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One of the more creative ways to run away from the KMT's toxic brand right now: a billboard for the new Republic Party (Min-Kuo Tang, a play on the Kuo-min Tang).

We're now four months away from the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, to be held on January 16th. At this point polls start to tell us something meaningful about how the election will turn out. To my eye, there are three things that stick out:

1. Taiwanese voters care most about the economy, and they overwhelmingly evaluate it as "bad."
A Taiwan Brain Trust poll that came out yesterday reports that about 64% of respondents named economic development as the primary issue in next year's elections--far outstripping government effectiveness (about 17%) and cross-Strait relations (only about 4.5%). 

Another poll from Taiwan Indicators Survey Research ll (TISR) that came out on Monday finds that an astounding 84% of respondents evaluated the overall state of the domestic economy as "bad" ("認為國內整體經濟狀況不好“); only 8% thought it was good. 

The headline numbers in both these polls focus on support for the three major candidates--Tsai Ing-wen, Hung Hsiu-chu, and Soong Chu-yu (aka James Soong). I think they're burying the lede. Economic conditions are a powerful determinant of election outcomes: in general, incumbents get the credit when people think the economic is doing well, and they get the blame when it is not--whether or not they actually have much control over economic outcomes at all. So the fact that most Taiwanese poll respondents are emphasizing the state of the economy, and that the large majority think it is bad, bodes very poorly for the KMT. (Note that this cannot just be Pan-Green supporters expressing discontent about the economy: this is 84% of all respondents. Dissatisfaction with the economy crosses party lines.) 

These results suggest that, like in the local elections in 2014, the KMT is going to be fighting a massive headwind. Even if they had a strong candidate (ahem, Chu Li-lun?) atop the ticket, I would expect them to lose with these numbers. With Hung Hsiu-chu as the nominee, and James Soong running yet another third-party campaign that's offering an alternative to Pan-Blue voters who don't like Hung, the presidential election already looks overdetermined. The KMT is going to lose, badly. And Tsai Ing-wen, by default, is going to win. 

At this point, though, I'd be very cautious about interpreting an impending DPP victory as anything other than a rejection of the KMT. There will inevitably be people in Taiwan and in Washington, DC who will frame this outcome as a repudiation of closer cross-Strait relations with the PRC, or an endorsement of Taiwanese independence. It's time to start beating the drum that the election is not about cross-Strait relations. It's not about independence or unification. It's not really even about a new "third force" of youth activism and social progressive politics. The 2016 election is about the economy. 
  
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2. The KMT is really unpopular, but support for the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen is soft.
Dissatisfaction with the KMT is really high right now. Taiwan Brain Trust puts it at 71%, which is a significant improvement from December 2014, when the rate was 80%.

What is more surprising is that the DPP is still not very popular in absolute terms. Throughout 2015, the DPP has had higher negatives than positives in the Taiwan Brain Trust survey results. The most recent poll finds about 45% dissatisfied with the DPP, and 42% satisfied. That's actually a significant improvement as well; for polls in March, April, and June over half of respondents were dissatisfied with the DPP. The TISR results are more positive for both the DPP and KMT, probably because survey uses a "feelings thermometer" to rank the parties on a scale from 0 to 100: the DPP ranks slightly positively with a net score of 52.0, as compared to the KMT's 35.7. That's still not particularly strong given the circumstances. 

Tsai Ing-wen's polling support is also still short of 50%; TISR finds 43.6% of respondents intend to vote for her, which is a new high in recent months. Undecideds and those saying they won't vote combined are still 25% of the electorate. Taiwan Brain Trust puts it a bit higher, at 46.8%.

What this suggests to me, again, is that Tsai and the DPP are positioned to do well in 2016 mostly because they're not Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT. Given how widespread dissatisfaction with the economy is right now, they're going to win a lot of swing votes as the "lesser of two evils." 
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3. The NPP might replace the TSU in the legislature.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union has three seats in the current LY. They're the deep green alternative to the DPP, and they've been struggling to hang on ever since the electoral system change in 2008 shut them out of the legislature. They need to pass 5% in the party list vote to get seats, which they did easily in 2012, winning 8.96%. They're currently polling at less than half that: they're at about 4.1% in the Taiwan Brain Trust poll. They're being outpolled now by the New Power Party (時代力量), at 6.8%, and James Soong's People First Party at 5.6%. 

