers, visionary scientists, and a new generation now facing critical choices, the film reveals how, half a century ago, an entire island came together in a high-stakes gamble to shape its own destiny—and the future of global technology.

​Though Taiwan accounts for less than 0.02% of the world’s landmass, it has become an indispensable force in the era of AI and advanced chipmaking. As the invisible engines of modern life, chips produced in Taiwan now power everything from smart devices to strategic defense, placing the island at the center of the global technology race. A Chip Odyssey is not only a chronicle of technological ascent; it is a powerful testament to the spirit of a small island that poured its heart and soul into survival, innovation, and global relevance. As tensions rise and the semiconductor race intensifies, the film reminds us that behind every chip lies a human story—and behind every breakthrough, a cross-generational gamble.

DISCUSSION AND Q&A FEATURING
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Hsiao Chu-chen, Director
Hsiao Chu-Chen is a senior documentary filmmaker and drama producer, currently serving as a professor at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan. She is a two-time winner of the Golden Horse Award for Best Documentary, with The Red Leaf Legend (1999) and Grandma’s Hairpin (2000), both of which were also selected by the International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam (IDFA), the Busan International Film Festival, and the Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival. 

Ben Chen, Producer
Ben Chen is a semiconductor veteran, prominent business leader, and active cultural executive. He serves as the Executive Director of MOXA Inc., Chairman of the Grand View Cultural and Art Foundation, and Founder and CEO of Grand Vision Co. Ltd. 

Ben Tsiang, Producer
Ben Tsiang is a serial entrepreneur and acclaimed film producer. In 1996, he co-founded Sina.com, one of the largest Chinese internet media companies in the world. A decade later, he cofounded CNEX, a leading platform for Chinese documentary filmmaking, where he serves as chairman. 

Karen Eggleston, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Karen Eggleston is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University and Director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a Fellow with the Center for Innovation in Global Health at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Her research focuses on government and market roles in the health sector and Asia health policy, especially in China, India, Japan, and Korea; healthcare productivity; and the economics of the demographic transition.

Larry Diamond, William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is the founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and has written extensively on democratic development worldwide. At Hoover, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Program on the US, China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

The Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region at the Hoover Institution hosted Contested Taiwan: Sovereignty, Social Movements, and Party Formations, a book talk with the author Lev Nachman of National Taiwan University, on Monday, October 20, 2025, from 4:00-5:30 PM PT at Herbert Hoover Memorial Building, Room 160.

ABSTRACT
Despite maintaining de facto sovereignty, states like Taiwan find themselves unrecognized in today’s international system because another power claims the state as part of its territory. This fraught status, in turn, significantly affects the domestic politics of these places.Contested Taiwan explores Taiwan’s political landscape after the 2014 Sunflower Movement and brings a fresh perspective to understanding social movement mobilization and political party formation in “contested states.” In these states, political cleavages are defined not by traditional left-right issues but by questions of identity, territory, and what to do about the country that claims them. Drawing from 150 interviews with Taiwanese activists and politicians, as well as a comparative analysis of Ukraine, Nachman reveals that traditional political science theories fall short when explaining the formation of movement parties in such contexts. Instead, he argues that looming existential threats and strained relationships between activists and established pro-independence parties drive social movements into formal political arenas.

Taiwan studies has grown a lot as a field in the last 10 years. I was just at the American Political Science Association annual conference after a couple years of skipping it, and I was astounded at the large number of panels on Taiwan topics and the robust turnout from Taiwan at the event. That's in no small part due to the efforts of the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS), which has grown rapidly over that time period. When I was coordinating it 10 years ago, we had only two dedicated panels. At the 2025 conference, there were 18! 

Another additional sign of growth is in the number of young people with policy interests now developing expertise in Taiwan issues. About six years ago, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco proposed a program to fill a gap in the talent pipeline on Taiwan. That program, the U.S.-Taiwan Next Generation Working Group, provides some training for young to mid-career scholars in the United States with Taiwan expertise. I was fortunate to be part of the first cohort (right before and during COVID, which presented its own unique challenges), and I benefited greatly from the trips to DC and to Taiwan, and the training for media exposure and public-facing writing that the program organizes. The program is now on its third iteration and is expanding to include Europeans as well.

