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I had the privilege yesterday of joining a two-panel roundtable session at George Washington University's Sigur Center for Asian Studies on the probable outcome and impacts of the upcoming Taiwan elections. Thanks to all who came to the event and asked great questions, and to Bruce Dickson for the invitation to participate.
I've gotten a couple requests for the slides from my presentation; they're linked here.
The short version of the talk: reform of the Legislative Yuan should be at the top of the priority list for the next president. Outside of Taiwan, the potential twists and turns in cross-Strait relations dominate the conversation and tend to overshadow everything else happening in the domestic arena. But there are a lot of problems facing Taiwan right now that don't directly involve cross-Strait relations.
I've gotten a couple requests for the slides from my presentation; they're linked here.
The short version of the talk: reform of the Legislative Yuan should be at the top of the priority list for the next president. Outside of Taiwan, the potential twists and turns in cross-Strait relations dominate the conversation and tend to overshadow everything else happening in the domestic arena. But there are a lot of problems facing Taiwan right now that don't directly involve cross-Strait relations.
The incoming administration will face several daunting domestic policy challenges, including:
Whatever the next administration tries to do, it will face opposition from some corners of the legislature representing vested interests that would lose out under reforms. Under the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, the LY's cross-party negotiation mechanism has in practice given any party caucus--even one with just three members--the ability to block most legislation. So the current system will prevent major changes on any of these issues unless Speaker Wang is replaced and the negotiation mechanism is weakened or abolished.
If the DPP wins a majority in the legislature, it will have a golden opportunity to reform the party caucus system and make it easier to pass legislation with a simple majority vote. It's critical for their own political future, for Tsai Ing-wen's, and probably for Taiwan's, that they do.
- a low tax base combined with a highly uneven distribution of the tax burden;
- widespread unhappiness with the Ma administration's China-first economic strategy, but no consensus about what to do instead, and long-standing opposition in the legislature to the kinds of domestic reforms required to enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership;
- a declining defense budget, now at 2% of GDP, and rising personnel costs from the faltering transition to an all-volunteer military force;
- a potential energy crisis driven by rising opposition to nuclear power without development of realistic alternatives.
Whatever the next administration tries to do, it will face opposition from some corners of the legislature representing vested interests that would lose out under reforms. Under the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, the LY's cross-party negotiation mechanism has in practice given any party caucus--even one with just three members--the ability to block most legislation. So the current system will prevent major changes on any of these issues unless Speaker Wang is replaced and the negotiation mechanism is weakened or abolished.
If the DPP wins a majority in the legislature, it will have a golden opportunity to reform the party caucus system and make it easier to pass legislation with a simple majority vote. It's critical for their own political future, for Tsai Ing-wen's, and probably for Taiwan's, that they do.
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In yesterday's Taiwan Democracy Project Taiwan Democracy Project talk, Cortez Cooper noted the DPP has developed an extensive set of Defense and National Security Blue Papers which reflect the party's current thinking about national security issues. The development of these policy papers was done over the past two years by the New Frontier Foundation, the DPP's de facto policy think tank.
The full set are posted below for reference. Source is here.
On a related note, the Ministry of National Defense released the latest biannual Defense White Paper in November 2015. The report is currently available only in Chinese; the English version should be released soon. However, for readers who prefer to get their information about military affairs in graphic novel form, a comic book version is already available. Seriously.
The full set are posted below for reference. Source is here.
On a related note, the Ministry of National Defense released the latest biannual Defense White Paper in November 2015. The report is currently available only in Chinese; the English version should be released soon. However, for readers who prefer to get their information about military affairs in graphic novel form, a comic book version is already available. Seriously.
DPP Defense and National Security Blue Papers
In order of release:
In order of release:
- DPP's Defense Agenda (June 6, 2013)
- Transforming the CSIST: Strengthening Indigenous Defense Research and Development (June 6, 2013)
- An Accountable National Security Council (June 6, 2013)
- New Chapter for Taiwan-U.S. Defense Partnership (June 6, 2013)
- China's Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025 (March 3, 2014)
- New Generation of Soldiers (Aug. 22, 2014)
- Bolstering Taiwan's Core Defense Industries (Oct. 6, 2014)
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (Dec. 5, 2014)
- Taiwan's Military Capacities in 2025 (May 26, 2015)
- Information Protection and Strategic Communications (May 26, 2015)
- Refinement of Veteran Affairs (May 26, 2015)
- Preparing the Development of Indigenous Defense Industry (May 26, 2015)
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I'm speaking on trends in Taiwan's defense spending on May 19th as part of the Taiwan Democracy Project Speaker Series. The official event page is here. The talk is motivated by the trends in the figures above: Taiwan's defense spending has dropped as China's has risen. To IR theorists, that should look weird. To policy wonks, it should be alarming. In the talk I will try to explain why it's happened.
Why Taiwan's Defense Spending Has Declined as China's Has Risen
Over the past 20 years, the military balance between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan has rapidly shifted. As China’s defense budget has grown annually at double-digit rates, Taiwan’s has shrunk. These trends are puzzling, because China’s rise as a military power poses a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. Existing theories suggest that states will choose one of three strategies when faced with an external threat: bargaining, arming, or allying. Yet for most of this period, Taiwan’s leaders have done none of these things. In this talk, I explain this apparent paradox as a consequence of Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Democracy has worked in three distinct ways to constrain rises in defense spending: by intensifying popular demands for non-defense spending, introducing additional veto players into the political system, and increasing the incentives of political elites to shift Taiwan’s security burden onto its primary ally, the United States. Together, these domestic political factors have driven a net decline in defense spending despite the rising threat posed by China’s rapid military modernization program. Put simply, in Taiwan the democratization effect has swamped the external threat effect.
Over the past 20 years, the military balance between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan has rapidly shifted. As China’s defense budget has grown annually at double-digit rates, Taiwan’s has shrunk. These trends are puzzling, because China’s rise as a military power poses a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. Existing theories suggest that states will choose one of three strategies when faced with an external threat: bargaining, arming, or allying. Yet for most of this period, Taiwan’s leaders have done none of these things. In this talk, I explain this apparent paradox as a consequence of Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Democracy has worked in three distinct ways to constrain rises in defense spending: by intensifying popular demands for non-defense spending, introducing additional veto players into the political system, and increasing the incentives of political elites to shift Taiwan’s security burden onto its primary ally, the United States. Together, these domestic political factors have driven a net decline in defense spending despite the rising threat posed by China’s rapid military modernization program. Put simply, in Taiwan the democratization effect has swamped the external threat effect.