There's a real possibility that the NPP takes a lot of votes from the TSU, passing the PR threshold while the TSU doesn't, and effectively replacing it on the deep green end of the political spectrum. It's notoriously difficult to poll support for small parties, so treat these as very rough estimates. The NPP is deliberately trying to appeal to young voters, who turn out at lower rates and are less predictable in their voting patterns than older generations. For another, the NPP is actually cooperating with the DPP in its district nominations--I'm not sure how this might affect the party list vote. 

(A third reason to be wary of the Taiwan Brain Trust numbers on the small parties: Hsu Yung-ming (徐永明), a professor at Soochow University, is both the polling director for the survey and now a legislative candidate for the NPP.)

There's a real danger here for the Pan-Green camp if their voters fail to coordinate in the party list vote: the Green Party and Social Democratic Party are running a joint list that may appeal to a lot of the same young, well-educated voters that the NPP is making a play for. They're currently polling at 1.8%, according to the Taiwan Brain Trust survey. It's not hard to imagine the NPP, Green-SDP, and TSU all pulling some Pan-Green support and each getting 3-4% of the PR list vote, leaving them all with no seats, while the PFP passes the threshold and wins several seats. If the district results end up closely split, the Pan-Green camp could even be denied a majority in the LY despite a significant advantage in the overall share of the vote. 

While I don't think it's particularly likely to happen, a Pan-Green win in the popular vote that leaves a Pan-Blue majority in control of the legislature would be a serious problem for Taiwan's democracy. So one thing I'll be paying close attention to in this election is how, or whether, this coordination problem is resolved in some way before the election.
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Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) is now the official KMT nominee for president in 2016. She has a reputation as a deep-Blue partisan without a demonstrated ability to appeal to moderates. If that's true, it bodes poorly for the ruling party's chances. 

But is it true? This anonymous article at Thinking Taiwan* attempts to make that case by examining her district vote totals in elections to the Legislative Yuan, which is the most concrete data we have about her electoral appeal. (Hung was elected as a KMT member from Taipei County in 1989, 1992, 1995, 2001, and 2004, and on the KMT party list in 1998, 2008 and 2012; the actual numbers are available here, from the Election Study Center at National Cheng Chi University.) Good for the writer for actually trying to supply some hard evidence for this claim, but in truth these results tell us very little about Hung's mass appeal.

The reason is that pre-2008 LY vote returns are from multi-member districts, and all the major parties used vote equalization (配票) systems in these elections. Vote totals for Hung or any other LY candidate nominated by a party can't be taken at face value as an indication of popularity. To imply otherwise is poor analysis.

A Quick Primer on Elections under Single Non-Transferable Vote
To see why, let's take a step back and remember how parties campaigned in these districts. Until 2008, elections to the legislature were held using the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. SNTV is defined by:
  • Multi-member districts, i.e. more than one representative will be elected from a single district;
  • Voters can cast only a single ballot for only one candidate (not a party, and not multiple candidates);
  • The top M vote-getters all win a seat, where M is the number of seats in a district. 

SNTV has a lot of features that make it unloved among electoral systems geeks, which is one of the reasons it was replaced for the legislature in Taiwan. (Nevertheless, it's still used for every other lower-level council election.) The most important is that it presents two serious coordination problems for the largest political parties, which increase in difficulty with the number of seats elected from a single district:
  1. A nomination problem. Parties have to estimate prior to the election how much support they have in the district to know how many candidates to nominate. Nominate too few, and your nominees all win but with many votes to spare, and all the extras could have won you another seat. Nominate too many, and your votes will be spread too thinly, leading in the worst-case scenario to a shutout when you could have won several seats. This gets harder the less information parties have about their level of support. 
  2. A vote distribution problem. To maximize the expected number of seats they'll win, parties have to get their supporters to distribute their votes as evenly as possible across multiple nominees. This can be a real challenge if one or two candidates are much more popular and well-known. If voters cast their ballots sincerely, then popular nominees will win with thousands of votes to spare, while lesser-known candidates from the same party will be overshadowed and lose.  

How to Solve Vote Allocation Problems: Randomization vs Responsibility Zones
Political parties in Taiwan have developed a number of ways to deal with these problems so that they can maximize their seat share. The DPP's most common strategy has been to randomize the votes: the party instructs its core supporters to ignore the candidates' identities entirely and "randomly" vote for one of the DPP nominees. 
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DPP campaign poster showing the vote-randomization system for candidates in Tainan County, 2004 Legislative Yuan election.

