- Published on
Worth checking out if you are in Taiwan over the next two months: on August 11, the 2014 Asian Barometer Conference (conference website not yet available) at National Taiwan University; and on September 15-17, the 2014 International Conference on Formosan Indigenous Peoples: Contemporary Perspectives, at Academia Sincia (conference website here.) The Taiwan Democracy Project and CDDRL are co-sponsoring the first. I will post more info here as it becomes available. Descriptions below.
Democracy in a Divided Society: East Asia in Comparative Perspective
An Asian Barometer Workshop
Organized by Program for East Asia Democratic Studies, IAS-NTU
Co-Sponsored by the Asian Democracy Research Network and
Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
Taipei, Taiwan, August 10-12, 2014
This workshop seeks to examine the functioning of democracy in divided societies by bringing together leading scholars from Asia and the United States. In particular, the workshop will focus on the politics of polarization: how it erodes or cripples young democracies in Asia and how we might mitigate its damaging effects. The on-going political crisis in Thailand and Taiwan timely reminds us how fragile young democracies can become when the push comes to shove. Most East Asian young and emerging democracies suffer from politics of polarization to some extent, including Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In a broader context, this problem has become epidemic as riot police trying to ward off angry demonstrators in Ukraine and Turkey. While the focus is on East Asia, our colleagues from the United States will help us to cast the regional experiences in comparative perspective. Some of our paper contributors will use data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS Wave III) as this cross-national data base provides rich source for individual-country investigation and for region-wide comparative analysis. Other contributors might employ historical, institutional, cultural or structural approaches to tackle the issue. We encourage innovative ways to combine survey data with macro-level factors, such as institutional design, culture, ethnicity, religion and class structure. We hope to evoke synthesis about the impact social division on the functioning of democracy and identify the institutional designs and compensating measures to moderate the tension. All country studies are encouraged to address some institutional arrangements, electoral institution or government structure, and other socioeconomic measures which could moderate or exacerbate the conflicts.
An Asian Barometer Workshop
Organized by Program for East Asia Democratic Studies, IAS-NTU
Co-Sponsored by the Asian Democracy Research Network and
Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
Taipei, Taiwan, August 10-12, 2014
This workshop seeks to examine the functioning of democracy in divided societies by bringing together leading scholars from Asia and the United States. In particular, the workshop will focus on the politics of polarization: how it erodes or cripples young democracies in Asia and how we might mitigate its damaging effects. The on-going political crisis in Thailand and Taiwan timely reminds us how fragile young democracies can become when the push comes to shove. Most East Asian young and emerging democracies suffer from politics of polarization to some extent, including Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In a broader context, this problem has become epidemic as riot police trying to ward off angry demonstrators in Ukraine and Turkey. While the focus is on East Asia, our colleagues from the United States will help us to cast the regional experiences in comparative perspective. Some of our paper contributors will use data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS Wave III) as this cross-national data base provides rich source for individual-country investigation and for region-wide comparative analysis. Other contributors might employ historical, institutional, cultural or structural approaches to tackle the issue. We encourage innovative ways to combine survey data with macro-level factors, such as institutional design, culture, ethnicity, religion and class structure. We hope to evoke synthesis about the impact social division on the functioning of democracy and identify the institutional designs and compensating measures to moderate the tension. All country studies are encouraged to address some institutional arrangements, electoral institution or government structure, and other socioeconomic measures which could moderate or exacerbate the conflicts.
2014 International Conference on Formosan Indigenous Peoples: A Contemporary Perspective
Organized by:
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica;
ROC Council of Indigenous Peoples;
Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines;
And co-sponsored by:
Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London;
European Association of Taiwan Studies
This year marks the 15 years since we had the First International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples in 1999. Taiwanese indigenous peoples have encountered dramatic socio-cultural and environmental changes in recent years, including the rectification of indigenous people’s names that have created new tribes for indigenous peoples, the passage of indigenous people’s basic rights in the legislation, the increase of natural calamities that threaten their living environments, and so on and so forth. All these developments require new research and discussions. The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, with funding support from the Council of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, will cooperate again to hold the Second International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples from September 15 through 17, 2014, at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
Organized by:
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica;
ROC Council of Indigenous Peoples;
Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines;
And co-sponsored by:
Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London;
European Association of Taiwan Studies
This year marks the 15 years since we had the First International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples in 1999. Taiwanese indigenous peoples have encountered dramatic socio-cultural and environmental changes in recent years, including the rectification of indigenous people’s names that have created new tribes for indigenous peoples, the passage of indigenous people’s basic rights in the legislation, the increase of natural calamities that threaten their living environments, and so on and so forth. All these developments require new research and discussions. The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, with funding support from the Council of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, will cooperate again to hold the Second International Conference on Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples from September 15 through 17, 2014, at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Published on
As an alternative to the way cross-Strait policy has been dealt with (or rather, not dealt with) in Taiwan over the last year, I've been thinking a lot about how similar foreign policy or trade controversies have historically been resolved in other democracies. One example I like a lot comes from the former West Germany.
Ostpolitik: Procedural Legitimacy, German Style
In 1969, West Germany had been a democracy for less than 20 years*. In a situation with some striking parallels** to Taiwan's current one, the newly-elected Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt pushed for a policy of engagement rather than confrontation with the communist East Germany and its Soviet patron. Under this so-called Ostpolitik, or "eastern policy," Brandt signed a series of treaties renouncing the use of force, recognizing post-war European borders, establishing diplomatic recognition of Warsaw Pact states in eastern Europe, and culminating in a peace treaty, the Basic Treaty, with East Germany itself in 1972.
Ostpolitik was hugely controversial in German political life. Brandt was the first non-conservative to hold the chancellorship in the post-war era, and his sharp change in policy was fiercely opposed by the former ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). After the Basic Treaty was signed in early 1972, several MPs from Brandt's coalition partner the FDP defected to the opposition, and it looked like Ostpolitik might be stalled or reversed.
But in a crucial showdown in April 1972, the CDU fell two votes short*** of winning a no-confidence vote to replace Brandt's government with a conservative coalition. Seven months later, Brandt's coalition was re-elected in federal elections, and the treaty was then approved by the German parliament. By winning both a no-confidence vote and an election after the Basic Treaty was signed, Brandt endowed his policies toward Eastern Europe with a great deal of democratic legitimacy despite the controversy. Most impressively, when the CDU eventually returned to power in 1982, it retained Ostpolitik, which by that point was supported by all the major political parties.
Ostpolitik: Procedural Legitimacy, German Style
In 1969, West Germany had been a democracy for less than 20 years*. In a situation with some striking parallels** to Taiwan's current one, the newly-elected Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt pushed for a policy of engagement rather than confrontation with the communist East Germany and its Soviet patron. Under this so-called Ostpolitik, or "eastern policy," Brandt signed a series of treaties renouncing the use of force, recognizing post-war European borders, establishing diplomatic recognition of Warsaw Pact states in eastern Europe, and culminating in a peace treaty, the Basic Treaty, with East Germany itself in 1972.
Ostpolitik was hugely controversial in German political life. Brandt was the first non-conservative to hold the chancellorship in the post-war era, and his sharp change in policy was fiercely opposed by the former ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). After the Basic Treaty was signed in early 1972, several MPs from Brandt's coalition partner the FDP defected to the opposition, and it looked like Ostpolitik might be stalled or reversed.