Applications are now open at the program's website at IEAS at Berkeley. Requirements to apply are: 

• Be either (1), an American citizen or U.S. permanent resident; or (2), a citizen or permanent resident from a European country, including the United Kingdom.
• Hold a faculty, research, or administrative position at a U.S. or Europe based institution of higher education OR have equivalent experience as a mid-career specialist in the private or public sector.

Full details on the program and how to apply can be found here. The deadline to apply is November 1, 2025. I have reposted the formal call for applications below. 

The Fulbright Taiwan program is still accepting applications until September 15. Their applicant pool is down from past years, and the Taipei office has sent out a special appeal to potential applicants. I repost that call below.

I have a new commentary out today at the Brookings Institution's U.S.-Taiwan Quarterly Analysis series on the aftermath of Taiwan's recall elections and what it means for the next 2 1/2 years of politics. I didn't get this observation into the piece, so let me just say here that in 25 years of watching Taiwan elections, the complete defeat of the recall votes is one of the most surprising outcomes I can remember -- perhaps second only to Han Kuo-yu's stunning win in Kaohsiung in 2018. I was way off in my predictions about the recall outcomes, as were most of the other analysts I followed. It's a good reminder that Taiwan voters are a fickle bunch, and to approach our analyses with a healthy dose of humility.

Anyway, the opening paragraphs are below: 

For the last 18 months, Taiwan politics has been out of equilibrium. The sweeping defeat last month of the attempt to remove 24 Kuomintang (KMT) legislators in a “great recall” demonstrated at least one incontrovertible truth: divided government is not going away. Taiwan’s political combatants now have an opportunity for a political reset. Let us hope that they seize it.

Political Uncertainty Drives Partisan Conflict
Taiwan’s previous elections in January 2024 delivered an ambiguous verdict. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) retained control of the executive branch but lost its majority in the legislature, while its primary opposition, the KMT, won a plurality of 52 seats (plus two allied independents) to the DPP’s 51. Far from indicating a strong mandate from the voters, however, the KMT’s victory rested on close wins in marginal constituencies and significant electoral malapportionment: across all districts, the party’s candidates won only 40% of the vote to the DPP’s 45%. Complicating matters further, for the first time in Taiwan’s democratic history, the balance of power was captured by a centrist party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), founded by former Taipei mayor and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je. This unprecedented situation injected additional uncertainty into Taiwan politics and contributed to the rapid escalation of partisan conflict over President Lai Ching-te’s first year in office.

​For the rest, see the Brookings website. 

Also, a side note: in putting this piece together, I was struck by how much good English-language coverage there is now on Taiwan politics. So much so, in fact, that I wasn't initially sure I had anything original to say after so many others got there first.

So here I just want to give a shout-out to the growing roster of outlets and people doing good work on Taiwan politics, including: 

• Journal of Democracy, which published an online exclusive by Raymond Kuo which I found especially thought-provoking. 
• The Diplomat has had a lot of good coverage of the recalls featuring a variety of perspectives. 
• Jamestown China Brief on the recalls and the stakes for the KMT. 
• GTI Brief -- including some great work by Ben Levine. 
• Taiwan Insight, which had a whole special issue on the recalls. 
• FPRI -- especially pieces by Brendan Flynn and Joshua Freedman. 
• Financial Times has regular original stories on Taiwan issues, thanks to Kathrin Hille's dogged reporting. 
• Bloomberg, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal now all have reporters based locally doing good work. 
• Foreign Affairs even published something on domestic issues in Taiwan for once, even if they did give it a troll-y title as is their habit. Excellent work Lev and Wei-Ting for surviving the FA editorial process! 

And on top of that, we've got Taiwan-based outlets that have expanded and deepened coverage too, including: 

• Taipei Times, which now has not one but two regular columns, by Michael Turton and Courtney Donovan Smith. 
• The inimitable Frozen Garlic blog by Nathan Batto.
• New Bloom and the extremely prolific Brian Hioe, who apparently never sleeps. 
• Domino Theory. 
• Commonwealth Magazine. 