For instance, in 2004, the DPP nominated five candidates for the legislature in Tainan County, a district with eight seats. The party then told its supporters to cast a ballot based on the last number of the voter's national ID card (see above). All five DPP candidates won; here were their vote shares:
  • (1-2) Lee Jun-yi 李俊毅: 9.28%
  • (3-4) Huang Wei-je 黃偉哲: 8.56%
  • (5-6) Yeh I-chin 葉宜津: 6.64%
  • (7-8) Cheng Kuo-chung 鄭國忠: 10.01%
  • (9-0) Hou Shui-cheng 侯水盛: 10.09%
Except for Yeh, that's what a randomization strategy will get you, if properly followed by your supporters: roughly even shares of the vote for all nominees, and they all get in. (Yeh won her seat despite not finishing in the top 8, because of the female quota rule; she bumped the 8th place candidate, the KMT's Kuo Tian-tsai (郭添財).) 

The randomization scheme is not a DPP innovation, by the way; the New Party also used this system in Taipei back when it was competitive. In general, the more ideological a party’s voters, the more appealing a randomization scheme is. 

In contrast, the KMT traditionally employed “responsibility zones” (責任區) within the larger districts: each official nominee was assigned some areas (usually groups of wards or villages) that were their exclusive zones to campaign in, and they were not supposed to appeal to voters in other areas.** The KMT also would hold back some of their so-called “iron vote” (鐵票) precincts—typically villages filled with military personnel, civil servants, and their families who could be expected to loyally support the party en masse. In the days leading up to the election, if a couple of the party’s candidates appeared to be doing worse than expected, the party strategists would at the last moment direct some of the iron vote to them to bolster their chances of winning. The responsibility zone system was used widely by the KMT in the 1980s and 90s because it worked well and gave them a systematic advantage: the party could exploit the advantages of its connections to local factions, its superior knowledge of local support levels, and its almost complete control of local ward chiefs and vote-brokers. 
You Can't Infer Candidate Appeal Solely from Election Returns under SNTV
So what do election results under this system tell us about Hung Hsiu-chu’s appeal as a candidate? Very little. Because the KMT imposed a vote distribution system in the LY elections, individual candidate vote totals are not a reliable indication of how popular the candidates are.

For instance, here’s her vote returns from the legislative election in Taipei County in 1992, by administrative area:
  • Banqiao City: 2.33%
  • Sanchong City: 0.89%
  • Zhonghe City: 4.2%
  • Yonghe City: 14.39%
  • Xinzhuang City: 1%
  • Xindian City: 4.52%
  • Shulin City: 1.01%
  • Yingge Township: 0.99%
  • Sanxia Township: 1.55%
  • Danshui Township: 2.08%
  • Xizhi City: 1.06%
  • Ruifang Township: 1.02%
  • Tucheng City: 2.78%
  • Luzhou City: 0.98%
  • Wugu Township: 0.74%
  • Taishan Township: 1.21%
  • Linkou Township: 1.14%
  • Shenkeng Township: 2.42%
  • Shiding Township: 1.31%
  • Pinglin Township: 3.95%
  • Sanzhi Township: 1.37%
  • Shimen Township: 0.91%
  • Bali Township: 0.94%
  • Pingxi Township: 1.59%
  • Shuangxi Township: 0.56%
  • Gongliao Township: 1.76%
  • Jinshan Township: 0.68%
  • Wanli Township: 2.43%
  • Wulai Township: 5.82%
Now, a couple of things about 1992: it was the first election for the full legislature, and Taipei County was a single electoral district with 16 seats--huge, by SNTV standards. This was close to a worst-case scenario for political parties trying to equalize votes: there hadn't been a previous full LY election to provide info about each party's expected support, and the district magnitude (i.e. # of seats) is really high. An effective vote distribution system is critically important for party success, and also really hard to implement here. 

These results show Hung was much stronger in some areas than others (Yonghe, Zhonghe, Xindian, Wulai, and Pinglin stand out), but they don’t show where her responsibility zones were or if she needed help from the “iron vote.”  If I had to guess, I'd say she was assigned to Yonghe and parts of the four other cities she was strongest in: they're all clustered together just south of Taipei. But we can't tell that from the returns; and they also tell us nothing about whether she over- or under-performed relative to expectations.