But in a crucial showdown in April 1972, the CDU fell two votes short*** of winning a no-confidence vote to replace Brandt's government with a conservative coalition. Seven months later, Brandt's coalition was re-elected in federal elections, and the treaty was then approved by the German parliament. By winning both a no-confidence vote and an election after the Basic Treaty was signed, Brandt endowed his policies toward Eastern Europe with a great deal of democratic legitimacy despite the controversy. Most impressively, when the CDU eventually returned to power in 1982, it retained Ostpolitik, which by that point was supported by all the major political parties.
Why a German-Style Solution Isn't Available in Today's Taiwan
It’s instructive to consider all the ways Taiwan’s current institutions prevent a kind of “German solution” to the CSSTA controversy. There are four big ones:
1. Ostpolitik Agreements were Treaties. The Basic Treaty signed by the Brandt government with East Germany was beset by ambiguity about the official status of the East German state: West Germany had claimed since partition to represent the entire German nation and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of an independent East Germany (sound familiar?). Brandt’s linguistic work-around was to assert that two states existed “in Germany,” but that they could not regard one another as foreign countries. Nevertheless, when the Basic Treaty was signed, everyone agreed that it required parliamentary approval to take effect--like the Treaty of Moscow and Treaty of Warsaw before it.
Unlike in the Taiwan case, the West German procedure for approving the Basic Law remained the same as for approving agreements with other foreign powers: an up-or-down vote in both houses of parliament. In Taiwan, however, it's not clear whether the CSSTA even requires a vote in the Legislative Yuan, even though trade agreements with other countries do.
2. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (I): Executive Actions depend on Parliamentary Confidence. As head of government in a parliamentary regime, Brandt’s actions implicitly depended on the continued support of a majority in the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament. Ostpolitik, and especially the Basic Treaty, were controversial enough that Brandt nearly lost this majority. Had the opposition CDU managed to win the no-confidence vote, Brandt would have been replaced by a new conservative coalition, and the Basic Treaty would likely have been modified or withdrawn.
In contrast to the Taiwan case, there was an obvious institutional way to settle the conflict over Brandt’s policy: hold a vote in parliament. Brandt’s victory in that vote confirmed he still had the minimum support needed to advance the treaty. In Taiwan, the legislature has a formal no-confidence power, but it's much weaker: it can be used only against the premier, not the president; it gives the president the right in turn to dissolve the legislature, so most LY members don't want to use it lest they have to face the voters in early elections; and it can only be used once every 12 months.
Moreover, in a move that looks rather stupid in hindsight, the DPP brought a no-confidence measure against premier Jiang Yi-huah last October, which, given the KMT's majority, predictably failed badly. So even if enough members of the LY were willing to risk early elections to bring down the premier and his cabinet, that option is closed off for the next six months.
3. Proportional Electoral Systems Make Coalition Governments Likely. Since the founding of the FDR, Germany has almost always had stable coalition governments. A key reason is the German electoral system, the so-called mixed-member compensatory system. Under the German system, all parties which win over five percent of the party vote get a proportional share of seats in the lower house. Thus, for much of Germany’s postwar history, a small centrist party, the FDP, held the balance of power in the Bundestag. Brandt relied on FDP support to stay in office; the vice chancellor and foreign minister under Brandt was the head of the FDP, Walter Scheel. When FDP members opposed to the Basic Treaty started defecting, the Brandt coalition was in trouble.
In contrast, Taiwan’s 2005 electoral reform created a much more majoritarian electoral system: the KMT’s current majority in the Legislative Yuan is due in part to a highly disproportional conversion of votes into seats. As a consequence, there is no coalition partner on which the KMT depends to get bills passed in the legislature, and no direct way for non-KMT parties to ensure they are included in the cabinet.*^
4. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (II): Early Elections. Fourth, despite winning the no-confidence motion, Brandt was still in a precarious political position. He had lost several members of his coalition, and it soon became clear that he no longer held a working majority in the Bundestag. So, he called early elections: in November 1972, seven months after the no-confidence vote, German voters got to weigh in on the Brandt government and, by association, Ostpolitik. The result of the polls left little doubt that Brandt had the support of a popular majority: both the SDP and FDP gains seats at the expense of the CDU. Brandt had for all intents received a popular mandate to continue with Ostpolitik.
Again, the contrast with Taiwan is stark. There is no requirement that the Ma administration face the voters again before implementing the CSSTA. Nor can Ma call early elections even if he wanted to; that would require a no-confidence vote to pass the legislature, which, as I noted above, isn't even a constitutional option until October 2014. In short, there's no easy way to have the voters weigh in directly on the current controversy or the Ma administration's performance until the 2016 general election--two years away. The consequence is that the CSSTA controversy is likely to remain unresolved, exacerbating political gridlock in Taiwan until at least 2016. It's hard to see that as a good outcome for Taiwan's democracy.
It’s instructive to consider all the ways Taiwan’s current institutions prevent a kind of “German solution” to the CSSTA controversy. There are four big ones:
1. Ostpolitik Agreements were Treaties. The Basic Treaty signed by the Brandt government with East Germany was beset by ambiguity about the official status of the East German state: West Germany had claimed since partition to represent the entire German nation and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of an independent East Germany (sound familiar?). Brandt’s linguistic work-around was to assert that two states existed “in Germany,” but that they could not regard one another as foreign countries. Nevertheless, when the Basic Treaty was signed, everyone agreed that it required parliamentary approval to take effect--like the Treaty of Moscow and Treaty of Warsaw before it.
Unlike in the Taiwan case, the West German procedure for approving the Basic Law remained the same as for approving agreements with other foreign powers: an up-or-down vote in both houses of parliament. In Taiwan, however, it's not clear whether the CSSTA even requires a vote in the Legislative Yuan, even though trade agreements with other countries do.
2. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (I): Executive Actions depend on Parliamentary Confidence. As head of government in a parliamentary regime, Brandt’s actions implicitly depended on the continued support of a majority in the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament. Ostpolitik, and especially the Basic Treaty, were controversial enough that Brandt nearly lost this majority. Had the opposition CDU managed to win the no-confidence vote, Brandt would have been replaced by a new conservative coalition, and the Basic Treaty would likely have been modified or withdrawn.
In contrast to the Taiwan case, there was an obvious institutional way to settle the conflict over Brandt’s policy: hold a vote in parliament. Brandt’s victory in that vote confirmed he still had the minimum support needed to advance the treaty. In Taiwan, the legislature has a formal no-confidence power, but it's much weaker: it can be used only against the premier, not the president; it gives the president the right in turn to dissolve the legislature, so most LY members don't want to use it lest they have to face the voters in early elections; and it can only be used once every 12 months.
Moreover, in a move that looks rather stupid in hindsight, the DPP brought a no-confidence measure against premier Jiang Yi-huah last October, which, given the KMT's majority, predictably failed badly. So even if enough members of the LY were willing to risk early elections to bring down the premier and his cabinet, that option is closed off for the next six months.