And too many others to list...

I can remember back in the Ma Ying-jeou era when English-language coverage was maybe a tenth of what it is now, and quite a bit shallower. I was going through old notes of that period recently and they reminded me of the parlous state of commentary on, for instance, the Sunflower Movement. So I find myself marveling now at the richness and diversity of English-language writing on Taiwan. I know I learn a lot from you all, so...thanks, and keep up the good work.   

I'm very late with this, but here's my attempt to make sense of the mass recall elections happening tomorrow in Taiwan. In all, there are 24 KMT legislators facing joint recall elections on July 26, and another seven on August 23. Taiwan's recall rules have a double-passage requirement: (1) at least 25 percent of eligible voters must vote yes, and (2) yes votes must be greater than no votes. This requirement was changed in 2016 by the DPP majority with support from the NPP (and current TPP leader Huang Kuo-chang), which lowered the threshold from a 50% turnout requirement.  

According to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, public officials cannot face a recall attempt until at least one year into their term. Since the current legislators were seated on February 1, 2024, the clock didn't start ticking on the recall campaign until February 1 of this year. But the threat of a recall of legislators was brewing much earlier, as early as June 2024 with the "Bluebird Movement" rally against the legislature's attempt to exercise more power over the executive branch. In response to this rally, KMT members started talking publicly about raising the recall threshold to something closer to where it was before; one proposal was that the "yes" votes must exceed the votes the representative received in the previous election, which would have made the current mass recall strategy all but impossible. One of the puzzles of this legislative term is why the KMT never actually followed through on this proposal, which would have saved them the trouble of defending all their legislators right now.

I have my own thoughts about that here -- I think the TPP probably blocked this change. But for this post I want to consider what would have to happen for the LY to flip control to the DPP, and how likely they are to do that. 

The DPP currently sits at 51 seats, and it needs to be at 57 for a majority. The simplest way for the party to reassume control is to recall KMT legislators and win the following by-elections in at least six districts. That would give the DPP the majority for the rest of the LY term. 

The second, temporary way is to succeed in recalling at least 12 KMT legislators; they're required to leave as soon as the votes are certified. So if any recalls pass, there will be a reduced number of legislators in the LY until the by-elections are held. If at least 12 are recalled, the total of KMT+TPP+2 blue independent seats will temporarily fall to 50 or less, handing the majority to the DPP for up to 60 days before by-elections are held and new legislators seated.

It is quite possible the recalls fall short of the 12 needed to shift control to the DPP immediately, but more than the 6 that could flip control if the DPP wins all the by-elections. That then sets up a hotly contested set of races in 30-60 days for the by-elections, and leaves the KMT+TPP temporarily still able to control the majority, but facing down up to another two months of uncertainty about their majority. 

Why are the recalls happening now? This has been an option since 2016, and recall elections have been held against three pan-green legislators in the past, so why is the recall mechanism only being employed as a mass campaign tactic now? To my mind, the most compelling answer is a series of strategic mistakes by the KMT over the last 18 months.

First, the 2024 election results did not deliver a decisive win for the KMT in the legislature. The headline number was the party winning 52 seats (plus two allied independents) to the DPP's 51. But if we look under the hood, the party actually came in 2nd in the party list vote, with 34.6% to the DPP's 36.2%, and in the constituencies, the KMT's vote share was five points behind the DPP's: 45.1% to 40.0%. It is only thanks to the disproportionality built into the electoral system that the KMT ended up with a plurality of LY seats at all. 