The one thing we can say from these figures is how the KMT itself did. The last winner in this district was Chou Po-lun (周伯倫) of the DPP, who got 2.65% of the vote. Hung got 3.04%. Of the 17 KMT candidates, not all of whom were nominated, 10 were elected, with vote shares ranging from 2.66% to 5.89%, and the KMT won 62.5% of the seats with 45.7% of the vote. From the KMT’s perspective, that was a terrific result, and Hung’s share of the vote was just about perfect: safely above the cutoff point, but not too much above that a lot of votes were wasted. That tells us that Hung, and most of the other elected KMT candidates, probably played by the party’s rules. What it does not tell us is that Hung had no mass appeal, because demonstrating that wasn't her objective in this (or any of the other) LY elections. 

If critics want to cast Hung as a deep-Blue ideologue with no ability to win votes from moderates, fine. She hasn't shown that ability, it's true. But she also has never been asked to. Her past election results tell us very little about how she'll do as the KMT candidate for president. 
* From Solidarity.tw, apparently.
**A fun aside: this is one of the best-studied topics in Taiwanese politics research. Among the prominent work on this is from the current chair of the Central Electoral Commission, Liu I-chou, who wrote his dissertation on the KMT’s responsibility zone system. Also, a big chunk of Shelley Rigger’s Politics in Taiwan, one of the best-known English-language books on Taiwanese elections, extensively covers party strategy in SNTV elections. 
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Hung Hsiu-chu is now the KMT's nominee for president in 2016. I'm surprised, to say the least. Hung is obviously not the strongest candidate the party could have run; Eric Chu was that, but he didn't want and managed to refuse the nomination for reasons that still aren't clear and probably won't be for some time yet. Wang Jin-pyng did want the nomination, but Ma Ying-jeou apparently still has the authority in the party to block Wang's nomination. I kept expecting the party leadership to patch up their differences, put on their big boy pants and draft Chu to run. Instead, here they are with Hung. 

So, the KMT, already facing a tough fight to retain power, is now a real underdog in 2016 against Tsai Ing-wen, and the DPP (and certain deep-green commentators) can barely contain their glee. Some of the hotter heads are even predicting the permanent collapse of the KMT and a slide into irrelevance. That's really far-fetched: the KMT didn't disappear after it lost power in 2000, and there's even less reason to think it'll fade away now. At this point, I think it's quite possible the KMT could retain their majority in the legislature. I even think it's not inconceivable that Hung could actually beat Tsai. (More on that in a future post.) But I won't disagree that both tasks look significantly harder now for the KMT. 

Finally, on a programming note, now that I'm finally (close to) finished with a couple major summer projects, I'm  transitioning back to more regular blogging--on the upcoming election, of course, but also on many other important things that get drowned out in the incessant commentary on the campaigns. Watch this space...
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One of the great things about this job is that I continue to find hidden connections to Taiwan around campus. For instance, there are not one but two different lecture series that honor former leaders of Taiwan's Central Bank: Stanford Library's Hsieh Memorial Lecture and the Stanford Center for International Development's Kuo Shu-liang Memorial Address. The Hoover Archives has an impressive collection of Taiwan-related materials that goes far beyond the Chiang Kai-shek diaries that everyone comes to look at. And just down the road, Stanford University Press regularly publishes good scholarship on Taiwan that places it in a comparative context. 

So it was bittersweet to read this week of the passing of Arthur P. Wolf, a professor of anthropology at Stanford. I learned from his obituary that he conducted fieldwork for many years in Taiwan--much of it focused on patterns of marriage, incest, and adoption--and that he built a unique archive of demographic data about the island's population in the early 20th century. I'm sorry I didn't know about his research or have a chance to meet him--I will have to go read his work now!

Wolf was the spouse of Hill Gates, herself a very prominent Stanford anthropologist and author of a landmark book on Taiwanese society, The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society. 
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In what is becoming an annual tradition, our program is hosting a videoconference with President Ma Ying-jeou tomorrow, June 2nd, 2015. This year we'll be live, with a panel of Stanford faculty and fellows to engage with President Ma via the video link. We'll be joined by the Taiwanese ambassador, Shen Lyu-shun, and a delegation from Washington D.C. The speech and the following Q&A will be broadcast at several other locations around the country as well. Details and the link to the official event page are below. 