3. Proportional Electoral Systems Make Coalition Governments Likely. Since the founding of the FDR, Germany has almost always had stable coalition governments. A key reason is the German electoral system, the so-called mixed-member compensatory system. Under the German system, all parties which win over five percent of the party vote get a proportional share of seats in the lower house. Thus, for much of Germany’s postwar history, a small centrist party, the FDP, held the balance of power in the Bundestag. Brandt relied on FDP support to stay in office; the vice chancellor and foreign minister under Brandt was the head of the FDP, Walter Scheel. When FDP members opposed to the Basic Treaty started defecting, the Brandt coalition was in trouble.
In contrast, Taiwan’s 2005 electoral reform created a much more majoritarian electoral system: the KMT’s current majority in the Legislative Yuan is due in part to a highly disproportional conversion of votes into seats. As a consequence, there is no coalition partner on which the KMT depends to get bills passed in the legislature, and no direct way for non-KMT parties to ensure they are included in the cabinet.*^
4. The Advantages of Parliamentarism (II): Early Elections. Fourth, despite winning the no-confidence motion, Brandt was still in a precarious political position. He had lost several members of his coalition, and it soon became clear that he no longer held a working majority in the Bundestag. So, he called early elections: in November 1972, seven months after the no-confidence vote, German voters got to weigh in on the Brandt government and, by association, Ostpolitik. The result of the polls left little doubt that Brandt had the support of a popular majority: both the SDP and FDP gains seats at the expense of the CDU. Brandt had for all intents received a popular mandate to continue with Ostpolitik.
Again, the contrast with Taiwan is stark. There is no requirement that the Ma administration face the voters again before implementing the CSSTA. Nor can Ma call early elections even if he wanted to; that would require a no-confidence vote to pass the legislature, which, as I noted above, isn't even a constitutional option until October 2014. In short, there's no easy way to have the voters weigh in directly on the current controversy or the Ma administration's performance until the 2016 general election--two years away. The consequence is that the CSSTA controversy is likely to remain unresolved, exacerbating political gridlock in Taiwan until at least 2016. It's hard to see that as a good outcome for Taiwan's democracy.
* It might not be obvious at first glance, but this is roughly the same age as Taiwan's democracy today: the first elected postwar government in Germany took office in September 1949, and Taiwan has had a fully elected legislature since 1992 and a popularly elected president since 1996.
** I should emphasize I do not mean to draw any lessons from this example about how cross-Strait rapprochement should proceed. I highlight this case only because of the admirable way in which a highly divisive foreign policy issue was resolved domestically to West Germany's long-term benefit, not because I think Taiwan-PRC relations should be handled in the same way.
*** The CDU lost the vote when two of its own members unexpectedly failed to support the party's motion. After the unification of Germany in 1990, East German secret files revealed that both MPs were paid by the East German secret service to vote against the motion.
*^ In practice, the Cross-Party Negotiation Committee (政黨協商) in the Legislative Yuan gives minority parties the ability to slow or block legislation; it does not, however, give them any say in, or claim to, Executive Yuan cabinet positions, as a real cross-party coalition would in a pure parliamentary regime.
** I should emphasize I do not mean to draw any lessons from this example about how cross-Strait rapprochement should proceed. I highlight this case only because of the admirable way in which a highly divisive foreign policy issue was resolved domestically to West Germany's long-term benefit, not because I think Taiwan-PRC relations should be handled in the same way.
*** The CDU lost the vote when two of its own members unexpectedly failed to support the party's motion. After the unification of Germany in 1990, East German secret files revealed that both MPs were paid by the East German secret service to vote against the motion.
*^ In practice, the Cross-Party Negotiation Committee (政黨協商) in the Legislative Yuan gives minority parties the ability to slow or block legislation; it does not, however, give them any say in, or claim to, Executive Yuan cabinet positions, as a real cross-party coalition would in a pure parliamentary regime.
- Published on
On May 5, 2014, the Taiwan Democracy Project will welcome Roselyn Hsueh to Stanford for a very timely talk on the politics of trade in Taiwan. Dr. Hsueh is an assistant professor of political science at Temple University and a visiting scholar in the Religion, Politics, and Globalization Program at U.C. Berkeley. Her talk is entitled, "Economies and Identities: The Politics of Taiwan's Globalization in the Age of China." The talk is free and open to the public, although you are encouraged to RSVP to alice.carter@stanford.edu. The talk abstract is below. UPDATE: The official event page is here.
Professor Hsueh's research focuses on the politics of market reform, comparative capitalism, development, and other areas of international and comparative political economy. Her publications include China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Cornell University Press, 2011) and “China and India in the Age of Globalization: Sectoral Variation in Postliberalization Reregulation,” Comparative Political Studies 45 (2012): 32-61. She received her Ph.D. from U.C. Berkeley and has served as a Hayward R. Alker Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Southern California and conducted research as a U.S. Fulbright Scholar at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Professor Hsueh's research focuses on the politics of market reform, comparative capitalism, development, and other areas of international and comparative political economy. Her publications include China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Cornell University Press, 2011) and “China and India in the Age of Globalization: Sectoral Variation in Postliberalization Reregulation,” Comparative Political Studies 45 (2012): 32-61. She received her Ph.D. from U.C. Berkeley and has served as a Hayward R. Alker Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Southern California and conducted research as a U.S. Fulbright Scholar at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Economies and Identities: The Politics of Taiwan’s Globalization in the Age of China
For several weeks in March and April, university students in Taiwan camped out in the legislative and cabinet offices to protest the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services between China and Taiwan. Joined by hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese, spilling out to the streets, the demonstrators claim President Ma Ying-jeou negotiated the agreement with China without seeking any public input and bypassing the legislative process entirely. Implications of this historical social movement include the functioning of Taiwan’s democratic institutions, which have undergone regime change but democratic consolidation remains in question. Additionally, a potential cross-strait crisis can affect U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War era. Two important forces are also at play: China’s meteoric playing-by-its-own-rules economic rise, and the evolving Taiwanese national identity after its transition to democracy. This talk will center on the national-specific consequences of liberal trade and democracy for Taiwan’s economic globalization and political development.
For several weeks in March and April, university students in Taiwan camped out in the legislative and cabinet offices to protest the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services between China and Taiwan. Joined by hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese, spilling out to the streets, the demonstrators claim President Ma Ying-jeou negotiated the agreement with China without seeking any public input and bypassing the legislative process entirely. Implications of this historical social movement include the functioning of Taiwan’s democratic institutions, which have undergone regime change but democratic consolidation remains in question. Additionally, a potential cross-strait crisis can affect U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War era. Two important forces are also at play: China’s meteoric playing-by-its-own-rules economic rise, and the evolving Taiwanese national identity after its transition to democracy. This talk will center on the national-specific consequences of liberal trade and democracy for Taiwan’s economic globalization and political development.
- Published on
The Constitutional Ambiguity of Cross-Strait Agreements
At the heart of the current conflict in Taiwan over the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (兩岸服務貿易協議) is a legal dispute, possibly even a constitutional one. Despite its role in igniting the student occupation of the legislature, there's not much English-language coverage of the legal questions. (Student protestors and riot police make for better news copy--who knew?!) Nevertheless, most of the materials at issue are publicly available online, so I think it's useful to gather these in one place, along with my take*. If you need some background on the conflict, see my previous post.
The first thing to note is it's not clear from precedent whether agreements signed with the PRC under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (兩岸經濟合作架構協議) require legislative approval to take effect--because there is no precedent! The Ma administration has argued that the CSSTA is technically an Executive Order (行政命令), not a law or treaty. Furthermore, because it does not require the adoption of new legislation or amendments to existing legislation, the agreement does not require legislative ratification to take effect.