Second, this plurality was built on narrow wins in several marginal constituencies. Here's the list of 13 KMT legislators who were elected with less than 50% of the vote: 

• Taipei 4. Lee Yen-Hsiu. 47.6%. TSP won 11% here to split the pan-green vote.
• Taipei 8. Lai Shih-bao. 47.5%. TPP candidate won 15.4%. 
• New Taipei 7. Yeh Yuan-chih: 46.1%. Obasang Party candidate won 9% here.
• New Taipei 8. Chang Chih-lun. 42.7%. TPP candidate won 20% here. 
• Taoyuan 1. Niu Hsu-ting. 48.44%.
• Taoyuan 2. Tu Chuan-Chi. 48.2%. Tu beat the DPP candidate by ~1000 votes. 
• Taoyuan 6. Chiu Jo-hua. 40.93%. Three-way race with independent and TPP candidate, no DPP challenger.
• Keelung City. Lin Pei-yang. 43.6%.
• Hsinchu County 2. Lin Si-ming. 44.52%. NPP and DPP candidates split the rest. 
• Hsinchu City. Cheng Cheng-chien. 35.2-31.9% for the DPP candidate. A TPP candidate won most of the rest. 
• Nantou 2. Yu Hao. 49.8-47.3% over the DPP candidate. 
• Yunlin 1. Ting Hsueh-chung. 47.8-46.1% over DPP incumbent Su Chih-fen. Margin of about 3000 votes. 
• Taitung. Huang Chien-pin. 34.8-31.6% over DPP challenger. Former DPP legislator Liu Chao-hao won most of the rest. 

And here's a couple other seats that flipped to the KMT but were close races and are potentially vulnerable to a reversal:

• New Taipei 12. Liao Hsien-hsiang. 50.8-45.0% over DPP incumbent Lai Pin-yu. 
• Taichung 4. Liao Wei-hsiung. 50.0-47.4% over the DPP's Chang Liao Wan-chien.  
• Taichung 5. Huang Chien-hao. 51.55%.
• Taichung 6. Luo Ting-wei. 52.1%. 

By my quick and dirty count, that's already 17 legislators who should have entered this term pretty worried about the next election -- and by extension, about the recall happening tomorrow.

Given how shaky the KMT's plurality win in the 2024 election was, I've been surprised that these legislators in marginal districts have not been a more powerful moderating influence on the party caucus over the last 18 months. In particular, it was not helpful to their re-election prospects for the KMT caucus to immediately make Fu Kun-chi and Han Kuo-yu the faces of the party in the legislature: both are deeply polarizing figures widely reviled by the pan-green camp. Fu Kun-chi served a prison term for insider stock trading, then got out, got back into the legislature, and then in 2024 was made caucus chair. Han Kuo-yu was the KMT's presidential candidate in 2020, when he got crushed by Tsai Ing-wen, and then recalled a few months later as Kaohsiung mayor. One of the key purposes of party leaders is to protect vulnerable legislators, and the KMT has not done a great job of that.  

Third, as everyone knows now, the KMT's control of the LY depends crucially on the support of the TPP. I have gradually come to suspect that the TPP's collaboration with the KMT hasn't been as consistent or as sincere (rather than tactical) as a lot of DPP supporters are making it out to be. The TPP has publicly opposed the recall elections, but they haven't been willing to play institutional hardball on recalls in the same way they have with the constitutional court and oversight laws. I think some TPP members would be secretly fine if a few KMT legislators lost their recall campaigns. 

What this adds up to is a legislative majority built on sand. It was always a risky political strategy for the KMT party caucus to be so aggressive in confronting the Lai administration. And if they lose their plurality tomorrow, here's why. 

​There are three big moments in the last 18 months that really galvanized this recall movement. The first was the decision to insist on the legislative oversight bill as the top priority of the KMT and TPP, and to pass this package as soon as President Lai had taken office. Some of the changes included in these amendments were reasonable, and the DPP had even advocated for in the past; other parts (especially the requirement that the President give a state of the union address and take questions from legislators) was obviously unconstitutional. So the pan-blue opposition really decided to be aggressive right from the beginning, and they had to know that this would end up challenged by the Lai administration and its fate determined by the Constitutional Court.  

But then in October, when much of this package was indeed ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, both the KMT and TPP immediately sought to retaliate for the decision and voted down all of President Lai's nominees, leaving the court without its full complement. They then piled on and changed the Court Act to require a 2/3 quorum to meet, and the votes of at least 9 justices in favor of invalidating a law. That decision dramatically raised the stakes of the power struggle with the executive branch, and it led to a sense of a budding constitutional crisis. 