杯弓蛇影. A short note on the timing of this event: I've seen claims in the Taiwanese media and heard privately of suspicions that President Ma's speech at Stanford was planned to coincide with Tsai Ing-wen's trip to the United States, perhaps as a way to overshadow her visit. I understand that it is tempting to see some kind of nefarious influence at work in the timing here. But the real reason is a lot more mundane: June 2nd was when we could get a conference room large and tech'ed-up enough for this event, and that still worked for all the participants. The date was set long before Dr. Tsai's itinerary was finalized and publicly announced, and it certainly wasn't pre-determined in Taipei. Given the conspiracy theory fever that grips much political reporting in Taiwan, it was probably inevitable that somebody would conclude otherwise. But in this case, they're just wrong.
On June 2, the Taiwan Democracy Project will host a special panel session featuring the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Ma Ying-jeou. President Ma will speak via live video feed to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and the long history of the U.S.-R.O.C. relationship, and to comment on his just-announced South China Sea Peace Initiative. Following his prepared remarks, the president will engage in a question-and-answer session with the audience and a distinguished panel of leading Stanford faculty and fellows, chaired and moderated by the former Secretary of Defense of the United States, William J. Perry. The live panel will take place in the Bechtel Conference Room of the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, in Encina Hall, 616 Serra Street, from 5:45-7:00pm. An informal reception in the lobby of Encina Hall will follow.


This event is co-sponsored with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, San Francisco; and the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan). It is free and open to the public. RSVP is required at the event page, here. 
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Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now accepting applications for the Taiwan Fellowship, awarded to scholars to conduct research at Taiwanese academic institutions for 3 to 12 months in 2016 in areas related to Taiwan studies, Cross-Strait relations studies, Asia-Pacific studies, or the Trans-Pacific Partnership and economic integration. The fellowship is open to foreign (non-Republic of China) nationals holding academic positions at the full, associate, or assistant professor level, post-doctoral researchers, doctoral candidates, or doctoral program students, or research fellows at the equivalent level in academic institutions abroad. 

The Taiwan Fellowship provides funding for one round-trip airfare and a monthly stipend of up to NT $60,000 (about US $2000). Applications are now open and will be accepted from May 1 to June 30, 2015. Details about how to apply are at the main website, here.
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I'm speaking on trends in Taiwan's defense spending on May 19th as part of the Taiwan Democracy Project Speaker Series. The official event page is here. The talk is motivated by the trends in the figures above: Taiwan's defense spending has dropped as China's has risen. To IR theorists, that should look weird. To policy wonks, it should be alarming. In the talk I will try to explain why it's happened.
Why Taiwan's Defense Spending Has Declined as China's Has Risen
Over the past 20 years, the military balance between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan has rapidly shifted. As China’s defense budget has grown annually at double-digit rates, Taiwan’s has shrunk. These trends are puzzling, because China’s rise as a military power poses a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. Existing theories suggest that states will choose one of three strategies when faced with an external threat: bargaining, arming, or allying. Yet for most of this period, Taiwan’s leaders have done none of these things. In this talk, I explain this apparent paradox as a consequence of Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Democracy has worked in three distinct ways to constrain rises in defense spending: by intensifying popular demands for non-defense spending, introducing additional veto players into the political system, and increasing the incentives of political elites to shift Taiwan’s security burden onto its primary ally, the United States. Together, these domestic political factors have driven a net decline in defense spending despite the rising threat posed by China’s rapid military modernization program. Put simply, in Taiwan the democratization effect has swamped the external threat effect. 
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Doing some catching up here...on April 19th we hosted Julia Huang for a talk on the Buddhist charity organization Tzu-chi (慈濟). Dr. Huang is currently a visiting scholar at the Ho Center for Buddhist Studies at Stanford University, and a Professor of Anthropology at National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan.

She has published articles in the Journal of Asian Studies, Ethnology, Positions, Nova Religio, the Eastern Buddhist, and the European Journal for East Asian Studies. Her book, Charisma and Compassion: Cheng Yen and the Buddhist Tzu Chi Movement (Harvard University Press, 2009) is an ethnography of a lay Buddhist movement that began as a tiny group in Taiwan and grew into an organization with ten million members worldwide. Huang has recently completed a book manuscript, The Social Life of Goodness: Religious Philanthropy in Chinese Societies (with Robert P. Weller and Keping Wu). She is currently working on a project on the Buddhist influences on cadaver donations for medical education in Taiwan.
The End(s) of Compassion?: Buddhist Charity and the State in Taiwan
The Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi (Ciji) Foundation from Taiwan is perhaps one of the largest Buddhist charities in the Chinese world today. This talk traces how Tzu Chi developed under the “regime of civility” in Taiwan. The same regime also contributed to the recent controversies between Tzu Chi and the Aborigines. I argue that the tension between the Buddhist non-governmental organization and the Christian Aborigines has to do with the inequality under the regime of civility: on the one hand, the Aborigines have been marginalized as the “subject” of the civility campaign by the state; and, on the other hand, the same regime of civility is what allows the Buddhist charity to thrive in civil society. This talk raises the question whether civility could turn against civil society.
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On March 9, the Taiwan Democracy Project hosted Lu-huei Chen, research professor and former director of the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, Taipei. His talk was entitled "Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations." The official event page is here.