Second, the CSSTA (in Chinese here) is technically an "annex" to the ECFA (text here; special website is here). As with all agreements governing cross-Strait relations, ECFA and the subsequent CSSTA have to be negotiated and signed by the "non-governmental" bodies set up to avoid the question of Taiwan's legal status vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China. These are the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) (海峽交流基金會) on the Taiwan side and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) (海峽兩岸關係協會) on the PRC side. The legal authority for negotiating cross-Strait agreements is delegated to SEF from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), as specified in Article 4-2 of the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例). That Act is available in its entirety online, in English (here too) and in Chinese.
The key articles relevant to the current dispute are in Chapter I, Articles 4 and 5. Article 5 requires that agreements be submitted to the LY "for record" if no new laws or amendments to laws are needed. If new laws or amendments to existing laws are required by the agreement, then it must be submitted to the legislature "for consideration."
"For Record" vs. "For Consideration" (備查與審議)
That leaves the question of what submitting to the LY "for record" and "for consideration" means. From Article 5, the Chinese for "for record" is beicha (備查)--literally, “for future reference." The Chinese for "for consideration" is shenyi (審議). In practice, these terms indicate what the status quo is: if an executive order is submitted "for record", the legislature must review and either approve, reject or change the order within 90 days of its submission; if it does not, the order takes effect automatically. Thus, no action means the executive order stands. If an executive order requires new legislation, it also requires "consideration". If the legislature "considers" and takes no action, then the order does not take effect, and nothing changes. To use a more technical term, the reversion point in bargaining between the branches favors the executive under "for record" and the legislature under "for consideration" submissions.
The difference between these two procedures is the crux of the conflict over the CSSTA. The Ma administration's argument is that the cross-Strait Relations Act plus the ECFA is all the legal authority it needs to sign and implement the CSSTA. Any regulatory changes agreed to under the ECFA structure are administrative in nature, and can be implemented via executive order. And at face value, that's what Article 5 says: no new laws or amendments, no need for legislative approval.
The counter-argument (spelled out nicely here, in Chinese) is that ECFA itself is either a "prospective treaty" (準條約) or an "administrative agreement" (行政協定), but not a law passed by the legislature (立法院通過的法律), an act of authorization (授權法), or an organic law (組織法). So agreements reached by the SEF under ECFA authority cannot be treated like executive orders, because the SEF is not a formal administrative body. As a consequence, the CSSTA should be submitted to the legislature "for consideration" as a treaty, just like the ECFA was, and like the recently passed New Zealand and Singapore free trade agreements were.
A Legal Mess
Now, here's where things get messy. Neither side in this dispute has an airtight legal argument. After the agreement was signed in June 2013, the Ma administration wanted to submit the CSSTA to the legislature as an executive order, "for record." The opposition camp opposed that, of course, but Ma's position also raised concerns among KMT and PFP legislators. Speaker Wang Jin-pyng then negotiated an agreement among the party caucuses, including representatives of the KMT, to treat the agreement as "for consideration"--i.e. requiring legislative approval to take effect--and moreover, to review and vote separately on each item in the agreement. Once that decision was made, the agreement's review became subject to all the procedural rules in the LY that govern legislation. When Chang Ching-chung asserted that the 90 day deadline for review had passed, he was contradicting his own legislative caucus's position that the agreement would be treated like a treaty, not an executive order.
But on the other hand, if one reads the actual Act from which the SEF's negotiating authority is drawn, it explicitly says that no legislative approval is needed if an agreement can be enforced without new or amended laws. Here is Article 5, in English:
At the heart of the current conflict in Taiwan over the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (兩岸服務貿易協議) is a legal dispute, possibly even a constitutional one. Despite its role in igniting the student occupation of the legislature, there's not much English-language coverage of the legal questions. (Student protestors and riot police make for better news copy--who knew?!) Nevertheless, most of the materials at issue are publicly available online, so I think it's useful to gather these in one place, along with my take*. If you need some background on the conflict, see my previous post.
The first thing to note is it's not clear from precedent whether agreements signed with the PRC under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (兩岸經濟合作架構協議) require legislative approval to take effect--because there is no precedent! The Ma administration has argued that the CSSTA is technically an Executive Order (行政命令), not a law or treaty. Furthermore, because it does not require the adoption of new legislation or amendments to existing legislation, the agreement does not require legislative ratification to take effect.
Second, the CSSTA (in Chinese here) is technically an "annex" to the ECFA (text here; special website is here). As with all agreements governing cross-Strait relations, ECFA and the subsequent CSSTA have to be negotiated and signed by the "non-governmental" bodies set up to avoid the question of Taiwan's legal status vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China. These are the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) (海峽交流基金會) on the Taiwan side and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) (海峽兩岸關係協會) on the PRC side. The legal authority for negotiating cross-Strait agreements is delegated to SEF from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), as specified in Article 4-2 of the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例). That Act is available in its entirety online, in English (here too) and in Chinese.
The key articles relevant to the current dispute are in Chapter I, Articles 4 and 5. Article 5 requires that agreements be submitted to the LY "for record" if no new laws or amendments to laws are needed. If new laws or amendments to existing laws are required by the agreement, then it must be submitted to the legislature "for consideration."
"For Record" vs. "For Consideration" (備查與審議)
That leaves the question of what submitting to the LY "for record" and "for consideration" means. From Article 5, the Chinese for "for record" is beicha (備查)--literally, “for future reference." The Chinese for "for consideration" is shenyi (審議). In practice, these terms indicate what the status quo is: if an executive order is submitted "for record", the legislature must review and either approve, reject or change the order within 90 days of its submission; if it does not, the order takes effect automatically. Thus, no action means the executive order stands. If an executive order requires new legislation, it also requires "consideration". If the legislature "considers" and takes no action, then the order does not take effect, and nothing changes. To use a more technical term, the reversion point in bargaining between the branches favors the executive under "for record" and the legislature under "for consideration" submissions.
The difference between these two procedures is the crux of the conflict over the CSSTA. The Ma administration's argument is that the cross-Strait Relations Act plus the ECFA is all the legal authority it needs to sign and implement the CSSTA. Any regulatory changes agreed to under the ECFA structure are administrative in nature, and can be implemented via executive order. And at face value, that's what Article 5 says: no new laws or amendments, no need for legislative approval.
The counter-argument (spelled out nicely here, in Chinese) is that ECFA itself is either a "prospective treaty" (準條約) or an "administrative agreement" (行政協定), but not a law passed by the legislature (立法院通過的法律), an act of authorization (授權法), or an organic law (組織法). So agreements reached by the SEF under ECFA authority cannot be treated like executive orders, because the SEF is not a formal administrative body. As a consequence, the CSSTA should be submitted to the legislature "for consideration" as a treaty, just like the ECFA was, and like the recently passed New Zealand and Singapore free trade agreements were.