​Now, to be fair, there is a big problem with the court's appointment system: members are appointed for 8-year terms, non-renewable, and so the court is now filled entirely with Tsai Ing-wen appointees! It's easy to argue that it's a partisan court given that design. And with its decision to invalidate much of the oversight legislation, there was no reserve of goodwill from KMT-TPP to give Lai's court nominees the benefit of the doubt. 

But the KMT also sought to attack the court for a previous decision that narrowed the scope of the death penalty, which was a deeply cynical political calculation. It's worth pointing out that the Constitutional Court's ruling was based in part on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the KMT majority itself ratified and adopted as Taiwan law in 2009. Here's what Article 6, Clause 2 of the ICCPR says: 

The court didn't have much choice in this case if it was following the letter of the law. And yet the KMT then decided to accuse the court of overriding the will of the Taiwan people, because the death penalty remains popular in Taiwan. That may have been politically advantageous, but it was both hypocritical and morally repugnant.  

​The third ​big moment came in December, when the LY took a hatchet to the Lai administration's budget proposal. Again, the opposition's political strategy here in hindsight does not look great: they took aim at lots of budget items without much forewarning or justification, and they managed to tick off a lot of constituents reliant on that funding who they didn't need to make mad. It was quite clear at the time that both the KMT and TPP were simply looking for things to cut to make life hard for the central government. 

They also made a critical messaging mistake: they also cut items in the budget for the Ministry of National Defense. Yes, they targeted the indigenous submarine program, which the KMT has been critical of (for good reason) for a long time. And yes, the overall amount frozen and cut was not a large share of the MND's overall budget. But the optics were terrible -- when you're trying for the next six months to explain to foreign interlocutors that you're not "anti-defense" or "pro-China," just anti-DPP, you've already lost the narrative battle.   

Since the rules were changed in 2016, seven recall elections have made it to the actual voting stage. Here's what happened in each one. 

Huang Kuo-chang (NPP) in New Taipei 12. 16 December 2017.
Yes: 48,693
No: 21,748
Turnout: 27.75%
Yes threshold: 63,888​
Result: Recall failed. Yes votes came in 15k below threshold, although yes beat no. 

Han Kuo-yu (KMT) as Kaohsiung Mayor. 6 June 2020.
Yes: 939,090
No: 30,169
Turnout: 42.14%.
Yes threshold: 574,996 votes. 
Result: Recall passed. Yes votes came in almost 400k votes above threshold. KMT side mostly boycotted this vote. The DPP's Chen Chi-mai easily won the by-election. 

Wang Hao-yu (DPP) as city councilor in Taoyuan (SNTV district). 16 January 2021. 
Yes: 84,582 
No: 7,128
Turnout: 28.14%
Threshold: 81,940
Result: Wang recalled. 

Huang Jie as city councilor in Kaohsiung (SNTV district). 6 February 2021.
Yes: 55,261
No: 65,391 
Turnout: 41.54% 
Threshold: 72,892
Result: Huang survives easily, yeses fall 17k short, and no beats yes.
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Freddy Lim (Ind, formerly NPP) in Taipei 9. 9 January 2021.  
Yes: 54,813
No: 43,340
Turnout: 41.93%
Threshold: 58,756
Result: recall fails by about 4000 votes. 

Chen Bo-wei (TSP) in Taichung 2. 23 October 2021.  
Yes: 77,899
No: 73,433
Turnout: 51.72%
Threshold: 73,744
Result: passed by about 4000 votes, Chen removed. But DPP candidate Lin Ching-yi won the by-election, 52-47%. 
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Hsieh Kuo-liang (KMT) as Mayor of Keelung. 12 October 2024.
Yes: 69,934
No: 86,014
Turnout: 50.44%
Threshold: 77,700
Result: recall fails -- yes falls about 8k votes short, and no beats yes by 16k 

What I take away from these seven races:
 
Meeting the turnout threshold is still hard. Both Huang and Lim survived because the opposition couldn't drive enough "yes" voters to the polls. Chen Po-wei and Wang Hao-yu both lost but even in those cases the "yes" votes were barely above the required threshold. The only "yes" vote that was a blowout was Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung -- and he's arguably a special case since he was by that point a national figure and his polarizing campaign for president had ended just six months before. 