Professor Chen is Distinguished Research Fellow at the Election Study Center and Professor of Political Science at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.  He is currently a visiting scholar of Top University Strategic Alliance (TUSA) at MIT. Professor Chen received his Ph. D. in political science from Michigan State University. His research focuses on political behavior, political socialization, research methods, and cross-Strait relations.  He has published articles in Issues and Studies, Journal of Electoral Studies (in Chinese), Social Science Quarterly, and Taiwan Political Science Review (in Chinese). He is the editor of Continuity and Change in Taiwan's 2012 Presidential and Legislative Election (in Chinese, 2013), Public Opinion Polls (in Chinese, 2013), and co-edited The 2008 Presidential Election: A Critical Election on Second Turnover (in Chinese, with Chi Huang and Ching-hsin Yu, 2009).
Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations

Cross-Strait relations play an important role in electoral politics in Taiwan. Increasing economic exchange together with warming political engagements make today’s cross-Strait relations a very unique case in the study of public opinion in Taiwan. Because of the economic prosperity of China, people in Taiwan might consider the expansion of trade and other forms of cross-Strait exchanges beneficial to the prosperity of Taiwan. However, growing trade ties also mean that Taiwan’s economic reliance on the mainland increases day by day, and it could eventually result in political unification—an outcome that the majority of people in Taiwan do not want. The long-standing antagonism across the Strait, especially visible in their different governing systems and ideological attitudes, has produced something close to two separate countries and contrasting national identities.  Dr. Chen was former Director of Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in Taiwan, and he will present long-term polling tracks to demonstrate how cross-Strait relations have affected electoral politics in Taiwan.
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I pass along this call for papers to the AACS annual conference, set for October 9-11, 2015, in Houston, Texas. Despite the name, this conference has a strong Taiwan focus--roughly 1/3 of all panels feature  Taiwan in some way, making it one of the larger annual gatherings in the United States for people working in Taiwan Studies. Last year's program is here.  Details for how to submit a paper are below.
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The American Association for Chinese Studies (AACS) annual conference program committee invites proposals for panels, roundtables, and papers concerning China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora for the 57th Annual Conference, hosted by the University of St. Thomas (Houston, TX) at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Houston, TX on October 9-11, 2015. The AACS seeks to construct a balanced program, including panels representing the humanities, social sciences, communication studies, education, and business-related disciplines.

The AACS is an interdisciplinary association devoted to the study of China broadly defined (http://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/homepage.htm). Submissions from all disciplines are welcome. Membership in AACS is required for participation in the annual conference, and non-members are welcome to submit proposals, join the Association and participate in the annual conference. We encourage submissions from graduate students, junior and senior scholars, and overseas participants.

The program committee prefers proposals for complete panels (a chair, 2-3 papers, and a discussant) and roundtables (a chair and 3-4 other participants). The committee also welcomes proposals for individual papers and will attempt to place them on appropriate panels. Panels and roundtables concerning special events or topics of broad significance are welcome.

The program committee consists of Hans Stockton (University of St. Thomas), Chiung-Fang Chang (Lamar University), and June Teufel Dreyer (University of Miami). Proposals should include the names and roles of panel/roundtable participants, contact information, paper topics and short abstracts (not to exceed 250 words). Please send your proposal by e-mail to the program chair, Hans Stockton, at stockton@stthom.edu. Include complete contact information (address, telephone number, and e-mail) for all participants. The deadline for panel proposals is April 1, 2014, and the deadline for paper proposals is May 1, 2014. Scholars submitting proposals by the deadline will be notified of their inclusion in the program by May 30, 2014.


The AACS views panelist registration and attendance as a serious professional obligation.  Panelists must register for the AACS 2015 conference before September 21, 2015 or be excluded from the printed program.  


If you have any questions about the AACS, please send them to us at aacs@mail.com.  

About Me

I am a political scientist with research interests in democratization, elections and election management, parties and party system development, one-party dominance, and the links between domestic politics and external security issues. My regional expertise is in East Asia, with special focus on Taiwan.

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