A Legal Mess
Now, here's where things get messy. Neither side in this dispute has an airtight legal argument. After the agreement was signed in June 2013, the Ma administration wanted to submit the CSSTA to the legislature as an executive order, "for record." The opposition camp opposed that, of course, but Ma's position also raised concerns among KMT and PFP legislators. Speaker Wang Jin-pyng then negotiated an agreement among the party caucuses, including representatives of the KMT, to treat the agreement as "for consideration"--i.e. requiring legislative approval to take effect--and moreover, to review and vote separately on each item in the agreement. Once that decision was made, the agreement's review became subject to all the procedural rules in the LY that govern legislation. When Chang Ching-chung asserted that the 90 day deadline for review had passed, he was contradicting his own legislative caucus's position that the agreement would be treated like a treaty, not an executive order.
But on the other hand, if one reads the actual Act from which the SEF's negotiating authority is drawn, it explicitly says that no legislative approval is needed if an agreement can be enforced without new or amended laws. Here is Article 5, in English:
- Where the content of the agreement requires any amendment to laws or any new legislation, the administration authorities of the agreement shall submit the agreement through the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan for consideration within 30 days after the execution of the agreement; where its content does not require any amendment to laws or any new legislation, the administration authorities of the agreement shall submit the agreement to the Executive Yuan for approval and to the Legislative Yuan for record, with a confidential procedure if necessary.
If we take this language at face value, then as long as the CSSTA does not require new laws or amendments, it can take effect as an executive order--no legislative approval required. From that perspective, the willingness of the KMT caucus to treat the CSSTA as needing to be ratified by the legislature looks like a significant concession.
Given how controversial anything related to cross-Strait relations is in Taiwan, there is a strong normative argument for getting agreements ratified by the Legislative Yuan before they take effect. But the legal argument is much less clear-cut--just look at Article 5. And that ambiguity is a big problem for everyone, because it undercuts the legitimacy of cross-Strait policy-making, whether or not the CSSTA passes.
Shouldn't the Courts Resolve Legal Conflicts?
In an ideal world, the question of whether the CSSTA is an "executive order" would be resolved by the Council of Grand Justices, Taiwan's constitutional court. It's unfortunate the issue wasn't put before them, and I'm not really sure why--probably a combination of several reasons: the long time it takes to get a court decision, the Ma administration's haste to get the CSSTA through the legislature, the timing of the student occupation of the LY, and the court's own desire to stay out of partisan conflicts. At any rate, that option appears to be precluded now, and Taiwan's democracy is worse off for it.
Nevertheless, there may be a silver lining here. The Ma administration has belatedly appeared to acknowledge the legitimacy problem surrounding cross-Strait negotiations, and has proposed changes that would strengthen legislative oversight. The students occupying the legislature have proposed their own mechanisms for oversight. If some version of those gets adopted--including, crucially, a requirement that cross-Strait agreements be ratified by the legislature to take effect--then at least some of Taiwan's democratic institutions might actually come out of this crisis with a bit more legitimacy in the long run. And that's something people of all political stripes in Taiwan ought to approve of.
Given how controversial anything related to cross-Strait relations is in Taiwan, there is a strong normative argument for getting agreements ratified by the Legislative Yuan before they take effect. But the legal argument is much less clear-cut--just look at Article 5. And that ambiguity is a big problem for everyone, because it undercuts the legitimacy of cross-Strait policy-making, whether or not the CSSTA passes.
Shouldn't the Courts Resolve Legal Conflicts?
In an ideal world, the question of whether the CSSTA is an "executive order" would be resolved by the Council of Grand Justices, Taiwan's constitutional court. It's unfortunate the issue wasn't put before them, and I'm not really sure why--probably a combination of several reasons: the long time it takes to get a court decision, the Ma administration's haste to get the CSSTA through the legislature, the timing of the student occupation of the LY, and the court's own desire to stay out of partisan conflicts. At any rate, that option appears to be precluded now, and Taiwan's democracy is worse off for it.
Nevertheless, there may be a silver lining here. The Ma administration has belatedly appeared to acknowledge the legitimacy problem surrounding cross-Strait negotiations, and has proposed changes that would strengthen legislative oversight. The students occupying the legislature have proposed their own mechanisms for oversight. If some version of those gets adopted--including, crucially, a requirement that cross-Strait agreements be ratified by the legislature to take effect--then at least some of Taiwan's democratic institutions might actually come out of this crisis with a bit more legitimacy in the long run. And that's something people of all political stripes in Taiwan ought to approve of.
* A caveat: I'm not a lawyer or an expert on ROC constitutional law. If you are an expert on ROC constitutional law, then by all means weigh in in the comments and tell me where I've gone wrong.
- Published on
On February 28, the Taiwan Democracy Project hosted a talk by Dean Chen, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Salameno School of Humanities and Global Studies, Ramapo College of New Jersey. Prof. Chen's talk was entitled "The Origins and Development of Taiwan's Policies toward Overseas Citizens' Participation in Homeland Governance and Policymaking." The event page can be found here.
Prof. Chen's expertise is in international politics, U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relations, and governance and institutions of China and Taiwan. His most recent publications include Sustaining the Triangular Balance: The Taiwan Strait Policy of Barack Obama, Xi Jinping, and Ma Ying-jeou (Univ. of Maryland School of Law, 2013), U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity (Lynne Rienner, 2012), and "The Evolution of Taiwan's Policies toward the Political Participation of Citizens Abroad in Homeland Governance," with Pei-te Lin.
Prof. Chen's expertise is in international politics, U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relations, and governance and institutions of China and Taiwan. His most recent publications include Sustaining the Triangular Balance: The Taiwan Strait Policy of Barack Obama, Xi Jinping, and Ma Ying-jeou (Univ. of Maryland School of Law, 2013), U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity (Lynne Rienner, 2012), and "The Evolution of Taiwan's Policies toward the Political Participation of Citizens Abroad in Homeland Governance," with Pei-te Lin.
The Origins and Development of Taiwan’s Policies toward Overseas Citizens’ Participation in Homeland Governance and Policymaking
This presentation traces the origins and evolution of the Republic of China (ROC)’s Policies toward its overseas constituents since the ROC’s founding in 1912 and its transfer to Taiwan after 1949. While discussing the ideological and legal principles underpinning the ROC’s policies toward the overseas community, the talk also focuses on how the changing international and domestic political circumstances have affected the degree and nature of involvement of overseas citizens in homeland political and economic decision-making. More essentially, democratization and the rise of Taiwanese-centered identity and consciousness have, since the mid-1990s, driven the ROC government to re-define and reconceptualize its relations to Taiwan as well as to its overseas citizens, thus resulting in the transformation of the political and legal policies toward the overseas compatriot community. The implications of these changes on the future of Taiwan’s domestic politics and foreign relations will also be examined.
This presentation traces the origins and evolution of the Republic of China (ROC)’s Policies toward its overseas constituents since the ROC’s founding in 1912 and its transfer to Taiwan after 1949. While discussing the ideological and legal principles underpinning the ROC’s policies toward the overseas community, the talk also focuses on how the changing international and domestic political circumstances have affected the degree and nature of involvement of overseas citizens in homeland political and economic decision-making. More essentially, democratization and the rise of Taiwanese-centered identity and consciousness have, since the mid-1990s, driven the ROC government to re-define and reconceptualize its relations to Taiwan as well as to its overseas citizens, thus resulting in the transformation of the political and legal policies toward the overseas compatriot community. The implications of these changes on the future of Taiwan’s domestic politics and foreign relations will also be examined.
- Published on
On February 7, the Taiwan Democracy Project will host a talk by Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland. Professor Kastner's talk is entitled "A Relationship Transformed: Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Taiwan Strait." The talk is free and open to the public, although you are encouraged to RSVP at the official event page here.
