The full article is available via Project Muse, and access is free through August 15, 2020.

If Tsai Ing-wen is superstitious, she should be worried: second term presidents in Taiwan appear to be cursed. Much like President Tsai, her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou started his second term on a confident and triumphant note. But over the next four years, he faced a relentless series of political crises, including an intraparty power struggle with Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, massive protests against the death of a military conscript and construction of a nuclear power plant, and of course the Sunflower Movement occupation of the legislature, which effectively halted cross-Strait rapprochement with Beijing. President Ma’s approval ratings bottomed out at record lows, and he stepped down in 2016 on the heels of a sweeping electoral defeat of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), ultimately having accomplished little in his last years in office.

Somehow, Chen Shui-bian’s second term was even worse. The controversy around his re-election victory in 2004 robbed him of whatever political momentum he might have enjoyed, and he spent most of his remaining tenure fending off vicious partisan attacks, anti-corruption accusations in the press, massive street rallies by his opponents, and impeachment attempts in the legislature. In his attempt to keep core pro-independence supporters on his side, President Chen pursued a brash symbolic agenda that deliberately provoked the pan-Blue opposition, infuriated Beijing, alienated even potential allies in Washington, and left him politically isolated. In the 2008 elections, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) paid a steep electoral price, and after his term was finally over, Chen ended up in handcuffs: the corruption accusations turned out to be true, and he was sentenced to a long prison term.

The rest of this piece continues at Taiwan Insight.

8:00 AM – 9:30 AM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Reunderstanding Cross-Strait Relations: The Status Quo? The One-China Policy? 
Chair: Robert Sutter, George Washington University 
Discussants: Scott Kastner, the University of Maryland and Kuen-Da Lin, Georgia Institute of Technology 

• "A Neo U.S. One-China Policy? Content Analyzing Obama’s and Trump’s Positions," Dean Chen, Ramapo College of New Jersey; Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas 
• "The Polarization of Cross-Strait Relations since 2016: the Status Quo at Stake," S. Philip Hsu, National Taiwan University 
• "The One China Policy and the International Status of Taiwan," Mikulas Fabry, Georgia Institute of Technology 
• "Nationalism, Alliances, and Geopolitics: US-China-Taiwan Ties under Trump and Xi," Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Adelphi University 

10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: New Theories and New Evidence: Studies of Turnout and Election in Taiwan 
Chair: Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas 
Discussants: Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky University and Nick Lin, Academia Sinica 

• "Declining Voter Turnout in Taiwan: A Generational Effect?," T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University 
  
• "Reverse Coattails Effects and Electoral Fortune in Taiwan’s Local Elections," Kuan-chen Lee, Academia Sinica Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas 
  
• "Critical Citizens or Electoral Losers? A Panel Study of 2018 Taiwan’s Election," Hsin-hao Huang, National Taiwan Normal University 
  
• "The Impact of Polling Primaries on Electoral Performance," Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University 

12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Public Opinion Research in Taiwan: Old Topics and New Angles 
Chair: Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University 
Discussants: Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University and Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University 

• "Democratic Deficit in Taiwan? A Longitudinal Study of Corruption Perception," Chilik Yu, Shih Hsin University 
  
• "Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: from Ma Ying-jou to Tsai Ing-wen," T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University; Su-Feng Cheng, National Chengchi University 
  
• " 'Return' of Chinese Identity? Exploring Some Recent Developments," Shiau-chi Shen, Soochow University 
  
• "Public Support for the Use of Force in Weak States," Kuan-Sheng Wu, Purdue University; Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University; Austin Horng-En Wang, Duke University 

2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Legislative Politics and Emerging Social Issues in Taiwan 
Chair: David An, Catholic University of America/Global Taiwan Institute 
Discussants: Wei-ting Yen, Franklin and Marshall College and Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University

• "Election Cycle and Roll Call Requests: Identifying the Target Audience," Weihao Huang, Academia Sinica Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, London School of Economics and Political Science 
  
• "Electoral Rules, Party Discipline, and Parliamentary Questions in Taiwan," Nick Lin, Academia Sinica; Jinhyeok Jang, National Sun Yat-sen University 
  
• "Unpacking LGBT Acceptance in Taiwan: What Explains Taiwan’s Public Support?" Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky; University Isabel Eliassen, Western Kentucky University 
  