Partisan green-on-blue still matters. When turnout was high-ish, it was because the recall triggered dueling mobilization of DPP and KMT partisans. That saved Huang Jie (in green Kaohsiung) and Hsieh Kuo-liang (in blue-ish Keelung). If the generic partisan tendency of the electorate leans against the KMT, the incumbents should be worried. If it doesn't -- as is true in several of the highest-profile cases in the current round of recalls (e.g. Fun Kun-chi, Wang Hung-wei, and Hung Meng-kai) -- then they're probably able to survive if they can turn out their base.

Winning the by-election is no sure thing either. After Chen Po-wei got recalled, the DPP still picked up the seat in a bit of an upset against Yen Kuan-heng. I haven't shown it here, but by-elections have generally had very different turnout and dynamics than general elections, and it's not certain that a recall removal will lead to a change of that seat. So we need to be cautious about how we interpret the results tomorrow if more than 6 KMT legislators go down to defeat -- it's no guarantee the DPP is headed for a majority. 

I'm not going to attempt to forecast what will happen in these recall elections -- this is an unprecedented situation, and I don't have a good feel for three critical variables:

1. Will there be differential turnout among DPP vs KMT partisans?
2. What will TPP voters do? 
3. Will anyone else show up to vote? 

The answers to these three questions will determine how this mass recall election goes. On each question:

Differential Turnout: If the DPP turns out their base en masse, they're probably going to be able to win a couple recalls in the marginal districts (I'm looking at the seats in New Taipei and Taoyuan especially). If there's differential turnout, then maybe a couple KMT legislators in bluer districts go down in surprise defeats, too -- think Taipei 3 or Hsinchu County. 

One very crude way to estimate possible outcomes is to start with the data above, from the Election Study Center at NCCU. They updated their regular partisan trends estimate just last month. The last data point in the figure above shows the DPP outpacing the combined KMT and TPP partisanship: 31.6 to 29.5%.

Now imagine -- again, this is very crude -- that both sides mobilize their bases and in a best-case scenario get all of those partisan identifiers out to the polls to vote for their respective sides: pro-recall for DPP, anti-recall for KMT. 

In that case, the KMT has to worry. There's enough DPP partisans to push the yes vote over the threshold in some of these districts all by themselves. So the KMT has to mobilize to try to win the actual vote, and can't count on low turnout saving them. Also, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence of asymmetric enthusiasm here: DPP supporters have been fired up to vote for a year or more, and it feels existential to some of them. My sense is KMT supporters, less so. 

On TPP Supporters: So that then leaves the TPP voters. If TPP identifiers buy the party's messaging that this is an illegitimate power grab by the DPP and Lai, and also turn out en masse, then that will probably be enough to keep successful recalls below six. But I'm not confident of that at all -- TPP voters (and I suspect some members of the TPP caucus) wouldn't mind seeing a few KMT legislators go down and open up some LY seats as potential targets for the TPP. 

On Non-Partisans: I know the partisans are fired up about this election. But my prior is that those irregular voters who turn out in general elections but not in local or irregular elections -- anywhere from 10-25% of the electorate, judging by previous turnout rates -- are probably going to sit this one out. For the DPP's wildest dreams of a massive wipeout of KMT legislators to come true, they probably need turnout from irregular voters, too -- the cases above where an incumbent survived solely because the yes votes didn't meet the threshold look like a cautionary tale to me.

Bottom Line: I think it's going to be hard for the DPP to flip control of the LY via the recall. Just about everything has to break their way tomorrow, and in the following two months, to pull that off. For intellectual honesty's sake, I think this is the most likely outcome...

More than six but less than 12 KMT legislators get recalled tomorrow. 

More than zero but less than six of those seats then flip to the DPP in by-elections. 

​And...Taiwan is basically back where it's been for the last 18 months, with a (possibly chastened, or possibly unrepentant) KMT + TPP majority in the LY still facing off against a (possibly newly conciliatory, or possibly defiant) DPP executive branch.