Professor Kastner’s research interests include China’s foreign relations, the international politics of East Asia, and international political economy. His book, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, was published in the Studies in Asian Security series by Stanford University Press (2009). His work has also appeared in journals such as International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Security Studies, and Journal of Peace Research. Kastner received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego.
Professor Kastner’s research interests include China’s foreign relations, the international politics of East Asia, and international political economy. His book, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, was published in the Studies in Asian Security series by Stanford University Press (2009). His work has also appeared in journals such as International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Security Studies, and Journal of Peace Research. Kastner received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego.
A Relationship Transformed: Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Taiwan Strait
After long being viewed as a potential flashpoint, relations across the Taiwan Strait have stabilized tremendously in recent years, reflecting moderation in the approaches both Beijing and Taipei have taken with regard to the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute. In my presentation, I consider whether this new-found stability in the Taiwan Strait is likely to persist. In particular, I consider how fundamental trends in cross-Strait relations—such as rapidly growing Chinese military power and deepening cross-Strait economic exchange—are affecting the likelihood that the conflict scenarios which worried analysts prior to the current détente will re-emerge as future concerns. My analysis suggests that the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is likely to be more stable in the years ahead than was the case in the years preceding 2008; this conclusion holds even if there is a change in ruling party in Taiwan. But I also emphasize that the cross-Strait relationship has not been fundamentally transformed, and that the potential for serious conflict remains.
After long being viewed as a potential flashpoint, relations across the Taiwan Strait have stabilized tremendously in recent years, reflecting moderation in the approaches both Beijing and Taipei have taken with regard to the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute. In my presentation, I consider whether this new-found stability in the Taiwan Strait is likely to persist. In particular, I consider how fundamental trends in cross-Strait relations—such as rapidly growing Chinese military power and deepening cross-Strait economic exchange—are affecting the likelihood that the conflict scenarios which worried analysts prior to the current détente will re-emerge as future concerns. My analysis suggests that the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is likely to be more stable in the years ahead than was the case in the years preceding 2008; this conclusion holds even if there is a change in ruling party in Taiwan. But I also emphasize that the cross-Strait relationship has not been fundamentally transformed, and that the potential for serious conflict remains.
- Published on
The Taiwan Democracy Project is hosting Benjamin L. Read, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Santa Cruz, today from 12-1:30pm in the Okimoto Conference Room, Encina Hall 3rd Floor, Stanford University. Professor Read will be speaking on his research examining Taiwan's neighborhood-level political networks. The full title and abstract are below. The event page is here.
Professor Read's book, Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei (Stanford University Press, 2012) uses surveys, interviews, and participant observation to compare the ways in which constituents perceive and interact with the urban administrative structures found in China, Taiwan, and elsewhere in the region. He edited Local Organizations and Urban Governance in East and Southeast Asia: Straddling State and Society (Routledge, 2009), also on the role of state-sponsored organizations, and has published research on civil society groups as well, particularly China's nascent homeowner associations. Read's next book, Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles, co-authored with Diana Kapiszewski and Lauren Morris MacLean, will be published in 2014 by Cambridge University Press. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Comparative Political Studies, the China Journal, the China Quarterly, the Washington Quarterly, and several edited books. He earned his Ph.D. in Government at Harvard University in 2003.
Professor Read's book, Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei (Stanford University Press, 2012) uses surveys, interviews, and participant observation to compare the ways in which constituents perceive and interact with the urban administrative structures found in China, Taiwan, and elsewhere in the region. He edited Local Organizations and Urban Governance in East and Southeast Asia: Straddling State and Society (Routledge, 2009), also on the role of state-sponsored organizations, and has published research on civil society groups as well, particularly China's nascent homeowner associations. Read's next book, Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles, co-authored with Diana Kapiszewski and Lauren Morris MacLean, will be published in 2014 by Cambridge University Press. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Comparative Political Studies, the China Journal, the China Quarterly, the Washington Quarterly, and several edited books. He earned his Ph.D. in Government at Harvard University in 2003.
Urban Taiwan’s State-Structured Neighborhood Governance: Deepening Democracy, Partisan Civic Engagement, Inverted Class Bias
Taiwan's system of neighborhood-level governance has origins in institutions of local control employed by both the Republican-era Kuomintang and the Japanese colonizers. In more recent times, the neighborhood wardens (lizhang, 里長) have come to play a complex set of roles, including state agent, political party operative, and community representative. Wardens of a new generation, with more women in their ranks than ever before, have adopted new practices and built different relationships with their communities, parties, and city governments compared to those of the older, often clan-based bosses.
Focusing on Taipei with glances at other locales, this paper draws on ethnographic research, interviews, surveys, public records, and other sources. It explores the particular kind of political and civic engagement that the neighborhood governance system elicits. It is statist; though independent in many respects, wardens have government-mandated duties and work closely with city and district officials. Community development associations (shequ fazhan xiehui), as well as other neighborhood groups and wardens themselves, compete for and receive government funding. Warden elections are also deeply democratic in ways that, in global perspective, are unusual for such ultra-local urban offices. Over the past 25 years, elections have become hotly contested, voter turnout has risen to remarkably high rates, and KMT dominance has partially given way to political pluralization. Citizens’ participation in this setting, like others, often shows deep divisions along partisan lines, with wardens and local associations split by party loyalties. Finally, civic engagement with the neighborhood system shows an inverted class bias. Residents with less education, for example, are more likely to know their wardens and vote in warden elections. Politics in Taiwan’s li thus has evolved substantially over time, and also contrasts in multiple ways with Western images of neighborhood politics.
Taiwan's system of neighborhood-level governance has origins in institutions of local control employed by both the Republican-era Kuomintang and the Japanese colonizers. In more recent times, the neighborhood wardens (lizhang, 里長) have come to play a complex set of roles, including state agent, political party operative, and community representative. Wardens of a new generation, with more women in their ranks than ever before, have adopted new practices and built different relationships with their communities, parties, and city governments compared to those of the older, often clan-based bosses.
Focusing on Taipei with glances at other locales, this paper draws on ethnographic research, interviews, surveys, public records, and other sources. It explores the particular kind of political and civic engagement that the neighborhood governance system elicits. It is statist; though independent in many respects, wardens have government-mandated duties and work closely with city and district officials. Community development associations (shequ fazhan xiehui), as well as other neighborhood groups and wardens themselves, compete for and receive government funding. Warden elections are also deeply democratic in ways that, in global perspective, are unusual for such ultra-local urban offices. Over the past 25 years, elections have become hotly contested, voter turnout has risen to remarkably high rates, and KMT dominance has partially given way to political pluralization. Citizens’ participation in this setting, like others, often shows deep divisions along partisan lines, with wardens and local associations split by party loyalties. Finally, civic engagement with the neighborhood system shows an inverted class bias. Residents with less education, for example, are more likely to know their wardens and vote in warden elections. Politics in Taiwan’s li thus has evolved substantially over time, and also contrasts in multiple ways with Western images of neighborhood politics.
- Published on
The American Political Science Association includes a Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS). Paper proposals are reviewed and panels organized separately from the regular paper submission process. Anyone interested in presenting a paper on any aspect of Taiwanese politics is encouraged to submit a proposal by the deadline of December 15th. The official call for papers is below. Papers from this past year's panels can be found here and here.