• "Court as Political Evasion: The Case of Interpretation No. 748 in Taiwan," Yu-Hsien Sung, University of South Carolina; Chin-shou Wang, National Cheng Kung University 

4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Panel Title: Social Media, Big Data Analysis, and Electoral Politics in Taiwan 
Chair: Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University 
Discussants: Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University and T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University 

• "How Connective Populism Was Made Online--A Case Study of the Han Tide in 2018," Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University; Frank Liu, National Sun Yat-Sen University 
  
• "Social Media and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Taiwan," Chia-hung Tsai, National Chengchi University; Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University 
  
• "The Effect of Social Media on Vote Choice: The Case of Taiwan," Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University; Chi Huang, National Chengchi University 
  
• "The Interaction between Politician and Netizens in Facebook: A Big Data Approach," Yu-Wei Hu, Chinese culture University; Jung Chun Chang, SOAS, University of London 

6:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Friday, August 30. 2019 (Washington Hilton, Fairchild East) 
Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) Business Meeting 

1. Can the DPP Hold on in the Special Municipalities? 
Uh, no. This result was just about the worst of all plausible outcomes for the DPP given the state of the race in the last week. Going in I thought it more likely than not that Lin Chia-lung would come up short in Taichung, but losing 57-43% is on the low end of what was possible. I also expected the DPP's traditional partisan advantage in Kaohsiung to carry Chen Chi-mai through despite the Han Kuo-yu hype, so Han's 54%-45% margin of victory is just incredible. Losing both those races alone probably sealed Tsai Ing-wen's fate as party chairwoman, but then the DPP also lost winnable races in Chiayi City, Taitung, Changhua, and Yunlin, and only won with 38% in Tainan (!!); given the magnitude of the defeat I don't see how she could have stayed on. President Tsai is, indeed, now facing a much more precarious path to reelection in 2020.

2. Can the KMT Finally Get Its Act Together Again? 
Close enough. This was, undoubtedly, a great night for the party and a vindication of sorts for chairman Wu Den-yi. The KMT's candidates won in Chiayi City, Hsinchu County, Taitung County, and Kinmen  despite the presence of renegade pan-blue candidates, and it pulled off convincing wins in the special municipalities of New Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung. On the down side, in Taipei, Ting Shou-chung didn't do any better against Ko Wen-je than Lien Sheng-wen did in 2014, and he fell just short of winning a three-way race, continuing the KMT's rather surprising recent weakness in the capital city. So Ko will remain in the spotlight and can potentially complicate any KMT challenge for the presidency in 2020 if he decides to run. Also, the jockeying for the KMT's presidential nomination in 2020 just got more complicated: in addition to Wu, Han Kuo-yu's rapid ascent has thrust him into the conversation, and Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, and even former President Ma Ying-jeou kept high profiles during the closing days of the campaign. With Tsai and the DPP looking more vulnerable than most observers expected they would, the value of heading the KMT ticket in 2020 just jumped.

3. How Many Councilor Seats Can Third Parties Win? 
Not many. The one small party to have some success in the local council races was the New Power Party (NPP), which won 16 seats around the island and has established itself more firmly than ever as the third party in the party system, after the DPP and KMT. But it fell short of the 20 it was aiming for, and it will still hold less than two percent of all council seats. The other old small parties fared quite a bit worse and appear to be in terminal decline: the PFP managed to win eight seats, the TSU five, and the New Party only two. The much bigger story was the resilience of the KMT in local races: it reversed a long decline in local councils and picked up eight seats this cycle. It will now form a majority in nine councils, including Kaohsiung. Rather than a realignment or breakup of the party system, this election suggests that the DPP-KMT duopoly remains entrenched. Much like in 2014 and 2016, when public opinion swings against the ruling party, the primary opposition rather than third party candidates is the main beneficiary.

4. What Happens if a Referendum Actually Passes? 
We're about to find out: seven did, including the two anti-LGBT measures that directly conflict with the Council of Grand Justices ruling in 2017. The only one that will take direct effect is the elimination of the nuclear phase-out amendment to the Electricity Act passed by the DPP in 2016, because it overturns an existing law. All the others will require additional action by the executive or legislature, and it's not clear what will happen if the government doesn't act.