The 2014 American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting will be held from August 28 - 31 in Washington DC. The conference theme is “Politics after the Digital Revolution.”
CGOTS invites paper and panel proposals on Taiwan’s domestic politics and international relations that are consistent with the conference theme of “politics after the digital revolution.” For instance, how has the evolution of Taiwan's democracy been enhanced and/or stymied by the use of the internet or social media? How are Taiwan’s democratic institutions impacted by and/or reflect the ever increasing utilization of digital communications? Do current technologies enhance or restrain the ability of majority and minority parties and social groups to engage in the democratic process? Which emerging technologies hold the prospect for empowerment or repression? Applicable to each of the above are proposals that also address cross-disciplinary and methodological approaches to questions of democracy and the information highway. We especially welcome proposals that address the contribution of Taiwan Studies to the broader political science literature, use Taiwan as a case for theory development, or compare Taiwan with other countries.
Please send proposals through the APSA website www.apsanet.org/2014. If the website is not accessible to you, you may send proposals to Professor Hans Stockton (stockton@stthom.edu), CGOTS Coordinator. The deadline for proposals is December 15, 2012. Decisions on the proposals will be communicated to you in February 2013. Travel support for CGOTS panelists is subject to the availability of external funding.
CGOTS invites paper and panel proposals on Taiwan’s domestic politics and international relations that are consistent with the conference theme of “politics after the digital revolution.” For instance, how has the evolution of Taiwan's democracy been enhanced and/or stymied by the use of the internet or social media? How are Taiwan’s democratic institutions impacted by and/or reflect the ever increasing utilization of digital communications? Do current technologies enhance or restrain the ability of majority and minority parties and social groups to engage in the democratic process? Which emerging technologies hold the prospect for empowerment or repression? Applicable to each of the above are proposals that also address cross-disciplinary and methodological approaches to questions of democracy and the information highway. We especially welcome proposals that address the contribution of Taiwan Studies to the broader political science literature, use Taiwan as a case for theory development, or compare Taiwan with other countries.
Please send proposals through the APSA website www.apsanet.org/2014. If the website is not accessible to you, you may send proposals to Professor Hans Stockton (stockton@stthom.edu), CGOTS Coordinator. The deadline for proposals is December 15, 2012. Decisions on the proposals will be communicated to you in February 2013. Travel support for CGOTS panelists is subject to the availability of external funding.
- Published on
The attempt by the KMT leadership to remove Wang Jin-pyng as speaker of the Legislative Yuan has a lot of interesting elements to it. For electoral studies geeks, though, the most fascinating might be that Wang was elected on the KMT’s proportional representation or "at-large" list (不分區) rather than from a single-member district (單一選區). As a consequence, he is especially vulnerable to purge attempts: unlike district legislators, Wang depends on his party’s support to retain his seat for this term.
A little background first: since 1995, Taiwan has had a mixed-member electoral system (混合制) with two parallel electoral tiers. Up until 2004, the larger, district-level tier consisted of between 25-30 multi-member districts (複數區), with multiple representatives elected from each district using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) (不可轉移單票制). The smaller, national-level tier consisted of a single nation-wide district in which seats were awarded to parties using closed-list proportional representation (CL-PR), based on the percentage of the vote that each party's district candidates won aggregated across all districts. A major reform* before the 2008 election halved the size of the legislature, replaced the multi-member districts with single-member ones, and introduced a separate vote for the PR tier, but retained the closed-list rule for the PR seats.
A little background first: since 1995, Taiwan has had a mixed-member electoral system (混合制) with two parallel electoral tiers. Up until 2004, the larger, district-level tier consisted of between 25-30 multi-member districts (複數區), with multiple representatives elected from each district using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) (不可轉移單票制). The smaller, national-level tier consisted of a single nation-wide district in which seats were awarded to parties using closed-list proportional representation (CL-PR), based on the percentage of the vote that each party's district candidates won aggregated across all districts. A major reform* before the 2008 election halved the size of the legislature, replaced the multi-member districts with single-member ones, and introduced a separate vote for the PR tier, but retained the closed-list rule for the PR seats.
Winning the List
The "closed" part of "closed list" PR means that the party, not voters, controls who gets these seats. It does so by submitting a ranked list of names (分配當選名單) prior to the election; when the seat totals for each party are announced, the PR seats are distributed down the list until the party's quota is met. For instance, in the 2012 legislative election, the KMT won 16 seats in the PR tier, so the top 16 candidates on its party list were awarded seats. This is how Wang Jin-pyng was most recently elected: he was ranked first on the list. (You can find the lists for this and other elections at the Central Election Commission website. The image at right was pulled from here.)
It is not hard to see that the order of names on the party list goes a long way toward determining who gets seats. The first candidate on the list is as good-as-elected once the list is submitted, unless the party fails to win any PR seats. But the 16th candidate will have to sweat out the election. And the 34th candidate has no realistic hope of winning a seat whatsoever. Thus, whoever controls the party list controls the electoral fates of all the PR legislators. Typically, party leaders determine the ranking and put themselves and their allies** at the top of the list, while incumbents who've ticked off the party leadership get left off entirely. So legislators elected from the PR tier have to toe the party line if they want to remain in office.
But that's not all. Taiwan electoral law also provides political parties another weapon to keep list legislators in line: the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act (公職人員選舉罷免法) specifies that any at-large legislator who loses his party membership will also immediately lose his seat. Hence why Wang Jin-pyng was so vulnerable to a purge by President Ma: as an at-large legislator, his seat depends on the continued tacit support of the rest of the party. Rather than wait until the run-up to the next election to deny Wang his previous position on the party list, Ma and his allies could remove him immediately by stripping him of his party membership. It is only through a rather surprising, and lucky, district court injunction that Wang has so far survived the attempt to boot him from the legislature.
The "closed" part of "closed list" PR means that the party, not voters, controls who gets these seats. It does so by submitting a ranked list of names (分配當選名單) prior to the election; when the seat totals for each party are announced, the PR seats are distributed down the list until the party's quota is met. For instance, in the 2012 legislative election, the KMT won 16 seats in the PR tier, so the top 16 candidates on its party list were awarded seats. This is how Wang Jin-pyng was most recently elected: he was ranked first on the list. (You can find the lists for this and other elections at the Central Election Commission website. The image at right was pulled from here.)
It is not hard to see that the order of names on the party list goes a long way toward determining who gets seats. The first candidate on the list is as good-as-elected once the list is submitted, unless the party fails to win any PR seats. But the 16th candidate will have to sweat out the election. And the 34th candidate has no realistic hope of winning a seat whatsoever. Thus, whoever controls the party list controls the electoral fates of all the PR legislators. Typically, party leaders determine the ranking and put themselves and their allies** at the top of the list, while incumbents who've ticked off the party leadership get left off entirely. So legislators elected from the PR tier have to toe the party line if they want to remain in office.
But that's not all. Taiwan electoral law also provides political parties another weapon to keep list legislators in line: the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act (公職人員選舉罷免法) specifies that any at-large legislator who loses his party membership will also immediately lose his seat. Hence why Wang Jin-pyng was so vulnerable to a purge by President Ma: as an at-large legislator, his seat depends on the continued tacit support of the rest of the party. Rather than wait until the run-up to the next election to deny Wang his previous position on the party list, Ma and his allies could remove him immediately by stripping him of his party membership. It is only through a rather surprising, and lucky, district court injunction that Wang has so far survived the attempt to boot him from the legislature.
Whither Wang?
It's noteworthy that Wang Jin-pyng has not always been an at-large legislator for the KMT. Until 2004, he was one of several legislators representing Kaohsiung County's First District, and a quite popular one at that. If he were still a district legislator, stripping him of his party membership would not have had the same effect; he would have retained his seat. That raises the question, why would a leading politician like Wang ever join the party list?
The answer is that it’s a sure-fire way to get into the legislature without having to win a district-level election. Campaigns for legislative district seats were notoriously fierce, and costly, under the old SNTV system, because candidates had to compete for votes not only against nominees from other parties but also with their own fellow party members. Winning a seat usually required relentless effort to differentiate oneself from everyone else and cultivate personal ties to constituents. (And, all-too-frequently, some form of vote-buying.) So when Wang first ran on the party list in 2004, when SNTV was still in place, it was undoubtedly appealing to him to leave behind the trouble of district campaigning. The switch to single-member districts in 2008 eliminated most intra-party competition, but at that point Wang was already ensconced at the top of the KMT list and had no reason to return to a district.
Now, of course, he does. My money is on him returning to his old Kaohsiung County district and running there in 2016, where he retains a base and can probably win comfortably. Whether or not he hangs on to his seat through the end of this term, I doubt we have seen the last of Speaker Wang.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[* Taiwan's history of electoral system changes is dauntingly complex, even post-martial law era. I will attempt to cover it in a future post.]
It's noteworthy that Wang Jin-pyng has not always been an at-large legislator for the KMT. Until 2004, he was one of several legislators representing Kaohsiung County's First District, and a quite popular one at that. If he were still a district legislator, stripping him of his party membership would not have had the same effect; he would have retained his seat. That raises the question, why would a leading politician like Wang ever join the party list?
The answer is that it’s a sure-fire way to get into the legislature without having to win a district-level election. Campaigns for legislative district seats were notoriously fierce, and costly, under the old SNTV system, because candidates had to compete for votes not only against nominees from other parties but also with their own fellow party members. Winning a seat usually required relentless effort to differentiate oneself from everyone else and cultivate personal ties to constituents. (And, all-too-frequently, some form of vote-buying.) So when Wang first ran on the party list in 2004, when SNTV was still in place, it was undoubtedly appealing to him to leave behind the trouble of district campaigning. The switch to single-member districts in 2008 eliminated most intra-party competition, but at that point Wang was already ensconced at the top of the KMT list and had no reason to return to a district.
Now, of course, he does. My money is on him returning to his old Kaohsiung County district and running there in 2016, where he retains a base and can probably win comfortably. Whether or not he hangs on to his seat through the end of this term, I doubt we have seen the last of Speaker Wang.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[* Taiwan's history of electoral system changes is dauntingly complex, even post-martial law era. I will attempt to cover it in a future post.]
[**I'd forgotten, it's an electoral law rule, not an intra-party rule. So all parties are required to reserve at least half their PR list seats for women.]
- Published on
Welcome! I've started a blog. In a world where people seem to be blogging about everything all the time--or Facebooking, or tweeting, or Instagramming--why do we need another? The interwebs don't exactly have a shortage of people pumping out snarky political commentary every day. So this blog will not be that. Nor will it be a re-hashing of the day's news, or funny tweets, or pictures of cats. There are plenty of those online already, too. Instead, here are the decidedly modest aims of this blog:
1. To provide a record of major political events in Taiwan. I follow Taiwanese politics pretty closely, partly because it's my job, partly because I find it really interesting, and partly because it provides regular insights into big questions in political science. But my memory is quite fallible. At various points I've found myself digging back through news archives trying to figure out when a major political event happened, why it happened, who was involved, and what the consequences were. And while there are a lot of news outlets that cover Taiwanese politics, they often don't record crucial details that I care about. So I will attempt here to provide a regular roundup of major political happenings in Taiwan: things like election outcomes, passage of important legislation, turnover in key positions within government and within the major political parties, significant demonstrations or rallies, major court decisions, and so forth.
2. To serve as a resource for Taiwan Studies. Announcements about conferences, funding competitions, diplomatic initiatives, and whatever else Taiwan-related that comes through my inbox will appear here.
3. To present a take on Taiwanese politics informed by political science. There are already a lot of online sources that provide well-informed, critical commentary on the Taiwanese political scene. No need to replicate what they do, even if I could. What I want to contribute is a different perspective, drawing on existing research and data, sometimes but not usually my own, to speak to contemporary politics in Taiwan. That will include discussion of events in other young democracies around the world--something that gets woefully little attention in Taiwan. It might also include the occasional foray into events in the People's Republic of China.
4. To think aloud. I'm extremely fortunate to be part of a vibrant intellectual community at Stanford, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). I envision this blog as a place for short posts about whatever's on my mind: reactions to campus speakers and events, to conversations in the hallway, to what I'm reading, to thoughts that bubble up on the train ride in--anything, really. Some of this will certainly be half-baked, uninformed stuff. But I hope that by posting it I can figure out what's worth thinking about more.
Finally, this is an experiment of sorts. Although I've been a regular reader of lots of good blogging work out there, I've resisted joining the online commentariat until now. Things may evolve here, and I welcome comments and suggestions that help improve the process and the product.
1. To provide a record of major political events in Taiwan. I follow Taiwanese politics pretty closely, partly because it's my job, partly because I find it really interesting, and partly because it provides regular insights into big questions in political science. But my memory is quite fallible. At various points I've found myself digging back through news archives trying to figure out when a major political event happened, why it happened, who was involved, and what the consequences were. And while there are a lot of news outlets that cover Taiwanese politics, they often don't record crucial details that I care about. So I will attempt here to provide a regular roundup of major political happenings in Taiwan: things like election outcomes, passage of important legislation, turnover in key positions within government and within the major political parties, significant demonstrations or rallies, major court decisions, and so forth.
2. To serve as a resource for Taiwan Studies. Announcements about conferences, funding competitions, diplomatic initiatives, and whatever else Taiwan-related that comes through my inbox will appear here.
3. To present a take on Taiwanese politics informed by political science. There are already a lot of online sources that provide well-informed, critical commentary on the Taiwanese political scene. No need to replicate what they do, even if I could. What I want to contribute is a different perspective, drawing on existing research and data, sometimes but not usually my own, to speak to contemporary politics in Taiwan. That will include discussion of events in other young democracies around the world--something that gets woefully little attention in Taiwan. It might also include the occasional foray into events in the People's Republic of China.
4. To think aloud. I'm extremely fortunate to be part of a vibrant intellectual community at Stanford, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). I envision this blog as a place for short posts about whatever's on my mind: reactions to campus speakers and events, to conversations in the hallway, to what I'm reading, to thoughts that bubble up on the train ride in--anything, really. Some of this will certainly be half-baked, uninformed stuff. But I hope that by posting it I can figure out what's worth thinking about more.
Finally, this is an experiment of sorts. Although I've been a regular reader of lots of good blogging work out there, I've resisted joining the online commentariat until now. Things may evolve here, and I welcome comments and suggestions that help improve the process and the product.