5. Can Taiwan's Election Management System Hold Up under Pressure? 
Barely. Despite similar turnout to 2014, there were long lines to vote in many precincts--unusual for Taiwan. The inclusion of 10 referendums really put the Central Election Commission under strain: it had to decide which referendum questions were legal to put on the ballot, to verify signatures, to design procedures for 18-19 year olds to vote (but only for referendums!), and to count an unprecedentedly large number of ballots.   
   

​Cross-posted from the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies website

The Conference Group on Taiwan Studies is a Related Group of the American Political Science Association. For this year's annual conference in Boston, CGOTS is sponsoring three special panels on Taiwanese politics. In addition, we encourage all APSA attendees to drop by the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies reception, Thursday, August 30, from 7:30-9:00pm in Marriott Salon K. Free (!!!) drinks and hors d'oeuvres will be served.   

All CGOTS members are also invited to attend our annual business meeting, to be held right before the reception from 6:30-7:30, next door in Marriott Salon J. We'll go over budget and membership numbers and nominate the new CGOTS leadership team. 

Please also check out the three official CGOTS panels, as well as other Taiwan-related presentations at the conference; details and a schedule can be found at the CGOTS website. 

Abstract
Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy is a record of a thirty-year research project that Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu began in 1987.  A distinguished sociologist and university administrator in Taiwan, Kao and his research team (which included Prof. Hamilton during his frequent visits to Taiwan) interviewed over 800 owners and managers of Taiwanese firms in Taiwan, China, and Vietnam.  Some were re-interviewed over ten times during this period.  The length of this project allows them a vantage point to challenge the conventional interpretations of Asian industrialization and to present a new interpretation of the global economy that features an enduring alliance between, on the one hand, American and European retailers and merchandisers and, on the other hand, Asian contract manufacturers, with Taiwanese industrialists becoming the most prominent contract manufacturers in the past forty years.

Bio
Gary G. Hamilton is a Professor Emeritus of International Studies and Sociology at the University of Washington.  He specializes in historical/comparative sociology, economic sociology, with a special emphasis on Asian societies. He is an author of numerous articles and books, including most recently Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths, Economic Organization and International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan (with Robert Feenstra) (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Commerce and Capitalism in Chinese Societies (London: Routledge, 2006), The Market Makers: How Retailers Are Changing the Global Economy (co-editor and contributor, Oxford University Press, 2011; paperback 2012), and Making Money: How Taiwanese Industrialists Embraced the Global Economy (with Kao Cheng-shu, Stanford University Press, 2018).

What I question is Wong's implicit assumption that China will inevitably continue on an upward trajectory over the next several decades. It's true that the relative power of the United States is declining ("fading" is a bit strong, but we'll leave that aside for now), as it has been since its early post-Cold War peak. It's also true that the "liberal hegemony" of the current global order, and especially the capacity, and willingness, of the United States to maintain it, is under considerable short-term threat right now.

But it is not obvious to me that China is especially well-positioned to benefit from these trends, because it's not self-evident that its current economic expansion will continue much longer, or that Chinese leaders will be able to adapt very effectively to the challenges looming on the horizon. The Chinese economy has grown quickly over the last 35 years, but despite many assertions that China's growth record is unprecedented, it is not--over a similar time interval, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and before them Japan registered equally impressive growth, with a much more equal distribution of gains, to boot. And those earlier "economic miracles" followed a broadly similar pattern--a greater role for market forces, increasing connectivity to the global economy, export-oriented development, high savings rates, broad investment in education and infrastructure, but a continued privileged role for an activist state. 

Here's the kicker: in all of those cases, the economy inevitably slowed down, and at the same time their  "demographic dividends" also ended. The transition to a different growth model has been wrenching, and it's not clear that Japan, or South Korea, or Taiwan or Singapore has hit on the right balance of reforms--in particular, improved corporate governance, strengthened rule of law, and banking reforms--that would improve their long-term economic prospects. (Singapore has probably come the closest so far.) So why should we expect China to? On all these dimensions, China actually looks much worse than its Asian predecessors, and it has the added burden of a hugely unequal distribution of wealth and a political system that suffers from a grievous, long-term legitimacy deficit. (This leaves aside, too, the question of whether its reported GDP figures actually reflect anything close to reality.) It also is facing a dire demographic picture made worse by the One-Child Policy: its workforce-age population is already declining, and its total population is projected to begin falling in less than 20 years. That does not sound like a country destined for global hegemony to me.

For a more detailed discussion, check out my essay at the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.